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ABSTRACT
What is the role of planners in the planning process for new transit modes? By
documenting transit-planning processes in Curitiba and Bogota from 1955-95 and
1986-2001, respectively, this work demonstrates that in both cities planners had
important roles in system design, the inventive adaptation of new technologies to local
conditions, the integration of newly proposed systems with existing service and,
above all, mediation between political leadership and strong vested interests. Both
cities put planners' roles in special context, however. First, the mayors had a firm
appreciation of planning services and understood that planners needed to interact
with stakeholders and politicians. Second, the mayors were strong leaders who
offered planners a benchmark from which to understand the implications of
stakeholders' demands. Third, these cases were framed by new technologies such as
Bus Rapid Transit, which competed against rail alternatives. Fourth, because of the
novelty of BRT planners had difficulty producing credible forecasts. This uncertainty
forced planners to interact more with stakeholders and politicians to build credibility.
Fifth, BRT offered the advantage of being highly flexible, particularly when compared
to rail proposals. This flexibility allowed planners to adjust the plans in response to the
feedback produced by the interaction with stakeholders and politicians. Adjusting the
plans often forced planners to innovate.
Within this context, planners' main role was to interact with politicians and
stakeholders. The interaction was above all a source of feedback for all parties
involved. Planners used this feedback, first, to mediate between politicians and
stakeholders by reducing power differentials. If either actor were too powerful the
planning process could not advance. Second, planners developed incremental
adaptations to the original plan in light of the political reality unveiled by the
interaction. The gradual adjustments to the original plan lowered risk for all parties.
The adaptations and the reduced risk helped assemble coalitions of support. Planning
teams with high levels of political capacity were able to interact with politicians and
stakeholders. Planning teams also needed a high level of technical capacity to
prevent stakeholders from capturing/co-opting the planning team.
Thesis Supervisor: Ralph Gakenheimer
Title: Professor of Urban Planning
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Part 1
Introduction
What roles do planners play in the planning process? If politicians and stakeholders
also participate in the planning process, what effect do planners have on the path of
decision and the shape of the plan? While there is an extensive body of literature on
what planners do and on the politics of planning, there are few examples that have
taken a look at planners' roles from a process perspective. I seek to answer these
questions by studying in detail transit planning processes in the cities of Curitiba and
Bogota in the periods 1955-95 and 1986-2001, respectively.
Chapter 1
Introduction
The City of Curitiba is recognized internationally for having successfully implemented
a comprehensive urban plan between 1971 and 1983. The plan emphasized bus
rapid transit to guide urban development. As a result, the downtown of Curitiba grew
along a series or corridors instead of spreading in all directions. Mass transit planning
and land use, therefore, reinforced one another. In the early 1990s Curitiba innovated
again by introducing "tube" stations and bi-articulated buses in its bus rapid transit
system-known as the Integrated Transit Network (RIT1). Since then passengers pay
upon entering the station and board at the same height as the bus' floor. The stations
allow buses to maneuver quickly and hence save time to the riders. RIT moves 1.9
million trips on an average day.2 The RIT technology system parallels in efficiency a
light rail system.
1 use the Portuguese acronym and not ITN the acronym in English that authors like Cervero (1998)
use. RIT is the acronym for Rede Integrada de Transporte.
2 Meakin (2002, p. 23).
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The achievements of Curitiba, a medium city, seemed difficult to replicate. Yet
between 1998 and the time of this writing, the city of Bogota managed to adapt the
main aspects of the RIT to its local conditions. The result is TransMilenio, a bus rapid
transit (BRT) system able to move as many passengers as most metros in the world.
With only 41 kilometers of network, TransMilenio's buses transport 790,000
passengers per day. The Washington D.C. subway with a 164-km network 3 moves
650,000 passengers per day.4 Bogota also adopted other innovative policies in
transportation, such as favoring non-motorized transport and curbing car use.5 /6 As a
result, Bogota has also achieved international recognition.
Both cities are considered therefore showcase examples around the world of
how urban and transportation planning can change cities for the better. Despite the
praise for being cases where planning led to positive change, little is known about the
actual roles that planners played in the planning processes. For example, a common
belief is that in Curitiba a planner-turned-politician, Jaime Lerner, used his leadership
abilities to get policies adopted "founded on a high level of technical and professional
competence in the planning function."7 Further, Pulichino concluded that Jaime Lerner
as mayor of Curitiba took advantage of the Brazilian dictatorship to impose his policy
innovations on the city.8 For the Bogota case, similarly, analysts argue that Enrique
Peialosa's leadership and a "carrot and stick" formula allowed him as mayor to
implement the bus rapid transit system he had envisioned in the mid 1980s.9 Finally,
Wright analyzed the cases of Bogota and Curitiba, among others, to conclude,
"political will is by far the most important ingredient in making BRT work." 10
3 Peialosa (2003, p. 97-8).
4 Ridership on the Washington D.C. metro in the month of June 2004 exceeded 700,000 passengers
per weekday. The figure of 650,000 is the average for the fiscal year 2003-4. See "June Metrorail
Ridership shatters records,"
http://www.wmata.com/about/MET NEWS/PressReleaseDetail.cfm?ReleaselD=443, July 2, 2004.
5 See Ardila and Menckhoff (2002).
6 It is too early to judge whether Bogota can also emulate the transportation-land use integration that
Curitiba has achieved.
7 World Bank (2002, p. xxi).
8 Pulichino (2003, p. 27).
9 Echeverry, Ibafiez, and Mel6ndez (2004, p. 22-25 and 30-33).
'
0 Wright (2002b, p. 3).
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These visions of the planning processes in Curitiba and Bogota certainly
capture the role politicians and their leadership played. But they seem to leave little
role for planners beyond, probably, supplying technical information.11 The processes
in these two cities, however, were clearly complex, involved many actors and had
many controversies. Yet the stories are reduced to "strong leadership," " political will,"
and "capable planners." What roles did planners play in the planning processes in
Curitiba and Bogota? If politicians and stakeholders participated in the processes,
what effect did planners have on the decisions made and on the final shape of the
plans?
In this dissertation I look in detail12 at the planning processes in Curitiba (1955-
1995) and Bogota (1986-2001). By comparing the two cases and focusing on their
commonalities,13 1 intend to build a single representation of the roles planners play in
the planning process. This dissertation, however, is not about explaining why Curitiba
and Bogota are considered successful examples of urban and transportation
planning. Neither is this research about why the different plans in each city were
adopted. In effect, the decision to adopt a plan is just a marker in my analysis and not
the object. My research is about documenting and interpreting the roles that planners
play in actual planning processes-without ignoring the important actions by
politicians and stakeholders.
The planning process and the role of planners
A common role assigned to planners is to provide technical information to decision-
makers.14 Other analysts have concluded that planners' roles include "technician,
advisor, intelligence agent, communicator, process feedback assessor, responsible
agent, advocate, educator, coordinator, specialist, researcher, and broker."15 To reach
these conclusions, analysts of planners' work have for the most part taken the planner
11 See Meyer and Miller (2001) who specifically limit the roles of planners in the planning process to
supplying technical and objective information.
12 Peattie (1995, p. 394) argues that this type of case study can be called "dense" case study.
13 See Ragin (1994, ch. 4) for a description of the use of qualitative methods to study commonalities in
social research.
14 See Meyer (2000, p. 41); Meyer and Miller (2001, p. 41); and Gakenheimer (1995, p. 460).
15 Stevens (2001, p. 11).
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as the unit of analysis.1 6 While these results are valid, this approach is incomplete in
at least two ways.
First, by taking the planner as the unit of analysis, authors tend to ignore
politicians and probably other participants in the process as well. Baum argues that:
"[Planning] theories offer a magical escape from troubling work conditions by
suggesting that planning "really" is not political. Rational planning theories do this by
denying politics altogether. Communicative theories that portray the planner as an
unemotional cognitive reasoner imply that planners can get by, even prevail, just by
thinking and speaking or writing clearly. [...] Still, the ambiguous juxtaposition of the
emphasis on the planner's cognitive activities with the description of a tempestuous
world of political power requires resolution. If cognitive reasoning is enough for
planners to prevail, then perhaps politicians are not "really" a part of planning and do
not have to be taken seriously. Such an unrealistic conclusion may serve a magical
purpose. By suggesting there are no powerful politicians in the planning world,
theorists take revenge on them, mentally eradicating them and telling planners, as
well, to give politicians no mind."17
Second, by focusing on the planner as the unit of analysis, authors tend to
ignore the planning process as such. Or rather, these authors assume implicitly a
model of the planning process that follows this "rational" sequence: analyze problem,
design alternatives, evaluate, make decision, implement, obtain feedback.18 Indeed,
some notion of "rationality" continues to influence the thought of urban planners,
transportation planners, economists, and policy analysts, among others.19 Willson, for
example, says: "Instrumental rationality has been the traditional espoused paradigm
of transportation planning."20 Brooks adds: "Ask a professional planner to describe
how he or she carries out the planning process, and the odds are good that you will
hear some version of the rational model."21 The problem is that few of these models of
16 Dalton (1989, p. 36); and Fischler (2000, p. 185).
17 Baum (1996, p. 377).
18 See Meyer and Miller (2001, ch. 2); Brooks (2002, chs. 10-11); Willson (2001); Dickey et al. (1983,
esp. ch. 2); Kane and del Mistro (2003); Gakenheimer (1995); Johnson (1997, ch. 1); Dimitriou (1995,
ch. 5); and Pas (1986).
'9 For urban planners see Brooks (2002, ch. 6); Healey (2003); Bayne (1995); Yiftachel (2001); Peattie
(2001); Flyvbjerg (1998); for transportation planners see Altshuler (1981); Meyer and Miller (2001, ch.
2); Edwards and Mackett (1996); Gardner (1998); Willson (2001 and 2003); Kane and del Mistro
(2003); and Langmyhr (2001); for economists see Grindle (1991); March (1996; ch 1); and Allison and
Zelikow (1999, ch. 1); for policy analysts see Heineman et al. (2002, esp. ch. 2); for political science
see Altshuler and Luberoff (2003, ch. 3); and Grindle and Thomas (1991, ch. 1).
20 Willson (2003, p. 354). See also Langmyhr (2001).
21 Further, Brooks (2002, p. 81) adds: "Ironically, planning schools often display a split personality on
this matter-trashing rationality in the planning theory class, while continuing to teach it in all its glory in
the methods and studio classes. Much like the creatures in horror movies, rationality is dead-but
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the planning process have been tested to determine the extent to which they can
describe actual processes. In fact, many authors recognize the models are merely
normative.22 My analysis of the cases below, moreover, suggests that the actual
processes did not seem to follow this sequence so ingrained in planning literature.
Indeed, if one compares the normative models of the planning process with the
empirically based models of the policy making process one finds strong
discrepancies. This result is odd bearing in mind that plan and policy can be
considered synonyms.23 The models of the planning process24 tend to ignore, among
others, the following aspects that the models of the policy process highlight.25 First is
the importance of time. The models of the planning process seem to assume that the
normative version of the planning process can start almost at any point in time. The
models of the policy process, on the contrary, argue that certain events happen only
during specific junctures in time.26 Second, the models of the planning process ignore
the leadership role that planners might have to play in the form of policy
entrepreneurs or policy brokers to get their plans adopted.27 Third, the models of the
planning process tend to ignore the role of political aspects such as elections and the
need to have coalitions of support.2 8
Therefore, authors who focus on individual planner's actions and ignore the
actual planning process overlook the dynamic context in which planners work. The
roles that emerge from those analyses do not necessarily fit the demands of an actual
planning process. For example, do planners have to play the same roles-advisor,
communicator, mediator, etc.-in each stage of the planning process? Or, do
keeps showing up in public places. Despite its purported flaws, rationality is still the dominant paradigm
in planning practice, and therefore continues to deserve careful scrutiny." Urban planners are not alone
in following this model of the planning process.
22 Pas (1986, p. 49); Meyer and Miller (2001, ch. 2); and Meyer (2000, p. 41).
23 In this research I treat plan and policy as synonyms. I do not distinguish between policy making
process and planning process.
For models of the planning process see Meyer and Miller (2001, ch. 2); Brooks (2002, chs. 10-11);
Willson (2001); Dickey et al. (1983, esp. ch. 2); Kane and del Mistro (2003); Gakenheimer (1995);
Johnson (1997, ch. 1); Dimitriou (1995, ch. 5); and Pas (1986).
25 For models of the policy process see Kingdon (1995); Sabatier (1999, 1999a, and 1999b); Sabatier
and Jenkins-Smith (1999); and Orstrom (1999).
26 See Kingdon (1995, esp. ch. 8).
27 See Kingdon (1995, p. 127-131, 179-183 and 204-205); Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999); and
Altshuler and Luberoff (2003, esp. p. 224-227).
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planners' roles change over time? How do these roles for planners help them take a
plan to the decision stage? How do planners' roles affect the final shape of a plan that
was adopted? How do planners' roles change when planners want to oppose
someone else's plan? Do some planners need to be leaders or project champions to
see the plans they crafted adopted? These are questions that are left unanswered
because the current tendency "is to generalize about planning as a procedural field of
activity, somehow removed from the messy political and economic realities of urban
and regional development."29
Another set of authors has analyzed the planning process to explore how
participants in the process arrived at decisions. The main conclusion is that decisions
are political and not technical, 30 as it should be in any democratic and accountable
setting. Altshuler, for example, claims that: "...the political system (of the US) as a
whole seems to strive for inclusiveness and broad support, rather than theoretical
consistency or elegance."31 For Altshuler the system "seeks politically to blur the
tensions and technically to find ingenious new means of reconciling the objectives."32
Hence, the implicit role of planners in this political system is to find solutions that are
politically viable. Further, Feldman and Milch argue that technical arguments seem to
play a secondary role, one where they justify rather than shape the political decision
process.3 3 Some of these authors have found planners' role limited by political
naivete34 or by planners' belief that they need goals to be effective in the planning
process. Yet setting goals in a democratic society is difficult if not impossible.35
28 See Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999); and Altshuler and Luberoff (2003, esp. p. 237-8, 284-6).
29 Yiftachel and Huxley (2000, p. 908).
30 See Altshuler (1981); Altshuler and Luberoff (2003); Luberoff and Altshuler (1996); Davis (1985,
1991, 1994a); Gakenheimer (1976 and 1985); Edwards and Mackett (1996); Flyvbjerg (1998); Feldman
and Milch (1982); Gifford (1984 and 1994); Logsdon (1986); Richardson and Jensen (2000); Acevedo
et al. (1993); Richmond (1991, 1998, and 2001); Taylor (1993, 1995, 2000); Lupo, Concord, and
Fowler (1971); Baumbach and Borah (1981); Wachs (1985 and 1995); and Vigar (2002), among
others.
31 Altshuler (1981, p. 11).
32 Altshuler (1981, p. 13).
33 Feldman and Milch (1982, p. 70). For a comprehensive view of the politics of forecasting see
Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl, (2002).
34 Altshuler (1965, p. 392).
35 Altshuler (1965, ch. 5, esp. p. 303); and Lupo, Concord and Fowler (1971, p. 200-2 and 211-212);
For planners' remedies to the problem of setting goals see Brooks (2002, p. 145-153); and Innes
(1996, p. 462-3), among others.
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Finally, this literature also addresses other political issues in the planning process
such as the need to form a broad coalition of support,3 6 minimize opposition, and
reduce the plan's negative impacts.37
Planners can certainly extract valuable lessons from this ample body of
literature. But planners need not easily connect these conclusions with their expected
roles such as advisor, communicator, or mediator. First, if the implicit role for planners
is to craft plans that are politically feasible, how do planners achieve this objective?
Do politicians determine what is politically feasible and instruct planners to validate
those decisions with technical arguments? Or, do planners play a role in figuring what
is politically feasible? If so, how do planners discover what is politically feasible?
Second, if goals are needed for an effective planning practice, how does actual goal
setting take place and how are planners' actions affected by the way goals were set?
Third, do planners' actions influence the formation of coalitions and the mitigation of
negative impacts? Finally, while this body of literature clearly shows that politics and
power relations affect planning,38 it says little about a possible two-way relationship or
interaction3 9 that might exist between planners, on the one hand, and politicians and
stakeholders, on the other. Actions by planners can trigger a reaction by politicians
and stakeholders, which in turn requires planners' actions thus generating a sequence
of interaction.
In sum, I argue that there is not sufficient understanding of the roles that
planners-or technical practitioners for that matter-play in actual planning
processes. The lack of better understanding of the roles of planners in the planning
process can have several negative consequences. First, authors lacking a better
understanding of their role in the process can call for an apolitical planning practice
that limits democratic participation-a rather unproductive strategy in light of the
36 Davis' 1985 and 1991 pieces are particularly relevant because her case is a developing country, with
a limited democracy. She analyzed the 1965 decision to undertake the Mexico City Subway (Metro).
37 An illustrative example is Luberoff and Altshuler (1996).
38 See Forester (1989 and 1999); Hoch (1994); and Benveniste (1989), among others, for how the
planning field has accepted this reality.
In this research I distinguish between relation and interaction. According to the Oxford Desk
Dictionary and Thesaurus, relation is what one person of thing has to do with another. Interaction, on
the other hand, is to reciprocally act on each other.
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democratizing trend worldwide.40 /41 I call these authors the "rationalists." Ison, for
example, analyzed why congestion pricing could not be adopted in the city of
Cambridge (England) and found several lessons for the practice of transportation
planning. One of them is that congestion pricing "has to be undertaken on a regional
or subregional basis and possibly by central rather than local government as a means
of taking it out of the local political arena."42 Given the impact of congestion pricing on
people's lives it is surprising that the solution advocated by Ison be to exclude local
actors from the decision.
Turochy, in turn, argues in favor of developing stronger technical tools-
nothing objectionable up to here-but in order to minimize the impact of politics on the
planning process. Specifically, "Such a rational approach would clarify and quantify
the merits of proposed projects, provide more information to decision makers in the
project programming process, and downplay the impact of political power in project
selection and prioritization."43 Finally, many authors in this group frequently conclude
that "strong leadership" and "political will" explain outcomes, without allowing much
room for other possible explanatory variables. When analysts resort to "strong
leadership" and "political will" to explain outcomes, they only fuel the argument that
the solution is to have "apolitical" processes with little participation of other actors
beyond the strong leader-and a few "enlightened" planners! 44
40 For evidence on the democratic trend in cities in the U.S. see Altshuler and Luberoff (2003). For
capital cities in Latin America see Myers and Dietz (2002).
41 These calls can be framed under the umbrella of a desire to return to a "rational" planning process in
the hope that planners will have a higher influence. Feldman and Milch (1982) analyzed the planning
process for eight international airports in five developed countries. They found that in most cases the
planners and decision-makers tried to follow the rational planning process. In the three airports where
the "rational" approach to decision making was followed more closely, there was a sufficiently powerful
organization that could curtail participation by many actors. This was what allowed implementation to
proceed. However, they argue that these were the cases that can be considered a failure, because the
demand forecasts that justified construction did not materialize. In the other five cases, broader
participation by other political stakeholders made the application of the rational model of decision
making impossible. Interestingly, Feldman and Milch argue that it was the input into the decision
making process by these actors that contributed to halting implementation. This, however, prevented
these cities from incurring in a similar failure as the cities that did implement the projects.
42 Ison (1998, p. 145).
4 3 Turochy (2001, p. 123). For similar examples see also Chu and Polzin (2000 and 1998); May,
Shepherd and Timms (2000); Black (1990); and Johnston et al. (1988), among others.
44 A second reaction in the transportation-planning field opposes advocating less democracy to achieve
a more democratic process. See Willson (2001 and 2003) and Langmyhr (2001). These authors use
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Second, if the actual roles of planners in the planning process were understood
better then the prescribed roles by planning theorists would have a larger impact
among the community of practitioners. While planning theorists' agenda is
professionally worthy, it seems to offer a precarious foundation for the understanding
of actual phenomena.45 As a result, some authors argue that planning theory has had
little impact on practitioners because of this gap between the normative statements by
planning theorists and what practitioners experience.4 6 Further, many of the
recommendations by these authors on how to practice planning are not contingent
only on planners' willingness to practice planning as recommended. For that reason,
these authors also recommend amendments to laws and regulations.47 These
amendments would allow their preferred way of practicing planning to flourish. But
these authors do not say what planners should do to get those amendments enacted.
Planners are only one actor among many48 in a complex political and technical
process-the planning process.49 How can planners change the world to practice
these normative ideals? Flyvbjerg concludes: "This, in my analysis, is the quandary of
normative idealists, including the majority of planning theorists: they know where they
would like to go but not how to get there."50
Third, practitioners can follow the advice of the "rationalists" and try to carry out
apolitical planning processes. This action can lead to the de-legitimization of the
planning function. Apolitical planning can de-legitimize the planning function because
interested parties can feel that while the plans affect their interests they have no
opportunity for voicing their concerns and affecting the plans. Even in highly restricted
political environments under authoritarian rulers, this type of planning will lead at a
ideas emerging from communicative rationality and consensus building to advocate more participation
and more democratic planning processes.
45 Yiftachel (2001, p. 252); see also Flyvbjerg (2001; p. 108-9).
46 See Brooks (2002, p. 25-8); Sanyal (2002, p. 120); Scott and Fainstein (2003, p. 12); and Yiftachel
and Huxley (2000, p. 909).
47 See Innes and Gruber (2001, p. 25); and Forester (1989, p. 61).
48 See Sabatier (1999); Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999); Kingdon (1995); and Zahariadis (1995) for
examples of how planners are just another actor in the planning process.
49 For an example see Innes and Gruber (2001, p. 25) who conclude that to further the applicability of
collaborative planning three major policy changes are needed. The authors, however, do not explain
how to enact any of these changes.
50 Flyvbjerg (1996, p. 384).
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minimum to resentment among the citizenry and eventually to the planning function
being considered illegitimate. Most probably a political reaction will develop against
this approach.51 Indeed, as Booth and Richardson say in this regard: "The democratic
deficit which has characterized strategic transport planning for many years has not yet
been repaired," and they claim this challenges the overall legitimacy of planning.52
Fourth, the lack of adequate understanding of the roles of planners in actual
processes can lead to "frustrated" planners who do not see the opportunities a
planning process offers them for advancing a plan they support. Instead, planners can
regard how their plans change as a result of "politics" as something negative that can
lead even to withdrawal from the profession.53 Brooks aptly summarizes this situation
by saying: "While the political nature of planning is indeed widely recognized today,
many planners continue to display ambivalence on this matter. Acceptance is one
thing; acting upon that acceptance is quite another. Too often planners are ill-
prepared to act upon the political content of their work; they may lack understanding
of the political system (ignorance), or lack knowledge of the techniques needed to
function effectively within it (inadequate education), or feel overwhelmed by political
forces (despair), or even reject the notion that they-in their particular roles-are
subject to the play of political power (denial)."54
Despite this lack of understanding of the actual roles that planners play in the
planning process, societies do actually manage to get plans and projects adopted.
Who could imagine a few years ago that London, a mega city with a democratic
government, would impose a charge on cars entering its downtown? This charge was
achieved, moreover, in a peaceful way, without the need to abolish basic liberties or
reduce political space.55 The academic field, therefore, seems to be lagging behind
51 See Scott (1999) for how rather authoritarian approaches to "rational" plan and policy making have
ended up in failed policies and in less legitimate governments. See also Peattie (1987); and Davis
(1985 and 1994).
2Booth and Richardson (2001, p. 141-142, quote from p. 144).
53 See Brooks (2002, ch. 1).
54 Brooks (2002, p. 16).
55 See Sarah Lyall (2003a and 2003b); and "First days show positive results for congestion charging in
London" www.polis-online.orq.
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the practitioners for it does not seem to fully understand the roles that planners play in
the planning process and in the decisions made in it.56
We therefore need research that takes the planning process as the unit of
analysis and that without ignoring politicians and stakeholders, analyses the roles that
planners play in the process. This approach will allow us to understand how planners'
professional work contributes to shaping a plan and to get the plan adopted or
rejected. I follow this approach in my dissertation.5 7 I therefore concur with Flyvbjerg
when he argues, "Research should focus on 'what is actually done,' towards verita
effectuale. In this way, we may gain a better grasp-less idealistic, more grounded-
of what planning is and what the strategies and tactics are that may help change it for
the better."58
A new framework
In the previous section I identified several limitations in the literature. First, planning
theory uses as unit of analysis the planner and not the planning process. Second, the
models of the planning process are not empirically grounded. Third, the literature on
the politics of planning is not specific about the roles played by planners. These
bodies of literature seem therefore inadequate for building a framework. I need a new
framework of analysis that recognizes conclusions already in the literature such as
that politics and power matter in the planning process. Further, I need a framework
that involves some notion of process.
A simple model of a city government would assume a city government consists
of elected and appointed politicians, and planners (also known as bureaucrats or
technocrats).59 In theory, the city government is interested in enacting policies that
satisfy legitimate and collective goals and not just the preferences of particular
56 See Wachs (1985); and Gakenheimer (1985).
57 See Gulyani (2001, p. 16-18) for a similar argument. Gulyani changed her unit of analysis from the
firm to the firm and its supply chain.
58 Flyvbjerg (1996, p. 391-93).
59 I follow Ellis (1992) in that the state or government is not a coherent organism with clearly defined
preferences. Instead, one has look at the preferences of politicians and bureaucrats to understand the
government's positions.
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individuals such as politicians, planners, or stakeholders.60 If policies and plans follow
the preferences of a particular stakeholder, then most likely the plan will
disproportionately benefit that stakeholder at the expense of other actors in society.
Likewise, if the plan follows the preferences of particular politicians or planners there
is no assurance that once adopted the plan will benefit collective and legitimate goals.
For one thing, what is a legitimate goal for politicians or planners need not be a
legitimate goal for stakeholders or even society at-large. For another, plans that follow
politicians' or planners' goals need not have a relatively fair distribution of costs and
benefits. For example, benefits can be concentrated in politicians' favorite
stakeholders.
Therefore, for government plans to reflect collective goals many stakeholders
should participate in the planning process and no participant-planner, politician, or
stakeholder-should have excess influence. By collective goals I do not necessarily
mean an outcome that is Pareto optimal-i.e. some actors are better off and no one is
worse off. Pareto optimality is probably difficult to achieve when it comes to planning
and public policy. Instead, I mean two things by plans that satisfy collective and
legitimate goals. First, government plans do not reflect the individual preferences of
planners, politicians, or stakeholders. Second, the distribution of costs and benefits is
not concentrated in a few actors. Instead, costs and benefits are somewhat fairly
distributed across society. Put differently, for the plans of a city government to reflect
collective and legitimate goals, the government needs a minimal space for action.
Within this space, several actors-none with overwhelming influence in the process-
60 My argument builds on the idea of state "autonomy." In theory state autonomy refers to the capacity
of a state to act somewhat "independently of class pressures, especially the demands of the capitalist
class." (Davis, 1994b, p. 46). (See also Skocpol (1985, esp. p. 9); and Ellis (1992, esp. p. 570-1) who
offer alternative definitions of autonomy.) When the government achieves a minimum level of autonomy
then its plans and policies satisfy legitimate interests-i.e. collective goals (Evan, 1994, p. 45) or citizen
demands (Davis, 1994b, p. 46)). However, to achieve this positive outcome, a government cannot be
totally autonomous from societal influence. Evan writes in this regard: "Is Zaire's state "autonomous"? If
"autonomous" means not having its goals shaped by societal forces, then it is very autonomous. No
class or organized civil society constituency can be said to control it. If, on the other hand, "autonomy"
implies the ability to formulate collective goals instead of allowing officeholders to pursue their
individual interests, then Zaire fails the test." (Evans, 1994, p. 45). Therefore, for government plans to
satisfy collective goals, actors beyond politicians and planners in office should participate in the
planning process. Autonomy does not refer then to allowing politicians and planners pursue their
individual interests (Evans, 1994, p. 45 and 59).
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shape the plan. The distribution of costs and benefits is fair and the plan does not
reflect any participant's particular preferences.
A city government achieves this minimal space for action by building capable
government agencies and by promoting the interaction between planners, politicians,
and stakeholders.6 Capable government agencies have the structure, funding,
human resources62 and knowledge63 needed to craft plans that are technically sound.
Capable agencies also have the knowledge to counterbalance the power of capable
stakeholders. Absent this capacity in the government agency, a capable stakeholder
can capture the agency and bias the allocation of benefits in its favor.64 Finally, as I
explain in more detail below, a capable agency has the political capacity to interact
with politicians and stakeholders. Organizational capacity helps reduce power
imbalances and in this sense contributes to building the minimal space for action the
government needs.
Having capable government agencies is not enough, however, to ensure that
the resulting plans benefit society at large. Evans argues that capable government
agencies can craft plans. But they need to embed themselves "in a concrete set of
social ties that binds the state to society and provides institutionalized channels for
the continual negotiation and renegotiation of goals and policies."65 I interpret Evans'
idea of "embeddedness" as the need to have capable government agencies that
interact with stakeholders and politicians. By interacting, members of these
agencies-i.e. planners-build the channels for negotiating goals and policies. The
61 See Evans (1995, p. 12 and 57) for an analogous argument.
62 See Goggin et al. (1990, ch. 5). For these authors organizational structure refers to the different units
and departments that constitute the organization. Human resources refer to the quantity and quality of
the people employed to perform the tasks in each unit within the organization. Organizational capacity
is also dependent on the funding available to the units and the human resources to perform their tasks.
63 See Ardila (2002, ch. 2) for a discussion of the role of knowledge in organizational capacity.
Knowledge refers to the sets of concepts that the human resource has to master in order to carry out
the tasks assigned to the organization.
64 See Ardila (2002, esp. ch. 2). Amaya (1998) argues that in Bogota the Secretariat of Traffic and
Transportation is organizationally weak. To operate and manage the traffic light system, STT hired a
private and capable multinational contractor. The resulting power unbalance led to capture of the public
agency by the contractor. The contractor obtained lucrative contracts in a non-competitive manner by
ensuring prices higher than normal and selling more equipment than necessary.
Evans (1995, p. 12 and 59).
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interaction, therefore, allows agencies to build a minimal space for government action
and obtain plans that reflect collective and legitimate goals.
Notice that all three actors-planners, politicians, and stakeholders-can have
different objectives. Planners, for example, because of their training can have their
own preferences regarding what solutions are better-e.g. rail- over bus-based plans.
In turn, stakeholders will tend to protect their interests. Politicians, likewise, can favor
certain plans not only because those plans maximize their chances of being reelected
but also because the plans reflect their ideology. It is the interaction among actors and
the resulting adjustments to the plans that allow the plans to reflect collective goals
and not the particular preferences of any of these actors. The interaction therefore
allows an equitable mediation of these actors' different goals. For the mediation to be
effective, however, typically planners have to reduce power differentials between
stakeholders and politicians. If either actor appears too powerful the interaction does
not render the expected benefits. Hence, when a government agency is capable,
interacts with politicians and stakeholders, and mediates effectively among all actors
involved it has better chances of producing change that reflects collective goals.
Finally, organizational capacity and interaction reinforce one another in the
objective of creating a minimal space for government action.66 Absent a capable
organization, the interaction will probably lead to capture by interests that stand to
benefit from the plan. Similarly, a capable agency that does not interact misses out on
the opportunities for obtaining feedback from politicians and relevant stakeholders.
The agency will be unable to lower power differentials among actors and adapt the
plan according to the results of the interaction. Most likely, a coalition against the plan
and the agency will emerge. Worse, the government might lose legitimacy. But if there
is a capable planning organization that interacts with politicians and stakeholders then
planners can mediate between actors, lower power differentials, and adjust the
original plan. Plans then reflect legitimate interests and not just the preferences of any
particular actor.
66 These ideas comes from Evans (1995, p. 56-58). Evans uses the term embeddedness and I use the
term interaction. The two terms are rather similar conceptually speaking.
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The second element in the framework introduces the idea of process. I borrow
the notion of window of opportunity from Kingdon.67 Kingdon defines a window of
opportunity as "an opportunity for advocates of proposals to push their pet solutions,
or to push attention to their special problems."68 When the window of opportunity
opens, actors who favor certain plans can start interacting with other participants in
the process in order to call attention to their plans. As the interaction progresses, the
plan can enter the political agenda of the city. The political agenda is the list of plans
that politicians, stakeholders, and planners are paying attention to. Participants pay
attention because plans in the political agenda stand a higher chance of being
adopted. If adopted, plans can affect participant's interests. Therefore, the possibility
of adoption intensifies the interaction among actors. Put differently, during the window
of opportunity there is a chance that the plan will be adopted and this calls
participants' attention.
Before the window opened, the chances of adoption do not exist and
stakeholders and politicians can consider a waste of resources interacting with the
planning team or any other promoter of a plan. The window of opportunity allows the
interaction to start. The interaction in turn can put the item on the political agenda.
Once in the agenda, the interaction intensifies. As seen, it is the interaction among
actors that allows the city government to ultimately enact plans that reflect legitimate
interests-provided there is a capable planning team. In short, windows of opportunity
matter because they increase the extent of the interaction among actors.
According to Kingdon, windows of opportunity open for political reasons, such
as the appointment or election of someone to office. Politicians in office can favor
certain types of plans. A crisis can also open a window of opportunity. Plans that can
address the problems highlighted by the crisis have a higher chance of being
considered. Windows of opportunity, however, have a limited duration. The term in
office of the politician comes to an end. Society forgets crises and no longer pays
attention to eventual solutions.69 Once the window of opportunity closes, participants
67 See Kingdon (1995, ch. 8).
68 Kingdon (1995, p. 165).
69 Kingdon (1995, p. 166-170). I only borrow Kingdon's concept of policy window or window of
opportunity. Kingdon's model explains how items get on the agenda. I assume instead a much-
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in the process stop paying attention to the plan. The interaction among actors ceases.
While windows of opportunity come to an end, the interaction among actors and the
resulting space for government action can extend the duration of the window. A
government that adopts plans that benefit legitimate interests builds political support
that extends the window of opportunity.
In sum, I conceptualize the planning process as consisting of two stages that
occur recurrently. The first stage is before the window of opportunity opens and the
second is during that window. During the window the changes of society adopting the
plan are large. The planning process spans over long periods of time during which
windows of opportunity open and close. Windows of opportunity open because of
political reasons, such as elections, or because of crises. I therefore do not separate
for analytical purposes the "political" process from the "planning" process. Further, the
planning process "involves many players and many interests all seeking different
outcomes or protecting different turf."70 When the window of opportunity opens, actors
begin to interact. This interaction can put the plan in the political agenda of the city,
which in turn intensifies the interaction.
Thanks to the interaction planners can reduce power unbalances between
stakeholders and politicians. The interaction also results in feedback to all parties
involved. The feedback allows the team to adjust the plans incrementally. The
adjustments to the plan resulting from the interaction increase the political feasibility of
the plan and lower risk for all parties involved. The interaction and the resulting
adjustments contribute to creating a coalition of support for the plan powerful enough
to have the plan adopted. 71 At the same time, the plan reflects collective and
legitimate goals-and not individual preferences. The interaction and the resulting
space for government action, moreover, can extend the duration of the window of
opportunity. When the window of opportunity comes to an end the interaction between
simplified version on how items get on the agenda. Kingdon's formulation is certainly useful but not for
my purposes of unveiling the role of planners.
70 Innes and Gruber (2001, p. 1).
71 While mayors and other politicians are key in the decision making process, I assume that the
ultimate decision to adopt or reject a plan is not entirely in the hands of these decision makers. That is,
even if a politician makes the decision to adopt a plan, actions by other actors can reverse or reinforce
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actors is minimal. Planners and promoters have "to plan" new solutions awaiting the
next window of opportunity, when the cycle begins anew.
Planners, politicians, and stakeholders defined
For analytical purposes, I consider three types of participants in the planning
process-planners, politicians, and stakeholders. Planners can craft plans, and so
can politicians and even stakeholders. All three actors can perform to a different
extent political as well as technical actions. One of the objectives of some of these
actors is ultimately to get the plan they favor adopted while for others is to oppose it
and/or seek changes. Politicians in office are the actors empowered to make
disposing decisions-for example to adopt a policy-in any political system. The city
mayor is probably a critical decision-maker, but city councilors, judicial courts, and
politicians in other levels of government such as the state of national level also matter.
Stakeholders are, among others, operators and users of bus services, interests linked
to urban development, neighborhood associations, interested citizens, and any
interest group that for whatever reason participated in the process.
By planners I refer primarily to the members of planning teams or offices
vested with the responsibility to plan and help the plan navigate towards the adoption
point. The cases also reveal the existence of planners that oppose the plans
promoted by other actors. In the category planners I include urban and transportation
planners, engineers, economists, administrators, lawyers, and any other "technocrat"
who happened to be part of the planning team. The plans and projects I analyzed in
Curitiba and Bogota are large and highly complex. Transportation and urban planners
were therefore unable to handle all the issues and hence the teams incorporated
other professionals.7 2
Finally, the framework indicates that it is important to have planning
organizations or teams that interact with stakeholders and politicians. I define a
this decision. Indeed, the cases suggest that it is difficult to trace the exact moment when a decision
was made because it is the outcome of a process and not just of a decision-maker's will.
72 See Dalton (1989, p. 31-32) who says: 'The broadest definition of planning practice would cover all
individuals who are identified in some way as planners, both through formal education and recognition,
and through the activities in which they are engaged."
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capable planning team as one that blends political and technical capacity.73 Political
planners provide the political capacity in the planning team. Political planners tend to
like the contact with people and tend to be good at lobbying and negotiating. Political
planners are aware of the importance of decisions and of the implementation of plans.
Political planners tend to be aware of the importance of time in the planning process.
Likewise, they realize the importance of having political support. They are skeptical
about the ability of information alone to influence. Political planners tend to value the
importance of receiving input from a wide variety of actors.74 Put differently, political
planners are more sensitive to political and interest-based positions as distinct from
working on the basis of technical principle alone or an incomplete understanding of
the surrounding political environment. Therefore, political planners are more sensitive
to the exigencies of responding to interests at play in the planning process. At the
same time, political planners may or may not be excellent at solving technical
problems.
The capable planning team also has a high level of technical capacity. A high
level of technical capacity is needed because transport plans and projects are
complex. Further, the interaction with stakeholders and politicians will show certain
aspects of the plan that need change or refinement. The planning team has to figure
out the changes in light of the political reality unveiled by the interaction. This is a
technical task subject to the constraints unveiled by the interaction. Absent a high
level of technical capacity the interaction might lead to capture by stakeholders with
higher levels of technical capacity. These stakeholders will benefit disproportionately
from the plan. Therefore, to achieve plans that benefit collective goals and not just
individual preferences it is necessary to have a team that interacts with stakeholders
and politicians and that has a high level of technical capacity.
73 Political capacity is necessary in addition to standard traits of organizational capacity, such as
organizational structure, funding, human resources, and knowledge, as mentioned above (see Goggin
et al., 1990, ch. 5; and Ardila, 2002, ch. 2). Technical capacity can be interpreted to mean structure,
funding, human resources, and knowledge.
74 I build the category political planners based on Howe (1994, p. 129-137). Howe, however, allocates
some of the traits I assigned to political planners to two separate types of planners, process planners
and active planners.
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The cases: mass transit planning in Curitiba and Bogota
My dissertation therefore seeks to improve the understanding of the roles planners
play in the planning process. I use case study methodology to study actual planning
processes. I look in detail at the actions by planners, politicians, and stakeholders.7 5 I
chose to study transportation planning in the cities of Curitiba76 and Bogota D.C.,77 in
the periods 1955-95 and 1986-2001, respectively. Table 1 shows a series of
indicators for each city. Both Curitiba and Bogota have a rich history in transportation
planning that has typically involved actions by planners, politicians, and stakeholders.
Transportation planning is distinct from other types of planning in that because of the
plans' impacts on economic development, land use, and people's lives it is more
visible. More stakeholders seek to participate thus making the planning process more
observable. The planning processes in each city are therefore somewhat similar. This
similarity is convenient for my purposes, because both my within-case and cross-case
comparisons focus on commonalities in the planning process-my unit of analysis. My
intent is therefore to build a single representation of the roles of planners in the
planning process using two cases. My selection of transit planning in Curitiba and
Bogota is grounded in the following reasons:
Curitiba and Bogota have private transit companies: Like most cities in the
developing world,78 in both Curitiba and Bogota private investors own the bus
companies that provide service to a majority of the population (Table 1). This
makes them representative of the situation in the developing world. When private
interests own the bus companies affected by the transport plans the public
decision-making has to go across institutional lines and become more openly
75 See Peattie (1995); and Flyvbjerg (1998 and 2001) for a defense of the "dense," or data rich, case
study method. The case study method, moreover, has a long tradition in the urban planning field
(Fischler, 2000; and Creswell, 1998) and in general in the social sciences (Creswell, 1998). Second,
the case study method is good for answering "how" or "what" research questions (Creswell, 1998),
which are the type of questions I answer in my research.
76 Curitiba is the capital of the state of ParanA in the southeast of Brazil.
77 Bogota D.C. is the capital of the Republic of Colombia. The D.C. ending in the city's name stands for
Distrito Capital or Capital District, which means that the city is a separate jurisdiction from the
surrounding state of Cundinamarca. From this point onwards I omit the D.C. ending in Bogota's name.
78 See Vasconcellos (2001, ch. 11); and World Bank (2002, ch. 8).
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visible. During the planning of these BRT79 proposals, therefore, planners and
politicians had to interact at a minimum with these actors. Thus it is feasible to
explore the actions by planners, politicians, and stakeholders and attempt to
understand their roles.80
The magnitude of the projects: The BRT proposals ultimately adopted in
Curitiba and Bogota were large enough to affect the shape of public transport and
impact mobility and land development. The proposals also impacted neighboring
communities and other interest groups at the city level, and even other levels of
government who supplied partial funding, turning them into relevant actors in the
processes. This characteristic raised the visible profile of the processes and made
them more observable. Transit planning in these cities, consequently, was rich in
actions involving the three types of actors I am interested in-planners, politicians,
and stakeholders.
79 Bus rapid transit (BRT) is a technology designed to increase the overall efficiency of bus traffic. BRT
has three complementary elements that distinguish it from other measures that also improve bus flow.
First, BRT involves the construction of busways or segregated lanes for buses. The busways can be
either at-grade or grade-separated. Second, because of its customer orientation, BRT implies
comfortable and modern buses, stations that facilitate passenger boarding and alighting, fare collection
technology, modal integration, a marketing identity, and overall excellence in customer service (Wright,
2002a, p. 2). Third, to achieve the second element, BRT usually implies an institutional transformation
that implies the creation and/or strengthening of the city agency in charge of managing the BRT
system. This agency usually contracts out and supervises the operations of the new buses with the
private sector. The agency might own and operate the bus fleet itself, but this is a least desirable
solution than contracting out (Peialosa, 2003, p. 86-7). In this dissertation when I refer to busways it
will mean only the physical intervention designed for the exclusive use by buses. When I refer to BRT I
will mean a system that blends busways and the aforementioned elements and an institutional
transformation to improve the level of service.
80 Curitiba and Bogota, however, do not have the same bus-ownership structure. In Curitiba, thanks to
a reform in the mid-1950s, ownership was consolidated into 9 bus companies each owning an
important number of buses. In Bogota there were over 60 bus companies that obtained permissions
from the city government to operate bus routes but did not own buses. Over 30,000 investors own the
buses and pay fees to the bus companies to operate their buses in the companies' routes. Planners,
politicians, and stakeholders, therefore, faced a different environment even though private actors
owned the bus fleet.
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Table 1. Selected statistics for Curitiba and Bogota
Indicator Curitiba Bogota
Area (sq. km) 432 (a) 492 (b)
Population
1950 180,575 736,000
1960 365,309 1,722,000
1970 609,026 2,855,000
1980 1,024,975 4,351,000
1990 1,315,035 5,737,000
1999 (2000 for Bogota) 1,580,505 (c) 6,173,096 (d)
Income US $ 4000 (median family US $ 2,942 (average income
income in 1990) (e) per person in 2000) (f)
Motorization Rate (cars per 267 (g) 87 (i)
1000 inhabitants in 1994)
Privately-owned bus fleet 1,636 (j) 27,762 (k)
in 1997, includes all types
of buses for public service
Average density of 49 inhabitants/hectare (I) 177 inhabitants/hectare (m)
urbanized area in 1995 (121.4 inhabitants/acre) (438.5 inhabitants/acre)
Sources: (a) Nieri (1999, p. 1); (b) Jica-Chodai-Yachiyo (1996, p. 17), the actual area of the entire
capital district is 1,731 sq. km., but most of it is located too high in the Andean Range and therefore is
not suitable for urbanization; (c) All population data for Curitiba from Santoro (no date, p. 16); (d) All
population data for Bogota from Myers (2002, p. 8-9); (e) Nieri (1999, p. 2); (f) SHD (2000, p. 24); (g)
Nieri (1999, p. 3); (i) Fainboim and Rodriguez (1999, p. 117, and calculations by author); ) Brasileiro
(1999, p. 467); (k) Fainboim and Rodriguez (1999, p. 117, and calculations by author); (I) Rabinovitch
(1996, p. 242); (m) Jica-Chodai-Yachiyo (1996, p. 12 and 17, and calculations by author).
Several transit technologies to chose from: Both cities had several mass transit
technologies-metro, light rail, bus rapid transit-to chose from, and both chose
BRT to solve their mass transit needs. Choosing BRT casts both cities as
innovators and leaders in the international arena particularly in the developing
world.81 These innovative bus-based solutions compete well with heavy rail
(metro) projects in terms of ridership, timesaving to users, and even aesthetic
impact-but at a fraction of the cost of a metro line (Table 2). As Wright says:
"Cases such as Curitiba, Bogota, Sao Paulo and Quito show that BRT systems in
developing cities can provide an excellent service popular with high and low
income users, and be profitable at a low fare. In comparison, rail systems provide
a more limited geographical coverage-especially for poorer people relying on
road-based transit."82 This sets a precedent for other cities in the developing world
81 See Gardner (1998) for the reasons why cities in the developing world usually choose rail over bus
rapid transit even if bus rapid transit is better suited to their needs.
82 Wright (2002a, p. 27). See also Hidalgo (2003c, esp. p. 5-6).
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that can find in BRT a more affordable solution for their mass transit needs. The
cases chosen are therefore meaningful in the international arena.
Table 2. Comparison of Selected Mass Transit Systems in Latin America
Curitiba Bogota Caracas Medellin
Integrated TransMilenlo Metro Line 4 Metro Lines A
Transit Network Phase 1 and B
Technology Surface bus Surface bus Underground Elevated heavy
rapid transit rapid transit heavy rail (b) rail (h)
Length (Km) 64.6 (a) 41.0 (b) 12.3 (b) Line A: 23.0
Line B: 6.0 Km
(h)
Passengers per 497,000 (cl) 792,000 (d) 350.000 (m) 310.000 (j)
day 1,900,000 (c2)
Max. passengers 15,100 (f) 35.000 (g) 21,600 (b) N.A.
per hour per
direction (actual)
Civil works cost 3.4 (c1) 5.1-5.3 (e) 90.25 (b) 108.0 (k)
per km
(US$ million/km)
Average 18.7 (a) 20+ (stopping) 50 (b) 37 (I)
Operating Speed 30+ (express)
(Km per hour) (b)
sources: (a) Hebelo (2003u;, p. 2); (D) Worla Bank (200UU, p. 113); (cl) Ueneviva (1999, p. 9), figure is for
56 km of busways; (c2) Meakin (2002, p. 43), figure for integrated transit network; (d) Hidalgo (2003a,
p. 2); (e) Hidalgo (2003a, p. 5); and Wright (2002a, p. 18); (f) Wright (2002a, p. 23); (g) Hidalgo (2003a,
p. 1); (h) Acevedo et al. (1993, p. 147); ) "Se alarg6 el metro," Revista Cambio, July 2 7 th, 2003; (k) "Se
alarg6 el metro," Revista Cambio, July 27th , 2003. The figure does not include claims still in litigation for
approximately US$ 640 million; (I) Acevedo et al. (1993, p. 143); (m) Figueroa and Henry (1989, p. 17).
Successful cases are easier to explore: The collection of information is
facilitated because Curitiba and Bogota are considered examples of "successful"
transportation planning.8 3 Defining success is of course difficult and controversial.
With this in mind, one important reason why academics and practitioners consider
Curitiba and Bogota as "successful" examples is the degree to which these cities
managed to adopt innovative projects that can be used as showcase examples
around the world.84 Because the cases are considered successful, actors involved
83 See World Bank (2002, chapter 8); Wright (2000?, 2002a and 2002b); Meakin (2002) and ITDP
(2003). Other cities with examples of successful transportation planning are Sao Paulo and Porto
Alegre in Brazil; and Quito in Ecuador (See World Bank (2002); ITDP (2003); and Wright, 2002a). In
Asia examples are Hong Kong and Singapore (see Meakin, 2002).
84 See for the Curitiba case the following pieces that consider it a successful case, albeit for different
reasons: Cervero (1998); Gakenheimer (1998); Rabinovitch (1992 and 1996); Rabinovitch and Leitman
(1993 and 1996); Frausto (1999); Kroll (1999); Wright (1996); Lambert (1998); Parasram (2001);
Ceneviva (1999); Nieri (1999); Kruckemeyer (1999); Fulton (2002); Smith and Hensher (1998); Grava
(2003, p. 391-3); and World Bank (2002). For a questioning of the extent of Curitiba's success see
A
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are more willing to discuss with a researcher their actions and views on the
processes that took place. If on the other hand, the cases were considered
unsuccessful, then actors involved would likely resort to trying to exculpate their
role and point out to other actors who could be blamed for the failure.85
* A variety of decisional outcomes: Curitiba and Bogota have had planning
processes that have led to two types of decisions, one, to adopt, and, two, to reject
a given course of action (Table 3). This variation within and across cases enriched
the possibilities for the analysis and allowed me to build a single representation of
the roles of planners in both types of planning processes.
* Both cities have the same political context: Because I analyze processes and
the role of planners and other actors in those processes, the political setting
becomes a crucial variable to hold constant in other to allow a meaningful cross-
case comparison.86 Curitiba and Bogota are located in similar political
environments-strong executive. Further, most cities in the third world are located
in a political environment with strong executives.87 A strong executive, be it the
president at the national level or a mayor at the local, has more formal power than
its counterparts in other political systems.8 w89 Executives, therefore, play a more
Smith and Raemakers (1998). For the Bogota case see: Ardila and Menckhoff (2002); World Bank
(2002); Hidalgo (2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, and 2003d); Hernandez (2001); Sandoval
and Hidalgo (2002); Rodriguez and Targa (2003); Levinson et al. (2003); Fulton (2002); Further, ITDP
(2003, p. 4-5) argues that bus rapid transit is spreading to Africa and Asia and that the experiences of
Curitiba and Bogota (as well as Quito) are important in this replicating effort.
85 Quito (Ecuador) also chose bus rapid transit and is also considered a successful case. However, for
logistical and case-specific reasons I did not choose to study this city. Specifically, my budget did not
allow me to include Quito. Second, MIT professor Ralph Gakenheimer, who attempted a case study
there, told me to that the planning process was nowhere near as complete as in Curitiba and Bogota,
and to be cautious about expecting collaboration from the planners and decision makers in Quito. This
reluctance on the part of actors in Quito could come in part from the need at one point in the process to
call the Ecuadorian Army to crush protests by bus operators (Pehalosa, 2003, p. 87). Contrary to
Curitiba and Bogota, in Quito the new BRT system is publicly owned and local operators were excluded
from its operation (see Arias, no date).
86 Precisely because my unit of analysis is the planning process, the fact that Curitiba and Bogota differ
significantly in size does not matter. That is, by looking at the process I eliminate city size as a possible
independent variable.
87 Vasconcellos (2001, ch. 7).
88 O'Donnell (1997a, p. 293-297). O'Donnell (1997a) uses the idea of "delegated" democracy. One
characteristics of this type of democracy is the existence of a strong executive. I do not use the idea of
delegated democracy because Curitiba was under a dictatorship at the Federal level for a significant
number of years.
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important role in policy initiation.90 Because of these characteristics, the
participation of stakeholders and of civil society in the decision-making process is
less frequent than in more representative democracies.91 Finally, initiatives by civil
society and organized interests are less likely to receive consideration than in a
representative one.92 Politics, however, are not eliminated from the planning
process. For one, powerful and organized interests find a way of participating and
obtaining benefits, thus usually biasing the political process in their favor.93 For
another, politicians in office still have to think about their political future and allow
some actors to participate to seek support.9 Therefore, in a strong executive
setting fewer actors participate than in a full democratic setting.95 While both cities
are in this type of political environment, it is important to point out that at the time
of the critical events mayors were appointed in Curitiba and elected in Bogota.96
This difference, however, does not make the comparison impossible for mayors in
Curitiba tended to be open to the participation by stakeholders just as in Bogota.
89 For examples of how the Colombian president is disproportionately powerful vis-a-vis the national
congress see Ahumada (1998).
90 O'Donnell (1997a, p. 295-6).
91 See O'Donnell (1997a); Stepan (1978); and Apuleyo et al. (1998).
92 This does not mean, however, that most proposals by civil society in a representative democracy
manage to get to the political agenda (see Kingdon (1995)).
9 3 O'Donnell (1997b, p. 318-323). Hence in delegated democracies urban transport policy is usually
biased in favor of the car-the mode used by the small middle class-even though the majority travels
by bus (Vasconcellos, 2001, p. 77-78).
O'Donnell (1997b, p. 318-323). Clientelism is also a common result. See Graham and Jacobi (2002,
p. 310-316) for examples of clientelism in Brazil. See Davila (1996) and Leal and Davila (1995) for
examples of clientelistic practices in Colombia).
95 Notice that this characteristic facilitates the research because there are fewer participants to
interview and document their actions.
96 The military regime suspended elections for mayor in Curitiba and all state capitals in 1966. The
regime allowed elections again in 1985 (Willis, Garman, and Haggard, 1998, p. 11-12; and Graham
and Jacobi, 2002, p.304). A constitutional amendment instituted elections for mayor in Colombia as of
1988 (Gilbert and Davila, 2002, p. 34).
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Table 3. Planning processes in Curitiba and Bogota
Curitiba Bogota
Year Transportation Adopted Year Transportation Adopted
(Approx.) Project/policy Yes or No (Approx.) Project/policy Yes or No
1965-66 Urban Master Yes 1986-92 Metro line 1 No
Plan
1971-72 Pedestrianizing Yes 1988-90 Caracas Av. Yes
downtown busway, Phase I
Curitiba
1967-72 Land Use Yes 1990-93 Caracas Av. Yes
integrated to busway, Phase II
mass transit
1971-74 North-South Axis Yes 1993-95 Metrobus BRT No
BRT
1977 Boqueirdo BRT Yes 1994-98 Transportation No
Master Plan
1975-82 Light Rail Line No 1994-2001 Metro line 1 No
1979 Integrated Transit Yes 1998-2001 TransMilenio, Yes
Network (RIT) Phase 1, BRT
1982 East West Axis Yes 2001-03 Circuitos, busway No
BRT
1985-87 Change of fare Yes 2001-03 TransMilenio, Yes
policy Phase 2, BRT
1985-87 Public Fleet No
1989-90 Direct Bus Yes
Service and tube
stations, BRT
1989-94 Light Rail Line No
1994-96 Upgrade to the Yes
RIT
Source: Fieldwork
The fieldwork
I conducted several months of fieldwork in each city (Table 4) using two main
research techniques: First, I reviewed documents, technical studies, newspapers, and
other written material to illuminate the underlying process, the events that took place,
and the politicians, stakeholders, and planners that participated. I then carried out a
content analysis of these materials. This information also provided a basis for
interviews, which served to clarify issues. Second, I conducted semi-structured
interviews of planners, politicians, and stakeholders who participated in the planning
process. In both cities I interviewed the main politicians, Mayor Jaime Lerner of
Curitiba, and Mayor Enrique Pefialosa of Bogota, as well as planners and other
relevant stakeholders, such as the owners of the bus companies. In total I interviewed
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close to 40 people in each city. Following ethical guidelines established by COUHES97
I abided to the level of anonimity my source requested. Several sources requested
complete anonimity and their name does not appear anywhere in the text. Most
sources, however, consented to being cited in the text with name.
To organize the events in each case I created a timeline of actions by actor-
planners, politicians, and stakeholders. This way of organizing the data allowed me to
capture the interaction among actors and how the interaction affected the process.
With this information I wrote a first draft of each case. I the asked some of my key
sources to read the case and comment. Carlos Ceneviva, Ken Kruckemeyer, and
Paul Procee read the Curitiba case, and Daniel Rodriguez read an early version.
Enrique Peialosa, Dario Hidalgo, Jorge Acevedo, and Pilar Rodriguez read the
Bogota case study. I incorporated their comments in the next version of the cases.
Dario Hidalgo kindly read a second version of the Bogota case.
Table 4. Fieldtrips to Curitiba and Bogotf
City Visits
Curitiba April and May, 2002
May and June, 2003
February 2004
Bogota June and November, 2001
February, June, and November, 2002
October, 2003
Outline of the dissertation
This dissertation is organized in four parts. Part 1 is the Introduction. I develop the
Curitiba and Bogota case studies in Parts 2 and 3, respectively. I write from the point
of view of a dispassionate academic observer. Throughout each case I have inserted
analytical sections entitled 'The roles of planners." In those sections I analyze the
previous set of events trying to understand the roles of planners. I devote Part 4 to the
conclusions. I try to build a single representation of the roles of planners in the
planning process emerging from the comparison of the cases. In the conclusions I
bring together the common themes that emerged from the analysis contained in the
sections "The roles of planners."
97 I secured clearance from MIT's Committee on Humans as Experimental Subjects (COUHES) to
conduct field work and interview people in Curitiba and Bogota.
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Part 2
Transit Planning in Curitiba
There is a significant body of literature in English on Curitiba that documents mostly
the outcomes of the planning and implementation processes followed in the city.98
Most authors provide a short description of the main elements of the Integrated
Transit Network (RIT)99 or other policies, discuss their performance and occasionally
they give the dates when the facilities opened to the public. The question of what
really happened in Curitiba remains therefore unanswered. Some say it was the result
of an authoritarian mayor appointed by a military government. Others say it was the
achievement of a charismatic individual. Finally, others say it was the product of a
political environment that trusted professional judgment. Let's see what role planners
played in the planning processes in Curitiba and how much they had to do with the
final outcomes in Curitiba. I cover the period 1955-95.
Chapter 2
The Situation up to 1965
Most accounts of Curitiba's story take 1965, the year the famous comprehensive
urban plan was written, as a pivotal point, but mention few events before this date,
with the exception of the 1943 comprehensive planning exercise.100 Yet, there are
many events that occurred before 1965-particularly regarding public transit-that are
98 For readers interested in more detailed descriptions of the outcomes of Curitiba's planning efforts
see Cervero (1998); Rabinovitch (1992 and 1996); Rabinovitch and Leitman (1993 and 1996); Frausto
(1999); Kroll (1999); Wright (1996); Lambert (1998); Parasram (2003); and World Bank (2002).
For a questioning of the extent of Curitiba's success see Smith and Raemakers (1998); and Samek
1 996).
In Portuguese Rede Integrada de Transporte. I use acronyms in Portuguese.
100 This is the Agache plan and I mention it in more detail below.
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important for understanding the behavior of actors later on in the account. That is, the
events prior to 1965 shaped a policy environment that to a considerable extent
determined what policies or plans would be feasible. If these events are ignored it is
difficult to understand, among others, why the bus operators became such an
important political actor. The events show a period when the government of Curitiba is
relatively weak because it in the process of strengthening its institutional capacity.
Because of this, the planning function is represented usually by commissions
appointed by the mayor, who frequently is retired from the military.
The demise of tramways and the emergence of buses
The evolution of public transit in Curitiba in the first half of the twentieth century can
be considered typical of many cities in the developing and developed world. Bogota,
where my other case study is located,101 certainly followed a path that resembles
Curitiba's. By the turn of the twentieth century Curitiba had horse drawn tramways
and by 1912 the concessionaire of the tramways, the South Brazilian Railways Ltd.,
had electrified the main lines.102 The operation was not highly profitable and by 1928
the South Brazilian returned the concession to the city.103 The city and state
governments then created the Parana Power and Light Company (CFLP10 4) to
operate the tramways and provide bus service-the latter starting in 1928.105 In 1936,
the city authorized private entrepreneurs to operate bus services even in lines that
competed directly with CFLP tramways and buses. This impacted the finances of
CFLP and the city's reluctance to authorize a fare increase further aggravated the
financial situation.106 In 1941 the city government opened a competitive bid for the
private provision of bus service and several bus companies were created, all of them
small. By 1942 there were 15 family-owned bus companies, licensed by the city
government to operate individual routes.107
101 For a similar account for Bogot's tramway demise see Jaramillo and Parias (1995).
102 Per6n et al. (1975, p. 11-14); and Urban (1987, p. 35).
103 Urban (1987, p. 35-37).
104 In Portuguese Companhia Forpa e Luz do Paran.
105 PerOn et al. (1975, p. 16); and Urban (1987, p. 35-37).
106 Per6n et al. (1975, p. 16).
107 Santoro (no date, p. 13-14).
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The additional bus service seemed to have catered to a latent demand. In 1940
total ridership was 11,113,432 trips per year, all in the hands of CFLP's tramways and
buses. By 1942, total demand had risen to 19,641,232, a 76.7% increase, but only
76.0% was served by CFLP-a hefty 4.7 million trips in the hands of the independent
bus companies.1 0 8 Despite the increased supply, which benefited many users, the
overall level of service remained low. The lack of supervision and clear rules resulted
in a low-quality bus service. Paradoxically, bus services were almost twice as
expensive as the tramways. Tereza Urban summarizes the situation for the bus
sector: "There were no rules for the public transit sector in this period: there were no
rights or duties. The city government did not require anything in exchange for the
concessions [of the bus routes]. Because of this, in parallel to CFLP's fleet, tens of
autonomous bus and car operators emerged."1 0 9
Despite the low quality of the service offered, bus service continued to gain
market share, because of its relative flexibility and convenience when compared to a
rigid system such as the tramways.110 The scarcity of oil during World War II provided
a temporary but not significant relief to CFLP from bus competition. 1 1 With the end of
the war, the trend was reinforced and by 1946 the situation was so dramatic that
CFLP offered to donate all its equipment and facilities to the city, but the city rejected
the proposal.1 1 2 Instead, the city opened a competitive bid to concession the tram and
bus services operated by CFLP. The different proponents questioned the bidding
process and a political fight in the City Council ensued. Only in May of 1950 the city
signed a new concession contract with the Curitiban Company of Public
Transportation (CCTC113 ), owned by Aurelio Fressato. 14 Fressato was one of the
original concessionaires of bus routes assigned in 1941 and had gradually acquired
other companies and become the largest operator. Fressato paid only 1 cruzeiro115 for
108 Santoro (no date, p. 13); and calculations by author.
109 Urban (1987, p. 38, translation by author). While Urban refers to tens of companies, according to
Santoro there were only 10 (Santoro, no date, p. 10).
110 Urban (1987, p. 39).
111 Per6n et al. (1975, p. 18-19).
112 Per6n et al. (1975, p. 16-19).
13 In Portuguese Companhia Curitibana de Transportes Coletivos.
114 Per6n et al. (1975, p. 19); and Brasileiro (1999, p. 471).
This amount was symbolic and whatever the current amount in real terms, it was very low.
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all of CFLP's facilities and rolling stock. In 1951 CCTC restarted tramway services
and purchased 40 new buses. In that year, the city authorized CCTC to increase its
fares, but this generated "popular revolts."'16
CCTC was short lived. In 1951 informal operators-owned and operated by the
driver-entered the market. By 1952 CCTC closed all tramway operations, unable to
compete with the constantly increasing supply of bus services,117 offered both by
formal companies and by informal operators. The closure of the tramways generated
protests by some users,1' 8 but other actors, interestingly, considered the tramways an
impediment to the city's expansion and progress.119 By 1954 there were over 150
buses,12 0 each owned and operated by the driver, in addition to the lines operated by
the approximately 10 small bus companies.121 Some of these companies existed
since 1936 and were owned by people such as Santo Franceschi and Humberto
Bertoldi, whose descendents still own bus companies in Curitiba.12 2 The level of
service was low, however, because the supply was disorganized, schedules were not
followed, and the quality of the equipment was poor.123 In short, the sector was highly
informal,12 4 despite the existence of some family-owned companies. Reform was
needed, more so given the fact that Curitiba's population was beginning to grow
rapidly, from 140,656 inhabitants in 1940, to 180,575 in 1950, and 365,309 in 1960125
(a 7.03% average yearly rate of growth between 1950 and 1960).
The election of Ney Braga and the consolidation of the bus
companies
Democracy and elections returned to Brazil in 1945 with the fall of the Getulio Vargas'
fifteen-year dictatorship and the promulgation of a new Constitution in 1946. This
democratic period, however, was short lived-until the military coup of 1964. Elections
116 Per6n et al. (1975, p. 19).
117 Per6n et al. (1975, p. 19); and Urban (1987, p. 38).
118 Urban (1987, p. 39).
119 Brasileiro (1999, p. 471).
120 Urban (1987, p. 39); Brasileiro (1999, p. 471); and Mazza (1990, p. 51).
121 Urban (1987, p. 39).
122 As inferred from fieldwork and date by Santoro (no date, p. 15); and Per6n et al. (1975, p. 16).
123 Urban (1987, p. 39); de Oliveira (2000, p. 137); Brasileiro (1999, p. 471).
124 De Oliveira (2000, p. 137).
125 Santoro (no date, p. 16).
41
for president took place in 1945 and in fact Vargas returned to office as elected
president in 1950.126 Elections for state governor took place under the new
constitution during 1946.127 Elections for mayor, at least in Curitiba, took place in
1954128 --only months after Vargas' suicide while in office.129 Ney Braga was elected
the city's first mayor for the period 1954-58.13° Until then, the governor of Parana
appointed the mayors of Curitiba.131
Braga was a major in the Brazilian army when in 1952 the Governor of Paran.
Bento Munhoz da Rocha Neto appointed him Chief of Police of the city of Curitiba.
Braga did a good job as police chief and several city councilors met with him to
convince him to run for mayor as the first elections loomed. To run, Braga joined the
Partido Social Progressista (Social Progressive Party) of Adhemar de Barros,132 who
incidentally used the slogan "steals but gets things done."133 Braga won the elections
in 1954 after a campaign where he apparently walked most of Curitiba and talked to
many people in their houses.13 4 As Mayor of Curitiba, Braga created the Department
of Urban Planning, and brought to work in this department names such as D6lcia
Aurfquio, Francisca Rischbieter, Saul Raiz, and Luiz Armando Garcez,13 5 among
others, who would become in the 1960s and 70's important actors in the city's
planning and politics. Braga used the method of appointing a commission to study a
particular problem and propose solutions that would be coupled with the plans of the
Department of Urban Planning. According to Braga "...in all the plans the population
was heard. It was not a very ample participation, but the city was much smaller and
we talked with the main leaders, the city councilors consulted their electors."13 6 By the
126 Bueno (2002, chs. 31 and 32); Lopez (1980, p. 102); and Fausto (2001, chs. 4 and 5).
127 Lopez (1980, p. 106).
128 Braga (1997, p. 17); and Menezes (2001, p. 70).
129 Braga (1997, p. 24).
130 Braga (1990, p. 1); Brasileiro (1999, p. 471), and Mazza (1990, p. 51).
131 Requiao (1997, p. 250).
132 Braga (1997, p. 18-22).
Bueno (2002, p. 345, translation by author). Despite Barros' motto, I found no reference to
corruption during Braga's tenure as Mayor and later on as Governor.
34 Braga (1997, p. 21).
135 Braga (1990, p. 3).
6 Braga (1990, p. 9, translation by author).
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end of his tenure, the Brazilian Institute for Municipal Administration (IBAM)
recognized Braga's administration as the best in the country.13 7
Given the poor shape of public transportation in Curitiba, the memory of a 36-
hour lock out by operators to request a fare increase a couple of years before,'38 and
large pressure by the population requesting change,'39 Braga appointed a
commission to study the public transportation problem and propose solutions.'40
Braga appointed the commission on December 17th , 1954.'4' The decree that
appointed the commission justified the need to address the problem by stating that
"the lack of satisfaction, on the one hand, of the operators of the public transportation
service, who request a revision of the fare and demand a legal regime that grants
them more security in their relations with the concessioning power, and on the other,
the users, who complain about the deficiency, scarcity and poor material shape of the
means employed in those services [the buses]."1 42 In addition, the commission was
charted with the responsibility of finding a fare structure that would not punish the
poor, who back then had to pay more because they lived farther away.143 Colonel
Alipio Ayres de Carvalho, a transportation and logistics engineer in the Brazilian
Army, headed the commission, which had eight other members, including engineers
Bernardo Fedalto and Osvaldo Kus, and legal counsel Edgar Tavora.14 4
The commission went to several Brazilian cities and noticed that the bus fleets,
frequently privately-owned, and were in poor shape due to over use and lack of
maintenance, just as in Curitiba. In effect, Curitiba would be one of the first cities in
Brazil to address these issues, which will be copied by other cities soon after.145 The
commission analyzed the legal framework for the transportation sector, the way the
bus operations were carried out, and the fare-setting methodology.146 Based on the
recommendations issued by the commission, it is possible to argue that the overall
137 Braga (1990, p. 10, translation by author).
138 Per6n et al. (1975, p. 21).
139 De Oliveira (2000, p. 137).
140 Mazza (1990, p. 53); Braga (1990, p. 6); and Per6n et al. (1975, p. 21).
141 Mazza (1990, p. 53).
142 Decree 763 of December 17th of 1954 as indicated by Mazza (1990, p. 53).
143 Mazza (1990, p. 53).
144 Mazza (1990, p. 53); Perdn et al. (1975, p. 21); and Braga (1990, p. 6).
145 Brasileiro (1999, p. 471).
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situation was the result of at least the following factors. First, an unstable legal regime
that increased the risk to investors and promoted under spending in maintenance.
Second, entry into the market was rather easy-almost any one with a small bus
could operate an informal route-which resulted in excessive competition. Third, a
weak government that lacked the capacity to supervise the operators and enforce its
regulations-which were limited anyway. In a context where competition is excessive
and the government cannot enforce minimum standards, the incentive is for operators
to cut maintenance and service-all of which lower the quality of the service-to
maintain their expected profitability.147 Finally, there were problems with the fare-
setting policy, which resulted in conflicts, and frequently in lockouts by operators and
protests and even riots by users. This diagnostic of Curitiba's situation in the 1950s is
not uncommon to many cities in the developing world even today. Almost 44 years
after Curitiba, Bogota addressed a similar situation-albeit in a different manner-in
order to implement the TransMilenio project.
The commission structured its recommendations around the concept of the
exclusive or "selective" area-as it was dubbed in Curitiba. The plan was to divide the
city into nine "selective" areas and grant a temporary monopoly to operate buses to
one or at most two companies per area.1 48 The head of the commission, Alipio Ayres,
summarized the intent of this measure in the following way: "It was fundamental to
prove...through technical and economic viability, that there would be a positive return
for the investor and the user..."149. Because the number of bus companies already
existing was significant and there were many informal operators, it was necessary to
group all of the operators in just 13 cooperatives or companies.150 The policy,
consequently, sought to reduce the excessive competition and lower the number of
actors that the state had to supervise and regulate. At the same time, because each
area was a monopoly, profitability was almost guaranteed-provided the fare was set
146 Mazza (1990, p. 53).
147 In addition, the large number of buses in the streets can exacerbate congestion and pollution levels
can increase. For a more theoretical discussion of these issues and policy recommendations see World
Bank (2002, ch. 7). See also Vasconcellos (2001, esp. ch. 11).
148 Mazza (1990, p. 53); Brasileiro (1999, p. 471); and Vasconcellos (2001 p. 129).
149 As quoted by Mazza (1990, p. 53, translation by author).
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to ensure this. Because some "selective" areas would be more profitable than others
would, the areas were defined in such as way that they included both profitable and
unprofitable routes,'51 which implied even having some non-continuous areas. Finally,
the downtown area-a box 1.0 mile in length-was considered neutral territory and all
companies could provide service in that area (Figure 1).
The government entered negotiations with the operators to seek a consensual
solution, 152 which was achieved in the end sometime in 1955.153 Unfortunately, my
sources do not go into detail and in my fieldwork I could not reconstruct this part of the
process. Probably as a result of those negotiations, however, Braga decided that
while the new companies would have to compete for servicing the "selective" areas,
the competition would be limited only to existing operators and no outsider would be
allowed to compete.154 This move clearly raised the political support for the plan
among operators and reduced their risk of participating in the process.155 These
negotiations must have also convinced the operators of the benefits of grouping in
companies, even if before the relations among them were not cordial due to excessive
competition.'56 The incentive of guaranteeing a monopoly to each company and the
secure duration of the permits or concessions-initially five years-together with the
possibility of renewing them, probably also motivated operators to follow the
government's policy. In other words, there is no evidence of the operators opposing
the proposed measures. Quite the contrary the evidence suggests the operators liked
the idea and rapidly organized themselves into 13 companies. In this regard,
Brasileiro refers to the overall process in the following terms: "It can be seen...an
effort to solve the potential conflicts between the city government and private bus
150 Brasileiro (1999, p. 471); Mazza (1990, p. 54); Vasconcellos (2001, p. 129); and Urban (1987, p.
34), but this last author mentions 14 companies and not 13.
151 De Oliveira (2000, p. 137); Braga (1990, p. 7); and Rovani (1990, p. 76).
152 Brasileiro (1999, p. 471-72).
153 Per6n et al. (1975, p. 20).
154 Braga (1990, p. 6-7).
155 In the process for the TransMilenio project a similar strategy is used to gather support from the
existing operators.
156 Mazza (1990, p. 54) documents the types of negative behavior that the excessive competition led
to. The same happened in the Bogota case years later when drivers would have to try to compete
against other vehicles and at the same time maximize the number of passengers. To make matters
even more unsafe, and again, the same as in Bogota, the driver would be responsible for collecting the
fare and giving change back to the passenger.
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operators. Through a minimum consensus, the operators benefited from the policies,
supported the policies and committed to the general urban planning orientations
proposed by the municipality."157
The city government wanted other changes that could have been opposed by
the operators, but again, there is no evidence of this happening. First, given that the
choice was to keep the operations in the hands of the private sector,158 the city
government became the main regulator, planner and enforcer.1 59 In this role the city
would set fares, establish schedules, frequencies, and determine the routes.160
Second, the city government forbade the use of small buses,161 or lota96es, which sat
up to 10 people.1 62 Lota96es used to be the norm in Curitiba at the time. The new
companies had to use a larger bus, known as conventional bus, and using any small
vehicle would be illegal.163 This implied a significant investment in new rolling stock,
which was assured by the contractual guarantee that the concessions would last 5
years, after which the conventional buses could no longer be used.'64 In 1956 the new
bus companies completed the introduction of conventional buses.1 65
157 Brasileiro (1999, p. 472).
158 Curitiba has never had a publicly owned bus company as such (Brasileiro, 1990, p. 471-2).
159 At the time the City of Curitiba had the autonomy to regulate public transport. In 1960 this autonomy
would be temporarily lost as I detail below (Mazza, 1990 p. 55).
160 Brasileiro (1999, p. 471).
161 Brasileiro (1999, p. 471).
162 Per6n et al. (1975, p. 21).
163 Brasileiro (1999, p. 471).
'64 Mazza (1990, p. 54).
165 Per6n et al. (1975, p. 21).
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Figure 1. Selective areas in Curitiba
[7]
t
Source: author based on a Brasileiro (1999, p. 459) and an actual map of the areas the author
saw in Curitiba.
Note: D.T. is downtown Curitiba. The figure only illustrates the idea of the selective areas. The
actual areas are more complex.
As a result of this process public transportation service in Curitiba suffered a
quite dramatic transformation on several fronts. First, from a disorganized, almost
informal, and almost unregulated structure, the system became an organized, formal
and highly regulated. Second, from a structure with little or no barriers to entry of
competitors into the market to one with high entry barriers. In fact, the 13 companies
consolidated into 9,166 and those are the companies that even today provide the
service in Curitiba. 167 Further, the "selective" areas still exist today, but in a de facto
manner, given that they were formally abolished in 1987.168 Third, the system
changed from a highly fragmented structure to a rather concentrated one. Politically
166 Brasileiro (1990, p. 471).
167 The de facto consolidation of the bus companies in Curitiba is higher today because a single family
group owns close to 50% of the bus companies, which continue to operate under different names (de
Oliveira, 2000, p. 142).
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speaking this is crucial. The new companies rapidly became highly capitalized due to
the required investments in new buses-with almost ensured profitability. Further, the
companies also became rather capable in their business of operating and maintaining
buses. These features gave them power and turned them into indispensable actors in
the provision of public transportation in Curitiba.
Finally, the city government emerged in theory as well as a powerful actor, able
to determine fares, plan service and determine schedules and frequencies. From a
government unable to control entry and limit informality, the city established effective
barriers to entry and effectively controlled informality. The city also acquired the legal
capacity needed to plan bus service and equally important to enforce its rules.169 For
example, for fare setting purposes the government needed to know the number of
passengers per route and hired students to do counts every three months170-few
cities in the developing world even nowadays are capable of doing this.171 Despite this
example, reality differed from this situation as I detail below, mostly because the legal
mandate was not paralleled by an increase in institutional capacity necessary to plan
service and to fully enforce regulations and contractual agreements.
In short, thanks to the reforms of this period both the bus companies and the
city government became empowered. De Oliveira argues that the balance of power
ran in favor of the nine bus companies,1 7 2 in part because of the lack of sufficient
institutional capacity in the city government. The next actions by the operators
indicate that they quickly realized they could extract more from the government-they
just had to build their political muscle and find opportunities to flex it.
168 My interviews with bus operators and planners in Curitiba show that the "selective" areas still exist
and any new service is assigned by the government bearing in mind the share that each company must
have according to the original areas. De Oliveira (2000) reaches a similar conclusion.
169 According to Brasileiro (1999) Curitiba is one of the few Brazilian cities that has not experienced
problems with informal transport. This is a striking contrast with the explosion of informal transportation
in cities such as S.o Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, where even violence is frequent in the relations with
informal operators.
170 Braga (1990, p. 7).
17' See World Bank (2002, ch. 11); and Vasconcellos (2001, ch. 8).
172 De Oliveira (2000, p. 138).
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Flexing the political muscle: the lockout of 1960
Braga left the mayor's office in 1958 after a successful tenure as mayor of Curitiba for
one term-there was no immediate reelection at the time. Braga ran that same year
for the Federal House of Representatives, winning easily a seat. In 1960 he was
elected governor of the state of Paran, for the 1961-1965 period.173 /174 General Iber6
de Mattos was elected in 1958 as mayor of Curitiba to serve for the next four-year
period. Mattos would have to face the demands of the bus companies.17 5 While the
changes during the Braga administration had improved the quality of bus service in
Curitiba, there were signs that the level of service could still be higher. For example,
drivers and fare-collectors-the conventional buses needed a crew of two people-
still did not treat well the passengers and service at night was scarce.1 7 6 Further, the
operators wanted changes that would reduce their risk and improve their profitability.
Four issues were in contention: first, the duration of the initial concessions; second,
the duration of the useful life of the buses as allowed by the contracts; third, the fare-
setting methodology and fare increases; and finally, the quality of the service.
To strengthen their political clout, the bus companies created their own trade
association to represent their interests, the Sindicato Estadual de Transportadores de
Passageiros do Parani (SETPP) circa 1956.177 This trade association submitted its
first two demands in August of 1959. First, SETPP wanted the city to guarantee the
173 Braga (1997, p. 26-27).
174 Braga would be one of the governors who supported the military coup of 1964, among others, by
signing in 1963 the "Manifest of Democratic Governors" against the government of President Jodo
Goulart (Bueno, 2002, p. 365). During the military regime Braga was appointed Secretary of Agriculture
(1965-66), elected senator in 1966, appointed Secretary of Education between 1974-78. Braga was
also elected by the state legislature governor of ParanA and served as governor between March 15 th
1979 and May 1 4th 1982 (Braga, 1990, p. 1; and Braga, 1997, p. 17-52). Braga would also participate
in the appointments of Jaime Lerner as mayor of Curitiba twice during the seventies as I detail below,
the first while Braga was senator and the second during his second tenure as Governor of ParanA.
Indeed, Braga was the main political leader in Parant and controlled its politics for almost 30 years (De
Novaes, 1997, p. 153).
175 Per6n et al. (1975, p. 21).
176 Per6n et al. (1975, p. 22). At night demand decreases and operators find it difficult to cover even
variable costs (labor and operating costs), more so with large vehicles. The rational decision is to cut
service and not have service at night. This is a problem common in many cities and can give informal
operators an opportunity to enter the market. Curitiba addressed this lack of service, among others, by
paying operators per distance logged by the buses and not per passenger transported. This change,
however, took place in the mid-1980s.
177 De Oliveira (2000, p. 138). In English the name is State Trade association of Passenger Bus
Companies of Paran.
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renewal of the concessions to the same companies, and second, it wanted a fare
increase. SETPP then submitted a third request, to extend the useful life of buses by
modifying the system for renewing the bus fleet.178 A five-year concession, as the
ones issued by Braga's administration, can be short, particularly when the useful life
of a bus can extend beyond this, depending on the usage. There is therefore an
incentive to request an extension of the concessions and of the useful life of the
buses. If granted, the companies would not have to incur any new capital costs, as
the buses could still be used for at least some years. This clearly increases the
profitability of the initial investment, particularly if the fare structure still reflects
payments to capital.
Because the city government had to authorize any fare increase this became a
critical source of conflict between the city administration and the bus operators. Each
actor faced different incentives. On the operators' side, the pressure to constantly
adjust the fare had its origin in the increasing rate of inflation of the Brazilian
economy,17 9 which increased their cost of doing business. By 1959 inflation was
39.5% per year,1 80 and the average yearly inflation for 1960-69 was even higher,
45.8%.181 Wages, on the other hand, did not keep pace with inflation.182 Unions and
others labor-oriented organizations therefore pressed against any fare increase. Fare
increases reduced even more the available income of workers-the main users of
public transport. The city government, or at least Mayor Mattos, was receptive to this
178 Per6n et al (1975, p. 21-22).
179 Between 1956 and 1960 Brazil's president Juscelino Kubitschek followed an economic policy
targeted at promoting growth and industrialization (Bueno (2002, p. 351-355); and Fausto (2001, p.
237-241)). The results of this policy were to a large extent positive; the economy grew between 1957
and 1961 at an annual rate of 7%, and income per capita at 4%, the fastest in Latin America (Fausto
(2001, p. 236). Other economic indicators are also worth mentioning. Between 1955 and 1961,
industrial output grew in real terms 80% and transportation equipment an impressive 600%. Indeed, an
important part of the development strategy was to attract foreign firms to assemble and manufacture
cars in Brazil (Fausto (2001, p. 237-241); and Bueno (2002 p. 351-355)). This economic development
policy, however, had another outcome, inflation, which was probably due to the high deficits the
government had and/or real shortages in the economy due to the rapid increases in income per capita
(See Cardoso and Helwege (1992, chapter 6). For a history of the car-manufacturing industry in Brazil
in this period see Shapiro (1991).
180 Fausto (2001, p. 238). The average yearly inflation for the 1950-59 period was 21 % (Thorp (1998, p.
352).
181 Cardoso and Helwege (1992, p. 141).
182 Fausto (2001, p. 239).
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argument and probably did not want to risk his electoral future by approving unpopular
fare-increases or at least not as frequently as the operators wanted.
To study the several petitions submitted by the operators' trade association,
SETPP, Mayor Mattos created a commission, the Comissao Municipal de Transporte
Coletivo, CMTC.183 Representatives of the city government and of the bus companies
integrated CMTC, but no representative of the bus riders was appointed to the
commission.1 84 The commission studied the renewal of the concessions and
concluded that each company would have to apply separately to renew its
concession. On March 1 1 th 1960, CMTC issued its report concluding that a 20% fare
increase across the board for all companies could be justified. Mayor Mattos rejected
CMTC's proposal on the grounds that the fare had been increased twice during 1959,
one of which was to cover an increase in the salaries paid to the drivers and
conductors. The bus companies had justified their petition for a fare increase precisely
on the order by a court to increase these salaries. SETPP did not like CMTC's
proposal either, for it had requested a 40% increase. SETPP argued, moreover, that
unless there was a fare increase, there would be a lockout and set a date for starting
the strike.1 85
Mayor Mattos maintained his position that a fare increase was not justifiable
and in light of the approaching lockout filed a petition with a judge to seize the bus
companies' buses and offices, which the judge allowed for the duration of the lockout.
Labor unions and other organizations offered public support for the mayor's policy.
The bus companies decided to abort their attempt to carry out a lockout and the judge
removed the injunction on the 2 5 th of March of 1960. The companies, however, kept
demanding a fare increase-this time, a 10% increase-now on the grounds that the
price of spare parts and fuel and lubricants had gone up 10%. Mattos replied that a
new study had to be done but looking at the finances of each company separately so
that the fare increase would be different for each company. SETPP strongly rejected
83 In English Municipal Public Transportation Commission.
184 Urban (1987, p. 40); and Per6n et al. (1975, p. 21).
185 Per6n et al. (1975, p. 21-22).
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this proposal because the most profitable companies had a return above 100% on
their investment and they would therefore get no fare increase.1 8 6
The bus companies then threatened to take their buses and their business to
the city of Sao Paulo, whose mayor, Adhemar de Barros, had apparently invited them.
Mayor Mattos replied that there were many investors who wanted to offer bus service
in Curitiba and the existing companies were free to leave the city. Mattos also voiced
the argument that public transportation in Curitiba could not depend on constant fare
increases and that a more structural solution was needed. He proposed to lobby the
president of Brazil, Juscelino Kubitschek, to seek measures that would lower the
costs for the industry. First, subsidies for spare parts made in Brazil as well as for fuel
and lubricants. Second, special exchange rates to favor the imports by bus
companies. Third, access to loans from the Brazil's National Bank for Economic
Development (BNDES) to finance the purchase of new buses at low rates and longer
terms. All three proposals were subsidies for the fixed and variable costs of the bus
companies. Fourth, to pave the streets used by the buses, which lowered their
operating costs. Finally, Mattos also proposed to eliminate the selective areas. The
bus companies, however, did not believe in this proposal and doubted the president
would ever act,187 more so 1960 being a presidential-election year.188
The bus companies then argued that their financial situation was dire and that
they could not operate after April 26th . The lockout started this day and lasted for 7
days, during which the citizens of Curitiba had to use city and army owned buses as
well as any vehicle willing to transport them. In anticipation to the Mayor's moves with
the judiciary to seize the buses, the bus companies had hid their equipment in
neighboring municipalities before the lockout started. Mayor Mattos nonetheless
obtained a court injunction that ordered the buses to be seized, which was done but at
a slower pace than in the attempted lockout the month before. Mattos, moreover,
wanted to cancel the concession contracts, abolish the "selective" areas and establish
a new bus company owned in part by the city and in part by the existing bus
186 Per6n et al. (1975, p. 22-23); and Urban (1987, p. 41).
187 Per6n et al. (1975, p. 23-24); and Urban (1987, p. 41).
188 Bueno (2002, p. 356).
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companies. On May 1st 1960 the mayor was about to issue a decree canceling the
contracts, but prominent actors, mainly the Catholic Archbishop, lobbied for a truce,
because an Eucharistic congress was about to start in Curitiba. A truce for sixty days
was signed that day between the mayor and the bus companies.
If implemented, Mayor Mattos' proposals could have hurt the interests of the
bus companies, who in response through SETPP lobbied the state government to
take control of Curitiba's public transportation sector. This responsibility had been
decentralized to Curitiba in 1952,189 but state law allowed the governor to revert this
transfer of responsibility.190 The governor of ParanA, Mois6s Lupi6n, decreed the
transfer of responsibilities for mass transit on May 2nd, and by the 3rd the State
government and the bus companies agreed to end the lockout without any fare
increase1 91-and without any of Mattos' proposals carried out. By the end of 1960,
however, the state government granted the fare increases the companies wanted.192
Early in 1961 the new governor, Ney Braga, returned the responsibility for mass
transit to Curitiba.193
The events that follow are not clear because authors such as Urban, de
Oliveira, Neves and Per6n et al. offer contradictory accounts. For example, de
Oliveira argues that as a result of the political strife between the bus companies and
the city government during the late 1950s the length of the concessions was extended
to 15 years, until 1974.194 Urban, on the other hand, argues that the concessions were
initially valid for 20 years, until 1974,195 and not for five years as de Oliveira argues.
Neves offers an account whereby in 1962 the bus companies and the city government
amicably agreed to cancel the existing contracts and issue new ones, valid for 5
years, which were constantly renewed-without competitive bids19 6-only to be
cancelled in the mid eighties by Mayor Requi.o. Per6n et al, finally, argues that the
189 Per6n et al. (1975, p. 25).
190 Mazza (1990, p. 55).
191 Per6n et al. (1975, p. 25).
192 Per6n et al. (1975, p. 25); and Urban (1987, p. 41).
193 Mazza (1990, p. 55).
194 De Oliveira (1999, p. 138).
195 Urban (1987, p. 39).
196 Neves (2002, p. 105); and Neves (1995, p. 67-69).
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contracts were issued in 1955 and expired in 1962, and were later on extended until
1974.197
In my fieldwork I was unable to find primary information about these events and
therefore I cannot directly clarify this contradiction in the existing literature in
Portuguese. However, a possible explanation for these contradictions lies in one
characteristic of Curitiba's transportation system-the bus companies have not
changed since their creation in the mid-1950s, except through mergers and
acquisitions, and still exist today.198 Around 1961 the bus companies managed to turn
the "selective" areas into a "principle" that could not be affected or changed by the city
government and much less cancelled.1 99 This move had ample repercussions that
favored the bus companies. First, by turning the "selective" area into a principle that
cannot be modified, the companies became the de facto owners of that share of the
pie for good. Second, because the bus companies are de facto owners of a "selective"
area, the city government has no need-or incentive-to hold truly competitive bids
when it needs to determine who will service a new bus route. Instead, any new bus
route always falls in some "selective" area and there is one company that already
holds the rights to any service in that zone.200
The accounts by de Oliveira, Urban and Neves can therefore be reconciled
when one understands that in Curitiba there is no need to hold competitive bidding for
bus routes, because of the rigidity of the "selective" area principle. Each company has
a share of the market for life. As seen later in this document, even today this principle
is used and there are no competitive bids. However, a formal renewal of the contracts
between the city and the operators is necessary-for public relations reasons at a
minimum-and several have taken place. I therefore accept De Oliveira and Urban's
accounts that the contracts did expire in 1974. Evidence I discuss later tends to
corroborate this.
197 Per6n et al. (1975, p. 20).
198 Brasileiro (1999, p. 471); and Menezes (2001, p. 71).
199 De Oliveira (1987, p.138).
200 Interviews in Curitiba corroborate this. For example, still today the city assigns routes bearing in
mind the selective area principle and in a non-competitive manner as described in the text.
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In the early sixties, the bus companies scored two other victories. First, the
companies succeeded at extending the useful life of the buses, from 5 years as
initially established, to seven, ten and finally twelve years.201 These changes lowered
the capital outlays by the bus companies and extended the period over which the
government had to recognize a return to capital item in the fare structure. Both
increase the profitability of the bus companies. Second, and related, the bus
companies managed to modify the way the city government calculated the fare by
introducing many elements-depreciation, tires, crew costs, etc.-some of which
inflated the true costs of providing the service.202 Further, the fare was different for
each "selective" area to recognize different conditions-amount of paved streets,
etc.2 03
In conclusion, when the bus companies flexed their political muscle in the early
1960s they met with strong opposition from Mayor Mattos. The companies managed
nonetheless to maneuver in different ways-including convincing a governor to
transfer the responsibility for public transportation to the State government-to obtain
what they wanted. In the end, the political strength of the bus companies was
sufficient to make them almost impregnable. The main achievement was to turn the
"selective" areas into a non-modifiable principle. This eliminated competition between
bus companies both for servicing new bus routes and for passengers along a route.
These rigidities seem to leave the city government with few elements to improve the
system-and certainly there was ample room for improvement as I show below. Yet it
would be the policies of the early 1970s that turned began the transformation of
Curitiba's bus transportation for the better. Before explaining these events, however, it
is necessary to describe the comprehensive urban planning exercises in Curitiba,
because they play a central role.
The role of planners
The events above reveal two different situations. First, during Braga's tenure the
government of Curitiba appointed a commission to propose solutions to Curitiba's
201 Mazza (1990, p. 54).
202 De Oliveira (2000, p. 138).
203 As inferred from Ceneviva (1999, p. 187).
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problems regarding public transportation. This commission represents planners in the
account. The commission proposed only one solution-the adoption of "selective"
areas and the consolidation of the operators into 13 bus companies. Unfortunately,
the level of detail is not enough to understand the events. But because the sources
indicate that the solution reached was consensual, my theoretical framework allows
me to argue that there was a minimal interaction between planners, politicians, and
stakeholders. This interaction allowed the government to enact a plan that favored
both operators' interests and broader ones, such as improving the quality of bus
services in Curitiba.
Second, Braga's policies allowed the companies to become powerful. At the
same time, the government of Curitiba does not seem to have developed the required
institutional capacity to match this power. A power imbalance emerged. By 1960 the
bus companies wanted to extend the duration of the concessions, increase the fare,
and extend the useful life of the buses. But absent the institutional capacity in the city
government-i.e. a capable planning team-there was no one to mediate between
the mayor and the bus companies. Mayor Mattos desperately tried to counter the
power of the bus companies but he could not. There seem to be no agency in charge
of interacting with the bus companies. What followed was a deep conflict because
there was no way to reduce the power of the bus companies. The companies
pressured the governor of ParanA to take control of mass transit planning in the city of
Curitiba. The companies then scored a series of victories that increased their
profitability at the expense of the user. In sum, the power imbalance led to a quasi
capture of the government by the bus companies. The results of any policy enacted
under capture are biased in favor of the stakeholder that captures the government.
Hence the image of the bus companies being almost impregnable. Years later, Mayor
Lerner will change around the situation by building capable institution that interacted
with the operators and lowered their power.
The Agache Master Plan and its political demise
Curitiba has had a rather long tradition of land use planning, which dates to the mid-
ninetieth century, when Curitiba became the capital of the newly created state of
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Paran.20 4 During the 1920s and 30s Curitiba experienced a deep recession that
severely limited the ability of the city government to invest in infrastructure and basic
services. In the 1940s, however, the economy of Parana began an accelerated
process of growth thanks to a new export crop, coffee, which made this state one of
the wealthiest in Brazil. The city of Curitiba was also experiencing a rapid population
growth and the elite decided to seek a new plan to reverse the declining trend of the
previous decades. The French architect Alfred Agache, who was famous amongst
others for the master plan for Australia's new capital, Canberra, crafted the new plan,
locally known after him.205
The Agache Plan was approved in 1943 and had as one of its main objectives
to transform the city into a city worthy of being a state capital.20 6 To achieve this the
plan proposed three main lines of work. First, to improve the water and sanitation
network. Second, to build a road network, consisting of radial roads to link the
downtown area to the rest of the city, as well as four concentric ring roads to connect
the radial roads. The plan called for using mostly the already-existing network, but
significant road widening had to take place in many areas. There was also a proposal
for a road that crossed the heart of downtown, using XV of November and Vicente
Machado Streets. The outer-most ring was planned as a 60-meter (180-ft.) parkway
and it was the road that implied the largest purchases of properties. Third, the plan
divided the city into several "functional" zones such as the command, production, and
social functions. The "Centro Cfvico," where the state government would have its
seat, represented the command function.207
Authors such as Cervero and Frausto208 have argued that the Agache Plan
was not implemented, mainly because the city could not afford the large avenues and
infrastructure proposed by the plan. I disagree with both statements. A significant part
204 Menezes (2001, p. 17-64); Nieri (2000, p. 173-175); and Santoro (no date, p. 7-15). Paranc was
?art of the state of Sao Paulo.
05 Menezes (2001, p. 63-65).
206 Boletim PMC (1943, p. 17 and 30-36).
207 Boletim PMC (1943, p. 10 and 17-36). See also Atherino (1991, p. 15-20) for a description of the
Agache plan from the point of view of a planner in charge of implementing it.
Cervero (1998, p. 268); and Frausto (1999, p. 44). Even IPPUC shares this view that it is mostly
financial reasons what explain the partial implementation of the Agache Plan (see IPPUC, 2002, p. 2).
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of the plan was implemented and therefore it was mostly political rather than financial
factors that explain the demise of this play. During Ney Braga's tenure as mayor a
number of streets were widened, including parts of the most active one in the city, XV
of November Street.20 9 Equally important, some of the functional areas were
implemented, the main one being the Centro Civico-with its modernist look, as well
as the main city market.210 The development of the Centro Civico area displaced
many people but once working, it catalyzed the development of the northern area of
the city.211 Underlying the implementation of the Centro Civico was the political push
of Governor Munhoz da Rocha to celebrate in this way Parana's centennial.212
Further, the Agache Plan had a large impact by having introduced urbanism and
planning as concepts that the elite would respect and even quasi-mystify later on.213
The political demise of the Agache Plan took place during the tenure of Mayor
Ivo Arzua (1962-1966). Arzua was part of Braga's party, who was then the governor
of Paran,, and had been chosen as candidate by a small group headed by governor
Braga.21 4 Arzua implemented two main reforms, one administrative and one fiscal.
The first changed the structure of the city government. For example, the Department
of Public Transportation disappeared and the newly created Department of
Concessions and Permissions assumed its functions. The second reform improved
the financial shape of the government of Curitiba in a dramatic manner. Tax revenue
grew at a faster pace than debt and administrative expenses (columns 1 and 2 in
Table 5), which freed resources for investment in public works.
Nieri (2000, p. 173-4) argues that little of the Agache plan was implemented but offers no specific
reason.
209 Braga (1990, p. 3); and Menezes (2001, p. 67). Other avenues that the city government widened as
part of the implementation of the Agache Plan were 7th of September, Visconde de Guarapuava and
Floriano Peixoto. These roads were used in the 1970s for the bus rapid transit system, based on the
trinary road concept.
210 Braga (1997, p. 23 and 25); Nieri (2000, p. 173-4); Menezes (2001, p. 67); and de Oliveira (2000, p.
51).
211 Valduga (1991, p. 95).
212 Brandao (1991, p. 6).
213 Menezes (2001, p. 72); and Coelho (1974, p. 23).
214 Interview by author with Karlos Rischbieter, April 2003.
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During the campaign, Arzua had promised to review the Agache Plan, but he
did not intend to change it for a different one2 15 -as it happened in effect. The review
seemed necessary because some of the plan's main tenets were becoming
outdated-e.g. the idea of building ring roads-and land use controls had not
managed to orient urban growth in the way the plan wanted.216 One of the first steps
by Arzua in his attempt to review the Agache Plan was to create a new agency in
charge of urban renewal, URBS.217 Arzua appointed Luiz Garcez, an urban engineer
who had worked under Mayor Braga and a faculty member at the Federal University
of Parana, as the director of URBS.218
Table 5. Fiscal indicators for the City of Curitiba, 1959-1973.
(1) (2)
Year Public debt/total revenue Administrative expenses/total revenue
(%) (%)
1959 99.9 53.0
1960 97.7 49.6
1961 86.8 50.1
1962 93.7 53.9
1963 71.2 56.8
1964 55.9 44.6
1965 63.7 42.7
1966 51.5 41.4
1967 N.A. 33.1
1968 N.A. 28.8
1969 15.8 21.4
1970 12.8 21.8
1971 20.3 35.9
1972 35.0 36.3
1973 36.3 47.8
Source: Coelho (1974, p. 41-42). N.A. = not available. The higher the value of column 1, the worse off
is the financial situation of the city for it has to devote a large share of revenue to debt payments,
leaving little for investment. Analogously, the higher the value of column 2, the less funds are available
for investment because administrative expenses consume a higher share of revenue.
Garcez proposed to build a viaduct for car traffic that was to run between two
of the main squares in downtown Curitiba-Praga Tiradentes and Praga Carlos
2 1 5 Arzua (1989, p. 4-5); Menezes (2001, p. 75); and Coelho (1974, p. 31). Arzua in his inaugural
address in March of 1962 announced he intended to review and update the Agache Plan (Coelho
(1974, p. 15).
16 Menezes (2001, p. 70-72); and Santoro (no date, p. 16).
217 Menezes (2001, p. 75); and Coelho (1974, p. 15). URBS is the Urbanization Company of Curitiba.
2 18 Arzua (1989, p. 10); Coelho (1974, p. 32).
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Gomez.21 9 The viaduct would go above XV of November Street, which the Agache
Plan wanted to turn into one of the main thoroughfares in the city. While from a traffic
perspective Garcez's proposal might have made sense, it should be clear that its
aesthetic impact in the heart of downtown could have been highly negative. Garcez
also convinced Arzua to widen other streets, in line with the Agache Plan, such as 7 th
of September, XV of November, and Marechal Deodoro, among others.220 These
proposals triggered a two-pronged political reaction that ultimately led to the crafting
and adoption of a new plan.
First was the reaction by a group of young engineers and architects221--among
others Jaime Lerner, Lubomir Ficinski, Luis Netto, Jose Maria Gandolfi, and Marcos
Prado.222 This group had been meeting periodically to discuss urban issues and
Curitiba's urban future in light of the public works announced by the mayor's office.
Lerner, for example, had been active writing op-ed pieces for newspapers with urban
planning analysis and proposals.22 3 During 1963 the group reached the conclusion
that Curitiba needed a new plan and the guidelines in the Agache Plan would not
serve well Curitiba's future.224 As Lerner told Menezes: "The Plans that Curitiba had
were passive: zoning, some guidelines for the road network...It was never an
inductive planning, one that would guide growth, one that would define urban growth. I
always had the idea that planning ought to be to achieve change."225
Luiz Garcez occasionally met with the group and could not defend his own
proposals and therefore proposed to take the group to meet the mayor to discuss its
conclusions.22 6 Mayor Arzua was receptive and seemingly allowed this group to start
working at the Urban Planning Department. These planners continued lobbying for a
219 F. Rischbieter (1990, p. 3); and K. Rischbieter (1990, p. 15).
22 0 Auriquio (1990, p. 4); and F. Rischbieter (1990, p. 3).
221 At the time, the University of Parana was about to graduate the first course in architecture. Students
of engineering could transfer to architecture and enter directly into the third year. Most of the people in
this group were either part of this group of had finished engineering and then started architecture once
the university opened this program, as was the case of Jaime Lerner, who had just completed studies
in Europe (Menezes, 2001, p. 75; and Ficinski, 1990, p.14).
222 Netto (1991, p. 53); and Ficinski (1990, p. 14-15).
223 Coelho (1991, p. 191).
224 Ficinski (1990, p. 14-15); Coelho (1974, p. 32-34); and Netto (1991, p. 53-54).
225 Menezes (2001, p. 76, translation by author).
226 Ficinski (1990, p. 14-15); Interview by author with Lubomir Ficinski in April 2003; and Forte Netto
(1991, p. 53-54).
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new plan and managed to convince the Urban Planning Department of contracting out
an update of the Agache Plan. The Sao Paulo firm SERETE submitted the only
proposal. While the appraising committee considered it technically sound, the
committee reported that the state development agency, CODEPAR,227 was willing to
finance a more comprehensive planning exercise without any cost for the
municipality. 22 8
CODEPAR was in fact the second source of opposition to the public works
announced by Arzua's administration and it had the financial muscle to achieve its
will. Karlos Rischbieter, a civil engineer and who had attended some architecture
courses, headed the Project Unit of CODEPAR and was married to Francisca
Rischbieter. Francisca was an advisor to the Urban Planning Department under Arzua
and had worked for Mayor Braga.22 9 Francisca Rischbieter and the Planning
Department, headed by Theodocio Atherino, sympathized with the need for an update
of the plan.230 Further, the young group of engineers and architects who wanted a
new plan had met with Karlos Rischbieter and asked him to finance a new plan for
Curitiba.23 1 Not surprisingly, when Arzua went to Karlos Rischbieter's office to seek
funding for the controversial road projects of his administration, Rischbieter
questioned the mayor about the choice of roads. Rischbieter argued that a
comprehensive evaluation of the projects was needed, which entailed a new
comprehensive plan.23 2
Arzua argued that Curitiba already had the Agache Plan and that it did not
need a new one.233 Arzua went to Ney Braga's office to complain about Rischbieter's
227 CODEPAR is the Economic Development Company of ParanA and was the first regional financing
entity in Brazil. It helped finance basic infrastructure projects (roads, sanitation, telephone, etc.) to the
municipalities of the state (Braga, 1997 p. 27).
228 Coelho (1974, p. 33).
229 Menezes (2001, p. 77); K. Rischbieter (1990, p 13-15); and interview by author with Karlos
Rischbieter.
230 Atherino (1991, p. 20-21); and F. Rischbieter (1990, p. 3-4). Mrs. Francisca Rischbieter later on
became one of the main allies of Lerner and actively participated in Lerner's administration. She
passed away in 1989. The Botanical Garden of Curitiba is named after her. See also Forte Netto (1991,
. 53-54).
interview by author with Lubomir Ficinski, April 2003.
232 F. Rischbieter (1990, p. 3), K. Rischbieter (1990, p. 15), and Auriquio (1990, p. 40 and Interview by
author with Karlos Rischbieter by author April 2003.
233 Auriquio (1990, p. 4).
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attitude. Braga, the governor of Parana and the creator of CODEPAR, strongly
believed in planning.234 Braga wanted Parana's capital to set an example for the other
municipalities in the state235 and easily supported Rischbieter's position.23 6 Arzua,
however, was still not convinced about the need for a new plan. CODEPAR then
started to flex its financial muscle to press Arzua to accept the idea of crafting a new
plan. For example, a couple of months later CODEPAR conditioned the release of
funds for the widening of Marechal Floriano Street to the realization of a new
comprehensive urban planning exercise. Further, CODEPAR established the same
condition for helping Curitiba with its intent to attract industries. Finally, CODEPAR
offered to finance 100 percent of the cost of doing the new urban plan.237 Arzua's
opposition to the new planning exercise was mostly on financial grounds. Once
CODEPAR offered to finance the entire cost of the study, Arzua was left with little
reasons to oppose it and many to support it, more so in light of the strong support for
the idea of crafting a new plan.
In conclusion, two years into Arzua's administration the Agache plan faced
insurmountable political opposition and the decision to draft a new plan had been
taken. The Agache Plan had been implemented slowly. Indeed, widening many
streets and even building the Centro Civico-which entailed displacing many
residents-had been politically possible. It was only when Arzua and Garcez's
proposals threatened to disrupt the downtown of Curitiba that a group of planners
mobilized to stop these works with the argument that a new plan was needed. These
planners, as the account shows later on, were particularly focused on the functional
and aesthetic importance of downtown for Curitiba and maneuvered to gain support
for their idea of having a new plan. Karlos Rischbieter and the powerful CODEPAR
supported this position and flexed their financial muscle to obtain a new plan.
Opposite to the Agache Plan, the new plan had de facto in some of its crafters a small
political movement-whose genesis took place in these events. From now on this
234 See Braga (1997). Braga also believed in the ideas of Economics and Humanism of Father Lebret
SMenezes, 2001, p. 74).
5 Menezes (2001, p. 72-78).
236 interview by author with Karlos Rischbieter, April 2003.
237 Coelho (1974, p. 33-34 and Menezes (2001, p. 77).
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group maneuvered in different ways to achieve influence and ultimately implement the
plan, as I show below.
Finally, an historical note is in order. On April 1 st 1964 the Brazilian military lead
a coup d'etat against democratically elected president Joao Goulart. While the military
originally intended to restore democracy in 1967, they remained in power until
1985.238 The military allowed the elections for governor to take place in 1965/66, but
they abolished by 1966 the elections for mayors of state capitals.239 Ivo Arzua was
appointed by the governor and confirmed by the state legislature as mayor for the
1966-1970. He resigned in 1967.240
The role of planners
Arzua created URBS in part to implement the Agache Plan, but URBS' first actions
generated opposition by a group of planners that included Jaime Lerner. The plan did
not change in light of these demands. These planners, and other interests, cared
about the negative impacts of implementing aspects of the plan in downtown. Absent
any changes to aspects of the plan the opponents resorted to opposing the entire
plan. Lerner and his fellow planners argued that the entire Agache Plan was no longer
a valid solution for Curitiba. In parallel, they offered an alternative solution, which was
to craft a new master plan. Indeed, planners that oppose a plan or policy tend to
follow this two-pronged approach-the plan is not a good solution and here is a better
alternative. Further, Lerner and his fellow planners had to maneuver to create the
conditions for drafting the new plan they wanted. These maneuvers entailed building a
coalition in support of the new plan. Planners brought agencies such as CODEPAR,
which had the financial resources to fund the new planning exercise, and interests
related to downtown into this coalition. In the end, these planners had to reduce the
power of the key decision-maker, Mayor Arzua, who thought the Agache Plan only
238 Bueno (2002, chaps. 33 and 34).
239 De Oliveira (2000, p. 79); Fernandez (1991, p. 47); de Novaes (1997, p. 153); and as inferred from
Willis, Garman, and Haggard (1998).
240 Arzua (1989, p. 1).
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needed small revisions. Thanks to the strength of the coalition, Arzua eventually
agreed to carry out a new planning exercise. 241
241 Authors such as Cervero (1998); Rabinovitch (1992 and 1996); Rabinovitch and Leitman (1993 and
1996); and Frausto (1999) consider the 1965 Master Plan as a critical element in Curitiba's evolution.
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Chapter 3
Crafting a New Urban Master Plan and then a Transport
Plan
By 1964 Mayor Arzua was convinced of the convenience of allowing a new planning
exercise to proceed. This had been the result of the successful political mobilization of
planners who wanted the city to abandon the Agache Plan and to adopt a new master
plan. This group of planners-Lerner, Ficinski, Netto, Gandolfi, etc.-entered the
public scene in Curitiba from this point onwards. These planners participated in the
crafting of the plan and became members of the new city agency in charge of
implementing the plan. The new plan had in these planners a small but effective
political movement that supported the adoption of the plan and that worked towards
this end. But for this to happen, planners needed to wait for the right opportunity,
which came with the appointment of Jaime Lerner as mayor of Curitiba. In this chapter
I describe the crafting of the master plan, or Director Plan, and discuss some of the
events that followed and that led to the writing of other plans for example in mass
transportation. In the next chapter I analyze the events once Lerner was appointed.
The Planning Exercises of 1965
In July 1964 the municipality invited consulting firms to bid for the new planning study.
The decision was to have a preliminary plan and not a Director Plan-as a
comprehensive plan is known in Brazil-because of cost and timeline issues.242 Arzua
was interested in having the new plan produced during his tenure, even if throughout
this stage he was still not fully convinced that he would like the final outcome. To his
advantage was the freedom of telling his constituents that the plan had anyway been
CODEPAR's gift if, for whatever reason, he rejected it.243
Of the firms that submitted a proposal, four are of interest for the purposes of
my research because of the actors involved. A consortium of two firms, Serete and
242 Coelho (1974, p. 10-13, 16, and 44-46).
243 Fernandez (1991, p. 31).
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Jorge Wilheim Architects, both from Sao Paulo, submitted the winning proposal.24 4
The second bidder was Sagmacs, or Society of Graphic and Mechanic-graphic
Analyses Applied to Social Complexes.245 Sagmacs had had a significant influence in
the state of Parana by helping to build a strong support for planning as a way of
promoting economic and human development. Sagmacs followed the "Economy and
Humanism" principles of the French priest Lebret. Father Lebret had worked in Brazil
in the 1940s and 1950s, and had influenced the ideology-toward one more centered
on humanity-of many future planners and leaders, including Saul Raiz, a future
mayor of Curitiba.246 Sagmacs had also written in 1963 the Development Plan of
ParanA for Governor Ney Braga-who was one of the converts to strongly believing in
planning.24 7
The next two proponents were directly or indirectly linked to Luiz Garcez, the
head of URBS at the time. In fact, URBS was one of the proponents. Garcez had
been head of the City Planning Department under Arzua, and had proposed with
others the creation of Curitiba's Planning Commission in 1960. He thought that URBS
could do the job of writing the new preliminary plan.248 The last firm was Urplan a firm
that included Jaime Lerner, Luis Forte Neto, Jose Maria Gandolfi and the other
members of the original group that I mentioned above, together with other
specialists.2 49 Garcez was linked to this proponent because of his friendship with
Netto and others in this group.2 50 Further, Netto and Gandolfi had worked with
Wilheim in SAo Paulo.251 Unsurprisingly, Wilheim later on hired this firm to do some of
244 Coelho (1974, p. 46); and Menezes (2001, p. 78).
245 In Portuguese Sociedade de Anlises Grdficas e Mecanograficas Aplicadas aos Complexos
Sociais.
246 Menezes (2001, p. 72-74); and Fernandez (1990, p. 72). Saul Raiz was mayor of Curitiba between
1975 and 1979, right in between Jaime Lerner's first two terms as mayor. Raiz studied in France with
Father Lebret. According to Raiz, one of the main tenets of the "Economy and Humanism" view was
that people had to be integrated into the planning process and that the ruler or planner had to be
sensitive enough to listen and convince people in an inherently interactive process. Interview by author
with Saul Raiz in April 2003.
247 Menezes (2001, p. 74); and Brasileiro (1999, p. 473). For a general description of Lebret's work and
influence in Parana and Brazil see Carneiro (1991).
248 Coelho (1974, p. 46-47).
249 Netto (1991, p. 53-54).
250 Coelho (1974, p. 50-51).
251 Netto (1991, p. 54); and Wilheim (1990, p. 28).
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the information gathering needed for the planning exercise and Wilheim even called
some of its members to participate in the local "accompanying group".2 52/ 253
CODEPAR had demanded that a local accompanying group worked together
with the consultants,254 to achieve two objectives. Formally, the intent was to have a
local team that would know the plan by having participated in its conception and that
could be responsible for its administration and continuity. Politically, however, the
local accompanying group can be interpreted as an attempt to appease opposition to
the planning exercise within the city government. Not only Garcez and his URBS, but
also the Urban Planning Department and other local planners-and even the media-
distrusted the idea of having a firm from Sao Paulo do the plan. A firm that, they
argued, would not be aware of the local conditions and which might try to tackle the
problem in a generic fashion.2 55
The local accompanying group, therefore, had representation from several city
agencies, the main one being the Urban Planning Department. This agency had
nurtured as well expectations that it would write the plan, but once this option was
discarded it expected to be the agency in charge of the plan once it was completed.2 56
Among the most relevant members of the accompanying group because of their past
and future actions were Jaime Lerner, Jose Maria Gandolfi, Luis Forte Neto, Lubomir
Ficinski-from the original group of planners in 1963-, Francisca Rischbieter, Dolcia
Auriquio, Almir Fernandez, and Onaldo Pinto257 among others. Saul Raiz is also listed
as a member of this team,258 but while he participated in many discussions, he was
not as involved. 59 Jaime Lerner and Saul Raiz later on became mayors of Curitiba
252 Netto (1991, p. 55); and Coelho (1974, p. 51).
253 The two other firms that submitted a proposal were Asplan and M.M. Roberto Architects (Menezes
2001, p. 78).
54 Coelho (1974, p. 48); and Fernandez (1990, p. 71). See also F. Rischbieter (1990); and Auriquio
(1 990).
255 Coelho (1974, p. 48-51).
256 Coelho (1974, p. 50-51).
257 F. Rischbieter (1990, p. 5); Monteiro (1991, p. 71); and Serete-Wilheim (1965, p iv).
258 Serete-Wilheim (1965, p iv).
259 Raiz (1990, p. 56-7).
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and were in charge of the implementation of the plan.260 Both drew some of their main
collaborators from this group.
In February of 1965 Serete/Wilheim and the local accompanying group started
to work in the preliminary plan for Curitiba.2 61 The Sao Paulo consultants worked in
that city and every two weeks went to Curitiba to interact with the local accompanying
group and discuss the proposals they made.262 Wilheim, the leading urban planner,
tried to understand the city and its growth pattern to launch proposals that would not
introduce dramatic changes if implemented-Curitiba was already growing linearly263
(see figure N). Conflict soon developed, however, between Wilheim and some of the
members of the accompanying group, mostly Onaldo Pinto. Pinto thought Wilheim's
proposal was just the Agache Plan with different terms-such as the later-on famous
structural axis, for defining a radial road.264
Theodocio Atherino, head of the Urban Planning Department, did not agree
with Wilheim's proposals either. De facto going against the mayor, he asked the
faculty of the Department of Architecture of the Federal University of Paran, (UFPR)
to write an alternative plan. Gustavo Monteiro, Luiz Garcez, and Onaldo Pinto-all
three among the faculty-started to write an alternative plan. Garcez, probably
because of his role as URBS' president soon left the group,2 65 but Pinto remained
working both in the alternative plan and as part of the accompanying group. This
allowed Pinto and even Monteiro to participate in the debates that took place in the
planning team, where each side analyzed the other's proposals and criticized them. At
one point, the part of the accompanying group working with Wilheim suggested to
unify the two proposals, because both had good things. Pinto rejected the proposal
arguing that it would be like mixing water and oil-impossible. Not surprisingly, the
proposal to unify the two plans was abandoned and the group formally chose
260 Moreover, Lerner will be elected twice the governor of Parana and Raiz will ran once for governor in
1982.
261 Coelho (1974, p. 16).
262 F. Rischbieter (1990, p. 4).
263 See Wilheim (1990, p. 29-30); Serete-Wilheim (1965, p. 163), and Raiz (1990, p. 56-7).
264 See Pinto (1990, p. 43-45).
265 Monteiro (1991, p. 71-72).
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Wilheim's plan 26 6 -the one they had been working on. By June of 1965 both
Wilheim's team and Monteiro and Pinto had finished their respective plans.2 67
The main proposals in Wilheim's preliminary plan were to allow the downtown
to grow mostly through densification and slightly toward the Batel area, to the
southwest of downtown.2 68 Second, the plan proposed to build two structural axes, as
these corridors are locally known, to promote the densification of the residential
areas 269-- something that was already taking place (see Figure 2). The structural axes
were to be tangential to downtown and were expected to link downtown to a set of
secondary centers2 7 0 (Figure 3). The plan called for building a ring road around
downtown to handle slow-speed traffic. Because of the new traffic pattern that this
ring created, the plan proposed the pedestrianization of XV of November Street and
other streets in the heart of downtown.271 Wilheim's plan also called for allowing
higher densities in certain areas, with the highest residential densities being along the
structural axes.272 Curitiba's overall density was remarkably low and planners wanted
to increase its density among others to lower the cost of urban service delivery.273
Finally, Wilheim's preliminary plan rejected the idea of allowing urban development to
take place to the southeast of the main federal highway that crossed Curitiba, BR-
2,274 in the Boqueir&o area. The main concern was that the area was prone to flooding
and the land had a low value.27 5
266 Pinto (1990, 46-49).
267 Coelho (1974, p. 16); and Pinto (1990 p. 49).
268 Serete-Wilheim (1965, p. 147).
2 6 9 Wilheim (1990, p. 29); and Serete-Wilheim (1965, p. 146-147, 150-154).
2 7 0 Serete-Wilheim (1965, p. 154 and 163).
271 Incidentally, this last proposal made Mayor Arzua nervous when he saw it, because the city
government was purchasing properties to expand XV of November Street. Arzua feared a backlash
from the public because the original intention was to turn this street into a main thoroughfare following
the Agache Plan. Wilheim replied to Arzua that instead of having a street (calgada) for pedestrians, the
city would have a very-wide-street for pedestrian (calgadao) (Wilheim (1990, p. 30 and 55-56).
272 Serete-Wilheim (1965, p. 150-154).
273 Serete-Wilheim (1965, p. xii-xiii, 84 and 146). While densification along these corridors did occur
once the structural axes were implemented, the axes concentrate a smaller share of the city's
population. In 1970 the corridors where the structural lines were built concentrated 35% of the home in
Curitiba. But by 1990 this figure was down to 29 and was expected to drop to 27% by 2020 (Smith and
Raemaekers, 1998, p. 238).
274 This highway is currently known as BR-116.
275 Serete-Wilheim (1965, p. 147); and Wilheim (1990, p. 32).
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Figure 2. Densification along linear axis in Curitiba before the Director Plan
o Centro principal dosenvolve-lfp' Et5vontaneamente d.f' forme. nlon~lllda, pAralela ft
Run XV de NoveG'lbro. Estn linlt .. ridnd" l'nellita a eoloeaeao d. vi .. " r,.pidlla que L
o tAnsenc.il!tm :sem cruztl-lo.
Source: Serete-Wilheim (1965, no page number).
Note: the caption reads ''The main center is spontaneously developing linearly, parallel to the
XV of November Street. This linearity facilitates the implementation of high-speed roads
tangent to it [downtown] without crossing it.
Figure 3. Wilheim's proposal for the structural axes
Source: Serete-Wilheim (1965, no page number).
70
Wilheim's plan has a strong flavor toward favoring car-based transport, because of
the main characteristics of the structural axes and because of its lack of attention to
mass transit, except for brief mentions of an eventual metro system.276 Regarding the
structural axes, Wilheim's plan called for roads with a constant width and with two
lanes for high-speed traffic and one for slow traffic in each direction. Further, the
structural axes "will be crossed by transversal viaducts and no traffic lights will be
needed."277 The plan also reserved space in the structural axes for an eventual metro
line, but does not elaborate much further.278 To join the two structural axes, the plan
proposed to build an elevated road that would have required demolishing entire
blocks in downtown Curitiba.279 Finally, the plan advocated for reorganizing traffic
flows to increase car-speed by creating alternating one-way streets.280 With the
exception of the plan to pedestrianize XV of November Street, the measures
proposed in the plan go against pedestrian flow safety while favoring car-based
transport.2 81 The structural axes, for example, resemble a parkway for high-speed
travel by car and certainly required wide space and substantial land takings. Because
of this, the cost of the plan was so high that the planners recognized the plan was
under-financed. 2 8 2
Pinto and Monteiro's plan shared with Wilheim's proposal the idea of having
two structural axes, only that the chosen alignments were radically different. Both of
Wilheim's axes ran from downtown, one towards the northeast of the city and the
276 Because of the level of detail I go into, I am able to trace the changes from the Preliminary Plan to
the Director Plan and then to what was eventually implemented. These changes are a central part of
my analysis. Other pieces in English on Curitiba's history tend to group these changes as part of the
original plan. While Curitiba today favors mass transit, the original plan did not mention it in major detail
and to the contrary it seemed to favor car-based transport.
277 Serete-Wilheim (1965, p. 155).
278 In this regard, the planners thought the heavy rail line would be needed by the year 2000 and the
needed capacity would be of 60,000 passengers per hour. The planners do emphasize, however, that
the heavy rail option needs to be compared with other alternatives including bus-based options, but
they do no elaborate much (see Serete-Wilheim, 1965, p. 208). The planners argued that a heavy rail
line would be needed because their population projections indicated that Curitiba would have 3.5
million inhabitants by 2000 (Serete-Wilheim, 1965, p. 147). Curitiba's population is estimated to be
around 1.6 million in 2000 (Santoro, no date, p. 16), less than half the planners' original projection.
279 Serete-Wilheim (1965, p. 150-154 and 197-202).
280 Serete-Wilheim (1965, p. 156).
281 During my fieldwork in Curitiba I could experience this first hand. The proposal to create alternating
one-way streets was implemented and has endured. Cars indeed can achieve very high speeds and
pedestrians have to be very careful when crossing a street.
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other toward the southeast-without crossing BR-2, the main interstate highway.
Monteiro and Pinto chose precisely BR-2 as one of their structural axes-under the
correct assumption that the federal government had plans to build a new highway
outside of Curitiba (Figure 4). The second axis was on Marechal Floriano Peixoto
Avenue and it would connect downtown to the Boqueiro area in the southeast-the
one that Wilheim considered inadequate for urbanization. The Floriano Av. axis
continued to the north and while it used a few existing streets it implied demolishing a
number of properties. Monteiro and Pinto conceived the structural axes as
"parkways," and, as Wilheim's axes, the traffic would face no interruption thanks to
grade-separated intersections.283 The plan also proposed to increase significantly the
density of Curitiba, particularly along the structural axes.284 Monteiro and Pinto were
against making pedestrian only XV of November Street.2 85
In short, by June 1965 Mayor Arzua had two preliminary plans to choose from.
Arzua was not necessarily in favor of either and was hesitant to decide which one to
adopt. Moreover, the Institute of Engineering of Paran. had published Monteiro and
Pinto's plan286 and the press had taken issue, among others, with Wilheim and the
main consultants in his team being from Sdo Paulo.28 7 Arzua acting as a politician
interested in his political future, decided to organize a seminar where CODEPAR's
plan-as the mayor dubbed it-would be presented to the public for discussion2 88 and
the seminar "will accept any other plan submitted for discussion."289 Arzua baptized
the seminar as "Curitiba of Tomorrow" and in a sound marketing act dubbed July the
"Urbanism Month." This was the first time in Brazil that a draft plan was to be
282 See Serete-Wilheim (1965, p. 197).
283 Monteiro and Pinto (1965, p. 5-14).
284 Monteiro and Pinto (1965, p. 6-7 and 19); and Pinto (1990, p. 51).
285 Pinto (1990, p. 50-51).
286 Pinto (1990, p. 51); and Monteiro and Pinto (1965). I1 want to thank Capt. Onaldo Pinto Jr. who gave
a copy of this publication. Mr. Onaldo Pinto Sr. passed away in 2000.
28 7 Wilheim (1990, p. 31); Coelho (1974, p. 52-53); and Monteiro (1991, p. 75).
288 Coelho (1974, p. 52-53); Wilheim (1990, p. 31).
289 Wilheim (1990, p. 31). Arzua was not bluffing. Press accounts at the time report with some surprise
how two instead of one plan were being submitted for presentation and discussion (see Gazeta do
Povo, Editorial note for July 9th 1965).
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discussed in public.29o Wilheim knew the situation was political and not technical and
praised the mayor for his decision.291
Figure 4. Pinto and Monteiro's proposal for the structural axes
PRANCHA 4
Source: Monteiro and Pinto (1965, p. 12).
Choosing a Plan: the Curitiba of Tomorrow Seminar
The need to subject the urban plan sponsored by CODEPAR-Wilheim's plan-to
public hearings was a political imperative, more so given Mayor Arzua's own doubts
about the convenience of the plan. In the end, because the funding for the plan was
not from the city government but from CODEPAR, Arzua could reject the plan without
major political costS.292 Moreover, there were in reality two plans and Arzua was
aware of that.293 Arzua justified the seminar by using a statement by John Friedman,
a rather famous U.S. urban planner: liThe planner is far from being God, who drives
mortals towards his inscrutable goals. The public interest must be found in the public.
290 Coelho (1974, p. 52).
291 Wilheim (1990, p. 31).
292 Coelho (1974, p. 53); and Fernandez (1990, p. 30).
293 Pinto (1990, p. 49); Monteiro and Pinto (1965, p. 4); Monteiro (1991, p. 75).
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The public must approve its own future."294 Arzua years later explained how he
understood Friedman's statement: "I could not impose, on my brothers in Curitiba, an
idea of mine saying that their future or their family's future had to be like this or like
that. It is necessary to listen to the people to see where they want to go, in general
terms. It is evident that in merely technical questions the technical concept should
prevail."2 95 In other words, in spite of the military dictatorship at the federal level in
Brazil, Arzua kept thinking as an elected politician2 96 who needed to have minimum
consultations before making a decision.
The seminar took place in the context of the "Urbanism Month," in which the
major's office had published Wilheim's plan, including a land use map and the section
where Wilheim advocated for the creation of a separate unit within the city
government. This unit was to be in charge of finalizing the plan and of leading the
implementation of the plan.297 The seminar took place in seven different sessions,
geared toward different parts of the public opinion.298 Most of the sessions targeted
the economic and intellectual elite of Curitiba-the Institute of Engineering of Parana,
the Chamber of Commerce of Paran., the Federal University of Paran., to name a
few. Two of the sessions targeted blue-collar workers and were held at the offices of a
local union and at a community center.299
In one of the first sessions, which took place at the Institute of Engineering of
Parana, Monteiro and Pinto presented their plan first to an audience of 500 engineers
and it was well received. The next presentation was by Wilheim and his planners.300
Wilheim had decided he would not do the presentation of the plan. Rather, it would be
the junior planners of the accompanying group who would. Wilheim did this to help
these planners appropriate and become responsible for the plan's future.301 These
planners did not do a good job the first time they presented the plan. This bothered
Pinto who took it as a lack of professionalism, and begun to ask tough questions and
294 Arzua (1989, p. 6, translation by author).
295 Arzua (1989, p. 6, translation by author).
296 Fernandez (1991, p. 47).
297 Coelho (1974, p. 52); and Serete and Wilheim (1965, p. 190).
298 Brasileiro (1999, p. 582).
299 Coelho (1974, p. 53-54); and Arzua (1989, p. 7-8).
300 Monteiro (1991, p. 75).
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criticize the content of the plan.302 Yet the situation created by Pinto-who did not
allow the presentation to proceed-became uncomfortable for all involved. After this,
Monteiro decided that it was not convenient to continue presenting their plan and
together with Pinto cancelled their participation in the seminar.30 3 The day after this
incident Pinto was excluded from the accompanying group and sent back to his
normal job in a city agency.304 Pinto, moreover, seemed not to have understood the
political importance of the hearings, which were not so much to analyze a technical
plan but to legitimize it in political terms. Years later he wrote: "what could a
businessman, even if successful, discuss about an urban plan?"305 Pinto and
Monteiro's plan was no longer an alternative for consideration in the Seminar-only
Wilheim's plan remained.
As the Curitiba of Tomorrow seminar progressed, Mayor Arzua changed his
attitude toward the plan, in part because he went to all the sessions. Fernandez, a
planner who was part of the accompanying group, said later on: "In that process that
lasted a month, we [the planners who wrote the plan] were able to explain and debate
the Plan, understand criticisms and absorb them, and at the end the owner of the plan
was Ivo Arzua."306 In this regard, in the session at the labor union, the planners found
it hard to explain Wilheim's plan to this group of people because the planners kept
using planners' jargon. It was Mayor Arzua, also an engineer, who found the way to
explain the technical concepts in the plan to this audience.307 The planners took this
as a sign that the mayor had decided to adopt their plan and had become a keen
supporter. 30 8
This support by major Arzua aggravated a conflict that was taking place
between three agencies or groups within the city government-the Urban Planning
Department, URBS, and the accompanying group. All three wanted to become the
agency responsible for the plan, which included writing the final version of the plan
301 Wilheim (1990, p. 35).
302 Pinto (1990, p. 49).
303 Monteiro (1991, p. 75).
304 Pinto (1990, p. 49).
305 Pinto (1990, p. 50).
306 Fernandez (1991, p. 31).
307 Coelho (1974, p. 54).
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and then participating in its implementation. Theodocio Atherino, head of the Urban
Planning Department, always thought that his agency was the natural place for having
the plan. Atherino, however, had argued before that there was no need for outside
consultants. Atherino, moreover, had spearheaded the initiation of Monteiro and
Pinto's plan309-- which at this point was politically dead given Monteiro and Pinto's
decision to withdraw the plan from consideration at the Seminar. Garcez, the head of
URBS, saw an opportunity to financially and functionally strengthen his agency by
being in charge of the plan.310 Finally, the accompanying group had participated in the
crafting of the plan, which said that the preferred option was to have a new agency in
charge of the plan. This new organization would be advisory to the mayor and would
rank above all other city agencies in order to advice them and evaluate how their
policies fitted the new master plan.311 At the crux of the conflict, therefore, was the
issue of organizational survival, because being in charge of the new plan could bring
resources and prestige for whichever agency became in charge.
The members of the accompanying group wanted Mayor Arzua to adopt their
plan without having consulted the Urban Planning Department or any other city
agency on the contents of the plan. Atherino opposed this view and wanted the mayor
to make the decision after his agency had produced a professional concept. When the
mayor adopted the plan without this concept, Atherino resigned, close to the end of
the Seminar.312 The path was open for the creation of a new agency. During the
Seminar, participants repeatedly asked the mayor about this new agency that would
be in charge of the plan-as the publication of the plan advocated. Mayor Arzua
initially did not know that part of the plan and often gave contradictory answers. But by
the last session he was convinced that a new agency was the best option and
announced the creation of APPUC-Advisory for Urban Research and Planning of
Curitiba. 3 13
308 Fernandez (1991, p. 31).
309 Coelho (1974, p. 55-56).
310 F. Rischbieter (1990, p. 5).
311 Serete and Wilheim (1965, p. 190).
312 Coelho (1974, p. 55).
313 Coelho (1974, p. 54); and Fernandez (1991, p. 33). I use the acronym in Portuguese, APPUC,
which stands for Assessoria de Pesquisa e Planejamento Urbano de Curitiba.
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In conclusion, thanks to the Seminar, Wilheim and the accompanying group
convinced Mayor Arzua that their plan was good enough to be adopted and scored an
additional victory when Arzua created APPUC and yet another one when APPUC
received the planning functions of the Urban Planning Department.314 Crucial in this
effort was that the Seminar allowed open participation by the public. Arzua had
emphasized to his planners that they had to answer the questions directly or if they
could not, they should mail a response later on or even meet with the person.315
These actions seemed to have contributed to legitimizing the planning exercise, as
was the fact that the plan was preliminary and not definitive. The audience believed
that more than being informed about an already-adopted public policy they could
actually question it and influence the final outcome.3 6 In effect, the preliminary plan
did suffer some changes, such as the creation of an historic district and the prohibition
to urbanize flood-prone areas, among others.317 The press also reviewed the Plan in
increasingly favorable terms as the Seminar progressed.318 All this contributed to de-
legitimizing those who opposed the plan on the grounds that an alien team from Sao
Paulo had written it and that it had been written behind close walls.3 1 9 The plan was
now close to becoming Curitiba's plan.
While some authors claim that thanks to the Seminar the preliminary plan was
on very political solid territory I disagree.320 Coelho for example argues that "the
seminar established for future mayors a public and irreversible commitment with the
intent of planning and with the guidelines of the plan itself."321 Coelho's statement has
to be seen in the context that Curitiba's political elite was very receptive to planning,
particularly as how planning tools could help its objective of attracting capital and
promoting economic growth.322 In this sense, it is clear that the seminar achieved the
objective of legitimizing the planning exercise with that elite and a couple of other
3 14 Coelho (1974, p. 57).
315 Arzua (1989, p. 8).
316 Fernandez (1991, p. 32).
317 Arzua (1989, p. 11-12).
318 Gazeta do Povo, various issues July 1965.
319 Coelho (1974, p. 56); and Menezes (2001, p. 81-82).
320 See Coelho (1974, p. 55-56); and Brasileiro (1999, p. 474-476).
321 Coelho (1974, p. 56).
322 See de Oliveira (2000, p. 42-44).
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actors. For Mayor Arzua the seminar was particularly important because once he saw
the elite approved the plan he decided to adopt it. However, even under these highly
favorable conditions for planning, future administrations were not necessarily
committed to implementing it-even if the plan became a city law in mid 1966-unless
the plan was changed in light of political conditions. And these political conditions
could not have been detected by the seminar for what was being discussed was an
abstract, comprehensive plan, which did not necessarily solve any tangible problem-
only many problems that could occur in the future according to the planners. It was
only when specific projects and policies based on the plan were being readied for
implementation that political forces materialized and forced changes in the plan in
order to allow it to proceed. Therefore, for the plan to be implemented much political
and technical work remained to be done.
Finally, the situation up to now in Curitiba is interesting in light of Altshuler's
argument that when there is a "coherent power elite firmly committed to a plan"323 a
comprehensive plan is more feasible than when this is not the case. Curitiba's case
partially validates this claim for there seem to have been a committed power elite.
Further, the city adopted a comprehensive plan that later on, as I detail below,
became a central piece of urban policymaking. However, Curitiba's case also shows
that even when there is this coherent power elite, a comprehensive plan is too general
and the political forces that materialize in its support are not significant enough to
guarantee implementation. Therefore, even in the context of Curitiba in the 1960s,
Altshuler's statement for a more developed democracy seems valid:
"...comprehensive democratic planning is virtually impossible. No legislature or
committee of interest group leaders can rationally evaluate a statement of
comprehensive goals. Its members cannot, in the absence of specific project
proposals and citizen reactions to them, predict how the countless measures needed
to accomplish the goals will affect the overall quality of community life or the interests
of their own constituents and organizations."3 2 4
323 Altshuler (1965, p. 311 ).
324 Altshuler (1965, p. 311, my emphasis).
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Creating IPPUC and enacting the Director Plan in the City
Council
In order for the plan to ever be carried out, the crafters of the preliminary plan
believed that a new organization was needed. The planners timidly argued in the plan
that creating a new agency should be the path to follow. However, they do not appear
to have been very convinced about the feasibility of their preferred alternative for they
devoted only two paragraphs to it. Instead, they focused on arguing that if the current
structure of the city government was streamlined it could be possible to write the
Director Plan and implement it. They suggested splitting tasks among the Department
of Urban Planning, which was to be in charge of the plan, the Public Works
Department, in charge of road construction, and URBS, in charge of special projects
related to the plan. 325 Their lack of belief in the feasibility of creating of a new agency
in charge of the plan indicates that it was the events during the Seminar the Curitiba
of Tomorrow that tilted the balance in favor of the alternative preferred by the
planners. In this regard, Mayor Arzua seemed to have been convinced that the
Department of Urban Planning and URBS were not appropriate for developing the
Plan. On the one hand, Arzua thought these agencies were too bureaucratic. On the
other, he became convinced that a new agency should plan, the Institute for Research
and Urban Planning of Curitiba (IPPUC), and the other two agencies should handle
the day-to-day administrative activities that implementing the plan entailed.326
Creating IPPUC, however, required a city law and this could take time. As a
result, Mayor Arzua came up with the idea of creating initially APPUC-although he
already had the draft legislation to create IPPUC by the end of the seminar. Arzua
charged APPUC with two tasks to be carried in that order of priority. First, APPUC
had to lobby the City Council and pass the law to create IPPUC. Second, APPUC had
to incorporate the results of the seminar and update the preliminary plan, with the idea
of eventually producing the Director Plan for Curitiba.327 The first task is mostly
political for it implies interacting with the councilors who were elected politicians. The
325 See Serete-Wilheim (1965, p. 190-191).
326 Coelho (1974, p. 66-67.
327 Fernandez (1991, p. 40).
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second is arguably mostly technical and it implied writing the final version of the plan.
APPUC never carried out the second task; it was IPPUC.
The draft legislation specified that IPPUC was to be an autonomous agency
directly under the city mayor, with exclusive responsibility for urban research and
planning and without responsibility for project construction.328 The draft legislation
also specified that IPPUC would be responsible for, one, writing the final version of
the Director Plan, and two, for adapting the plan with the objective of insuring its
implementation.329 For this purpose IPPUC would receive authority to design specific
projects and control the implementation of the plan.330 The authority to design projects
was not limited to any specific area, in effect giving IPPUC the possibility of "planning"
projects in education to transportation-this feature later on became a source of
interagency conflict.331 Arzua received the draft legislation and introduced provisions
to force IPPUC to consider many stakeholders and interest groups when making
decisions.332 Arzua then sent the project to the City Council.
The City Council had few objections and passed the law creating IPPUC easily
in December 1965.333 One aspect that probably helped was that by being an
autonomous agency, IPPUC had to have a "deliberative council" or board of directors
with two representatives of the City Council. Interestingly, the "deliberative council"
also had representatives of several city agencies, some of which would have opposed
the creation of IPPUC-the Department of Urbanism and URBS for example.33 4
Because the "deliberative council" is the ruling body at IPPUC, all these agencies
3 2 8 Coelho (1974, p. 58).
329 Fernandez (1991, p. 41).
330 Coelho (1974, p. 58).
331 See Auriquio (1990). For an idea of the range of projects that IPPUC has undertaken see IPPUC
(1985).
32 Arzua (1989, p. 13).
333 Fernandez (1991, p. 43); and IPPUC (1985, p. 11). Among the functions assigned to IPPUC in the
law that created it were the following. First, "to carry out the studies to institutionalize the Director Plan
of Curitiba, and subsequently suggest the necessary modifications." Second, 'to promote studies and
research for the integrated planning of the city of Curitiba." Third, "recommend legislation and
amendments to law that can impact the urban planning of the city." Fourth, "cooperate with other
agencies in the city government to rationalize and coordinate the integrated planning of Curitiba." Fifth,
"create conditions for the implementation and continuity in planning and to establish the continuous
adaptation of the sector and global plans to the changing reality of the municipality." (all quotes from
IPPUC (1985, p. 11), translation by author.)
334 Coelho (1974, p. 59-60).
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have at least a nominal ability to influence the urban planning set by the Institute.
Further, the "deliberative council" can also be an instrument for coordinating the
several city agencies and seek policies that do not undermine the director plan. While
true in theory, conflict between IPPUC and other agencies developed quite frequently
and mayors had to develop mechanisms to address it.
IPPUC's initial task was to prepare the draft legislation containing the Director
Plan for Curitiba.33 5 Opposite to comprehensive plans for other cities,3 36 IPPUC
prepared a highly flexible plan that contained mostly guidelines as to how urban
development ought to take place. For example, for the road system, including the
structural axes, the Director Plan devotes only two short pages. The structural axes-
the main transportation and land-use element of the plan-are covered in one short
paragraph that specifies their width and indicates that they should have intersections
reasonably spaced and no left turns.337 Contrast this to the less-flexible Preliminary
Plan that defined in more detail the structural axes as quasi-urban highways with
grade-separated intersections.33 8 Planners at IPPUC selected to submit to the City
Council a highly flexible-and therefore scantily detailed-plan because they realized
that the Director Plan had to change in response to many situations.3 3 9 Fernandez, a
participant in the process, summarizes their rationale:
When we submitted [to the City Council] the draft law of the Director Plan, we practically
submitted a plan with basic guidelines, because our rationale was like this: 'What is a Director Plan?
Are we going to send a straightjacket? Are we going to send detailed maps to the City Council?" It
wasn't that what mattered, at that time, in reality, we were inventing a way of leaizing an urban policy
for the city of Curitiba. Nothing was detailed; we would do the detailing later on.
The city councilors had some objections to this approach. The main one was
that in practice IPPUC could change the Director Plan-by adapting it to a changing
reality-without having to go to the City Council to obtain a new law. The city council,
therefore, was afraid that if the law passed as presented, IPPUC would have too
335 The law that created IPPUC gives it responsibility to (1) control de implementation of the Director
Plan. (2) Design and detail projects. (3) Implement, under special circumstances, projects in
cooperation with other city agencies. See Coelho (1974, p. 58); and see IPPUC (1985, p. 11).
336 See Scott (1998); and Peattie (1987) for examples of this.
337 PMC (1966, p. 5-6).
338 See Serete-Wilheim (1965, p. 150-154).
339 Fernandez (1991, p.41).
340 Fernandez (1991, p. 42).
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much power and de facto IPPUC would be the plan. The planners argued that their
philosophy was that IPPUC-the planning agency-ought to be permanent, whereas
the plan had to constantly change. The planners also put in the law a provision that
allowed only IPPUC's "deliberative council" to introduce changes to the plan. Because
the "deliberative council" had two city councilors, the City Council was in effect
represented whenever a change was being discussed.34 1 This approach convinced
the city council, which approved the city law (law no. 2828) adopting the Director Plan
in July of 1966.3 42
The role of planners
The events show that the planning team in Curitiba was a capable planning team,
according to the definition in Chapter 1. The team had technical and political capacity.
Planners were able to craft the Preliminary Plan and then modify it to turn it into the
Director Plan-mostly technical tasks. The political side of the team was able to
present the plan at the Curitiba of Tomorrow Seminar. More important, the team was
able to pass in the City Council the legislation creating IPPUC and formally adopting
the Director Plan. Contrast now with Monteiro and Pinto's team, which I argue lacked
political capacity-but had technical one. Pinto did not understand the political side of
planning and as a result had to withdraw his plan from consideration.
The combination of political and technical capacity allowed the planning team
to later on specialize to maximize its effectiveness. In effect, according to Aurfquio, in
the future she and Francisca Rischbieter became in charge of lobbying the City
Council to defend the Director Plan and to pass legislation needed to adapt the plan
to changing conditions.3 4 3 Other planners at IPPUC figured out technical solutions to
political problems that emerged as the plan was implemented, as I detail below.
Hence, IPPUC became a capable agency able to tackle the technical and the political
side of planning.
341 It is important to understand, however, that the extent to which the plan can be changed without City
Council approval is limited. The changes are more on the how to carry out the objectives of the plan,
but not on the main guidelines for urban development embedded in the plan. See PMC (1966).
342 Fernandez (1991, p. 42-43).
343 Auriquio (1990, p. 6).
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Finally, planners introduced flexibility in the Director Plan by removing details
and many elements that could later on prove difficult to change. Flexibility is important
because any plan is crafted with incomplete information-mostly on how stakeholders
will respond to specific elements in the plan. For the plan to be implemented a window
of opportunity has to open, for example the appointment of someone supportive of the
plan to the mayor's seat. During the window of opportunity a series of political forces
become active precisely because there is a chance that the plan will be adopted. If
adopted, the plan can affect stakeholders' interests and this possibility motivates them
to participate in the process. A capable planning team is then essential for the political
side of the team has to interact with the stakeholders and with politicians. As a result
of the interaction, the plan will change in response to the political reality unveiled by
the interaction. A flexible plan can be adapted. Hence the importance of introducing
flexibility in a plan-even if it implies fighting for it in the City Council, as planners in
Curitiba did.
The first years of the Director Plan
Arzua's term as elected mayor expired at the end of 1966. Because the military
dictatorship at the Federal level had abolished elections for state capitals, the state
governor appointed Arzua for a new term. Arzua resigned, however, by 1967,34 4
because he was appointed minister of state by the military regime.345 Governor Paulo
Pimentel346 appointed Omar Sabbag as mayor of Curitiba for a four-year term running
until 1971.347 Sabbag was a sanitary engineer and his main concern was precisely in
that area-where Curitiba has lagged historically-and not in the Director Plan as
such.3 4 8 Sabbag, in effect, had not participated in any of the events that led to the
344 Arzua (1989, p. 1).
345 De Souza (1999, p. 126).
346 Pimentel (1997, p. 53-54).
347 Brasileiro (1999, p. 475); Wilheim (1990, p. 31)
348 Brasileiro (1999, p. 475); see also Wilheim (1990, p. 32) who agrees with the diagnostic that Curitiba
is lacking in water infrastructure. Based on a comparison with the city Porto Alegre, also in the south of
Brazil, it is possible to argue that Sabbag's emphasis on sanitation later on increased the political
feasibility of implementing the Director Plan. In Porto Alegre, the Workers Party arrived to the mayor's
office with the idea of writing the city's budget through a highly participatory process (Abers, 1996 and
1998). Fieldwork I conducted in 2002 indicates that city officials initially expected people to prioritize
street paving, but in reality they prioritized sanitation. Only when this problem had been sufficiently
addressed did the people ask for street paving in the participatory budgeting process.
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adoption of the Director Plan.3 49 Furthermore, Sabbag was a bit distrustful of IPPUC's
broad mandate and the power this represented.350 Both things led to several conflicts
with the heads of IPPUC.
As part of Sabbag's appointment, the governor of Parana ordered him to
appoint as head of IPPUC Luiz Forte Netto, a personal friend of the Governor and
who had been part of the overall planning effort.3 51 Netto had four objectives in mind.
First, to strengthen the institutional capacity of IPPUC by appointing knowledgeable
people, mostly the planners of the accompanying group, including Jaime Lerner.
Second, Netto wanted IPPUC's planners to design projects that would allow the city
administration to implement the guidelines in the Director Plan.352 Netto knew that
these plans and projects would not be used immediately, but his intent was to have
them ready for whenever a window of opportunity emerged.353 Thirdly, Netto wanted
to convince other city agencies of using the Director Plan and of following IPPUC's
instructions in that regard.354 Fourth, Netto understood that it was necessary to begin
implementing some elements of the Plan-namely the road system.35 5
Netto successfully achieved the first two objectives and thus IPPUC became a
capable planning agency that was able to elaborate projects in areas ranging from
education to transport.356 Netto, however, only partially achieved the other two
objectives. Many line agencies acquiesced to Netto's desires that they consulted
IPPUC and even that their own plans be approved by IPPUC's deliberative council
before becoming agency policy.357 Instrumental in convincing other agencies were
IPPUC's institutional capacity, which allowed it to formulate innovative plans, and its
Deliberative Council, where the mayor and the heads of many city agencies gathered
to make decisions by consensus-at least in theory. Yet the Urban Planning
Department-which had been stripped of all urban planning functions-and the
349 Coelho (1974, p. 63).
350 Fernandez (1991, p. 34).
351 Coelho (1974, p. 74-75); and Netto (1991, 57-58).
352 Netto (1991, p. 58-61).
353 Coelho (1974, p. 71).
Netto (1991, p. 58-61).
355 Coelho (1974, p. 68-71).
356 Coelho (1974, p. 73).
Coelho (1974, p. 72 and 77); and Netto (1991, p. 60).
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Department of Public Works opposed IPPUC's idea and even argued that IPPUC
should only plan when a line agency asked it to do so. Therefore, each agency should
and could plan on its own without needing IPPUC's approval.35 8
Also opposing IPPUC was Mayor Sabbag who regarded IPPUC as a "group of
architects" interested more in aesthetics than in the technical and financial aspects of
city administration. Sabbag also opposed the need to have consensual decisions at
IPPUC's Deliberative Council for he was willing to override decisions using his
authority as city mayor and/or his technical knowledge as sanitary engineer. As a
result, Sabbag isolated IPPUC and confined it to planning new projects but without an
intention of having these projects implemented.3 59 Despite all this opposition, IPPUC
was able to start the implementation of the first ring for slow traffic around Curitiba's
downtown-a relatively simple project3 60-but it implemented little else under
Sabbag's tenure.3 6 1
The resources to finance the ring road and other parts of the plan resulted from
a conflict between IPPUC and the Department of Public Works. IPPUC argued that
the city government should use all its available funds to implement the Director Plan.
The Department of Public Works, on the other hand, was very receptive for demands
by neighborhood groups to guide its expenditures in street pavement and devoted its
resources for that purpose. Given the demand for local pavements, planners at
IPPUC came up with the idea of creating a Communal Paving Plan in which URBS
would pave a street if the neighbors provided the funding. The plan was a success as
residents were willing to supply the funding. This made URBS a powerful and rich
agency thanks to this new source of revenue, which was not part of the tax base.362
The outcome of IPPUC's proposal in the end was threefold: URBS insured its own
organizational survival, which was at stake; IPPUC freed financial resources for
358 Coelho (1 974, p. 77).
359 Coelho (1974, p. 74-75).
360 Implementing the ring road around downtown entailed linking small streets around the core of
downtown. Little or not demolitions took place. The project entailed new traffic patterns.
361 Netto (1991, p. 62-63).
362 This wealth helped URBS implement the Industrial City of Curitiba (CIC) project as detailed below.
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implementing the plan, although more funds were still necessary. Finally, IPPUC and
URBS began to frame an alliance.363
The conflict between the mayor and IPPUC eventually led to Netto's
resignation in 1969. By then, IPPUC had produced a significant number of plans and
project designs. Netto, moreover, suggested Mayor Sabbag to appoint Jaime Lerner,
who was head of physical Planning at IPPUC, as the new head of the Institute.
Sabbag agreed and Lerner became president of IPPUC for the first and only time in
his life.364 Lerner's tenure, however, was short-lived. Sabbag wanted to build the new
bus and train terminal-locally known as Rodoferroviaria-which was contemplated in
the Director Plan. IPPUC had prepared a project, but the mayor did not like it. In a
meeting of IPPUC's Deliberative Council the mayor said that IPPUC's project for the
station was incomplete and that contracting a professional firm was necessary. Lerner
defended IPPUC by saying the project was almost ready. Lerner formally proposed to
hold a public hearing, which would include the City Council and other political actors,
to present IPPUC's project and get feedback. Lerner wanted the members of the
Deliberative Council to vote his proposal.365 Clearly, Lerner was looking for political
backing outside of the mayor's realm by putting forward this proposal. But Sabbag
had already made up his mind and as president of the Deliberative Council rejected
Lerner's idea and said the city would contract a private firm to design the terminal. As
a result Lerner resigned on the spot on July of 1969.366
Sabbag appointed ClOvis Lunardi as president of IPPUC, and Lunardi in turn
kept Lerner in a senior position at the Institute.367 Sabbag's move isolated IPPUC
from the rest of the administration and Lunardi had to maneuver to stop Sabbag from
shutting down the Institute.3 68 In the end, Sabbag accepted that IPPUC continued to
design projects and plans to develop the guidelines contained in the Director Plan but
without trying to get them adopted.369 The hope of the planners was, however, that
363 Netto (1991, p. 61-63).
364 Netto (1991, p. 64).
365 Coelho (1974, p. 75-78); and Lunardi (1990, p. 6-7).
366 Coelho (1974, p. 75-77); and Taniguchi (1990, p. 49).
36Lunardi (1990, p. 7).
Lunardi (1990, p. 7).
369 Coelho (1974, p. 75-78); Brasileiro (1999, p. 475); and F. Rischbieter (1990, p. 5).
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their ideas would someday be implemented. Part of the plans and projects planners
worked on had to do with transport, as I detail in the next section.
Transportation planning during the Sabbag administration
Luis Netto, president of IPPUC during the Sabbag administration, organized a
seminar around 1967-68 to study what to do with the structural axes in the Director
Plan. Experts from around Brazil, and even some foreigners, were invited to attend.
Someone presented a relatively new technology-buses using exclusive lanes
segregated from general traffic. This person argued that a few other cities in the world
had already adopted this technology and that it worked effectively because cars did
not interfere with bus operation.3 7 0 As of that moment, planners at IPPUC started
discussing this new option and in particular the resulting idea of reserving space in the
structural axes for mass transit purposes. Planners, however, were aware that the
reserved lane could be for a busway, light-rail, or even heavy-rail. 371
Between 1968 and 1969 IPPUC carried out several transportation planning
studies, in part during Lerner's tenure a president of the Institute. The main study was
the "Preliminary Study for the Metro of Curitiba," also known in Curitiba as
"Preliminary Mass Transit Plan."372 Lerner thought even back then that a car-oriented
Curitiba was impossible because of the endless need to increase road capacity, with
its associated cost and negative urban impact. The solution was therefore to promote
mass transit and the pedestrianization of downtown Curitiba.373 To carry out these
studies, planners at IPPUC collected information on mass transit systems in the World
and studied several alternatives for Curitiba.374 Planners found that many mass transit
370 Anecdotal information suggests that Lima (Peru) was the first city in Latin America to build a busway
and that even planners from Curitiba went to Lima to see this facility. IPPUC's report "Preliminary Study
for the Metro of Curitiba" (1969, p. 1.7) says that planners at the Brookings Institution developed the
idea of exclusive or segregated lanes for buses. The report, however, does not give more information
in this regard. In the late 1960s the city of Liege (Belgium) implemented the first busway in Europe
(Cracknell, Cornwell and Gardner, 1991?, p. 3). Grava (2003, p. 405) reports that the first busway (or
rather High Occupancy Vehicle Lane) in the U.S. opened in 1969 in Washington D.C. and a second
one in 1973 in the Los Angeles area.
371 Netto (1991, p. 63).
372 IPPUC (1972, p. 7); Dely (1990, p. 18); and Per6n et al. (1975, p. 27-30); see also IPPUC (1969).
373 Lerner (1997, p. 324).
374 IPPUC (1969, ch. 2 and 4). Standard practice suggests that an origin-destination study should be
carried out to determine travel patterns and plan the transportation system accordingly. To this day,
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systems, particularly rail-based, had important flaws once in operation. First, the mass
transit systems did not have a clear linkage to land-use considerations and therefore
the systems did not necessarily accompany the city's growth. Second, the systems
were designed for servicing high-density areas, both at the origin and destination, but
could not serve well medium- and low-density areas. Overall, these systems were not
flexible enough to adapt to the changing needs of a rapidly growing city as Curitiba.375
Planners also concluded that a system based on only one type of technology would
not be able to satisfy all the needs of a growing city and therefore a combination of
technologies was needed.376
Any transportation system for Curitiba had to address these flaws and had to
be within the guidelines established by the Director Plan, which proposed to increase
the residential density along the structural axes. The Plan established that density
was to be progressively lower the farther away from the structural axes. This meant
that there had to be three types of services. First, mass-transit services for the high-
density corridors on the structural axes. Second, a feeder service linking medium
density areas with the service on the main corridors, and thirdly, a low-density area
served by conventional buses.37 7 After considering several alternatives-heavy rail,
light rail, commuter rail, and buses on busways and on mixed traffic, among others-
planners concluded that "in underdeveloped and developing countries, where urban
activity patterns change rapidly, the adoption of rigid mass transit systems, with high
investments, is an unsafe strategy." 37 8/ 3 79 The study, however, was not very fond of
bus-based solutions either, despite the higher flexibility. The study did recognize that
Curitiba does not have an origin-destination study. Planners have resorted instead to less detailed
approaches such as traffic counts to determine demand, which do appear in this study (see IPPUC,
2969, ch. 5).
375 IPPUC (1969, p. 1.4); and Per6n et al. (1975, p. 27-30).
376 IPPUC (1969, p. 4.6, 5.3).
377 IPPUC (1969, p. 5.2-5.3); and Per6n et al. (1975, p. 27-29). For a more general discussion of these
issues see Transport Research Laboratory/Halcrow Fox and Associates (1989) and the recent update
of this study HFA (2000).
378 IPPUC (1969, p. 6.2); and Per6n et al. (1975, p. 28-29).
379 Notice that one outcome of Curitiba's planning was to integrate quite closely transport and land use
planning. While planners criticized heavy rail for being too rigid, they adopted a flexible BRT system
that helped downtown businesses and residents extend along specific axes and not in all directions.
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bus-based alternatives had some potential, particularly if buses were given an
exclusive lane.38 0
The planners therefore recommended against a heavy rail-based solution and
opted for a gradual strategy with two stages. First, planners recommended the
implementation of an express bus system that will use especially designed buses with
wide doors, stations where passengers would pay before boarding the bus, and the
stations would be farther apart than in the existing system. The intention was to have
this system offer a higher quality service and in this way build demand to prepare the
corridor for the second stage, the "Transit Expressway."381 The study, however, is not
fully convinced about the need for the first stage-but leaves the option open.382 For
the second and main stage, the plan proposed the construction of a "metro" network
using a new but rather untested technology developed by Westinghouse called the
"Transit Expressway." The Transit Expressway used small electric vehicles with
rubber tires on concrete rails. An apparent advantage was that the technology in
principle allowed the use of trains with up to 10 cars-almost 1,000 passengers per
train. The proposed network was elevated for the most part with tunnels in
downtown.383 Apart from not being widely used, this technology had other problems
such as not allowing an easy transfer of the cars from one track to another due to the
use of concrete rails.38 4 These limitations were some of the reasons why Lerner, the
second author of the report after Euro Brandao, advocated the use of a bus-based
solution first. That is why Lerner managed to introduce the bus-based component in
the report.385 Bus rapid transit, which was flexible and could be adapted to Curitiba's
changing needs, begun to loom as the preferred option.
The role of planners
The Director Plan is a city law. Moreover, IPPUC, a capable planning agency, is in
charge of the plan. Further, IPPUC's elite seems very receptive to planning. These
380 IPPUC (1969, p. 1.7, 4.3).
381 IPPUC (1969, p. 6.4 and 8.3).
382 See IPPUC (1969, ch. 9) where the intended schedule does not include the preliminary stage.
383 IPPUC (1969, p. 4.5-4.6, and 6.1-6.5).
384 Brando (1991, p. 7-8).
385 BrandAo (1991, p. 7).
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seem adequate conditions to allow the plan to be implemented. Yet the plan does not
move forward. The main reason is that the time has not yet come for the plan. Mayor
Sabbag does not believe in the plan and distrusts IPPUC. Sabbag puts the plan in the
back burner. This situation illustrates the point that time matters in the planning
process. Lerner and his fellow planners took advantage of the window of opportunity
that Mayor Arzua opened when he announced that the Agache Plan needed some
changes. By mobilizing and interacting with other actors, Lerner and his group were
able to get a new plan, turn it into city law, and create IPPUC. The appointment of
Sabbag closed that window of opportunity. The window lasted enough to allow many
things to happen but not the actual implementation of the plan.
A second reason that explains why the plan was not implemented was that the
plan was too general. While the lack of specific projects made the plan highly flexible,
it also meant it was not possible to implement the guidelines in the plan. Further, a
general plan cannot elicit reactions from affected parties or from politicians, who
cannot easily see how the plan affects their interests. As a result of these two
reasons, stakeholders and politicians were not interested in the plan. Therefore,
planners could not interact with these actors and obtain valuable feedback that could
have lead to building a coalition of support for the plan.
Planners then retreated to a corner where Mayor Sabbag did not look
frequently to carry out two tasks. First, planners detailed the plan by producing other
plans, such as the mass transit plan, and specific projects, some of which were
somewhat ready for adoption.386 Second, planners fought for the survival of IPPUC.
To do so, they followed a two-pronged approach. First, planners tried to implement
small parts of the plan, such as the ring road around downtown. Thanks to this
attempt they realized that funding was going to be a critical issue. Indeed, the
Preliminary Plan acknowledged that the plan's costs surpassed the city's financial
capacity.387 Second, and related, planners built an alliance between IPPUC and
URBS, thanks to the way IPPUC planners solved the lack of funding. With allies it was
more difficult for Mayor Sabbag to kill IPPUC. From their corner planners were
386 Coelho (1974, p. 79).
87 Serete-Wilheim (1965, p. 197-8).
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awaiting more receptive conditions. That is, a window of opportunity to carry out their
plans.
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Chapter 4
A First Window of Opportunity for Implementing the
Director Plan
The appointment of Jaime Lerner as mayor of the City of Curitiba opened up the
window of opportunity that the planners supporting the Director Plan were awaiting. In
this chapter I describe the events that took place during Lerner's first term in office
regarding the implementation of certain aspects of the Director Plan and mostly of the
transport component-the express bus system. For Lerner and other influential
planners I offer also a description of their views on the practice of planning for they
illuminate why they were effective. I also offer two "intermezzos" on aspects that are
not central to the story but that are nonetheless relevant. The uninterested reader can
skip these "intermezzos" and will still be able to understand the rest.
The appointment of Jaime Lerner and his views on planning
and politics
By 1971 Ney Braga was federal senator.3 8 8 Braga visited IPPUC to inquire about
Curitiba's situation and future. Lerner and other planners at IPPUC presented to
Braga the Director Plan and several of the projects they were planning. Braga was
impressed by the plans at IPPUC389 and evidently saw leadership abilities in Lerner.
Lerner, most probably, used his political abilities and his experience as former
president of IPPUC to sell the idea that IPPUC had many projects almost ready for
adoption and that the only impediment until then had been an administration that was
not convinced of the plan.3 90 Braga then told Lerner he would get him appointed
mayor with Governor Haroldo Le6n391-one thing Braga could do because he was the
political boss of Paran, at the time.39 2 Lerner was a "technician" and state governors
throughout Brazil were looking precisely for "non-politicians" to appoint as mayors of
388 Braga (1990, p. 1); and Braga (1994, p. 34).
Wilheim (1990, p. 31).
390 Lerner (1978, p. 25 and 26).
391 Wilheim (1990, p. 31).
392 De Novaes (1997, p. 153); and Pereira (1997, p. 135-136). See also Braga (1997, p. 17-52).
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state capitals. Governors were seeking to avoid immediate and future political
competition from the mayors. As an architect, president of the Institute of Architects of
Paran,, and former president of IPPUC393 Lerner was an ideal candidate from this
point of view. The governor accepted Braga's proposal and submitted Lerner's name
to the state assembly for confirmation, which took place and Lerner became mayor for
the period 1971-75.394
While some participants in the Curitiba story have called the appointment of
Lerner a "happy event,"3 95 it is possible to argue that it was also a political move by
Braga to further his own political agenda. As the term of Mayor Sabbag was finishing,
political figures in Parana were looking for candidates to present to the recently
appointed Governor Le6n, and Braga found in Lerner-then only 33 years old3 96 -his
candidate. Lerner shared Braga's belief in planning as a tool for change and knew
very well the Director Plan that Braga had sponsored when governor. Lerner,
therefore, was Braga's best chance of seeing the plan implemented and of having
someone of his own political group in the mayor's office.
Lerner took office on March 24th 1971 and began his tenure by doing three
critical things. First, because Lerner knew both the Plan, and wanted to see the Plan
carried out, he increased IPPUC's powers. From a primarily planning and research
based agency, Lerner gave IPPUC powers to "coordinate, control, implement and
manage virtually all the administration's reform programs."397 Second, Lerner
appointed people from IPPUC to head most of the other departments and line
agencies in Curitiba's administration,3 9 8 including URBS, which had been headed by
Garcez for almost 10 years.399 Lerner said, "my team was the team at IPPUC."400 With
this, planners who had been involved in the planning and detailing of the Director Plan
were now in control of the agencies that had opposed the implementation of the Plan
in the previous administration. Lerner's still nascent "political movement" was now in
393 Lerner (1978, p. 25 and 26).
394 Lerner (1997, p. 321-22), and Interview by author with Jaime Lerner, April 2003.
395 Netto (1994, p. 66); and F. Rischbieter (1990, p. 5-6).
396 Menezes (2001, p. 90).
397 Coelho (1974, p. 79).
398 Netto (1991, p. 64); and Lerner (1997, p. 322).
399 Coelho (1974, p. 79).
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power and was extending its tentacles throughout the administration. Third, because
Lerner knew the projects available at IPPUC, he organized an exhibition of large
panels with some of the projects his administration would implement during its four-
year tenure.40 1
Because of the role of Jaime Lerner in Curitiba's history it is important to
mention some of his background as well as some of his views regarding planning and
politics-views that certainly guided his actions as mayor and that influenced other
members of his administration. Lerner is a civil engineer (1960) and an architect
(1964) from the Federal University of Parana. He also completed urban and regional
planning studies in France, and did internships in Paris and Toulouse, where he
participated in a comprehensive planning exercise.4 0 2
Lerner's views on planning and politics are, first, he believes that planning's
main worth is when its recommendations are adopted-hence for him planning and
implementation cannot be divorced. In an interview to a planning publication in 1978,
Lerner said: "One thing is to plan for planning's sake. It is very different to plan for
implementation. The proportions are completely different...A planner solves his/her
problem: tries to do a good job, well supported in research, with solid analysis, with all
the alternatives defined. That takes time! When you are in a country that has a
population that expands rapidly, it is even criminal. I think it is even more criminal than
not to plan! This is a selfish attitude, for personal satisfaction, ignoring the collective
needs of the society."403 Lerner's opinions had not changed much by 2003 when I
interviewed him. He said: "You cannot know all the answers beforehand. Many
[planners, mayors] miss the opportunity to do something because they want to have
all the answers beforehand. Planning a city is a process that you can correct. The
important thing is to do something and not continue just carrying out studies."404
Lerner's view on planning and implementation does not mean that he believes that
implementation ought to occur at any price or without careful planning or a political
400 Lerner (1997, p. 322).
401 Ficinski (1990, p. 19-20).
402 Biography of Jaime Lerner, No date, no author, mimeographed, Public Library of Parand.
403 Lerner (1978, p. 25, translation by author).
404 Interview by author with Jaime Lerner, April 2003.
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process-as the next point suggests. Rather, it is a call for planning that leads to
changes through actions and a rejection of planning that just carries out studies but
achieves little else.
Second, and related, Lerner seems to believe that planning and politics are
inseparable and further, that political events can nourish a planning exercise. For this
process to work, he believes that the politicians and planners ought to put forward a
proposal-or place it in the political agenda of the city in the terms I've been using-
and await the reaction from interested parties and the population at large. Again from
the 1978 interview: "It is key to have a proposal and put it forward for discussion. That
is when participation begins, when the reaction by the representatives of the
community, by the press, by associations starts. All these reactions nourish the
proposal, and can generate consensus or changes [to the proposal]. But it seems
evident that you need a question to get an answer. It is through the question that
participation starts and things are validated."4 0 5 In an interview with me, he added in
this regard: "You do not need to know everything, the population itself is going to
correct you, because people react to a proposal-[therefore] it is key that people learn
about the proposal."40 6
This view translates into a plan-making style whereby a proposal is first floated
with the objective of getting reactions from stakeholders and the population at large.
These reactions most probably imply adapting the proposal or even abandoning it
altogether-as Lerner told me it had happened many times. If there is enough support
and consensus, then the administration implements the proposal. Lerner offers an
example of this: "I was not a politician, evidently. Politics caught up with me but I had
a clear notion that things do not happen without one being accountable. You have to
reveal your plans to the population and feel the reaction so that those plans are
consolidated or modified. The Park Plan implemented in Curitiba was the result of
modifications due to the reaction of the population. We had a beautiful project, one
park every 500 meters. There was a sudden reaction from the population. "Instead of
405 Lerner (1978, p. 27, translation by author).
406 Interview by author with Jaime Lerner, April 2003.
95
building [many parks] why don't you preserve the existing forests?" They were right,
therein lies the origin of the Curitiba's development in green areas."407
Thirdly, Lerner thinks that the availability of funds should not determine
whether a project should be undertaken or not. Lerner illustrates this by telling a story
that took place when Ivo Arzua was mayor, circa 1964. "I went to talk to the head of
the Planning Office. As he told me about the projects they had, he said: "See, it is
impossible to do anything here in Curitiba because we do not even have the
resources to purchase [the properties] and widen Marechal Deodoro St." This
sentence stayed in my head: "It is impossible to do anything here in Curitiba." There
was no idea how much can be done in a city. So many years passed and see what
took place in Curitiba. It was impossible to do anything in Curitiba. Of course it was
possible! The problem is not money. The problem is to establish a good equation."40 8
The equation Lerner refers to is what he calls the shared-responsibility
equation. He told me: "You have to understand that every problem has a shared-
responsibility equation. The quandary is not money. Sometimes the public sector has
to contribute more, sometimes the private sector, sometimes the population. In a
proposal that all understand as desirable, everyone will help."409 Notice the
importance of the previous point. Lerner, therefore, as a policymaker was receptive to
bringing in the private sector when needed in order to make a policy feasible. The
Integrated Transit Network and the Industrial City of Curitiba are examples of this.
Finally, Lerner recognizes the importance of showing results as a way of
achieving legitimacy and gathering political support. When Lerner was appointed
mayor for the first time, there was no guarantee that an appointee would fulfill his/her
term in office. The governor could ask for the resignation of a mayor or the military in
charge of the federal government could dismiss any governor or mayor-and even
407 Lerner (1997, p. 326, translation by author). Curitiba has one of the largest indices of green space
per inhabitant in the world. The index went from 0.5 square meter per inhabitant to 52 (Rabinovitch
(1992, p. 69). Part of the reason this jump was possible is what Lerner describes in the example in the
paragraph. By preserving the forests around the city, Curitiba created a green area around part of its
perimeter.
408 Lerner (1997, p. 320).
409 Interview by author with Jaime Lerner, April 2003.
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legislators.410 Further, Lerner's political situation was complex because he was an
appointed mayor while the City Council was elected-the councilors had been elected
in 1968 and new elections for council took place in 1972. Lerner therefore knew he
could have strong opposition and that one solution was to show results quickly. Lerner
constantly reminded his team of this political reality.411 As Lerner said, "Every week
they wanted to throw me out of office. There was always a political movement. What
made me last in office? What made us last in office? I always told my team: 'We have
to do things quickly because we do not know how long we are going to be in the
mayor's office." Moving quickly... gave us popular support."412 Indeed, Lerner went
through two changes of governor, and while they could have removed him they opted
for leaving him in office.4 13
The need to show results promptly, together with Lerner's emphasis on doing,
are probably some of the reasons why Lerner's administration focused on relatively
small-scale projects-at least when compared to other Brazilian cities.414 Lerner
summarizes this by saying: "Curitiba went against all [the plans] that other cities [in
Brazil] were implementing. If the other cities talked about doing and did projects for
the automobile, we were doing projects for pedestrians. The other cities spoke about
a metro for the year 2000, we were doing the transportation system that we could do
at the time."415 Lerner's view is therefore that plans and policies should not target a far
away horizon. Instead, plans should target the problems that the current generation
faces.4 16 At IPPUC, for example, Lerner's view translated into plans and policies that
"respect the scale of the city so that the result of the technical solutions is not even
worse distortions from a human point of view than the original problems
themselves." 41 7 And Carlos Ceneviva, later on president of IPPUC and head of URBS,
410 See Pimentel (1997, p. 64-68); and Bueno (2002, chapter 34).
411 Lerner (1997, p. 321-23, translation by author).
412 Lerner (1997, p. 322, translation by author).
413 Gomes (1997, p. 104, 115-116). The military asked governor Haroldo Leon to resign. The deputy
governor, Pedro Parigot de Souza, took office, but passed away soon after. Governor Emilio Hoffman
Gomes was appointed by the military and confirmed by Assembly of Paran. Gomes took office on
August 13 th, 1973.
414 See Ceneviva (1999); and Kruckemeyer (1999) who also highlight Curitiba small-scale approach.
415 Lerner (1997, p. 326, translation by author).
416 Lerner (1978, p. 27).
417 IPPUC (1975a, p. 2).
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said that the ideas of Lerner were to "'find our own solutions, local and simple
solutions, never thought of before...The idea was to figure out our own solutions at a
low cost."4 18
Lerner's views of planning and politics contrast with the views of planners and
politicians in other cities in Brazil and with those of the military then in office at the
Federal Level. For one, while cities in Brazil were undertaking large-scale projects-
highways and rail systems--Curitiba was implementing bus rapid transit and streets
for pedestrians. For another, Lerner advocated exposing a policy proposal to the
people to get feedback at a time when the military regime had become a fully-fledged
dictatorship-in 1968 the military had temporarily closed congress and several state
assemblies.41 9 Yet Lerner does not seem to have been the only politician in Parana
who valued a rather democratic policy making process. For example, Paran.'s
assembly was not closed in 1968 thanks to the successful lobbying of then Governor
Pimentel. Governor Pimentel convinced the military president to go against the advice
of his Minister of Justice, Gama e Silva, who had engineered the measure to close
down congress and other legislative bodies.4 20 Gama e Silva had said then "ruling a
state is much easier without the state assembly."421 Pimentel argued that Gama e
Silva's opinion was wrong: "It is much easier to govern [a state] with the Assembly.
Because any error, any mistake is corrected by the control exerted by the
Assembly." 42 2
An initial set of modifications to the plans
The appointment of Jaime Lerner in 1971 to the Mayor's Office opened a window of
opportunity for the eventual implementation of the Director Plan and the transport
plans, amongst other proposals at IPPUC. The possibility-albeit still remote-that
implementation was possible unleashed social, economic, and political forces that the
planners had not faced before. Planner Rafael Dely-who had joined IPPUC in
418 Ceneviva (1990, p. 34).
419 See Bueno (2002, ch. 34). The measure that closed congress and allowed the military to close state
assemblies was known as Ato Institucional (Institutional Act) No. 5.
420 Pimentel (1997, p. 64-66).
421 Pimentel (1997, p. 66, translation by author).
422 Pimentel (1997, p. 66, translation by author).
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19684 2 3 -eloquently summarizes this by saying: 'What troubled us [the planners at
IPPUC] the most was the question: What is a plan on paper and what is a plan that
can be implemented? Things completely change in the second part because it is then
necessary to take into account economic, political, and operational conditions."424
Dely added: "The proximity of implementation generated realism."425 Curitiba,
however, had both a quite flexible Director Plan and planners who understood how to
take advantage of that flexibility. Lubomir Ficinski, head of IPPUC during the first
years of the Lerner administration and part of the original group that lobbied for a plan
in 1964, argued that the advantage of the Plan was that it offered only guidelines and
not rigid proposals. 'We the planners had to detail the plan in real time."426
Probably the main element of the Director Plan was the structural axes-one
from downtown toward the northeast of the city and the other toward the southeast-
along which population growth was to concentrate. As seen, Curitiba's Mass Transit
Plan called for building an initial stage using buses followed by a relatively untested
and risky "Transit Expressway." Lerner favored the bus option and not surprisingly
planners focused on this first stage. Planners pretty much abandoned for good the
"Transit Expressway" alternative.427 The bus option implied adding two exclusive
lanes for buses in the median of each structural axis. The structural axes, therefore,
reached a width of 60 meters (180 ft.). The construction of the axes now entailed even
more property purchases by the city government, because existing roads were 30
meters wide or less.428 If the structural axes were implemented as the transportation
plan directed, the city administration would have had to dislocate thousands of
residents and spend millions in property takings. Planners were worried about these
social impacts. "Even if the city had the money, it was not fair in terms of urban
memory and culture to bulldoze all that the city had built over time, placing instead an
423 Dely (1990, p. 11).
424 Dely (1990, p. 13, translation by author).
425 Interview by author with Rafael Dely, April 2003.
426 Interview by author with Lubomir Ficinski, April 2003.
427 See IPPUC (1972).
428 The original Director Plan established that the structural axes were to be 30 meters wide (PMC,
1966, p. 5). When the bus lanes are added, the stations, and the sidewalks, the total width required
easily surpasses this figure and can even reach 60 m., depending on the design.
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incredibly wide avenue without urban scale."429 In addition, because of their huge
scale, the structural axes would not promote pedestrian use. Overall, the planners
judged the transport plan as something bad for the city.430 Mayor Lerner, in turn, was
also worried about the political consequences of adopting the structural axes as they
were planned and did not approve them.
If the structural axes were to be implemented and if the emphasis on mass
transit was to be kept, it was necessary to accommodate several lanes for general
traffic and two lanes for the buses, plus space for the bus stops and pedestrian
traffic.43 1 Dely was the planner who came up with the solution to this problem early in
1972, a solution dubbed the trinary road system.43 2 Instead of building one very wide
road, Dely proposed to build three narrower but parallel roads each with a different
function. The central road would have the exclusive lanes for buses, the bus stops
and wide sidewalks, together with two lanes for general traffic in each direction and
some parking spaces. These lanes for general traffic would target slow-moving traffic.
Overall, the design sought to foster retail and business development along this road,
by allowing easy access from both car and bus riders. The two other roads in the
trinary scheme would target high-speed traffic, in particular cars and trucks that
wanted to cover longer distances. At one block distance from the central road, each of
the high-speed roads was to have three lanes and be one-way streets.43 3 Dely's
proposal sought to connect the existing roads that were already somewhat wide-and
hence could handle larger volumes of traffic-through minor land takings and without
any major urban surgery (Figure 5).434
429 Dely (1990, p. 14, translation by author).
430 Interview by author with Rafael Dely, April 2003.
431 Kochanny (1991, p. 271).
432 Ceneviva (1990, p. 29); Dely (1990, p. 14); interview by author with Lubomir Ficinski, April, 2004;
and interview by author with Rafael Dely, April 2003 and February 2004.
433 Dely (1990, p. 14-15); and interview by author with Rafael Dely, April 2003.
434 Barao (1991, p. 230), Ceneviva (1999, p. 183-4), and interview by author with Carlos Ceneviva,
April 2002. According to Ceneviva (1999, p. 184-6) the central road in the trinary road is 30 meters
wide, including sidewalks, general traffic lanes, and busway lanes.
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Figure 5. An structural axes and the trinary road system solution
Notice the buses in the busway at the center of the trinary road system.
Source: IPPUC.
The planning community at IPPUC, after some discussions, accepted Dely's
proposal, for it addressed most of the planners' main concerns. Indeed, the amount of
properties the city had to purchase was minimal, and thus the proposal for the trinary
road system preserved Curitiba's urban scale and memory.435The adoption of the
structural axes-the main element of the Director Plan because the axes would guide
urban growth-seemed possible now. Mayor Lerner, however, was not fully
convinced and it took Dely and other planners two weeks of daily discussions to show
Lerner that the trinary road system was the solution they were looking for.436
Dely's approach to planning probably helped him convince Lerner for Dely
believes that a good plan is an idea that is feasible and that can become operational.
Regarding feasibility, Dely, an architect, speaks of four "subjective" values: urban
scale, cityscape, urban animation, and urban memory. A plan is feasible if it enhances
or preserves these subjective values of a city, for example by motivating people to
use the streets (animation), and by creating a cityscape such that it does not disrupt
the existing urban scale and preserves the urban memory. These "subjective" values,
according to Dely, are complemented by "objective" values such as the buses and the
435 Dely (1990, p. 15).
436 Interview by author with Dulcia Aurfquio, April, 2003.
101
facilities that constitute a good transportation system. For the Dely the "planner that
only works with "objective" values runs into trouble because the population does not
create linkages to the "subjective" values of the city."437 Hence for a project to be
feasible and eventually successful it has to be planned bearing in mind both objective
and "subjective" values.438
Regarding operations, a feasible plan is one that can operate with existing
technology, or with some innovation, and at a reasonable cost.4 3 9 Dely argues that if
one of these parts to a good plan-idea, feasibility, and capacity to be operated-
does not materialize then implementation is impossible and if implemented failure is
around the corner.440 Dely then says: "A friend of mine said "I have a good idea but it
is not feasible," to which I replied "then it is not a good idea at all.""441 Dely also
believes that planning has to show results by getting projects implemented. His call is
not necessarily for mega-projects but rather for interventions along his idea of
"subjective" values. The need to have something done is to obtain the population's
response and with this feedback figure out adaptations and improvements. Dely calls
this "planning through successive approximations," and uses the trinary road system
as a critical example of his overall approach.
Dely showed Lerner how his proposal for the trinary road system was feasible
and could become operational. Given Lerner's like of simplicity and desire to show
results, it is not surprising that Dely's solution eventually convinced him. Notice,
however, how Dely's conception of feasibility even if defined in architectural terms has
clear political ramifications that appeal to a politician in office. A proposal that is
437 Interviews by author with Rafael Dely, April, 2003 and February, 2004.
438 Dely gave here the example of Paris where buildings blend stores in the first level, offices in the next
couple of floors, and then apartments. According to Dely that is why streets in Paris are usually crowed
with people and therefore the city is animated. Dely's view of planning, in particular his idea of
animation, had an important impact in Curitiba. Specifically, IPPUC under Dely carried out a study on
the use of public spaces in Curitiba and found that public space use was low. IPPUC recommended the
creation of Cultural Foundation of Curitiba, an idea that was accepted and implemented by Lerner
(Paciornik (1991, p. 163-4)). Lidia Dely (1991, p. 176) says in this regard "IPPUC was the planning
agency, URBS was the executive agency that built public works. And the Cultural Foundation of
Curitiba brought life to these public works. For example, all the parks built had an animation project." In
this regard, Kruckemeyer (1999, p. 196) writes about Curitiba: "The stores and markets in downtown
Curitiba are thriving. Because there is so much activity, one feels safe, day and night."
439 Interview by author with Rafael Dely, April 2003.
440 Dely (1990, p. 13).
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feasible along Dely's subjective values is one that tends to eliminate negative impacts
and quite the contrary that tries to create positive ones. Therefore, the chances that
promoters of a feasible plan can gather political support and minimize opposition are
larger. In this regard, contrast the feasibility of the structural axis as contained in the
transportation plans and the trinary road system and the political ramifications of
each. Clearly, the trinary road proposal had fewer impacts and was politically
appealing. On the operational side, at least at this point, the trinary road concept did
not entail major changes to the operations of the buses in Curitiba-later on planners
introduced important changes in this front. Lerner was eventually convinced and gave
orders to detail the project so that construction could begin in 1972 and would open
by 1974.442
Dely was also the planner who came up with a second important change to the
guidelines contained in the Director Plan. The Plan called for concentrating business
activity in the existing downtown. The downtown area could expand in a limited area
bounded by the two structural axes443--for industrial activity the plan contemplated
the creation of an industrial park known today as Cidade Industrial de Curitiba. Dely
and other planners argued that constraining downtown would eventually overload the
traffic system in the downtown area. Dely then suggested allowing the business
activity to grow along the structural axes. The original plan allowed only housing to
concentrate along the axes, which would be a linkage between the main downtown
and a series of secondary centers. Now the main business district would grow along
the axes and eventually reach the secondary centers. This proposal had additional
advantages from a transport perspective. At least in principle, housing would be
closer to the workplace thus reducing average trip length.4 4 4 Second, because of the
mixed land use, buildings would both generate and attract transit trips, hence having a
fairly balanced two-way flow. This helps the financial health of any public transit
441 Interview by author with Rafael Dely, April 2003.
442 Brasileiro (1999, p. 479).
443 Akel (1991, p. 21 1).
444 Dely (1990, p. 13-14).
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system.445 In short, Curitiba's central business district was to grow linearly along the
structural axes and not in all directions as it does in most cities.44 6
Finally, Dely and planners at IPPUC realized that incentives were needed to
have developers build along the structural axes. The solution was to allow a built area
to plot area ratio higher than in the downtown area, thus increasing the profitability of
building in these corridors.447 This served to integrate the transportation system with
the land-use scheme because developers had the aforementioned incentives and
residents were attracted to live by a high-quality transit system. In the end, the zoning
would allow higher densities the closer to the busway-the central road in the three-
road system-because it is designed to handle large volumes of passengers. Hence
the block between the busway and each of the one-way streets would have the higher
densities and mixed land uses (Figure 6). After each of the one-way streets density
decreases and built space is mostly residential.4 48
Figure 6. Distribution of densities along the trinary roads in Curitiba
One-way street Busway One-way street
Iaaa.st I.ar .I . . .l
Source: author based on Cervero (1998, p. 274).
445 Cervero (1998, p. 273-4).
446 Ceneviva (1999, p. 184). For a description of the trinary axes concept as it was finally adopted,
including land use regulations, see IPPUC (1989, p. 26-28).
447 Dely (1990, p. 15).
448 Cervero (1998, p. 273-4); Cervero (1998, p. 285-286) also reports that the dwellers in the higher
density areas are the ones that use the least the bus-based transit system. This is because high-
income people are the ones who can afford to live in the high-rises along the structural axes. For one,
the higher a building the higher the cost of construction and therefore the least affordable to poor
people. Poor people can also live in high-density areas but not high-rises (see Jaramillo, 1994). For
another, market conditions can place a premium on living in an area readily accessible to downtown as
it happens in Curitiba (Cervero (1998, p. 285). And higher-income people are the ones with higher car-
ownership rates.
I I I M
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Lerner decided in favor of all of Dely's proposals, which implied significant changes to
the 1966 Director Plan.449 The Lerner administration submitted a proposal to the City
Council to amend the Director Plan particularly regarding zoning rules. In 1972 the
City Council approved city law 4,199 which enacted new zoning regulations and
entirely revoked the 37 articles on zoning in the Director Plan45 0-- a law that had in
total 65 articles.4 51 The amended Plan now included the trinary road concept and the
accompanying land use regulations that made feasible the structural axes.452 Lerner
appointed Dely as IPPUC's president after Ficinski resigned late in 1972. Dely was
later on in charge of overseeing the implementation of the trinary system and the
busways, together with a new bus service dubbed the express bus. Dely remained
president of IPPUC until 1975, when Mayor Saul Raiz was appointed and Ficinski
took over again a president of IPPUC.
Putting the Plan in the Agenda: the pedestrianization of
downtown Curitiba
In spite of the planners being now in office, a significant amount of mostly political
work laid ahead in order to get the Director Plan and its projects adopted. Lerner
knew he had to start with something that could show results and help gather support
for his overall objective of transforming Curitiba's physical layout through the
implementation of the Director Plan. Indeed, in his inauguration speech, Lerner had
argued that downtown Curitiba ought to be given back to pedestrians; cars should be
displaced to other roads.45 3
The policy Lerner chose was therefore turning one of Curitiba's main downtown
avenues-the XV of November Street-into a pedestrian-only promenade, as the
Director Plan instructed. This move, however, had a large political risk embedded in it,
because no other city in Brazil had done this before and therefore neither the
administration nor the neighboring businesses could point to a successful
449 Barao (1991, p. 230).
450 The Director Plan is city Law 2828 of 1966.
451 Menezes (2001, p. 101-103).
452 Coelho (1975, p. 120-124).
453 Lerner (1971, p. 9-10).
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precedent.454 People would find it difficult to relate to the abstract idea of
pedestrianizing one of Curitiba's main streets. On the technical side the situation was
different because Wilheim-the father of the idea of a pedestrianized downtown-had
noticed that it was possible to handle the traffic in downtown Curitiba with that street
closed to traffic. Wilheim also noticed that the many pedestrians used XV of
November Street and that pedestrianizing would only reinforce its character.455 In
spite of IPPUC's solid library documenting the success of similar interventions in
Europe, the planners could not be fully assured that it would benefit the business
sector.4 5 6
Lerner and his team established a strategy to implement the pedestrianization,
which had been designed by architect Abrao Assad.457 First, they approached the
retail sector, presented the idea, seeking feedback and support for the idea.458 The
retail sector, however, was reluctant to support a pedestrian only street for it feared
sales would go down.459 Second, IPPUC launched a media campaign to explain the
idea and its benefits. As part of this campaign, Lerner and Wilheim figured out a way
to organize an event to call the attention of the local press. Wilheim was Brazil's
representative to the International Architect Union (IAU), entity that wanted to hold a
meeting in Brazil. Wilheim managed to convince the organizers to hold the meeting in
Curitiba. Lerner and Wilheim agreed to temporarily close XV of November Street to
car traffic as a way to honor the IAU members visiting the city. Wilheim, in turn,
lobbied the visiting architects to issue statements praising the value of the exercise
454 Lunardi (1990, p. 4).
4 55 Wilheim (1990, p. 30). Atherino (1991, p. 16) corroborates that XV of November street was heavily
used by pedestrians before it was pedestrianized.
456 Lunardi (1990, p. 4); and Dely (1990, p. 15).
457 Assad (1990, p. 27-28).
458 Santoro (no date, p. 25).
459 Brasileiro (1999, p. 477). Even in Europe where the experience with turning streets into pedestrian-
only facilities is broad, the business sector can strongly oppose a measure like this one. Flyvbjerg
(1998) documented one such experience in Aalborg (Denmark). The business sector thought that
buyers arrived by car to shopped while planners argued they shopped on foot. The planners did
surveys to document their claims. A business association responded by hiring its own survey, which
interestingly arrived at opposite conclusions. After a lengthy political battle, the street was
pedestrianized and the sales by retail increased as a result.
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and its benefits. The press then said that pedestrian-only street was an idea praised
by the most respectable architects in the World.4 60
But this did not change the opinion of most of the retailers on XV Street who
still opposed the measure.4 61 Lerner had a third part to the strategy. Once he realized
the project was too controversial, he concluded that an example was needed to show
how the pedestrianization worked and its benefits. He therefore decided to build a
100-meter leg.4 62 For a year Lerner had the Department of Public Works figure out a
way to build this short stretch of the pedestrian-only project in less than 48 hours. This
implied preparing all the necessary aspects of the project: lampposts, benches,
planters, etc. So that no party could resort to filing a lawsuit with a judge and halt
construction, the "operation" started on the Friday night of a three-day weekend in
April 1972.463 By Monday this one-block stretch was done.46 4 Lerner explains "If the
project did not work, there would be no problem. It was a simple project, it could be
reverted to car use, but it was important that the population could see [a pedestrian
street] in practice. "4 65 Initially, retailers tried to petition Governor Parigot to fire Lerner,
but the governor told them he would meet with them in 30 days. This meeting,
however, never took place,46 6 because in less than a month the project proved to be a
success as pedestrians and shoppers flocked to the new street, thus showing retailers
that the measure worked.467 Given this, retailers and pedestrians filed petitions to
extend the street area turned over to pedestrians and the city administration
eventually pedestrianized 49 blocks (Figure 7).468 The first intervention using the
460 Wilheim (1990, p. 34).
461 XV of November Street is known in Curitiba as Rua XV or XV street.
462 Lerner (1997, p. 395).
463 Interview by author with Carlos Ceneviva May 2002.
464 F. Rischbieter (1990, p. 9); Dely (1990, p. 9).
465 Lerner (1997, p. 395).
466 Interview by author with Lubomir Ficinski, April 2003.
467 Lerner (1997, p. 395); F. Rischbieter (1990, p. 9); Dely (1990, p. 9); Brasileiro (1999, p. 477). While
pedestrian traffic increased, people tended to walk on the old sidewalk forgetting the newly
pedestrianized road. Planners at IPPUC figured that they had to create activities to have the people get
used to the new pedestrian areas. One such activity was providing paper and watercolors to children
who would paint in the middle of the pedestrian-only street. It took close to two years of activities like
this to convince the majority of the people that they could walk in any part of the pedestrian street and
not only on the sidewalks (see Dely (1991, p. 176) and Paciornik (1991, p. 163 and 165-66)).
468 Cervero (1995, p. 271).
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guidelines in the Director Plan had yielded a resounding success. The Director Plan
and its components were in the political agenda of the City of Curitiba.
The role of planners
The appointment of Lerner as mayor of Curitiba opened the window of opportunity for
the Director Plan. Before the window opened planners were crafting proposals, such
as the Mass Transit Plan. But planners were not interacting much with other actors
such as the mayor let alone stakeholders. Mayor Sabbag, for example, was paying
attention to other proposals (mostly in sanitation) but not to the Director Plan. When
the window of opportunity opened, planners began to interact with Mayor Lerner. The
original plan began to change. Lerner was not willing to raze thousands of houses in
order to implement the key element of the Director Plan-the structural axes. Dely
discovered the solution in the form of the trinary road system, which minimizes the
impact of adopting the axes. Dely added another change regarding land use--a
change that would tighten the link between transportation and land use. The plan
changed as a result of the window of opportunity because of political forces that
materialize only during the window. Before the window, planners might have changed
the plan by adding elements, but they lacked the political context given by the window
of opportunity.
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Source: Author.
The implementation of the pedestrian-only street in downtown Curitiba
extended the scope of planners' interaction beyond Mayor Lerner. Planners,
politicians, and stakeholders had to interact. The planners talked to the retail business
and sought feedback. In part because the idea was so new at the time, planners
found it difficult to explain the idea. This difficulty complicated planners' effort at
persuading the key stakeholders. Thanks to the interaction, however, the original
project changed because otherwise it was politically infeasible. Further, risk was too
high for Lerner who could end up loosing his job. The project did not change,
however, in the broad objective of pedestrianizing the XV of November Street but on
how the pedestrianization was going to be implemented. Lerner figured a
demonstration segment was needed so that people could understand the project and
then give useful feedback. Risk went down for Lerner and for all other parties. If the
demonstration segment did not work it could be torn down. Lerner's bet worked out
and the project was a success. Lerner gained significant political capital as a result.
In sum, during the window of opportunity planners interact with politicians and
stakeholders. Planners then become problem solvers but within a political context
defined by the interaction. Plans change as a result. Thanks to the interaction the plan
or project can enter the political agenda of the city. Coupled to Lerner's marketing
ability, people started talking about the plan and on how planning was possible in
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Curitiba. But stakeholders were still unable to voice a meaningful response to the
abstract concept of "a plan." The adoption of the Director Plan therefore proceeded
through specific projects.
Intermezzo 1: The Rodoferroviaria experience
Before continuing with the story underlying the planning of the bus rapid transit
system it is important to analyze two events. First, the opening of the Rodoferroviaria
station-the design of which had led to the resignation of Lerner as president of
IPPUC in 1969-and second the decision to implement the Industrial City of Curitiba.
These events are important because they are one more example of how the Lerner
administration would have to assemble a coalition of support and negotiate with
stakeholders in order to achieve its goals. Further, the Industrial City of Curitiba in
particular shows also that the Lerner administration is pro-growth and pro-business
and that many of its future actions in urban transportation are also framed by that
logic. I treat here the Rodoferroviaria experience and in the next section the Industrial
City story.
Even if Lerner did not like the designs for the Rodoferroviaria station-a station
for both inter-city buses and trains-he could not demolish it and was responsible for
opening it to the public. Lerner in fact, had to go to Rio de Janeiro to convince the
Railways' central administration of allowing the construction of the station to
proceed.46 9 IPPUC and URBS were in charge of putting the Rodoferroviaria in
operation and hired Cassio Taniguchi-an electronics engineer with graduate work in
economic development planning-to head this effort. For eight months Taniguchi
directed the negotiations with the different stakeholders that were affected by the new
station-mainly bus companies and retail owners. Taniguchi was in constant contact
with Lerner and planners at IPPUC during this process. By the end of this effort, the
Rodoferroviaria was opened and passengers, bus companies, and retail operators
liked the final outcome.470 In fact, thanks to the high quality work in some areas, the
station became a showcase example among Brazilian cities.47
469 Brandao (1991, p. 4-5).
4 7 0 Taniguchi (1990, p. 49-50).
471 Coelho (1991, p. 200).
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Lerner liked Taniguchi's work and appointed him to head URBS, an agency
that was the "doer" agency-in charge of building infrastructure and the Industrial City
of Curitiba-while IPPUC was responsible for "planning."472 Taniguchi summarizes his
role and URBS': "I was more involved with the execution of things, because there was
a group that had ideas but that could not transform them into facts, into reality. A lot of
things from Jaime's [Lerner] first term in office, in terms of financing and securing
funds, were done by our people [at URBS]. URBS at that time raised or helped raise a
series of financial resources from BNH, Banco do Brasil, and from organizations that
could offer some sort of financial cooperation [to Curitiba]."473 From URBS, Taniguchi
also played a role in the implementation of the trinary axes and the express bus
service. Taniguchi later on would head IPPUC during Lerner's second and third
administration and would be elected mayor of Curitiba at the end of the 1990s (see
Table 6 below).
In conclusion, Taniguchi exemplifies the "planner" who possesses executive
ability to materialize other planners' plans. That is, Taniguchi is a good manager, able
to find funds, and able to direct a complex organization in charge of contracting out
the construction services needed to build the facilities specified in the plans. The
implementation of the Director Plan could not have been possible in the absence of a
capable organization such as URBS. Having only capable planning organizations,
such as IPPUC, leaves the planning function orphan for these agencies usually do not
have the capacity to carry out most of the tasks involved in the implementation of their
plans. In the division of labor among agencies adopted in Curitiba, IPPUC was the
planning, with capacity to oversee the implementation, and URBS was the main
"doer" agency.47 4 Bogota adopted a similar division of labor for the implementation of
the TransMilenio project.
472 Taniguchi (1990, p. 49-50).
473 Taniguchi (1990, p. 51, translation by author). BNH is Banco Nacional de Habitagao or National
Housing Bank.
474 For an similar argument see Hayakawa (1991, p. 222-223).
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Intermezzo 2: The Industrial City of Curitiba
The second event to analyze is the adoption of the Industrial City of Curitiba and its
aftermath. In the early 1960s, the intellectual and business elite in Paran; and
Curitiba was concerned about the economic future of the city and the state. Parann's
economy was mostly agricultural and Curitiba had little industry. The elite was worried
that the state had to "import" its industrial consumption from other states in Brazil. The
elite was also worried that agriculture-most importantly coffee-would not be able to
sustain the state's population. The elite concluded, therefore, that industrial
development had to take place. In 1965, some time after the Curitiba of Tomorrow
Seminar, the economic elite organized the Industrial Development Seminar of
Curitiba. This seminar gathered members of the city and state government as well as
local economic actors to discuss alternatives for promoting Curitiba's industrialization.
Among the conclusions was first the need to strengthen the government agencies in
charge of promoting economic development. Second, the need to create policies that
would attract investors, such as promoting the advantages of the city and giving tax
brakes and other financial incentives.475 While the Master Plan incorporated an area
for industrial development, the city government under Omar Sabbag did not undertake
the implementation of any industrial policy, but it did expand the area devoted to
industry in the zoning legislation of 1969.476
Lerner in his inaugural address brought attention to the topic of economic
development and industrialization. Lerner said back then: "the Municipality must act in
a more dynamic and efficient manner at attracting industries, through the definition of
a policy that provides incentives and through the consolidation of production centers."
He then criticized the problems emerging from Brazil's typical urbanization pattern in
which the population cannot find decent jobs-i.e. industrial jobs. Lerner concluded by
saying: "Industrialization is the main accelerator of our development. And we need to
walk fast."477 With this speech, Lerner opened a window of opportunity for policies that
promoted industrialization.
475 De Oliveira (2000, p. 124-126); See also Taniguchi (1990, p. 50).
476 Coelho (1975, p. 123).
477 All quotes from Lerner (1971, p. 6, translation by author).
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In October 1971, seven months into Lerner's first administration, business and
industrial associations organized the Economic Development Conference of Curitiba.
The objective was to continue Lerner's initial effort of putting industrialization in the
political agenda. The main conclusion of the event was that economic development
should be promoted along the following lines. First, state economic development
banks should attract new industries to Curitiba through measures such as providing
subsidized capital to these firms-for example by purchasing the firms' stock. Second,
the creation of specialized agencies that would advice firms regarding their decision to
update technology or to merge with other industries. Finally, Curitiba should have
specific areas for the exclusive use by industries-what eventually became the
Industrial City of Curitiba.478/479
The strategy used by the economic elite to put economic development on the
agenda seemed to have worked. A first result was the creation of the Council of
Financial Policy of the City of Curitiba, whose objective was to help Mayor Lerner
design policies to attract funds to finance economic development policies.480 Second,
Lerner seized on the momentum created by the seminar and went in February of
1972 to Karlos Rischbieter, now president of the Economic Development Bank of
Paran, BADEP-formerly known as CODEPAR-to ask for support for an industrial
city within Curitiba.481 BADEP already had programs to attract industry, but the
missing element was physical-an issue solved precisely by Lerner's proposal.48 2
Third, the changes to the zoning law, law 4,199 of 1972 discussed above, included a
specific mention for the first time of the Industrial City of Curitiba483_CIC for its name
in Portuguese. The CIC was to cover almost 10% of the Curitiba's area-
478 De Oliveira (2000, p. 128-9).
479 This sounds very similar to what States, counties, and cities still do in the U.S. to foster economic
development within their jurisdictions. See Blakely and Bradshaw (2002); and Eisinger (1988).
480 De Oliveira (2000, p. 128-9).
481 Lerner originally called it an industrial park, but when he went to talk to Karlos Rischbieter at
BADEP, Rischbieter said that name was passe (Rischbieter (1990, p. 19). Lerner then had the idea to
build a beautiful industrial park or rather a garden and from there came the idea of calling it Industrial
City or Cidade Industrial de Curitiba in Portuguese (Rischbieter (1990, p. 15). Taniguichi (1992 p. 24)
offers a similar account.
482 K. Rischbieter (1991, p. 15).
483 De Oliveira (2000, p. 129).
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approximately 43 square kilometers to the southwest of downtown.484 Fourth, IPPUC
and URBS hired Jorge Wilheim, the author of the original Director Plan, to develop the
plan for the CIC.485 Wilheim's original plan contemplated a single access to the CIC
and a self-contained road system within the industrial city. Dely, president of IPPUC,
thought a better approach was to have several points of access,486 ultimately to have
the industrial area integrated to the city and not as a functionally separate element.487
Taniguchi remarks regarding this situation: "...once again the original project was
modified, by giving it a more humane conception..."48 8
In January of 1973 Lerner signed the decree that condemned the land-mostly
rural and underdeveloped-for the CIC allowing the city to purchase it.489 Also in this
year the state and city government signed an agreement splitting the responsibilities
for the implementation of the CIC.4 90 Curitiba's government was in charge, through
URBS, of planning and developing the site, providing a basic road network,
purchasing the land, and selling it-at a discount-to the interested industries. The
state government had to supply water, electricity, and phone infrastructure. More
important, the state government through its development bank had to provide
financing for the establishment or expansion of industries. Secondly, the state had to
offer tax exemptions and postponements and even working capital in the form of
shares to attract new industries.491 Clearly, the strategy was to offer a good package
that included disguised subsidies to attract firms to the CIC.
Hence the economic elite, the state of Paran,, and the city of Curitiba had
formed an alliance-or growth coalition-to promote industrialization mostly by
attracting new industries to Curitiba. Actors in all three levels mobilized to support this
effort. D'Aquino, who coordinated the implementation of the CIC at URBS in 1973,
summarizes the situation by saying:
484 D'Aquino (1991, p. 297). 43 square kilometers are equivalent to 16.8 square miles. The total area of
Curitiba is 432 square kilometers or 169 sq. mi. (Nieri, 1999, p. 1).
4 8 5 Taniguchi (1990, p. 50); de Oliveira (2000, p. 129); and Wilheim (1990, p. 32).
4 8 6 Taniguchi (1990, p. 50).
487 Dely (1990, p. 16).
488 Taniguchi (1990, p. 50).
489 D'Aquino (1991, p. 297); and Taniguchi (1990, p. 51).
490 De Oliveira (2000, p. 129-130); and Cordeiro (1992, p. 70-71).
491 De Oliveira (2000, p. 129-130); See also K. Rischbieter (1990, p. 19-21).
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At the time, the Brazilian [economic] miracle was taking place.492 Brazil was
experiencing the arrival of foreign capital at an important pace. And all the states were
competing for these projects. And Parand had nothing to offer. The Industrial City
project was therefore the only thing we had to offer at the time. All the agencies were
involved in promoting it. The president of BADEP in 1973, Karlos Rischbieter, was a
real traveling salesman...We made contact with Bosch [an industrial firm]. We learned
that Bosch was studying alternative areas for establishing a new facility in Brazil. He
telephoned Bosch and then he went there to talk to the directors of the company. He
went to "sell" Curitiba, to sell Parand. Today when you hear that Bosch is in Curitiba,
generating five thousand jobs, it is important to know that that was the result of the
hard work of a few people. That same work to search, to contact, took place with
several firms.4 93
Karlos Rischbieter was indeed a key player in this effort to attract industries to
the CIC-among others he helped convince Bosch, Siemens, Philip Morris, and
Volvo. Rischbieter reasoned that all the cities in Brazil had essentially the same things
to offer in terms of financing, more so given that the main force behind attracting
foreign direct investment was the Brazilian economic miracle.494 What differentiated
Curitiba was "the combination of a city that was turning itself into "livable," an
industrial city and a series of mechanisms" 4 95 whereby the state of Parana invested in
the company's stock to provide low-cost access to capital. The agreement established
that after several years the firm could repurchase the shares from the state.496
Rischbieter, however, was clear that if the only reason why a company located in
ParanA was the subsidies, then it was not going to be sustainable once these
incentives came to an end. Location and other factors had to play a major role in this
decision.4 9 7
Key to the effort to attract industries was to let investors know about Curitiba's
plan-something that probably started Curitiba's strong tradition at marketing a
positive image full of achievements. Lerner and his team, for example, would make
presentations to industrial firms highlighting not only the advantages of locating in the
492 During the Brazilian Miracle the rate of growth of the Brazilian economy exceeded that of all
countries in Latin America, except Costa Rica (Thorp (1998, p. 338); and Cardoso and Helwege (1992,
p. 25).
493 D'Aquino (1991, p. 299, translation by author).
494 K. Rischbieter (1990, p. 19).
495 K. Rischbieter (1990, p. 20).
4 9 6 K. Rischbieter (1990, p. 20).
D'Aquino (1991, p. 302).
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CIC but also the changes that were taking place in Curitiba that would improve the
quality of life.498 Further, they lobbied media commentators to make "glowing write-
ups about the City."49 9 BADEP and URBS scheduled missions in Europe, the United
States, and Japan to promote the investment opportunities at the CIC.500 Rischbieter
and Ney Braga and other members of the state government went on to occupy
important positions at the national level501 from which they promoted Curitiba and
from there contributed to the successful implementation of the CIC.502 Rischbieter,
moreover, helped promote Curitiba through friends at the most important newspapers
in Sao Paulo, O Globo, and Folha do Sao Paulo who wrote positive articles on
Curitiba. The effort was so successful that in Sao Paulo-the industrial powerhouse of
Brazil-the governor complained to Rischbieter that Curitiba was "stealing" their
industries.5 03
URBS, headed by Cassio Taniguchi, was in charge of the construction of the
basic infrastructure for the CIC. To finance these works URBS and the city of Curitiba
used part of the huge revenue from a betterment tax that URBS charged property
owners who benefited from the road paving done by URBS. This revenue was the
same amount as the city government devoted each year to investment, approximately
30% of the city's tax revenue.50 4 For accounting purposes URBS and the city
government were separate. These funds, however, were not enough and URBS and
the city government had to contract debt with national and international banks. An
informal agreement between the state and the city indicated that a fraction, around
30%, of the state taxes raised in the CIC would be returned to the city of Curitiba.
Curitiba, in turn, would repay its debt for the CIC.50 5 To formalize the agreement, any
of the governors should have asked the state legislature to enact a law to share the
498 Lerner (1980, p. VII).
499 Schwartz (2004, p. 55).
500 Schwartz (2004, p. 55).
501 Rischbieter was appointed president of a national bank, the president of the Brazilian Federal
Reserve, and then minister of finance (K. Rischbieter (1990, p.13). Braga was appointed minister of
education between 1974 and 1978 (Braga, 1990, p. 1).
502 Hoffman Gomes (1992, p. 10).
503 Interview by author with Karlos Rischbieter, April 2003.
504 Taniguchi (1991, p. 25).
505 Taniguchi (1990, p. 53-54).
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tax revenue from the CIC between the state and the city, but this never happened.50 6
Because the agreement was kept informal, it was up to the governor to honor it or not
and this rarely happened. As a result, Curitiba found it difficult to repay the debt in the
early 1980s-which kept rolling and as a result multiplied from 20 million dollars to
120 million. 507 This situation was finally solved when Roberto Requiao was governor
of Parana and Lerner was in his third term in office as mayor.5 08
The CIC was inaugurated officially on March 4 th, 1975,509 days before Lerner's first
term in office finished. By then, however, several firms had already signed contracts
or even opened facilities. By 1992 CIC had more than 400 industries51 0 that directly
employed approximately 50,000, and indirectly another 200,000. CIC generated close
to 17 percent of the revenue of the Parana's tax on commerce and industry. Finally,
the firms at the CIC produce a wide range of products in different industrial sectors,
using the most modern technologies in Brazil,511 and in general in an ecologically
friendly way.51 2
Schwartz studied why some firms decided to locate in the CIC and found
several factors. First was Curitiba's proximity to Brazil's major regional market-the
Sao Paulo-Rio de Janeiro-Belo Horizonte triangle. Second, a comparable set of
incentives-tax brakes, subsidies, etc.-to that offered by other cities. Third, good
and improving educational levels. Fourth, lower salaries for skilled labor than in other
cities. Fifth, "municipal promoters apparently somewhat more adept than those from
most other cities in linking foreign investors to national incentive schemes and in
attending to special interests of individual foreign investors." Interestingly, Schwarz
found that the issue of "quality of live"-for which Curitiba is nowadays known-only
started to play a role once Lerner in his third term in office undertook a strong
marketing campaign to highlight this feature of Curitiba, both within Brazil and abroad.
506 Cordeiro (1992, p. 72-73).
507 Taniguchi (1990, p. 53-54). See also de Oliveira (2000, p. 131).
508 Requiao (1997, p. 254).
509 Sganzeria (1992, p. 2).
510 IPPUC (1992, pp. 245-254); and calculations by author.
511 Sganzeria (1992, p. 2-3).
512 The CIC allows only industries that do not pollute the atmosphere. However, the Curitiba area has
attracted industries that do pollute, which have had to settle in neighboring communities (De Oliveira,
2000, p. 181). See also Menezes (2001, p. 94-103).
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But by then, the stock of firms already in the CIC made it appealing for new firms to
establish themselves there.513 Hence it is unclear what is the role of the "quality of life"
issue in the firms' decision to locate. The role of marketing the city, however, seems
clear at promoting Curitiba to gain the attention of potential investors.514
In conclusion, the way Lerner maneuvered during his first administration to
implement the CIC shows two important things. First, Lerner is clearly pro-growth and
pro-business, particularly regarding industry, and so is his political movement.515
Hence, policies and plans that are politically feasible in Curitiba are pro-business and
serve the objective of promoting economic growth. Second, Curitiba is a city where
the political elite and the economic elite are part of a growth coalition or "growth
machine." Altshuler and Luberoff define growth machines as "alliances of those in the
community who stand to profit from development."516 /517 The support from this growth
coalition explains in part why Lerner's movement has been in office in Curitiba 27 of
the last 33 years. Brasileiro summarizes these points by saying: "Curitiba is a city
project inserted in an industrial project, for which economic, political, and social actors
are committed and for which they converge."518
The plans for the express bus rapid transit system
The planning done until 1972 and the decision to implement the structural axes using
the trinary road system took care of the infrastructure side of the project (busways,
general traffic lanes, shelters, etc.). Yet the operational side (buses, terminals, feeder
service, etc.) was still crude.519 Indeed, the implementation of the first two trinary
axes-including the exclusive lanes for buses, or busways-started in 1972.520 These
513 Schwartz (2004, p. 101-2).
514 See Sanchez-Garcia (1997) for a critical view of Curitiba's city marketing.
515 For an example see Dely (1989).
5 1 6 Altshuler and Luberoff (2003, p. 67); see also Logan and Molotch (1987)
517 It is possible to argue that Curitiba's political system can be characterized as a "regime." Fainstein
and Fainstein (1983, p. 256) define regime as the "circle of powerful elected officials and top
administrators who move in and out of office," and who are "responsible for setting policy and
susceptible to electoral forces." Local regimes represent mostly the dominant sectors of the local
business class and they have to act as mediators between the capitalist and lower class interests
(Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003, p. 65).
18 Brasileiro (1999, p. 462, translation by author).
519 See Ceneviva (1990, p. 30).
520 Brasileiro (1999, p. 479).
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first two axes run in the direction the city was already growing, northeastwards and
southeastwards from downtown, and the two are known together as the North-South
Axis (see Figure 3, above).521 The construction of the busways was rather simple for it
implied building a small median to separate the busway lanes from the general traffic
lanes and simple bus stops or shelters for passengers (Figure 8). Equally simple was
the construction of the high-speed roads in the trinary road system for they implied
giving continuity to existing streets. By October 1972, just months after Lerner took
the decision to adopt the project, 50% of the civil works had been already
concluded.52 2 Incidentally, because bus service could not be disrupted, the existing
bus fleet continued to operate on segments of these corridors. This allowed planners
to pre-test the operations of segregating bus traffic from general traffic and see its
benefits5 2 3 (see Figure 9).
Planning for the operations side of the project took place between 1972 and
1974.524 The bases for these plans were the "Preliminary Mass Transit Plan," and the
plan for mass transit terminals, the latter done 1971 just after Lerner took office.52 5
Indeed, in his inaugural speech Lerner had hinted that the use of terminals where
people could park their cars and transfer to buses was a solution to the ever-
increasing traffic problem.526 Recall also that Lerner had managed to include the bus
option in the "Preliminary Mass Transit Plan,"5 27 which already contemplated a
change of bus toward a user friendly one.
521 Instituto Jaime Lerner (1994, p. 9).
522 IPPUC (1972, p. 12).
523 Per6n (1975, p. 29 and 30); and IPPUC (1975a, p. 6).
524 Brasileiro (1999, p. 479).
525 Per6n et al. (1975, p. 27).
526 Lerner (1971, p. 9-10).
527 Brandao (1991, p. 7).
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Source: IPPUC. Notice the simple shelters used as bus stops.
Passengers paid upon boarding the bus.
As a result of the planning exercises between 1972 and 1974 planners refined
the concept of what eventually came to be known as the "express" bus service. The
buses of the express service were to use exclusively the busways and no other bus-
known as conventional bus-could use them. The system would therefore operate
under a trunk and feeder system with the express buses as the trunk service and the
conventional buses as feeders, with integration between the two at terminals. This
general concept of the new service affected the interests of the existing bus
operators, particularly in the "selective" areas where the axes were being built.
Operators were not used to a trunk and feeder system; instead, they ran routes from
the neighborhoods to downtown.
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Figure 9. Old buses using the busway in Curitiba
b
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f
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Source: IPPUC (1990). Notice the new bus on the left side of road and the old
one on the right side. The picture is in downtown Curitiba.
The planners also came up with three additional changes that increased the
impact on the bus operators-the most relevant political actor at this point. First,
planners wanted the express service to be able to run from the south end to the north
end of the structural axis without having to interrupt its service in downtown.528
Passenger would pay one fare for this trip and not two as it happened back then. This
distortion was a legacy of the "selective" area scheme adopted in the 1950s and
significantly strengthened in the 1960s (see Figure 1, above). Second, planners
wanted a new type of bus, larger, wider, and lower, with improved suspension and
engine, with three wide doors-instead of two narrow ones. In short, a new bus
specifically designed for mass transit purposes. While more a comfortable bus, most
of the passengers will be standees in order to fit more passengers.529 Until then in
Curitiba-as in many third world cities even today-buses were assembled on truck
chassis, and frequently resemble the U.S. school bus.530 This type of bus is, above
all, incredibly difficult for passengers to board and disembark because of the bus' high
platform and the lack of wide doors. Adopting the new buses implied important capital
expenses for the bus companies, who had been successful before at extending the
528 De Oliveira (2000, p. 138).
529 Brasileiro (1999, p. 479); de Oliveira (2000. p. 138-9); Ceneviva (1990, p. 30-31); Rovani (1990, p.
77-79); and Tomizawa (1991, p. 273-279).
530 Ceneviva (1990. p. 30).
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useful life of the buses. Thirdly, planners wanted to improve the control system so that
the city government could rigidly enforce the new schedules and impose sanctions
accordingly.531 As seen, the control until then had not been as strict and companies
faced little or no penalties.
The planners regarded the express service concept as the "only feasible
solution at the time, with the conditions to compete with the private car in terms of
offering mass transit service, representing a significant improvement of the urban bus,
which had evolved little or nothing in the last 20 years with respect to critical aspects
such as comfort, safety, flexibility, power, passenger capacity, seat arrangement,
visibility, etc."532 While the planners and Mayor Lerner backed this position and the
underlying plans, the bus operators were quite against the idea of introducing so
many changes at once. To implement the express bus as desired, negotiations
between the city government and the bus operators had to take place.
The negotiations with the bus operators
The express bus service on the North-South axis affected only two bus companies-
Transporte Coletivo Gl6ria and Auto Viagao Redentor-each the de facto "owner" the
respective "selective" area. This reduced the number of actors that planners had to
negotiate with.533 The planners at IPPUC and other city agencies, backed by Lerner
who even attended some of the meetings, approached the negotiations with these two
bus operators with the following strategy. First, they had a clear proposal of what they
wanted the operators to do in the express bus service. Planners were aware the city
had the power to control bus services. A participant in these meetings paraphrased
what was told to the bus operators: "The city is only one. You operate a service that is
a concession by the city. We are going to plan the service and you are going to
operate it according to our terms."53 4 Second, planners knew they were requesting
these two operators to introduce quite a few changes at the same time, many of them
531 De Oliveira (2000, p. 139).
532 Quoted by Per6n et al. (1975, p. 30, from an undisclosed original source, translation by author).
533 This contrasts to what happened in Bogota, where planners had to negotiate with close to 64 bus
companies at the same time.
122
not tested before, such as the trunk and feeder system. It was natural therefore that
the operators would be reticent to accepting these changes. "The operators had
doubts referring for example to eliminating a route that went to downtown and turning
it into a feeder route." Third, they intended to hold many discussions and meetings
with representatives of the two affected operators to show them the benefits of the
express bus, particularly in terms of profitability. "In the discussions we showed them
that profitability was not going to drop-instead it was going to increase. We showed
that they and the city-all of us-were better off with the proposal."535
Yet the planners lacked strong empirical evidence to back their claims. For
one, demand estimates were not as accurate as some would like, particularly
because operators assumed 100% of the risk-return on the investment was
contingent on the number of passengers. Operators were therefore reluctant to accept
the city's proposals. Lerner, according to several accounts, in one of the meetings
said: 'The city needs this project. If you [the operators] do not want to do it, we are
going to call someone else." Lerner, moreover, even threatened the operators with
having the city purchase the bus fleet and operate the service.536 These words, more
likely, were to show the resolve his administration had and improve the city's
bargaining position. At the same time, Lerner also offered to help the operators find
soft loans and other funding for the new buses.537
The city's bargaining position improved significantly because the concession
contracts with all the operators expired in 1974.538 According to sources, in the
negotiations Lerner took advantage of this by threatening the operators with opening
up the competition to other firms if Transporte Coletivo Gl6ria and Auto Viagao
Redentor did not accept the express bus. As seen above, the "selective" areas never
expire and are almost the property of the bus companies. The concession contracts
534 This information comes in part from interviews to planners and bus operators carried out during
2002 and 2003. I have decided not to disclose these sources in this section of the document to protect
their identity. I do disclose secondary sources, however.
535 By putting buses to operate in a segregated busway, operation costs go down, in essence because
buses are interrupted less by cars and trucks and buses therefore get to travel at higher speeds. Also,
the maneuver to pick up and drop passengers off takes less time and costs less.
536 Ceneviva (1990, p. 30).
537 De Oliveira (2000, p. 143).
538 De Oliveira (2000, p. 141).
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between the city and the operators, in contrast, do expire. Therefore, formal renewals
of the contracts-even if they are not truly competitive-were needed and this
happened in 1974. The city had to negotiate this renewal with all the operators,
represented by their trade association. Thus the operators as a whole were interested
in the outcomes of the negotiations around the express service. By mid February
1974 the city administration and the trade association reached an agreement to renew
the contracts for seven years until 1981.539 This general agreement also mentioned
the specific agreement regarding the express service.
This agreement met in part planners' expectations. First, the operators in
general and Transporte Coletivo Gl6ria and Auto Viagao Redentor in particular agreed
to the introduction of the express service, which implied changing the routes within
two "selective" areas.540 The bulk of the routes would be merged into the express
service and would run along the busway. Another share of the routes would be
transformed into feeder routes to converge at terminals and transfer passengers to
the express service. Finally, the remaining routes would continue to link the
neighborhoods to downtown by using the high-speed roads of the trinary road
scheme.5 41 Furthermore, the agreement contemplated the possibility of extending the
express service to other selective areas owned by other companies and to slowly
increase the share of total ridership carried by the new service.542
Second, the "selective" areas would not be affected by the introduction of the
express service in the North-South structural axis.543 The planners' proposal to have a
route along the entire axis that started in one "selective" area and finished in another
was unacceptable to the operators. This proposal violated the exclusive "rights" each
company held to an area. Further, each company had its own fare. Therefore, the
proposal was difficult to make operational. "The most we could do was to establish a
539 Gazeta do Povo, "Cidade Tem mais 66 novos 6nibus." March 7 th 1974; and de Oliveira (2000, p.
141).
540 See de Oliveira (2000, p. 140-142).
541 IPPUC (1975b, p. 15); IPPUC (1990, p. 58); and Per6n et al. (1975, p. 42-43). 50% of the
frequencies outside the trunk lines were to feed the trunk-line express service. The remaining 50% of
the frequencies kept going from the neighborhoods to downtown (Per6n et al., 1975, p. 42-43).
542 Gazeta do Povo "O expresso n.o elimina o sistema convencional." April 11, 1974; and de Oliveira
(2000, p. 141).
43 De Oliveira (2000, p. 139-140); and Peron et al. (1975, p. 42-43).
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linkage in downtown. One company operated the South segment and another the
North one...and arrived at the borderline between the two areas. The bus companies
themselves determined this because it was established in the contract."544 Therefore,
a passenger wanting to travel along the entire axis had to disembark in downtown and
board a second bus-owned by a different company-to continue the trip.
Third, operators agreed to use the new bus, more comfortable and designed
for mass transit purposes, proposed by the planners.54 5 The problem was that no
company made this bus in Brazil. Planners at IPPUC had to find a company willing to
make the chassis they needed and then find a bodywork manufacturer who could
build their designs. While they could not find the chassis-lower than for a truck-they
were able to convince Marco Polo to manufacture the new bodywork.546 Fourth, bus
operators agreed to the new controls of their operators by the city government.
Interestingly, the Department of Public Services did not have the capacity to control
the new express service. IPPUC, therefore, took over the responsibilities for planning
bus service and supervising the operators.547
Finally, the system for determining the fare to be charged to the passengers
was not altered-a methodology that was rather favorable to the bus operators.548 At
the time, each bus company collected from its riders the fare inside the bus and the
fare was different for each company or "selective" area.5 49 The fare estimate covered
all costs for the operators including an estimate for the capital invested in the new
buses and a reasonable return. Lerner's administration wanted to avoid subsidies and
hence the fare paid by the user had to cover all costs-and also be affordable to the
user. The city also agreed to continue to stop other operators from entering the
market to compete with the established bus companies.550 Curitiba is in fact one of
544 Rovani (1990, p. 71). The contract Rovani refers to is the contract that created the "selective" areas
that never expired.
545 De Oliveira (2000, p. 140).
546 Ceneviva (1990, p. 36); Tomizawa (1991, p. 275-6); Rovani (1990, p. 77-78); and Per6n et al.
(1975, p. 35). Marco Polo also was a key player in the TransMilenio project in Bogota, for it helped a
local firm assemble the custom-made articulated buses the project planners' required (see Ardila and
Morrison, 2002).
547 De Oliveira (2000, p. 140-1).
548 De Oliveira (2000, p. 142-3).
549 Rovani (1990, p. 73).
550 De Oliveira (2000, p. 142-3).
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the few cities in Latin America were informal operators of small vehicles have not
been able to enter the market-precisely because of the effective action by local
authorities to prevent this from happening and equally important the existence of a
good bus service.551 These two measures are necessary to lower the risk for the
operators who are investing in expensive equipment and who are assuming the
demand risk, because their revenue comes entirely from the fare box.
The role of planners
Planners' role was to interact with politicians and stakeholders to achieve two
objectives. First, reduce the power of the bus companies, which were initially reluctant
to accept even minimal changes to the way the operated their buses. Planners
entered with a clear strategy for negotiating with the operators. In the negotiations,
Mayor Lerner and the planners took advantage of the expiration of the concession
contracts in 1974. If the two bus companies affected by the plans were unwilling to
accept at least some of the changes, the city could, in principle, concession the
services with other parties. This threat helped planners lower the power of the bus
companies. In parallel, planners' interaction with the CEOs of the bus companies
affected by the express service helped them persuade them individually. Once the
affected companies got on board the other companies had less power to oppose.
Second, thanks to the interaction, planners were able to modify the original
plans for the express bus. These plans had been crafted with imperfect information,
specifically regarding what was politically feasible. Further, the original plans entailed
a very high risk for the bus operators because the plans brought about too many
changes at the same time. By interacting with the operators and modifying the plans
risk went down. As risk went down, the operators were willing to support the modified
version of the express service. Carlos Ceneviva, one of the main transportation
planners in Curitiba, summarized the situation by saying: "One thing is the idea,
another thing is to make it happen. Then, this group [at IPPUC] started to do this:
551 Brasileiro (1999, p. 462).
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work on the idea [in the original plan], detailing it, transforming it into fact. In this, the
idea is transformed, it stops being the original one."552
The opening of the express service and its significance
Parallel to these events, Lerner's administration started a campaign to inform the
population about the new service and create positive expectations among the
population.553 On the 2 2nd of September of 1974 the North-South axis started
experimental service with 20 new buses, locally known as Expressos. In days, actual
demand surpassed initial expectations-around 38,000 passengers per day-and
planners had to allow old conventional buses to use the busway to add much needed
capacity. 554 Two weeks after, planners had to order 16 new express buses: "because
a lot of people left their car at home, because the new bus was fast."5 55 The official
opening took place on the 11 th of October of 1974. The President of Brazil, General
Eduardo Geisel, and other members of the national government participated in the
inauguration and rode in the new buses. Four months after opening, demand had
reached 54,000 passengers per day-60% percent above estimated demand.556
The significance of implementing the first express service corridor is twofold.
First, it established what would evolve into a strong relationship-or rather an
alliance-between Lerner's political movement and the bus operators. Darci Gulin,
one of the main bus operators summarizes this when he said to a magazine in 1994
that commemorated the first 20 years of the express service: "It has been 20 years
since we started operating with large buses...We had a solid foundation, naturally so
in a city that offers safe conditions for making investments."5 57 Another operator told
me in an interview: "The municipality and the bus operators are partners, there is
mutual trust."
Second, planners in charge of the bus system also understand the importance
of their relationship with the bus operators and therefore seek win-win solutions. One
552 Ceneviva (1990, p.29).
553 See Gazeta do Povo, several editions April-May, 1974.
554 Per6n et al. (1975, p. 30-31 and 43).
555 Rovani (1990, p. 75). Per6n et al. (1975, p. 44) reports that four months into the operation of the
express service, 17.6% of the sampled users used to commute by car.
556 Per6n et al. (1975, p. 35-37 and 43-44).
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planner at URBS, the agency currently in charge of the system, told me: "URBS does
not like to cause traumatism by introducing radical changes. We plan and negotiate
with the operators any change we deem necessary." Euclides Rovani, a key transport
planner, told me: 'We look for win-win solutions. Maintaining the financial equilibrium
of the bus operators [i.e. the profitability] is fundamental for us. We do not want to hurt
any enterprise let alone all of them."55 8 By having this type of solution within the
context given by the alliance with the operators, planners figure out proposals that
operators can live with, and in general, operators support the planners and Lerner's
movement.
The initial operation of the express services and its
problems
Immediately after the express bus service begun to operate some problems
appeared overcrowded buses, insufficient bus fleet, and regrettably some express
buses ran over pedestrians, probably because busway technology results in
increased speed. These problems received prompt attention in one way or another-
ordering operators to purchase additional buses, improving signage, etc.559 More
complex, however, were the problems emerging from the trunk-feeder system, in
which some passengers were required to take a feeder bus and transfer to a trunk
bus at an integration-terminal. If not properly handled, a passenger can end up paying
more to get to downtown than with the previous system and this can generate a
negative reaction among users.560 That these problems emerged so soon after
operations started and the way they were handled by planners at IPPUC are
indicative of the planning style at IPPUC.
557 Tech Bus, March 1994. "O Onibus A.C. e D.C."
558 Interview by author with Euclides Rovani, April, 2003.
559 Per6n et al. (1975, p. 32-33).
560 See TRUHFA (1989, ch. 6 and 7). Metro systems in the developing world have usually found it very
hard to achieve an effective integration between the rail service and the feeder buses. More often than
not, a justification to build the metro was that it would replace the buses in the streets, hence reducing
congestion. Buses would then become feeders to the metro. But a typical result is that integration is
very difficult and buses continue to operate routes that directly compete against the new metro line.
This reduces the overall economic benefits of undertaking a metro line.
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Several reflections by Carlos Ceneviva, an architect who joined IPPUC in 1972
and one of the main planners for the express bus service,561 illustrate the planning
style at IPPUC. "The base was the goal of having a good transportation system that
saves time at a low cost and that respects the city." "I had never worked in
transportation before, but most people at IPPUC had not fiddled with many things, so
when the problem emerged I did what everyone does: I used my head to solve it."562
'We learned from practice." 'We used very simple techniques to estimate passenger
demand-we did not have time to do an origin destination survey5 63 for it takes one to
two years and only delays implementation." "Lerner told us: 'The important thing is to
have a proposal to start with and then solve problems as they emerge, in real time.""
"Time is critical in the planning process for there are opportunities that go away if you
don't get something done while they last." "There are no definitive solutions, solutions
always have to change." "Planning is intertwined with learning from experience; lots of
experience, spend most of your time in the street, at the project site, not in your
desk." 5 64
This vision is not unique to Ceneviva. Manoel Coelho, another planner at
IPPUC, corroborates this approach by saying: 'We studied everything in depth and
carried out tests. When we wanted to implement something...we would test it in the
streets, to receive critiques, suggestions, etc. Then and even today we proceed in that
way: We leave certain things in the street and observe the reaction."5 6 5 This
approach, obviously, has limits. Ceneviva himself qualifies his opinion: "You cannot
be irresponsible. You have to start knowing that the chances of success are fairly
high. Once started, as you go along, you see what is possible and what needs to
561 Ceneviva (1990, p. 29-30); and Lerner (1997, p. 327).
562 Ceneviva (1990, p. 30). This last idea by Ceneviva brings to mind Sch6n's (1991) '"The Reflective
Practitioner." Specifically, Sch6n's ideas on "knowing in action" and "reflection in action." Schbn argues
that people can think of what they are doing while they are doing it and that by doing this they develop
a theory in action.
563 In mid-2003 a new transportation study was taking place that was going to estimate an O-D survey
for trips between the metropolitan area cities and Curitiba. This will be the first time that an O-D survey
exists in Curitiba, but even then trips within Curitiba will not be captured because of the study's
emphasis on trips from the metro area to Curitiba and vice versa.
564 All quotes from interviews by author with Ceneviva in April 2002 and 2003 and in February, 2004;
translation by author.
565 Coelho (1991, p. 201).
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change. You have to do what is possible, not what is a dream. The definitive plan
does not exist."5 66
I use the example of the problems of integrating the feeder and express service
to illustrate the planning style at IPPUC. To achieve fare integration between express
and feeder buses, planners at IPPUC first tried a system whereby for each ride either
on the express or the feeder a person would receive a ticket.567 Each ticket would
allow them a free ride later on in the express bus. Six or seven months into the
operation of this scheme, planners learned that some people were counterfeiting the
tickets. Planners decided to change the scheme. By now Saul Raiz was the mayor of
Curitiba (more on his tenure below). Planners then tested having passengers pay two
separate fares, 0.20 cruzeiros in the feeder and 0.30 cruzeiros in the express. This
system did not last long because it was socially unfair. The relatively wealthy who
could afford to live on the structural axes had to pay less than a poor person who had
to take two buses. This scheme lasted one and a half years after which planners at
IPPUC tested a new solution. The feeder bus would be free and passengers would
only pay for using the express bus. But this scheme had perverse incentives
embedded in it for some people abused the free ride on the feeder bus. After some
time it was also abandoned. Rovani, a planner at IPPUC says about this experience:
'We learned that for free, nothing can be done."568
Planners then came up with the idea of enclosing a small area within each
terminal to allow passengers to disembark one bus, walk a short distance and board
the other bus. Passengers paid whatever bus they took first and thanks to this
enclosed area boarded the connecting bus for free. Because the enclosed areas were
small and an increasing number of riders used them, they became crowded and were
dubbed by the population as "little pigpens." This was clearly a feature that lowered
the quality of the system and users did not like them.5 69 To solve this problem, some
planners proposed to eliminate the "little pigpens" by enclosing the entire transfer
566 Interview by author with Ceneviva in April 2002 and 2003; translation by author.
567 This account is based on Rovani (1990, p. 71-71); and Ceneviva (1990, p. 32-33), unless otherwise
noted.
568 Rovani (1990, p. 72).
569 Neves (1995, p. 76).
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terminal area-including the shops inside. Only bus passengers would have access to
the terminal. But a group of planners at IPPUC, involved mostly with urban planning,
adamantly opposed this idea. These planners thought the integration terminals ought
to serve for more than transfers between feeder and express buses. They argued that
terminals should contain stores, markets, and pharmacies. People from the
neighborhoods would take the feeder bus to the terminal, do their shopping at the
terminal and head back home without going to downtown.
In 1980, when Lerner was again the mayor, the "little pigpen" problem needed
solution. Lerner offered a ticket to Hawaii to the planner who could figure out how to
achieve fare and physical integration between the feeder and express lines without
having to enclose the entire terminal. No one won the ticket to Hawaii. The terminals
then became fully enclosed. Passengers pay on the bus they take first or upon
entering the terminal, and transfer between buses if needed at the terminal. Citing
Rovani again: "This solution is sensational: there is no lost revenue, and boarding and
disembarking are done very quickly."570 Enclosed terminals are used even today in
Curitiba and some have shops. The enclosed terminals have also proven resilient to
other changes in the system, such as a new high-platform buses and a fare box that
is raised by the city government and not the operators-changes that take place in
the mid eighties and early nineties and that are covered below.
In sum, planners at IPPUC, most probably inspired by Lerner's style, are not as
worried about methodological rigor; instead they care for having a proposal that can
be put forward for eventual adoption. A proposal generates reactions by stakeholders
that result in adaptations to the proposal and that serve to take it to the decision point.
Once a plan is adopted, moreover, planners also seem open to starting a process of
marginal improvements as problems emerge.5 7 ' It is the interaction with
stakeholders-bus operators and users in this case-that generate the feedback that
allow planners to make adjustments to improve the plan. Aware of the need for
570 Rovani (1990, p. 72).
571 Interestingly, not always are planning teams and city administrations willing to adjust their plans
after implementation to address emerging problems (see Flyvbjerg (1998 and 2002).
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adjustment as the process evolves, planners in Curitiba also craft proposals that are
flexible.
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Chapter 5
The Window of Opportunity Extended
The successes achieved by Lerner and his team during their first term in office gave
momentum to the implementation of the Director Plan. The Plan had ample support
and continued to be in the political agenda of the city. The Plan continues to change
in part in response to political forces and in part to additions introduced by planners
who want to expand the scope of the plan. In this chapter I focus on the
administrations of Saul Raiz and Jaime Lerner, who was re-appointed to the mayor's
office. These administrations are credited with finalizing the implementation of the
main elements in the Director Plan. A key issue that will emerge is that when there is
a successful precedent, carrying out subsequent stages of the same projects is
politically easier. I finish the chapter with a discussion of the sources of funding used
in the implementation of the transport elements of the Director Plan.
The appointment and tenure of Mayor Saul Raiz
In March 2 5 th 1975 Jaime Lerner completed his four-year term in office. Lerner took
part of his planning team and went to work as a consultant around Brazil in cities such
as Aracaj[, Recife, Sdo Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and even Caracas in Venezuela. Later
on he received an invitation from Berkeley University to teach as a visiting professor-
Lerner would be in Berkeley when Governor Ney Braga appointed him mayor again in
1979.572 In 1975 the military government of Brazil appointed Jayme Canet as
governor of Parand. Canet in turn appointed Saul Raiz as mayor of Curitiba because
Canet wanted someone that could continue with Lerner's work. Canet and Raiz,
together with Karlos Rischbieter were part, among others, of Ney Braga's group.573
Not surprisingly, Braga as head of this political group was behind Raiz's appointment.
Braga, in effect, was the power broker during 30 years in Parann's politics.574 Braga
572 Lerner (1997, p. 328-9); Braga (1997, p. 41).
573 Pereira (1997, p. 129).
574 De Novaes (1997, p. 153); and Pereira (1997, p. 135-136). See also Braga (1997, p. 17-52).
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by then had been appointed minister of education at the federal level-and from that
position helped direct federal resources to Curitiba.575
By the time Raiz was appointed mayor he had ample experience in planning,
politics and as an executive in the private sector-he was heading a private company
in Sao Paulo when the governor appointed him.576 For instance, with just 24 years of
age Raiz headed the Department of Urban Planning during Braga's tenure as mayor
of Curitiba in 1954.577 And during Braga's first term as governor in 1961, Raiz headed
the Highway Department of the state of Paran. There, among others, he had to raise
funds abroad to build the Londrina-Curitiba highway and in this way reduce the
pressure for separation of the northern part of the state from Paran. 57 8 Raiz
furthermore studied urban planning in France between 1958 and 1959 and took
classes with Father Lebret. Raiz was influenced by Lebret's ideas on humanism.
According to Raiz, Lebret argued that it was not enough to just make a plan. It was
necessary to have a planning process that brings people in, to listen to these
participants, and to obtain their reaction to the initiatives the administrator launches.
That is, the planning process has to have many discussions among planners,
politicians, and citizens. Raiz claims that these ideas helped him during his term as
mayor and allowed him to continue implementing the Director Plan-while introducing
some changes.5 7 9
Raiz took office aware that he could not interrupt Lerner's urban policies and
that "Curitiba deserved continuity without repetition. Curitiba deserved that whoever
was mayor did not destroy what was fundamental, that is, the Director Plan." 580 Raiz,
therefore, tried to keep some of the people who had participated in Lerner's
administration. Raiz appointed Lubomir Ficinski to head IPPUC. Ficinski had headed
IPPUC for over a year at the beginning of Lerner's tenure (Table 6).581 Raiz also
575 Braga (1990, p. 53).
576 Interview by author with Saul Raiz, April, 2003.
577 Raiz (1990, p. 53)
578 Interview by author with Saul Raiz, April, 2003. De Oliveira (2000, p. 125-126) argues that the elite
of Paran. resident in Curitiba afraid of the possibility that the north of the state separated, undertook
economic planning and industrialization policies.
579 Interview by author with Saul Raiz, April, 2003.
580 Raiz (1990, p. 58).
581 Ficinski (1990, p. 20); and Rocha (1990, p. 16).
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called Dely but he could not join his administration initially. Raiz also retained
Francisca Rischbieter and Dilcia Auriquio to work on land use planning and control,
as well as other planners of the Lerner administration.582 This approach ensured
IPPUC's hold on power by supervising the work of other agencies and being close to
the mayor.5 83 Raiz summarizes his approach: "I am proud of having had the courage,
at a time when there were pressures to liberalize everything, of having supported
Lerner's plan, introducing small modifications that his own planning team deemed
important, without distorting that Plan, which is the basis for everything."584
D6lcia Auriquio, also became the liaison between IPPUC and the Department
of Urban Planning (DUP), because once again there was a serious conflict between
these two agencies. In essence, IPPUC would plan for example land use regulations
and DUP would be in charge of implementing and enforcing those regulations. DUP,
however, would not always agree with IPPUC's ideas and tried to change them,
hence the conflict. Mayor Raiz argued that DUP might have valid reasons to introduce
changes and called Aurfquio to mediate between the two agencies by having her work
half her time at each agency.585 This created a new flow of information between the
two agencies, which now analyzed problems together and figured out solutions, such
as new legislation.586 Aurfquio was also in charge of lobbying the City Council in order
to get the changes to the land use regulations enacted.587 "Whenever there was a
problem we immediately proposed a change to the [zoning] law...and sent it to the
City Council. My job was to defend that idea at the City Council. We were always at
the City Council with some change [to the legislation], something that addressed the
problems that were happening."588
In effect, during Raiz's tenure there were many pressures by developers to
relax the zoning. The Raiz administration tried to resist and even tried to make zoning
582 Raiz (1990, p. 59).
583 Rocha (1990, p. 20).
584 Raiz (1990, p. 61).
585 Aurfquio (1990, p. 6-8); and interview by author with DOIlcia Aurfquio, May 2003.
586 Da Rocha (1990, p. 17).
587 Auriquio (1990, p. 6-8); and interview by author with DIlcia Auriquio, May 2003.
588 Auriquio (1990, p. 6-7).
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stricter.589 This generated a lot of opposition from interests associate with land
development, some of which filed lawsuits against the measures.59 The new land use
law was effective at curbing the occupation of some areas prone to flooding but not as
much at curbing the emergence of illegal housing occupied by poor people-the
famous favelas.591 To address this problem Raiz and Dely designed a policy to
provide public housing to some of the people living in the favelas. This policy was
handled by a new city agency headed by Dely, COHAB-CT.592 Raiz said in this
regard: "I wanted the policies to address the favela problem not only by relocating
people, but also by having a wider scope, by providing a unit with services, with
schools, and with the participation of the future resident in defining how his/her future
house would be. I wanted to break with the monotony of the residential
complexes."593 1594
Transportation Planning during Raiz's tenure
In addition to the land use changes to the Director Plan, the Raiz administration
introduced two other changes. First, it planned three new structural axes that where
not contemplated in the original plan. The first two extended eastward and westward
from downtown and together later on constituted the East-West Axis595-which was
opened to service during Lerner's second administration. The third new structural axis
extended in the direction of Boqueirao.5 96 This was the area that Wilheim had rejected
in his original plan and argued it should not be urbanized for it could flood. It was also
the area that planner Onaldo Pinto had foreseen as being important for development
and as the one needing the structural axis. Despite Curitiba's apparent strong land-
use controls, occupation of this area had proceeded at fast pace.597 The low price of
589 Raiz (1990, p. 58-61).
590 De Oliveira (2000, p. 153-4).
591 Menezes (2001, p. 112-114).
592 Dely (1990, p. 19-22); Raiz (1990, p. 60); and Malucelli (1991, p. 264-5).
593 Raiz (1990, p. 60).
594 For other aspects of the Raiz administration see also Greca (1991, p. 41-42); and Rocha (1990, p.
18-20).
595 Raiz (1990, p. 59-60); and IPPUC (1976, p. 21-28).
596 Raiz (1990, p. 59-60); and IPPUC (1976, p. 21-28).
597 Habinobitch (1996, p. 54).
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the land in the area made it attractive for poor people to locate.598 Paradoxically, the
low price of the land is explained by the lack of public infrastructure as the city was
trying to follow the Director Plan, which called for not urbanizing this area.599 Yet there
is evidence that as early as 1974, when the express bus service opened in the North-
South axis, the Boqueirao area already concentrated an important number of
people.60 0
Table 6. Mayors of Curitiba, Heads of IPPUC, and Governor's of Parand
Year Mayor of Curitiba Head of IPPUC Governor of Parana
(Approx.)
1954 Ney Braga (54-58) No IPPUC at the time Munhoz da Rocha (??-
(a) 55)
Antonio Annibelli (55)
Adolpho de Oliveira (55-
(am)
1958 Ibere de Mattos (58-62) No IPPUC at the time Moisds Lupi6n (??-61 ?)
(ak) (an)
1962 Ivo Arzua (62-66, 66-67) Jair Leal Ney Braga (61-65)
(c) (d) (b)
1967 Omar Sabbag (67-71) (e) Luiz Forte Netto (67-69) Paulo Pimentel (66-71)
(f) (h)
Jaime Lerner (69)
(f)
Cl6vis Lunardi (69-71)
(g)
1971 Jaime Lerner (71-75) Lubomir Ficinski (71-72) Haroldo Le6n (71)
(i) ) ()
Rafael Dely (72-75) Pedro Parigot (71-72)
(k) (I)
Hoffman Gomes (73-75)
(m)
1975 Saul Raiz (75-79) Lubomir Ficinski (75-79) Jayme Canet (75-79)
(n) (j) (o)
598 IPPUC (1976, p. 24).
599 Menezes (2001, p. 111).
600 Specifically, a newspaper recorded that many people were surprised the new facility had not been
built instead toward the Boqueirdo area, showing that urbanization in this area had proceeded rapidly
(Diario da Tarde, Sept. 23, 1974, cited by Peron et al. (1975, p. 32)).
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Table 6 (continued). Mayors of Curitiba, Heads of IPPUC, and Governor's of Parand
1979 Jaime Lerner (79-83) Carlos Ceneviva (79) Ney Braga (79-82)
(i) (p) (b)
Cassio Taniguchi (80-83) Jose de Novaes (82-83)
(q) (aj)
1983 Mauricio Fruet (83-86) Alcidino Pereira (83-85) Jose Richa (83-86)
(r) (s) (t)
Omar Akel (85-86)
v
1986 Roberto Requi.o de Mello Adhail Sprenger Joao Ferraz (86-87)
e Silva (86-88) (ao) (w)
(u) Alvaro Dias (87-91)
(y)
1989 Jaime Lerner (89-92) Cassio Taniguchi (89-92) Roberto Requiao (91-94)
(x) (q) (Z)
1993 Rafael Greca (93-96) Rafael Dely Mario Pereira (94-95)
(aa) (ap) (ac)
Mauro Magnabosco
(ab)
1997 Cassio Taniguchi (97-00) Unknown to author Jaime Lerner (95-98)
(ad) (i)
2001 Cassio Taniguchi (01-04) Luis Hayakawa (01-04?) Jaime Lerner (99-02)
(ae) (af) (ag)
Roberto Requi.o (03-07)
(ah)
Note 1: Since Jaime Lerner became mayor in 1971 the only mayors who have not been part of Lerner's
group are Mauricio Fruet and Roberto Requiao, for a total of 6 years.
Note 2: The official term in office for mayors and governors is four years all along the period shown in
the table, except for the transition period between 1983 and 1988. The day of the year the inauguration
of a new mayor or governor takes place has changed frequently. Currently, mayors and governors are
sworn in on January 1st of the year their term begins.
Sources: (a) Braga (1990, p. 1); (b) Braga (1997, p. 67-68); (c) Arzua (1989, p. 1); (d) Valduga (1991,
p. 96); (e) Brasileiro (1998, p. 475); (f); Netto (1991, p. 51); (g) Lunardi (1990, p. 1); (h) Pimentel (1997,
p. 53-54; (i) Lerner (1997, p. 317); (j) Ficinski (1990, p. 11); (k) Dely (1990, p. 9); (I) Gomes (1997, p.
104, 115-116); (m) Gomes (1997, p. 99); (n) Raiz (1990, p. 53); (o) Pereira, p. 124); (p) Ceneviva
(1990, p. 27); (q) Taniguichi (1990, p. 47); (r) Menezes (2001, p. 121); (s) Pereira (1988, p. 3); (t) Richa
(1997, p. 157); (u); Menezes (2000, p. 121); (v) Akel (1991, p. 205); (w) Ferraz (1997, p. 181); (x)
Menezes (2001, p. 123); (y) Dias (1997, p. 1978); (z) Requiao (1997, p. 249); (aa) Schwartz (2004, p.
133); (ab) Interview by author with Mauro Magnabosco, April, 2002; (ac) Pereira (1997, p. 275); (ad)
Schwartz (2004, p. 133); (ae) Schwartz (2004, p. 133); (af) Gazeta do Povo (2003, p. 7); (ag);
Schwartz (2004, p. 134); ah) Gazeta do Povo (2003, April 15 th); (aj) de Novaes (1997, p. 139); (al)
Per6n et al (1975, p. 21); (am) Annibelli (1997, p. 1-3); (an) Per6n et al. (1975, p. 25); (ao) Correio das
Noticias, January 22d, 1987; (ap) Interview by author with Rafael Dely, February 2004.
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The Boqueirao axis with express service was opened to service in 1979.6 01
There is little evidence that there was any problem negotiating the necessary changes
in the bus fleet with the bus operators. Most probably, the fact that there was a
successful precedent, the North-South axis, assured the bus company in the
Boqueirao selective area that it would be profitable to adopt the new technology.
Business and merchants in Boqueirto did not oppose the project either. Residents at
first did not like the idea of having to transfer from a feeder bus to the express service,
more so when before they only had to take one bus. However, the savings in time
once the service opened convinced bus users that the project was convenient.
Opposition, however, did exist and it was by the business owners in downtown. In
essence, the trinary road concept could not be used in downtown for it implied
demolishing a large number of properties, given the width of the streets. The solution
was to have a one-way street carrying the express buses and the high-speed traffic
lanes. Because it was a one-way street, the express bus lanes would face the
storefronts. It was these merchants that opposed the solution, but planners managed
to convince them to accept this solution.602
The second change introduced by the Raiz administration was regarding the
Mariano Torres St., a street in downtown that connected the north and south
structural axes and that connected downtown to the road to the airport. This street
was to be built underground to allow for segregated over passes.6 3 Raiz thought this
project was too expensive and ordered changes. 'We changed this project into one
far simpler, with the feet on the ground (everybody was saying [about the original
plan]: "its going to be a beautiful project, with viaducts..."). We had the courage to
confront the retailers of Tibagi St." 604 In the end, the solution was to use two streets
instead of one, the Mariano Torres and Tibagi streets, which are one block away from
601 URBS (1998, p. 6).
602 Malucelli (1991, p. 263).
603 See IPPUC (1976, p. 10). It is interesting to see that Raiz had to even change the plan IPPUC did at
the beginning of his administration (IPPUC, 1976), which followed the original plan in having an
underground Mariano Torres St., once financial reality showed the underground avenue was not
feasible.
604 Raiz (1990, p. 62).
-
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each other. Both connect the north and south structural axes carrying traffic in only
one, but opposite, direction.
Lerner re-appointed Mayor of Curitiba
In 1978 the state assembly elected Ney Braga governor of Paran. for the period
starting on March 15 th, 19796°5-the day Saul Raiz's term as mayor finished.
According to Raiz, Braga offered him to continue as mayor for a second term, but
Raiz originally had plans to return to private industry in Sao Paulo and did not accept
Braga's offer.606 Raiz, however, later on became secretary of Municipal Development
for Braga and this allowed him to run-unsuccessfully, nonetheless-in 1982 for
governor in the first open election since the mid-sixties.607 For the mayor's office,
Braga then thought of appointing Lerner. Lerner, who was teaching at Berkeley, was
reluctant at the beginning, but then accepted the offer and returned to Curitiba to start
his second term as mayor.608 Notice Braga's important role in this story. It took 12
years to implement the main elements of the Director Plan and Braga was behind the
appointments of Lerner and Raiz, the mayors who achieved this outcome. But as
said, Braga was the political boss of Paran. during this period.
The military dictatorship at the federal level in Brazil was beginning to allow a
slim democratic opening-hence Braga's election by the assembly.60 9 At the same
time, organized labor in particular began to demand changes to the political system.
Led mostly by union leader Luis "Lula" da Silva, currently the president of Brazil,
workers demanded direct elections for president and therefore an end to the military
regime.610 Curitiba also saw its share of strikes during this time. At the same time, the
Brazilian miracle was beginning to slow down and serious economic problems were
around the corner.6'1 Lerner's second term, therefore, took place within this
environment, complex in political and economic terms.
605 Braga (1997, p. 17-18).
606 Interview by author with Saul Raiz, April, 2003.
607 Braga (1997, p. 40); AND Interview by author with Saul Raiz, April, 2003.
608 Braga (1997, p. 41); and Lerner (1997, p. 329).
609 Bueno (2002, p. 379-383).
610 Bueno (2002, p. 398-401). See Paran. (2002) for a series of interviews to Lula about his life and his
role in these strikes and movements to democratize Brazil, among others.
611 Bueno (2002, p. 380, 382-3).
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Given this context, Menezes writes: "Permeated by the democratic opening,
Lerner's second term was noted for the reaffirmation of the planning philosophy
started in his first administration, with specific and strategic improvements in what can
be considered the social arena. "Curitiba for All" was the proposal of his
administration. This translated, among others, into the objective of decentralizing
urban infrastructure to all neighborhoods in the city. "A technocratic vision of social
issues," in the opinion of the political groups in the opposition, which started to
question "the technocratic approach imposed by IPPUC.""6' 2 The "Curitiba for All"
slogan was precisely a way of countering these and other critics of Lerner who
claimed he had been mayor only of downtown Curitiba during his first tenure.61 3
The constitution of the Integrated Transit Network
During 1980 Lerner's administration opened for service the East-West axis of the
express service.614 Just as with the Boqueirdo axis, there is no evidence of the bus
operators opposing the implementation of the express bus. Again, the successful
precedent reinforced the point that it was convenient for the bus operators to upgrade
their bus fleet and switch to the trunk and feeder system. Moreover, each "selective"
area had its own fare calculated so as to cover operating and capital costs.
Profitability was insured. Finally, the contracts signed in 1974 between the Lerner
administration and the bus companies-due to expire in 1981--contemplated the
expansion of the express service. More contentious, however, was convincing all 10
operators of adopting an inter-neighborhood route to link the integration terminals
along the structural axes.
The idea to establish an inter-neighborhood service belonged to Carlos
Ceneviva. Lerner had appointed Ceneviva as president of IPPUC at the beginning of
his second mayoral tenure. Ceneviva, however, resigned soon after to pursue
graduate studies in France.6 '5 Ceneviva returned to Curitiba arguing that an inter-
612 Menezes (2001, p. 116).
613 Coelho (1991, p. 198).
614 URBS (1998, p. 6-7).
615 Ceneviva (1990, p. 36-38).
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neighborhood bus service was needed.61 6 His reasoning was that the successful
implementation of the Director Plan and its amendments had achieved their main
objective-downtown activities had begun to extend along the structural axes. As a
result, someone in neighborhood A might not need to go to a destination in downtown,
but rather to a point in neighborhood B along a different structural axis. The system
forced this person to take an express bus to downtown, descend there and pay a
second fare to take a second express bus. Ceneviva reasoned that the solution was
to create a circular service that connected neighborhoods without having to go to
downtown and paying a second fare. The new service would connect the existing
terminals, where passengers already transferred from the feeder routes to the
express or feeder lines, along the different structural axis.617
The bus companies, however, adamantly opposed this proposal for it blatantly
violated the "selective" area principle,618 which until then had been considered almost
sacred. Ceneviva's proposal implied that a bus from one company would be allowed
to circulate in the streets of the "selective" area of another company-in fact, of all
companies for the route was circular. The problem was worse because the inter-
neighborhood route implied that a passenger who paid to an inter-neighborhood
operator could transfer for free at a terminal to an express bus owned by a different
operator. Hence the second bus company would not receive any revenue.61 9 In the
express service, on the contrary, the feeder routes belonged to the same company
that operated the express bus-as guaranteed by the selective area principle-and all
revenue went to the same company. The inter-neighborhood service introduced,
therefore, important changes.
Negotiations started with the companies. Planners tried to explain the idea
underlying their proposal. For example, while a passenger would pay in the morning
to the company that operated the inter-neighborhood service, in the evening that
person would pay to the company that operated the express service. Averaging over
a day or a week, none of the companies would have lost revenue and, on the
616 Lerner (1997, p. 329-330).
617 Ceneviva (1990, p. 36-38); and Rovani (1990, p. 73-74).
618 De Oliveira (2000, p. 141).
Interview by author with Carlos Ceneviva, April, 2003.
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contrary, possibly even won passengers from the increased catchment area. Hence
the distribution of the new revenue was automatic. The bus companies were reluctant
to accept this argument but were eventually convinced.620 In the end, the discussions
led to a solution whereby the bus fleet needed to operate the inter-neighborhood
service was apportioned to all companies. A given company would get a number of
buses proportional to the share of its "selective" area in the total area of Curitiba.
Hence, all the bus companies in Curitiba would operate the inter-neighborhood
routes. All parties deemed this solution satisfactory. Lerner and the planners wanted
the new service, and the operators wanted their fair share of the new cake.
Around the same time Lerner's administration adopted a second change
dubbed the "social" fare.621 As said, at the time each "selective" area had its own fare.
This could be unfair to some people who could end up spending in bus services a
larger share of their income than others spend. Each area had its own formula to
calculate the fare. The formula was the result of both technical and political (or
bargaining) factors. Moreover, having different fares complicated the fare integration
of the inter-neighborhood routes to the trunk lines, for passengers might be motivated
to take the buses of companies with a lower fare.622 The "social" fare established a
single fare for the entire city. The social fare therefore eliminated the fare-related
conflicts between companies facilitating fare integration.623 Further, by giving the flat
fare scheme the name "social" fare, Lerner begun to show his concern for social
issues-and his genius at marketing public policies.
Because with the flat fare some bus companies could make an even larger
profit while others could start losing money, the city had to establish a compensation
fund. Planners determined which companies stood to earn more money and which
ones would lose. Companies having an even larger profit with the new fare had to
deposit this surplus in a bank account. The bank would then transfer to the companies
loosing money to compensate them.624 The compensating system was established
620 Interview by author with Carlos Ceneviva, April, 2003.
621 Dely (1990, p. 16).
622 Rovani (1990, p. 73-74).
623 Ceneviva (1999, p. 187).
624 Rovani (1990, p. 73-74).
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and the social fare was successfully implemented.62 5 Notice the importance of
maintaining the profitability to the bus operators to make the proposal feasible.
The Integrated Transit Network was officially born once the inter-neighborhood
routes connected the five structural axes and the "social" fare was established.62 6
Since 1980, a user in Curitiba can take a feeder bus in a neighborhood, transfer to a
trunk line at a transfer terminal, ride to downtown in it, or go to another terminal and
transfer either to a feeder bus or the inter-neighborhood service-all for a single
fare.627 To increase the number of inter-neighborhood lines it was necessary to
increase the number of transfer terminals. Just between 1980 and 1982 the Lerner
administration built 15 such terminals.628 Further, given the demand increase, in 1980
the Lerner administration convinced the operators of the North-South axis to use
articulated buses, with a capacity for 160 passengers. Figure 10 shows the gradual
evolution of the RIT, from its origins in 1974 until 1995.
In 1981 the Lerner administration renewed the contract with the bus companies
that it had signed in 1974. This renewal, however, was a mere extension of the 1974
contract. The concessions were extended for 10 years, until September 1 5th 1991,
and the useful life of the buses was extended from 7 to 10 years.629 The new
contracts also allowed for fare changes more frequently than before, probably to
respond to the increasing inflation, and apparently recognized a higher return on the
capital invested by the operators.630 All these measures increase bus operators'
profitability. As usual, the renewal of the contracts involved no competition and it
preserved the "selective" area principle.631 Bearing in mind the investments in express
buses for the Boqueirao and East-West structural axes and the new articulated buses
in the North-South axis, it is not surprising that the Lerner administration proceeded in
this way for there were at least two incentives to do so. First, months before the
625 The Lerner administration also undertook during its second term in office the construction of the first
stage of a bike-path network (Menezes, 2001, p. 117).
626 URBS (1998, p. 6).
627 However, there is still no full fare integration in downtown, mostly because there is no single
terminal that encompasses all the routes.
628 Ceneviva (1999, p. 187).
629 Urban (1987, p. 48-9); De Oliveira (2000, p. 146); Pereira (1988, p. 62); and 'Transporte Urbano de
Curitiba evoluiu apesar das dificultades." Diario Popular, December, 23 , 1981.
630 Neves (1995, p. 68).
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contract renewal, two companies had investment in new express buses for the East-
West structural axis. And less than two years before a third company had invested in
buses for the Boqueirao axis. Risk was too high for these operators unless there was
some assurance that the concession contracts would be extended for a reasonable
number of years.
Figure 10. Evolution of the RIT, 1974-95.
Source: URBS.
631 Urban (1987, p. 48-9); and De Oliveira (2000, p. 146).
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A second incentive lied in the "selective" area principle itself, which granted for
life an area of the city to each company and thus eliminated all effective competition.
It is therefore important to underscore the importance of the "selective" area principle.
Intended by its planners in the mid-fifties as a temporary solution, it turned permanent
and became the frame for any policy making in mass transport in Curitiba. To this
day, even after a strong attempt to dismantle the "selective" areas in the mid-
eighties-discussed in Chapter 6-fare box revenue is allocated between companies
taking into account the share of the pie each one "owns." Competition for the market
took place in the fifties when the original areas were established and this eliminated
all competition in the market for good. In the absence of competitive forces to
discipline operators to offer a good service, it is the supervision by the city
government to enforce the contracts between the city and the operators that makes
the difference.
The role of planners
The existence of a precedent-the North-South axis-facilitated the expansion of the
express bus system to Boqueirao and the East-West axes. Operators knew the
scheme was profitable, because ridership was high and operating costs were less.
Finally, operators had agreed in the 1974 contract to allowing the extension of the
express service. The contract gave planners a bargaining tool, even if the contract did
not specify which axes or when would be implemented. That is, the contract allowed
planners to lower the power of the bus companies. Together with the positive
precedent, the three new axes proceeded without major controversies.
Ceneviva took advantage of Lerner's receptiveness to proposals in transport-
i.e. Lerner opened a window of opportunity-to put forward the idea of creating the
inter-neighborhood route. Planners took the proposal to the operators. Planners
interacted with the operators with two aims. One, persuading the operators of the
convenience of the new service. Two, figuring out the adaptations to the proposal
needed to make it acceptable to the operators. Illustrative of this process is a press
article in late 1981 that reported the recent innovations and how they took place
against all odds. In that article the bus operators' credit the importance of the
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meetings that took place periodically with city agencies.632 At least in this case,
planners did not seem to have employed any conspicuous mechanism to lower the
power of the operators. Rather, interaction, persuasion, and adjustments were what
made the idea feasible.
This outcome is interesting in light of disproportionate power the "selective"
area principle gives to the bus companies. Absent any mechanism to lower this
power, the outcome begins to favor disproportionately the bus companies.
Specifically, the renewal of the concession contracts is afterthe Boqueirao and East-
West axes are scheduled to open. In 1974 when the negotiations for the first North-
South axis, the contract renewal coincided with the opening of the new axis and the
city administration was able to use this coincidence to lower the power of the
operators. But in 1980, it is the operators who have the advantage. Probably in
exchange for accepting the additional axes, operators demand contracts with a higher
return on the investment. The terms of the 1981 contracts will come to haunt all actors
involved in the mid-1 980s when the system enters into a crisis.
Land-use planning during Lerner's second term
As seen, Mayor Raiz had tried to tighten the city's grip on land use by enacting
changes to the legislation that limited developers' rights particularly along the
structural axes.3 3 Developers had responded by filing lawsuits and by complaining
that IPPUC had excluded them from the rule making process.634 During Lerner's
second term this approach seemingly changed to one more attentive to market forces
and to requests from land development interests. These interests were represented
by a trade association, the Commercial Association of Parana (ACP),635 which lobbied
Lerner's administration to change the limitations imposed by the Raiz administration
and other limitations included in the original Director Plan. Specifically, the Director
Plan established that in the structural axes each square block could have a maximum
of three, 63-meter high rises (about 15 floors), separated at least 30 meters from one
632 '7ransporte Urbano de Curitiba evoluiu apesar das dificultades." Diario Popular, December, 2 3rd ,
1981.
633 Raiz (1990, p. 58-61); and de Oliveira (2000, p. 153-4).
634 De Oliveira (2000, p. 154).
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another.63 6 The Plan called for a cityscape with high rises embedded in parks and
gardens. 63 7
The busways and the trinary roads' success at lowering travel time, however,
made very attractive the structural sectors for middle classes, which were willing to
pay for the premium location.6 38 As a result, land developers wanted a higher density
in the structural axes because there was demand willing to live in high rises and
because they could extract higher profits from densification. According to de Oliveira,
Lerner issued a decree changing land-use criteria along the structural axes on March
25 th, 1980. Little or no consultation with affected parties had taken place. On April 10 th
of that year, ACP and other trade associations met with Lerner and other city officials
to lobby a change in the legislation. On April 2 5 th 1980, Lerner issued the decree
changing many land use regulations and opening the door for a much higher
densification of the structural axes than contained in the original Director Plan.639
Lerner's actions have to be understood, however, within the broader context
dictated by the growth coalition he is part of. Clearly, interests linked to land
development are part of this coalition because they profit from economic growth.
Particularly if Ihigher incomes insure customers for apartments in high-rises, which
have a higher price than houses-even if the overall density is the same.6 4 0 Lerner
allowed IPPUC's planners to depart momentarily from what matters to the growth
coalition. But as soon as ACP and other trade associations reacted, he negotiated
changes. These trade associations have participated, albeit informally and in an
unregulated manner, in the definition of land use controls ever after.6 41
The market responded as expected and construction took place. Today, the
structural axes have in certain areas-particularly closer to downtown-quite high
635 In Portuguese Associagao Comercial do Parana, I use the Portuguese acronym.
636 PMC (1966, p. 13).
637 De Oliveira (2000, p. 154).
638 See Cervero (1 998, p. 285).
1339 De Oliveira (2000, p. 154-156).
640 See Jaramillo (1994. Ch. 147-155 and 192-196). In Curitiba, the North-South axis has the highest
number of residential towers in high densities. Wealthy people live in that axis (Cervero, 1998, p. 285).
For the Boqueir.o axis, while the density is probably higher than in the other axes there are no high-
rises, but only low-height housing.
641 de Oliveira (2000, p. 161-2).
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densities (Table 7),642which have left little or no space for the parks and gardens
originally intended (Figure 11). While the increased density in turn helps support a
high-capacity transit system such as the busways,643Arzua, a former mayor, laments
that the high density contributes to lowering quality of life because of increased noise
and air pollution.644
Zone Population Density
Per Hectare Per
Acre
High Density 130,700 294 119.0
Medium to High Density 217,300 164 66.4
Medium Density 240,800 76 30.8
Low Density 416,506 63 25.5
Table 7. Residential Densities in Structural Axes and in Low-Density Areas
Source: Cervero (1998, p. 285).
Figure 11. Actual built up density along North-South Structural Axis
Source: Author.
642 Cervero (1998, p. 284).
643 Cervero (1998, p. 282-286).
644 Arzua (1989, p. 10-11).
149
Finally, it is worth briefly discussing an innovation in land use that took place
years later during Lerner's third term in office, the "buy-up" program.645 This program
originated in the constitutional debates regarding reforming urban legislation at the
national level. Lerner gathered support by sending a draft of the proposal to several
trade associations and other associations who commented on the proposal.646 The
end result was a program whereby developers can "buy up" up to two extra floors on
residential buildings located in the vicinity of the structural axes. Developers have to
pay the municipality 75% of the market value of the additional area. The funds go to
COHAB, which is in charge of funding housing projects for low-income people. Hence
the program is a cross-subsidy between wealthy residents and poor ones.647
The role of planners
During Lerner's second term planners tried to act free of interest group pressure.
Planners convinced Lerner of enacting land-use legislation that the planners deemed
adequate but seemingly without consulting the relevant stakeholders. These
stakeholders reacted and ultimately achieved a legislation that favored their interests.
While the structural axes enjoy a density higher than originally intended, the market
response suggests people approve the higher density. Hence the distribution benefits
does not seem to be overly skewed in favor of the land-related interests. The lesson
for planners is that it is the interaction between planners, politicians, and stakeholders
that allows a city government to adopt policies that benefit legitimate and collective
goals. If land-related interests were too powerful in Curitiba, then planners needed to
discover ways of reducing the power of those interests. But planners should not have
excluded those interests from the process. For example, planners could have
interacted also with neighborhood associations and other elements of organized civil
society. Bringing in more participants lowers the power of the land-related interests.
The participation of a broader range of stakeholder would lead to a balanced
645 This program is known as or "solo-criado"in Portuguese, which translates literature into created
sace. I use Cervero's (1998, p. 283) term "buy-up" program.
De Oliveira (2000, p. 160).
647 Interview by author with Rafael Dely, April 2003.
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feedback648 and possibly to better land-use regulations that ensure an outcome that
satisfies collective goals.
Light Rail planning during Lerner's second term
As early as 1965, when Wilheim and his planners drew the first draft of the director
plan, planners in Curitiba have been talking about the need for a rail-based system. In
that plan, planners argued that at the time, Curitiba did not need a metro line. But
projections suggested that by the year 2000 population could reach 3.5 million and
demand 60,000 passengers per hour. The city would then need a metro.649 Neither
projection was met. As seen, planners during the Sabbag administration carried out
studies and determined that a heavy rail-based solution was not feasible at the
time,65 0 due to its high cost, high risk, and lack of flexibility.65' Curitiba then adopted a
bus-based strategy to address its mass-transit problem and undertook the North-
South axis during the Lerner and Raiz administrations.
During the Raiz administration (1975-79), the idea of a rail-based solution
floated again.652 Through a cooperation agreement with the French government
planners from IPPUC had studied in France and seen this country's rail solutions.
Planners were impressed by the light rail alternative-or tramway. Through this
agreement as well, IPPUC hired Sofretu (French Society of Urban Transport
Studies)653 to study the feasibility of a light rail solution in Curitiba. This study found
the light rail project feasible,65 4 and defined an alignment for the network.6 55 Lerner
inherited the project, but never adopted it. Why? Brasileiro claims that it was for
financial reasons: "Financial problems were the determining obstacle to furthering the
648 For the positive consequences of participatory planning processes see Forester (1999, esp. ch. 5).
See also Susskind and Cruikshank (1987) for examples of how land use rules are negotiated in the
U.S. setting.
649 See Serete-Wilheim (1965, p. 208 and 147).
650 IPPUC (1972, p. 7); Dely (1990, p. 18); and Per6n et al. (1975, p. 27-30); see also IPPUC (1969).
651 Per6n et al. (1975, p. 28-29).
652 Malucelli (1991, p. 264); and Hayakawa (1991, p. 222).
653 Sofretu has also conducted studies in cities such as Bogota. Sofretu belongs to the Paris Metro
(Brasileiro, 1994, p. 95). Some analysts argue that part of its mandate is to promote French metros
abroad. These analysts, therefore, question the objectivity of Sofretu's planning studies.
654 Brasileiro (1998, p. 482); and Brasileiro (1994, p. 95).
655 Brasileiro (1998, p. 482); and Malucelli (1991, p. 264).
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idea of implementing a light rail system in the capital of Paran."65 6 Planners who
participated in the process seem to agree.657
While funding certainly plays a role in explaining why the light rail project was
not built, it is an insufficient explanation. First, the financial argument is weakened by
the loan from the World Bank obtained by Raiz and executed by Lerner.658 The loan
could have freed up resources for starting construction of the first light rail line.
Second, the lack of funding became clear only in 1981-82-in the second half of
Lerner's term-when Latin America's debt crisis erupted and the Brazilian
government could not pay its foreign debt.659 Lerner could have undertaken the
project during the first part of his second term, but instead he ordered more planning
studies.
Planners supporting the light rail option-or bonde, as it is known in Brazil660-
developed a series of arguments to justify their pet proposal during Lerner's second
term. First, they argued the express bus system in Curitiba was close to being unable
to handle the increasing demand. Rail was therefore the only alternative. Taniguchi,
the president of IPPUC, said that by 1984 the system would be saturated and
vehemently attacked the bus option, "Other cities make a mistake if they copy
Curitiba...the solution is the tramway." Taniguchi, however, acknowledged that the
tramway had a high cost and that funding it was difficult.661 Second, planners argued
that the bus fleet used abundant quantities of fuel-a scarce and expensive
commodity at the time in Brazil after the oil crisis of 1979. The electric train, on the
other hand, would save fuel.662 Third, and related, the user fare would go down as a
656 Brasileiro (1998, p. 482, translation by author).
657 Malucelli (1991, p. 264).
658 See Mitric (1997) for the evolution of thought at the World Bank regarding the Bank's role in funding
heavy rail projects. See also World Bank (2002, ch. 8 and p. 190-1).
659 Cardoso and Helwege (1992, p. 116-119); and Thorp ( ch. 7, in particular p. 219-232).
660 The word bonde originated in Rio de Janeiro. The firm Bond & Share supplied the trains for this city.
People in Rio baptized the trams as bondes and the name caught in Brazil (Per6n et al, 1975, p. 3).
661 "Sistema Expresso entra en colapso em 1984, diz IPPUC." Diario do ParanA, January, 8, 1982.
662 "Um sistema aprovado." Gazeta do Povo, September, 12, 1982.
152
result of introducing the light rail technology.6 6 3 The cost of the light rail proposal was
US$ 494.2 million.6 64
These arguments presented by the planners were not that convincing because
Curitiba had already proven that a bus-based option was feasible and flexible enough
to accommodate higher demands. Indeed, in 1980 the first articulated buses went into
operation;665 a measure that showed the capacity of the system could be expanded.
Equally important was that the total cost of the bus alternative was several times
lower than the total cost for the rail option. Planners were careful to say that the
operating cost was lower and that therefore the fare would go down thanks to the rail.
Planners, however, seem not to have been explicit about the fare covering only
operating costs, but not capital costs for the rail cars. For the bus option, the fare
covered both.666 Moreover, the cost of the civil infrastructure was several times higher
for the rail alternative than for the bus alternative. Neither alternative recovered
through the fare the cost of the infrastructure.667
There was, moreover, opposition to the rail project by the bus operators, who
lobbied to delay the decision.668 To bring them on board, planners argued the gradual
introduction of the electric train would ease the impact. Further, planners argued that
bus operators would be in charge of the feeder lines, using their old buses.669 This
strategy had been used in Curitiba when introducing new services-the old buses
became feeders, thus reducing the capital expenses for the operators and helping
them recycle their fleet.670 The planners' argument did not convince the operators who
663 "N.o pegue o bonde andando (eis aqui os seus nutmeros)." Gazeta do Povo, December 12, 1982;
and "Corn bondes, passagens ficarAo mais baratos." Diario de Paran., July 1 7 th, 1982.
664 "N.o pegue o bonde andando (eis aqui os seus numeros)." Gazeta do Povo, December 12, 1982.
665 URBS (198, p. 7).
666 "Sistema Expresso entra en colapso em 1984, diz IPPUC." Diario do Parana, January, 8,1982. This
article also says that the original light rail car was priced at 0.8-1.0 million dollars. Taniguchi recognized
that for the project to be feasible, each rail car had to cost only 350,000. Interestingly, the latter value is
auite close to the value of an articulated bus in Curitiba.
See Armstrong-Wright (1986) for a comparison of costs across modes.
668 "Sistema Expresso entra en colapso em 1984, diz IPPUC." Diario do Parana, January, 8, 1982.
669 "Com Bondes, passagens ficarao mais baratos." Diario de Parana, July 17h , 1982.
670 For example when the inter-neighborhood service was created in 1979 most of the buses used were
old express buses. A user commented to the press: "I expected the bus to be more comfortable. In
actuality, only two of the ten cars that serve the route are new. The rest were refurbished by the
operators, which means they painted them green." (O Estado do Parana, "Onibus interbairros, o
"melancia" em face de testes," Sept. 9, 1979). Interviews with planners and operators also corroborate
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would lose the most profitable lines to the tramway. Further, the opening of the East-
West axis prompted in 1981 the extension for 10 years of the concession contracts
between the Lerner administration and the operators. Finally, as seen, the bus
operators are a critical element of Lerner's pro-growth, pro-business coalition. The rail
proposal did not fit within these considerations.
Lerner's decision not to adopt the tramway during his term is therefore not
surprising. As a planner who participated in the events said: "Jaime's [Lerner] decision
was to continue the busway projects, because they were the most important thing we
had to serve the demand we had."671 In 1982, at the end this term, Lerner declared to
the press that while the rail project's plans were ready and the project had support at
the federal level, the final decision by the President of Brazil was still pending. Lerner
stated it would be up to his successor to achieve the final decision.672 Yet by this time
the debt crisis made this project-and many others673-- ompletely unfeasible as
Brasileiro says.67 4
The role of planners
The planning community in Curitiba is divided between pro-rail and pro-bus camps.
The pro-bus side was able to extend the bus-base system to five axes and create the
RIT. The pro-rail camp is less effective at moving forward its proposal. The pro-rail
camp is highly influenced by the French in promoting light rail as a feasible solution. It
also helped that usually a strong myth accompanies rail.675 Despite these seemingly
favorable conditions, the pro-rail camp cannot show that their proposal was a better
the point that buses are recycled in Curitiba from one service to the other. For example, some of the
old articulated buses can be seen in the inter-neighborhood service and even as feeders to the bi-
articulated lines. Some of the fleet in these lines, however, has new buses.
671 Rocha (1990, p. 22).
672 "Bonde estA voltando a Curitiba." Diario de Parand, December 14 th , 1982.
673 Menezes (2001, p. 99). Menezes cites a report stating that (2001, p. 99, translation by author):
"Between 1966 and 1974 every Brazilian city was offered ridiculously pompous projects: underground,
elevated and at grade metros, panoramic cable-cars, ski tracks using artificial snow (and two were
built), enormous underground parking lots to "alleviate" downtown traffic...a 1.5 Km-long people
mover...innumerous projects to reformulate the downtown roadways through the construction of
expressways in highly populated areas, whose cost would be higher than the value of the existing fixed
capital in each city, and so on."
674 In addition, it seems that some in the federal government did not receive well the idea of building
liht rail instead of heavy rail (Rocha, 1990, p. 22).
See Richmond (1991 and 1998).
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solution than the bus rapid transit already in operation. Curitiba had started to improve
a bus-based technology to the point where it could effectively compete against rail-
based proposals and defeat them. Pro-rail planners try to belittle the bus alternative,
but this action runs contrary to the investments the city and the operators are making
in expanding this system.
Further, decisional outcomes are ultimately linked to the power of the coalition
that supports a plan. If sufficiently strong, the plan will likely be adopted. Pro-rail
planners were unable to assemble a sufficiently strong coalition in support of the rail
option. One reason was that they were never able to adapt the rail alternative to the
political exigencies of Curitiba. Namely, the bus operators needed to be part of the rail
alternative. For example, the rail alternative had to cover its operating costs and
provide the operators with similar profits to the ones they enjoyed at the time-which
were high.676 Rail alternatives rarely cover operating costs. The lack of flexibility of rail
options ran against pro-rail planners' objectives; analogously, BRT's flexibility
benefited pro-bus planners. Given these conditions, pro-rail planners opted for
maintaining their proposal in the political agenda of the city. Lerner was aware of the
lack of funding and resorted to delaying the decision on a project he was not fully
convinced of, but that some of his closest staff supported. Further, announcing the
decision not to adopt the light rail could have had a high political cost Lerner was not
willing to incur.
Crisis in the system: the user as a political actor and
Lerner's response
Despite Lerner's investments in expanding the express service and the creation of the
RIT, the system was entering into a crisis-at least from the point of view of bus
users, some of whom demanded a say in the planning process. Three interrelated
factors generated a quasi-social movement that demanded changes to the conditions
of the public transportation system in Curitiba. First, the end of the Brazilian "miracle"
led to an economic crisis in the Brazilian economy at the beginning of the 1980s. The
676 See next chapter.
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crisis decreased income per capita, and increased unemployment and inflation677
(Table 9 below). Salaries, for example, were readjusted below inflation and below the
rate of increase in bus fares,67 8 thus making riding a bus unaffordable. The fare
became a contentious issue and operators began to decrease the quality of service to
protect their profits.
Second, some characteristics of capitalism in developing countries make it
difficult for the poorer sections of the population to find adequate housing and related
public services.679 Poor people therefore try to associate to press the state into
obtaining recognition of property titles, solutions to their housing problem, and access
to public services including transportation.68 0 In Curitiba the grassroots movement had
these demands among others,681 notwithstanding the efforts by the city government to
provide housing for the poor through its COHAB-CT program.682 Thirdly, and
particular to the Brazilian situation, the military regime was allowing a democratic
opening, in part as a result of mobilization by unions and grassroots organizations.6 83
In Curitiba the grassroots movement seeking change in urban and
transportation policies had initially two distinct wings. The first was closely linked to
the Catholic Church,684 which was the only space for dissent that the military regime
was not repressing.6 85 In 1978, the Church organized the Pontifical Commission of
Justice and Peace of Paran, (CPJP-PR in Portuguese) to defend human rights and
fight the repression practices of the military regime. CPJP-PR also helped organize
neighborhood associations in the poor neighborhoods of Curitiba through the use of
parishes and other already-existing Church infrastructure such as the Ecclesiastic
Grassroots Communities.686 These neighborhood associations gradually gained
677 Bueno (2002, p. 382-3).
678 Neves (1995, p. 75).
679 See Jaramillo (1994) for a theoretical discussion of these issues.
680 Alfonso, Hataya, and Jaramillo (1997, p. 11-14).
681 See Neves (1995, ch. 2).
682 Malucelli (1991, p. 266).
683 Bueno (2002, p. 398-400).
684 Neves (1995, p. 29-39).
685 Affonso (1987, p. 23).
686 Neves (1995, p. 29-39). Affonso (1987, p. 23) suggests that by 1980 there were in Brazil
approximately 80,000 Ecclesiastic Grassroots Communities with 2 million people participating in them.
The situation in Curitiba is therefore not unique but rather typical to what was happening in Brazil at the
time (see Affonso, 1987, ch. 2).
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experience at influencing urban and transportation policy and by 1982 constituted the
Neighborhood Association Movement of Curitiba and Metropolitan Region (MAB in
Portuguese). 6 8 7
The second wing of the grassroots movement in Curitiba was linked to resident
associations started in illegal neighborhoods that originally sought state recognition of
their land titles. In 1980 these associations grouped into the Council of
Representatives of Residents and Friends of the Neighborhoods in Curitiba. The
Council of Representatives fought to legalize tenancy and to bring public utilities to
the neighborhoods.688 The environment in Curitiba during Lerner's second term was
therefore marked by a constant tension between the grassroots movement,
representing bus users, seeking affordable and better transport, on the one hand, and
the city and the operators, on the other, seeking a financially sustainable bus
system.689
Just months after Lerner started his second term in office the grassroots
movement began to act. On May 1st 1979-labor day-unions and neighborhood
associations organized a demonstration to demand adequate bus service at night and
a halt to the increases to the bus fare. On July 8 th on that same year, 17
neighborhood associations submitted a letter to Lerner demanding improvements to
the bus system, among others. Two thousand people attended. By November 1979
drivers and conductors of buses in Curitiba started a strike to seek a wage increase.
Construction and factory workers, and even taxi drivers, soon joined. Negotiations
ensued and the agreement called for allowing an increase in the wages for drivers
and conductors, but without an increase in the bus fare. Lerner, nonetheless,
authorized a fare increase. The bus companies then conditioned any increase in
wages to their employees to an increase in the fare. More protest followed.690
By June 1981 the grassroots movements managed to organize a petition, with
88,189 signatures, that proposed not only to freeze the bus fare but also to transfer to
687 Neves (1995, p. 29-39).
688 Neves (1995, p. 27-29).
689 The situation and events in Curitiba are rather similar to those in the city of Sdo Paulo as told by
Affonso (1987).
690 Neves (2002, p. 107-108); Neves (1995, p. 74-76).
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state property the bus operations.691 This petition forced Lerner to pay closer attention
to the movement, which was advised by CPJP-PR. Lerner agreed to meet with
representatives of the grassroots movement. The representatives voiced four petitions
on behalf of the movement. First, they requested freezing the bus fares. Second, they
demanded state ownership of bus operations. Third, they requested increasing the
fleet size to increase frequency particularly in the feeder service. Finally, the
movement requested a seat in the Transportation Municipal Council (MTC).692
MTC had been created in December of 1966,693 during the Arzua
administration, and it is conspicuously absent until now in my account of Curitiba's
transportation history. This is probably because MTC had no user representative-
only city government agencies, the City Council, business associations, and the bus
operators had seats.9 4 MTC had two main tasks, first, to supervise the performance
of the bus operators, and second, to help the mayor determine the fare policy.695 As
seen, the Lerner and Raiz administrations needed the help of the bus operators in
order to implement their plans and this turned MTC into a "yes boy" for the policies the
administration wanted and that needed to be convenient for the operators. While MTC
handled information on costs and fares, bus users and the public at large were
excluded from seeing it, thus generating a power imbalance.
Lerner met with the representatives of the grassroots movement in July of 1981
to discuss their petitions. Lerner argued that the situation was complex and much of it
was beyond his control69 6--it was the federal government's policies that were creating
the inflation and the decreasing wages.6 97 Further, the increases in fuel prices, a
critical component in the cost structure, were the result of the second oil embargo. In
addition, Lerner asserted that the city's coffers could not afford to purchase the bus
fleet from the current owners. He agreed, however, that it might be possible to revise
691 Neves (1995, p. 75-77); Brasileiro (1994, p. 91); and de Souza (1999, p. 274).
692 Neves (1995, p. 75-77); and Brasileiro (1994, p. 91).
693 Neves (2002, p. 106). Brasileiro (1998, p. 480; and 1994, p. 91) says that this council was created in
1973.
694 Brasileiro (1998, p. 480); and Brasileiro (1994, p. 91).
695 Neves (2002, p. 106).
696 Neves (1995, p. 78).
697 Bueno (2002, p. 398-400).
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some elements of the fare structure and agreed to carry out some studies.698 In 1981
the federal government had transferred the responsibility to set bus fares to the
mayors, and had instructed them to carry out studies of the true costs of bus
transportation and to transfer any saving to the user.699 In the end this mobilization by
the grassroots movement achieved some improvements in the level of service-
higher bus frequency and more routes. The fares, while not frozen, did not increase
as fast as before for some time.700
Lerner also agreed with the grassroots movement to give a seat in MTC to
someone from the general public that could represent the user. The grassroots
movement agreed the representative had to come from CPJP-PR. Lerner, however,
did not act on the appointment. By March 1982 the grassroots movement sent a letter
to Lerner emphasizing the need to curtail the increase in fares. The expenditure by
most users exceeded 6% of the minimum wage, which was the maximum allowed by
Brazilian law.701 The letter also reminded Lerner of appointing the grassroots
representative to the Transportation Municipal Council.702
Lerner, however, did not act and eventually left office in March 1983 without
appointing the grassroots representative to the Council.703 Most likely, the pressure
exerted by the grassroots movement and the neighborhood associations was not
enough to counteract two powerful incentives. First, the bus operators strongly
opposed the presence of a grassroots representative in the Council704 and the
operators and Lerner were de facto allies. Second, the operators-and probably
Lerner-did not want the broader public finding out the items in the cost structure that
determined the fare. As seen above, this cost structure was established in the early
698 Neves (1995, p. 78).
699 Affonso (1987, p. 60).
700 Brasileiro (1994, p. 91).
701 Neves (1995, p. 78-80). The situation was similar all over Brazil and the government did not enforce
the legislation. The requirement to have the expenditure in public transit be less than 6% of the
minimum wage was established by President Getulio Vargas in 1938 (Affonso, 1987, p. 60). The vale
transporte policy enacted in 1985 (Neves, 1995, p. 91) ordered employers to subsidize the bus fares
for their employees in order to satisfy the requirement that the fare be less than 6% of the minimum
wage (World Bank, 2002, p. xvi).
702 Neves (1995, p. 78-80).
703 Neves (1995, p. 78-79).
704 Neves (1995, p. 79).
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1 960s and had been slightly modified by the 1981 contracts. The cost structure amply
favored the operators' interests, 5 as will be found out during the Requi.o
administration-detailed below.
The role of planners
During Lerner's second tenure several reasons tilted the balance in favor of the bus
companies, which were able to inflate the fare and hence hurt the user. First and
foremost, the user was politically absent and was not empowered to affect the way
the fare was set. MTC was a "yes boy" that did not include the user among its
members. Second, and related, there was a lack of technical knowledge. Planners
used mostly to physical planning now faced issues for which they did not have the
required knowledge. Namely, planners did not know how to estimate the true
operational cost of buses and design ways of lowering the fare without eliminating
operators' profitability. In addition, MAB and other grassroots associations that
demanded changes did not have either the required knowledge to establish a
solution. While planners might have interacted with these stakeholders, the interaction
did not enrich the process at this time because of this lack of knowledge. Third, MTC
did not gather the required information on operating costs for fare-setting purposes.
As a result, planners did not have this information. Fourth, Lerner's agenda of
finishing the expansion of the express service to three new structural axes and of
establishing the RIT also ran against introducing changes to the fare structure. More
so at a time when the operators were making important investments in new rolling
stock.
Seen differently, these four reasons curtailed the efforts of Lerner's
government of achieving an outcome that satisfied collective goals for the most part
and not those of particular stakeholders. While the RIT and the busways benefited
both the user and the bus companies there was a power imbalance that favored the
bus companies. The bus companies did not capture the city government, but Lerner's
policies tend to favor them disproportionately, as future events will prove. Yet it is only
an economic crisis what began to unveil the real situation. To restore the equilibrium
705 Urban (1987, p. 48).
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and bring about policies that benefit collective goals the government of Curitiba will
have to reduce the power of the bus companies and gain knowledge. The next
administrations in Curitiba will slowly achieve this outcome.
Financing the implementation of the Director Plan and the
RIT
The original Preliminary Plan contemplated works so expensive that its own crafters
deemed most of the plan financially infeasible. The Director Plan, a modified version
of the Preliminary Plan, contemplated simpler projects and was therefore more
affordable. The string of changes that took place during Lerner's first administration
lowered even more the cost of implementing the plan. Thanks to the forces activated
once the plan was in the political agenda of the city, and thanks to planners able to
figure out adaptations to the plan, the cost went down. The prime example is the
Trinary road concept. On the other hand, Lerner was not afraid of private participation
where it was feasible and was also good at raising matching funds from federal and
state sources. The combination of these two factors made the implementation of the
Director Plan financially feasible.
To finance the implementation of the director plan and what became the RIT,
the Lerner and Raiz administration used a combination of sources, including local,
federal, and private. This follows Lerner's idea of finding a "shared responsibility
equation"--analyzed above-in which both the private and public sectors participate.
But there was a bit more, particularly coming from the federal level of government. In
general, the private sector represented by the bus companies supplied the new
buses-Curitiba is one of a few Brazilian cities that has never had a city-owned bus
company.706 Often, the city government helped the operators obtain loans from
BNDES, a development bank. These loans had subsidized interest rates and
favorable conditions.707 The city government, in turn, was responsible for financing the
civil work construction-roadwork, bus stops later on bus stations, sidewalks-and
maintenance.
706 Brasileiro (1999, p. 461).
707 De Oliveira (2000, p 143).
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During his first administration, Lerner was able to finance these and other
public works in part with tax revenue, but mostly with transfers from the federal
government, and crucially with loans from federal agencies (Table 8). Lerner was able
to gather federal support for two main reasons. First, the Brazilian government was
pursuing a strong development agenda by promoting industrialization and fast
economic growth. Brazilian cities had to be adapted to this new reality and urban
planning was seen as the way to achieve this. "Planners were to prepare the cities for
the industrialization process, [the latter] understood as equaling development and
modernization." 708
Second, the Lerner administration was able to show results earlier on-the
pedestrianization of XV Street-which allowed it to market an image of being a city
were urban planning could show results.70 9 This was just what the kind of showcase
example the military government was looking for,710 which coupled to Lerner's ability
at marketing Curitiba, unleashed a strong financial support from the federal
government71 (Table 8). Francisca Rischbieter, one of the main planners in Curitiba,
summarizes the results of this approach by Lerner: "It was fantastic, we just had to go
and look for funds. And Curitiba had a credibility that no other city in Brazil had. We
were in touch with the World Bank and were the only ones that showed how the
money was spent. We were therefore preferred sons, preferential customers [of the
federal banks and funding agencies]."712
708 Menezes (2001, p. 34-36, and p. 93-94, quote from p. 34).
709 Ficinski (1990, p. 20).
710 Menezes (2001, p. 93).
71' Ficinski (1990, p. 20).
F. Rischbieter (1990, p. 7).
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Table 8. Composition and evolution of the sources of revenue for the city of Curitiba, 1971-74
Source of Funding/Year 1971 1972 1973 1974
Composition of the city's total revenue
Tax revenue 39.9% 38.5% 31.5% 35.5%
Transfers 44.2% 50.1% 29.6% 36.9%
Loans 6.9% 3.0% 31.7% 21.0%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Evolution of the city's revenue, 1971=100
Tax revenue 100 124.9 196.0 232.3
Transfers 100 147.0 166.6 218.1
Loans 100 57.3 1146.6 800.0
Total 100 129.7 248.4 261.4
Source: Coelho et al. (1975, Table 17, and calculations by author).
This approach was deepened during Raiz's tenure as mayor, building on
Curitiba's increasing reputation within Brazil as a city where planning was possible.713
According to Ficinski, who headed IPPUC during Raiz's tenure, Raiz was able to
increase the share of subsidies from the federal government that Curitiba did not have
to pay back.714 Coincidentally, Karlos Rischbieter-the first sponsor of the new
Director Plan-was president of the Bank of Brazil (1977-79), and Finance minister
(1979-80).715 Because of the nature of these positions he must have participated in
the decisions to grant subsidies and loans to Curitiba. The Raiz administration also
planned the construction of three new structural axes, East, West, and Boqueir.o,
and sought funds with the World Bank for the first two. According to Raiz, he sold
Curitiba's overall urban project to the World Bank by showing them that it would be a
model for other cities and that it would help control urban growth by, among others,
avoiding migration from the rural areas.7 1 6
It would be Raiz's successor, Jaime Lerner, who received most of this loan and
opened the East-West axes to the public. But during Lerner's second term the
Brazilian economic miracle came to an end and income per capita begun to
decrease-the economy shrunk by 2.5% in 1983,717 after entering into a recession in
1981718 (Table 9). City finances begun to deteriorate and this trend peaked at the end
713 See Rocha (1990, p. 19).
714 Ficinski (1990, p. 20).
715 K. Rischbieter (1990, p. 13).
716 Raiz (1990, p. 59-60). See also Neves (2002, p. 103)
717 Bueno (2002, p. 383).
718 Neves (1995, p. 25).
163
of the 1980s-the years the opposition to Lerner was in office. Tax revenue did not
grow as fast, and debt payments begun to absorb an increasing share of the total
budget.
Table 9. Average Annual Rates of Growth of Gross Domestic Product, Income per Capita, and
Average Annual Inflation Rate in Brazil (1970-1990)
Indicator 1970-80 1980-85 1985-90 Average 1980-90
GDP 8.1% 1.3% 1.9% 1.6%
Income per capita 5.5% -0.8% 0.0% -0.4%
Annual Inflation 37% 145.5% 653.8% 330.2%
Sources: For 1970-80 data Astorga and Fitzgerald (1998, p. 337, 373, 352, and calculations by
author); all other figures from ECLAC (2002, p. 68, 69 and 94).
Finally, of the 12 years between 1971 and 1983-the Lerner and Raiz
administrations- 10 had a good or relatively good financial situation. These were the
years during which the first physical transformation of Curitiba took place. After 1981
there is little built in Curitiba until the beginning of the 1990s when the financial
situation improves again, as I detail below. This suggests that a window of opportunity
for a plan can also be defined in economic and financial terms. During these windows
of opportunity, there are sufficient resources or those resources can materialize or the
plan can be adapted to fit the available resources. The effectiveness of planners is
therefore higher during these windows for the solutions they craft have a higher
chance of being affordable. More importantly, when the economy is buoyant the
nature of the most salient problems to solve might be different than when the
economy is in a recession. In Curitiba the problems found solutions that were mostly
physical in nature-building segregated lanes for buses, shelters, and promoting
development along the structural axis. Most of the planners in the account up to now
had training that allowed them to think solutions in that regard. But when the
recession started, the nature of the problems changed. In Curitiba it was the highly
nebulous issue of fare structure that became relevant.71 9
719 U.S. history offers a similar example. During the 1950s and 1960s cities invested heavily in urban
highways and other expensive projects. In the 1970s the economic situation was not as good and
planners shifted toward policies that emphasized the operations and maintenance of the system. See
Pas (1986, p. 50-53); see also Altshuler and Luberoff (2003, esp. ch. 1 and 2).
164
Chapter 6
The Opposition to Jaime Lerner in Office
In the period between 1971 and time of this writing in 2004, Lerner's political group
had only been out of office for approximately six years, between 1983 and 1989. Two
mayors, Mauricio Fruet and Roberto Requido, were in office during this period. They
governed during a difficult period for Curitiba and for Brazil. Inflation was very high,
city tax revenue was going down, and the city's bus transit system was in disarray.
The problems seemed evident, but solutions were missing. Civil society came up with
a better understanding of the problem and a few new solutions. Thanks to this in part,
planners and politicians were able to put forward solutions that addressed the crisis in
the system. But Requiao had a very different style to Lerner and was unable to form
an alliance with the operators to sustain his policies. Conflict between Requi.o and
the operators resumed and by the end of the period, the system was still in poor
shape.
The appointment of Mauricio Fruet as Mayor of Curitiba
In 1980 the president of Brazil, General Jo&o Figueiredo, authorized the realization of
direct elections for state governors in 1982.720 As a result of those elections, Ney
Braga's political machine, represented by Saul Raiz, lost the elections to Jos6 Richa,
from the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB in Portuguese).7 2 1 The
military government, however, did not allow direct elections for mayors of state
capitals-these were to take place starting in 1985. Governors, therefore, were to
appoint the mayors of state capitals.722 Aware of this responsibility, the PMDB soon
after winning the elections started to prepare a plan for the future mayor, without
knowing who it would be.723 Governor-elect Richa wanted to introduce some
democratic taste to the appointment of Curitiba's mayor. He found out which members
720 Bueno (2002, p. 399).
721 De Novaes (1997, p. 154); and Menezes (2001, p. 121).
722 Graham and Jacobi (2002, p. 304).
723 Pereira (1988, p. 31).
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of his party were interested in being mayor and assembled a short list. With the help
of a radio station carried out a survey to see which person in the short list had more
support. The population surveyed favored councilman Mauricio Fruet, and Richa
appointed him mayor of Curitiba.7 2 4 Both took office on March 1 5 th, 1983. Fruet
established as his administration's motto the sentence "Participatory Curitiba,"72 5 to
reinforce the democratic opening of the Brazilian political system and to contrast his
administration with Lerner's.72 6 Fruet appointed Alcidino Pereira as President of
IPPUC.72 7 Fruet because of the economic crisis would face a city treasury with fewer
resources than his predecessors.7 2 8
The Fruet administration drew its policies using the input from some
communities and aware that the grassroots movement in Curitiba had contributed to
the triumph of the PMDB in the election. In transportation in particular the
administration wanted to rationalize the cost of bus service by eliminating all
subjective factors in determining the cost structure and the resulting fare. To achieve
this objective, the plan called for transparency both in planning and in managing the
bus system. To achieve the latter, the plan called for allowing members of the
community to be part of the Transportation Municipal Council. Finally, they wanted to
create a city owned company to manage and coordinate the public transport
system. 7 2 9
Planners were also aware that the bus system of Curitiba, despite being a
reference among Brazilian cities, was in disarray because of insufficient bus
frequency, too few buses and the existing ones in poor shape, and increased costs
and fares.730 In addition, the decreasing income of bus users translated into social
tension. According to Pereira's account, planners came up with two alternatives to
solve these problems and presented them to Mayor Fruet. The first option implied the
724 Richa (1997, p. 158, 165-6).
725 In Portuguese "Curitiba Participativa" (Neves, 2002, p. 110).
726 Akel (1991, p. 214-215). Fruet held weekly public hearings in the neighborhoods of Curitiba. The
meetings were held on Wednesdays and Fruet took with him his cabinet. The idea was to get input
from the community and try to detect problems (Akel, 1992, p. 214).727 Pereira (1988, p. 3).
728 Malucelli (1991, p. 267).
729 Pereira (1988, p. 36).
730 Urban (1987, p. 48).
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city of Curitiba assuming in its entirety the bus transit system, which implied ignoring
the existing contracts and assuming the "responsibility for all negative consequences."
The second alternative called for "gradual change, step by step, based on real data
obtained through controls [to the operators] to determine the true cost" of providing
bus service.731 Unsurprisingly, Mayor Fruet chose the second alternative. The account
by Pereira-who headed IPPUC at the time-seems to over emphasize the role of
planners and suggest the process was "rational" in that the problem was diagnosed,
planners figured out solutions, and the decision-maker chose an alternative. Pereira,
however, is leaving out the crucial role that the neighborhood associations, and in
particular MAB played in this story.
Fruet's response to the Neighborhood Associations
As seen, the grassroots movement in Curitiba had two wings, the Neighborhood
Association Movement of Curitiba and Metropolitan Region (MAB in Portuguese), and
the Council of Representatives of Residents and Friends of the Neighborhoods in
Curitiba.732 With the 1982 elections for governor looming, the political parties sought
to influence these grassroots movement, finding a fertile ground in the Council of
Representatives. Tensions soon developed within the Council of Representatives and
it split into a wing favoring the nascent Workers Party and another favoring the also
newly created Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB in Portuguese).7 33
Roberto Requiao, a young lawyer, who had advised both the Council of
Representatives and the Movement of Neighborhood Associations, headed the
second wing.734 Requiao was also prominent in the PDMB in Curitiba and was elected
to the state assembly in 1982, only to be elected Curitiba's mayor in 1985.7 35 While
the PDMB incorporated part of the agenda of the neighborhood associations into its
731 Both quotes from Pereira (1988, p. 63).
732 Neves (1995, p. 29-39).
733 During most of the dictatorship the military regime had allowed only two parties, ARENA and MDB.
ARENA, or National Revolutionary Alliance, was the official party. MDB, or Brazilian Democratic
Movement, was the opposition (see Bueno (2002, ch. 34). With the democratic opening these two
parties were dismantled and other parties were allowed to exist. MDB was transformed into the PMDB.
Neves (1995, p. 41-42).
735 Requio (1997, p. 249).
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own political agenda, a main outcome was that this wing of the movement became
less active as a result of its participation in party politics.
Therefore, MAB-which remained apart from this politicization-became the
flag bearer of the neighborhood grassroots movement.736 MAB sought mechanisms to
participate in the decision making process instead of simply continuing with a strictly
confrontational approach as the one followed before the elections-during Jaime
Lerner's tenure.737 One of MAB's first decisions was to institute a Transportation
Commission. This allowed MAB to qualify its members to understand the jargon of
transportation planners and bus operators and to eventually figure out solutions on its
own.738 This began to slowly change the balance of power in favor of MAB, because
the state and the operators began to lose their monopoly on information and
knowledge.739 Because MAB was independent of the PMDB and Mayor Fruet, it
continued to demand changes to the transportation situation in Curitiba. In March
1983-one week into Fruet's term-MAB held a neighborhood conference to analyze
the situation and draw a list of petitions to the mayor. In May 1983, MAB organized a
demonstration--i 5,000 people showed up-to present to the mayor its list of
petitions. Fruet then acceded to open up spaces for the grassroots movement in the
discussions for setting the fare.740
In June 1983, the Fruet administration introduced three timid changes to the
cost structure trying to reduce the rate of increase of the fares. First, the way some of
the labor costs were taken into account in the cost structure was modified. Second,
the useful life of bus tires was increased from 55,000 Km (34,375 mi.) to 108,000
(67,500 mi.). Finally, the existing cost structure allowed for part of the depreciation of
the buses to be considered a contingency. The administration eliminated this part of
the depreciation741 -although depreciation as such continued to be recognized
736 Neves (1995, p. 80).
737 Neves (1995, p. 40).
738 Garcia (1990, p. 101); and Neves (1995, p. 80-81).
739 Neves (1995, p. 80-81).
740 Neves (2002, p. 11 1); and Neves (1995, p. 82).
741 Pereira (1988, p. 63).
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elsewhere in the cost structure. Fruet then authorized a fare increase for the semester
July-December of 1983.742
Fruet and his planners did not discuss with MAB the change to the cost
structure and the resulting fare increase. Fruet, therefore, broke his agreement to
allow MAB to participate. MAB interpreted this as a sign that the operators were highly
influential even with a PMDB administration, which supposedly was nearer the
grassroots movement.7 43 Fruet argued that the 1981 contracts signed by the Lerner
administration with the operators did not allow him to act otherwise. MAB responded
by arguing that the cost structure used to determine the fare was inflated for at least
two reasons. First, the maintenance personnel cost was above the one actually
incurred by the operators. Second, the contracts specified that the contingency item
was to be used for expanding the service, but this was not taking place. Hence, the
operators were pocketing this part of the fare. The head of the Department of Public
Utilities accepted MAB's comments, but argued that the decision was not technical
but political.74 4
MAB then followed a two-pronged attack. First, MAB questioned the
qualifications of the personnel of the Department of Public Utilities who where in
charge of studying fare changes.745 This action mobilized the bus operators who, on
the one hand, defended the qualifications of the personnel at the Department of
Public Utilities, and on the other, mobilized their employees to press the City Council
and the mayor to accept the fare increase. Interestingly, one city councilor, member of
Lerner's political party, had been a bus driver and argued that not increasing the fare
could cost 30,000 jobs.746 The second part of MAB's attack was to go directly to
Mayor Fruet and remind him of the agreement he had reached with MAB in May. MAB
also demanded the institution of a commission to verify the true costs incurred by the
bus operators. MAB argued that the commission was to have representatives of the
mayor's office, the bus operators, and the neighborhood associations or MAB. To
742 Pereira (1988, p. 63); and Neves (1995, p. 82).
743 Neves (1995, p. 82).
7" Neves (1995, p. 84).
745 Neves (1995, p. 83).
746 Neves (1995, p. 83).
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back its claim, MAB showed that between 1979 and 1983 bus fares had gone up
3,338% while the minimum wage had gone up only 2,129%. MAB also showed
estimates that indicated that 100,000 users had stopped using the bus service
because they could not afford traveling by bus anymore.747
The Fruet administration's response was to enact a series of measures to
improve the control and supervision of bus operations trying to obtain better
information on the true costs of operating the buses. First were measures to avoid
operators from saying they had transported fewer passengers than in reality. Second,
the administration requested operators to show receipts and payrolls to prove their
expenses. Third, the administration reactivated the office in charge of controlling
schedules and frequencies.7 48 While Fruet had acted, MAB's request to form a
multiparty commission was not met. Fruet also started negotiations with the bus
operators for the fare increase due in January of 1984. In November the mayor
announced a fare of 126.53 cruzeiros (Cr$), while the operators demanded Cr$
145.00. MAB and others including a few city councilors proposed Cr$ 100.00. The
range of differences in the proposed fares suggests that Fruet's measures to gather
better information on the operating costs had still not rendered benefits. Because
MAB managed to the take the polemic for the first time to the City Council, it was able
to present its reasons for believing the operating costs were overestimated. MAB
again proposed the creation of the multiparty commission and added this time that the
contracts signed in 1981 should be cancelled.7 4 9
But again Fruet did not act on the creation of the commission, and instead
delayed the announcement of the new fare of Cr$ 125, which the operators had
accepted. Once Fruet announced the new fare, MAB and even some councilors
protested Fruet's approach. The councilors belonging to Fruet's party demanded the
cancellation of the contracts and the nationalization of the bus fleet. Further, Roberto
Requiao, a PMDB member of the state assembly, agreed with MAB that the fares
were inflated and demanded better supervision and a discussion of the possibilities to
747 Neves (1995, p. 85).
748 Pereira (1988, p. 63).
749 Neves (1995, p. 84-85).
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nationalize the bus fleet. Facing this pressure, Fruet's administration ordered
operators to reduce the frequency of service. With more passengers for every bus trip
there was no need to readjust the fare as frequently. However, this lowered the level
of service and bus users criticized the measure, which the administration then
abandoned. 7 5 0
The Fruet administration was feeling the political costs of the polemic and was
in need of measures.7 1 In February 1984 the administration created a joint
commission between planners from IPPUC and those of the Department of Public
Utilities.752 By March this joint commission found that the cost structure was inflated
and that the fare could be lower753--what MAB had been claiming all along. The joint
commission decided to try to change the fare structure towards one that reflected the
true costs,754 but the contracts signed in 1981 between the operators and the city
government did not allow this change. In fact, the operators had the power to
determine the cost structure, which was then approved by the Municipal Transport
Council and the city mayor.755 A partial solution, therefore, was to amend or cancel
the contracts, but the latter only took place during the Requiao administration.
By May 1984, MAB's efforts to strengthen its capacity had paid off for MAB
was able to submit a new cost structure that allowed lowering the bus fare.7 56
Members of MAB had attended several conferences and seminars, including one
early in 1984 titled "Mass Transit and Popular Participation." This last seminar was
also attended by several politicians and by planners from different municipalities in
Brazil, including the head of the Planning Department of the city of Diadema (Sao
Paulo), Amir Khair.757 It was Amir Khair who helped MAB design a new cost structure
that could lower the fare and still be profitable for the operators.758 MAB also joined
efforts with other grassroots and union leaders, and with some legislators to file a
750 Neves (1995, p. 86-87).
751 Pereira (1988, p. 64).
752 Pereira (1988, p. 63).
753 Neves (1995, p. 87).
754 Pereira (1988, p. 63).
755 Neves (1988, p. 68).
756 Neves (1995, p. 87-88).
757 Garcia (1990, p. 179).
75 Neves (1995, p. 87-88).
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lawsuit seeking the cancellation of the 1981 contracts between the city and the
operators.7 5 9
Facing these strong actions, Fruet issued in June 1984 the decree creating a
Commission to verify the costs of bus operations.7 60 Representatives of MAB were
allowed to participate in the Commission. Other participants were delegates from
IPPUC, the Department of Public Utilities and other city agencies, the Catholic
Church, 2 city councilors (one for the party in office and one for the opposition), and a
retail association, among others.761 For the first time in Curitiba the method to set the
fare was discussed in public.762 The Commission reviewed the expenses incurred by
the operators in the 18-month period before July 1984. The Commission found that
indeed the costs were inflated.763 Examples of the inflated costs were:
· The distance logged by the bus fleet was exaggerated by 8,000 km per
day.764 The actual number of passengers carried was not known, but an
estimate was used to calculate the fare.765 If operators underestimate the
number of passengers, and overestimate the distance logged by the fleet,
the apparent costs are higher than in actuality.
· The cost structure continued to recognize a depreciation cost-or
repayment to capital-even on buses that were fully depreciated.
· The cost structure used retail prices for spare parts, but operators bought
these pieces in bulk, hence achieving prices 16% lower than in the estimate
used to set the fare.
· Administrative costs were inflated by 60% above the true value, and
personnel costs by 15%.766
The operators, although officially excluded from the Commission, found out
about the results and proceeded to craft their own report and managed to get the
759 Neves (1995, p. 90).
760 Neves (1995, p. 88).
761 Pereira (1988, p. 64-5); Brasileiro (1994, p. 92); and Garcia (1990, p. 180).
762 Brasileiro (1994, p. 92).
763 Urban (1987, p. 56); Garcia (1990, p. 180); and Neves (1995, p. 89).
764 Garcia (1990, p. 180).
765 Urban (1987, p. 56).
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Commission to vote on which of the two reports, the Commission's or theirs, would be
the official one. In a first vote the report by the Commission won. The operators then
requested a second vote. This time, the councilor of the party in office-PMDB-
changed his vote in favor of the operator's report.767 Together with him, the councilor
of the party in opposition, all the representatives of the city government, and the
representative of the retail association cast the other votes in favor of the operator's
report.768 The final report, issued in November of 1984, recognized some cost inflation
and, interestingly, suggested to adopt a methodology similar to the one proposed by
the joint commission of planners from IPPUC and the Department of Public Utilities.769
While the cost structure was somewhat modified and brought the estimated cost
closer to the true cost,770 it still favored the operators' interests and more changes
would be needed later on.
The issuing of the report and some additional pressure by MAB and other
grassroots organizations had other consequences. First, Fruet agreed to allow the
grassroots movement, including MAB, to have its own people supervising the bus
operations.771 Second, old poor people, some of the unemployed, and some
policemen were to receive free passes to ride in buses. MAB was to administer the
distribution of the 8,000 daily passes for the unemployed. 2 Finally, MAB and other
grassroots organizations used the momentum created by the Commission's report to
lobby their inclusion in the Transportation Municipal Council. In June 1985 Mayor
Fruet proposed to the City Council this change,773 which was finally approved in
September of 1985.774 It had taken over 4 years of mobilization and learning for the
grassroots movement to defeat the resistance by the operators, who feared sharing
cost information with bus users.
766 All information on bullet points from Urban (1987, p. 56).
767 Interestingly, around the time of these events the head of the City Council was the largest bus
operator in Curitiba (Neves, 2002, p. 106); and (de Oliveira, 2000, p. 151-2).
768 Garcia (1990, p. 181).
769 Pereira (1988, p. 65).
770 Pereira (1998, p. 66); and Pereira (1984; p. 18).
771 Neves (1995, p. 90).
772 Pereira (1988, p. 64).
773 Neves (1995, p. 91).
774 Pereira (1988, p. 65).
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In sum, by this point the recession, the resulting fall in income, and the ever-
increasing fare prompted the user to mobilize via MAB to seek changes to the fare-
setting mechanism. Planners, however, lack the knowledge to effectively address this
problem. The alternative solutions planners present to Mayor Fruet are disappointing.
Planners at IPPUC continue to focus on physical issues even when planning new bus
services.7 7 5 Interestingly, it was MAB, the main representative of the bus user, the
actor able to solve the lack of technical capacity. MAB was the one that discovered
that the problem was the inflated cost structure. Equally important, MAB proposed a
new cost structure that lowered the fare while recognizing operators a return on the
investment. Put differently, a key stakeholder-the user-was absent from the
process and hence the interaction between planners, politicians, and stakeholders
was incomplete. The effects of the interaction on the plans and policies were
inherently biased against the user and in favor of the operators. Further, absent the
user, the need to have strong technical capacity regarding how to calculate the fare
was not apparent to politicians and planners. Bus operators, on the other hand, knew
how to take advantage of the situation.
The election of Roberto Requiao as mayor of Curitiba
1984 was the year civil society mobilized throughout Brazil to demand direct elections
for president. These protests and demonstrations brought to an end the military
regime, which acceded to having congress elect a civilian president in January of
1985.776 The new civilian-led government authorized elections for mayors of state
capitals to be held by the end of that year, for the 1986-89 period.77 7 In Curitiba,
775 For an example of the emphasis on physical issues and not the cost structure of bus services see
IPPUC (1984, p. 4).
776 Bueno (2002, p. 396-8).
777 Willis, Garman, and Haggard (1998, p. 11-12); and (Graham and Jacobi (2002, p.304). It is likely
that this mayoral period went until some date, probably March 1 5 th , 1989, or even 1990. Brasileiro
(1994, p. 92) reports that Requi.o's term was of 4 years, but it lasted less. The new Constitution of
Brazil, enacted in October of 1988 established in a "transition" article that the 1986-89 mayoral period
would finish on January 1 t, 1989, thus shortening the term. The need to have this in a "transition"
article-an article that is valid only once, during the transition from one constitution to another-
suggests that the mayoral term originally was scheduled to finish at a different date. The constitution
also established that the president of Brazil, the governors of the states, and the city mayors would
take office on January 1st of the year after their election. (See Constituicao da Repiblica Federativa do
Brasil, arts. 28, 29, 82, and transitional article no. 2).
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Jaime Lerner and Roberto Requiao de Mello e Silva were candidates for mayor.
Lerner campaigned on his record as successful two-time mayor and as a technician
not involved in politics as such.778 For his part, Requiao, a lawyer with graduate
studies in city planning,77 9 argued in his campaign that Lerner's policies had paid
attention only to downtown while abandoning the periphery, where the poor lived.780
As seen, Requiao had been involved with the grassroots movement that sought
changes to the bus system and as a state legislator had requested the nationalization
of the city's bus fleet.781 Requiao also linked Lerner to the bus operators and to the
inflated fare unveiled by MAB.782 Requi&o won the election with 43.7% of the vote,
supported primarily by the lower classes "who did not know about the work of Jaime
Lerner."7 83 Lerner got 40.1% of the vote.7847 8 5
Requiao was the son of Wallace de Mello e Silva, who had been appointed
mayor of Curitiba in the early 1950s and had lost in 1954 the election for mayor to
Ney Braga-the starter what became Lerner's political group. Wallace was of the
opinion that the bus operators charged too much and offered too little, and had a
political fight with them. Requido says in this regard "I grew up seeing my father's fight
against those interests and his desire to change the situation."786 Because of this
example and because of the political situation at the time in Curitiba (and in most
Brazilian cities787), Requiao structured part of his agenda around this topic seeking to
improve the transport system.788 Specifically, Requi.o wanted to cancel the contracts
signed between the bus operators and the city in 1981789 during Lerner's second term
778 De Oliveira (2000, p. 57-8).
779 Requi.o (1997, p. 251).
780 Neves (1995, p. 91).
781 De Oliveira (2000, p. 144-5).
782 Neves (1995, p. 91).
783 Paz (1990, p. 7).
784 Lerner left Curitiba to do consulting around Brazil, including Rio de Janeiro. In Rio Lerner developed
the tube station, which that city never adopted. Curitiba adopted the tube station when Lerner was
mayor for the third time.
785 Lerner (1997, p. 336).
786 Requiao (1997, p. 250-1).
787 Affonso (1987, ch. 1).
788 Brasileiro (1998, p. 480); and Brasileiro (1994, p. 92).
789 Neves (1995, p. 92).
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in office. Requiao also wanted to lower bus fares by changing the methodology for
estimating bus-operating costs and to create a city-owned bus fleet.790
Finally, it is important to point out that during Requiao's term the grassroots
movement, including MAB, receded in its demand to lower bus fares.791 In 1986 the
federal government enacted a plan to curb inflation, which changed the currency and
froze prices, including bus fares at the same time that salaries were adjusted
upward.792 While the plan did not lower the inflation rate (see Table 9, above) by
raising salaries it lowered the pressure of the fare as a political issue. More
importantly, in 1985 the Brazilian government enacted the "vale transporte" policy,793
through which employers subsidize the bus fares for their employees.794 As long as a
user is formally employed, therefore, the bus fare matters little and this eliminates the
incentive for political mobilization. Further, Requi&o decided to enlarge MTC from 13
to 225 members, including all of the City Council, and representatives of political
parties, civil society, etc. MTC met few times, for rarely sufficient members gathered
to achieve a valid quorum. Also, by increasing the size to 225, the incidence of the
organizations representing the user-only three seats in the council-was minimal.795
Despite this lack of political pressure, Requiao had an agenda and called his team at
URBS, under Stdnio Sales, to spearhead the effort and enact the changes he wanted
in Curitiba's bus system. Under Requi.o, consequently, IPPUC saw a dramatic
change of fate; from being a powerful agency under Lerner, Requiao transferred
many of IPPUC's functions and personnel to other agencies. Further, IPPUC's
Deliberative Council did not meet once during Requiao tenure.796
A distance-based payment and a city-owned bus fleet
Mayor Requiao had two broad objectives in transport: to change the system that
determined the fare, and to gradually establish a city-owned bus fleet. To achieve
these objectives Requiao needed to cancel the contracts with the operators. Given
790 Interview to planners who worked for Requi.o.
791 Neves (1995, p. 91).
792 Bueno (2002, p. 404-5).
793 Neves (1995, p. 91).
794 World Bank (2002, p. xvi); and HFA (2000, p. 189).
795 Neves (1995, p. 97).
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the events of the mid-1980s, Requiao had figured out that these were in his view the
right policies. It is impossible to deny, therefore, the role that MAB and the grassroots
movement played in shaping Requiao's agenda. Requido started by strengthening
URBS' role in managing and administering the public transport system through a
decree issued in March 1986.7 9 7 URBS then started learning about operating the bus
system, its costs, scheduling, etc. Planners at URBS had several advantages vis-a-vis
the planners in previous years. For one, they had the reports of the Commission to
verify the costs of bus operations, which showed the costs were inflated and
suggested ways of lowering the fare. For another, MAB and other grassroots
organizations had people supervising the operations of the bus fleet in real time.
These supervisors provided the evidence Requiao needed to implement elements of
his agenda such as canceling the contracts. The supervisors, for example, found that
operators "manipulated data and hid from authorities information on what buses were
[illegally] circulating even though their useful life had expired."798
Requiao then hired lawyer Geraldo Ataliba to render an opinion regarding the
validity of the 1981 contracts between the city government and the bus operators.
That contract had been issued without a competitive bid-it was just an extension of
the 1974 contracts, with some modifications. Ataliba issued his opinion in September
of 1986 concluding that the mayor could cancel these contracts because of the lack of
a competitive bid. Requiao then announced his intentions to proceed in that manner.
Operators probably were expecting this,799 more so given the tense relationships
between them and the mayor. Relations between the city government and the
operators were tense, as usual, around fare issues. But during Requiao's tenure they
reached a peak. During 1986 the operators had demanded a fare increase and
Requido had denied it arguing that the fare was inflated. The operators responded by
saying that Mayor Fruet-of the same party as Requio-had changed the cost
structure and that Requiao had to respect this and the 1981 contracts.8 0 0
796 De Oliveira (2000, p. 104).
797 URBS (1992?, p. 14).
798 De Oliveira (2000, p. 145).
799 Neves (1995, p. 91-2); and de Oliveira (2000, p. 148).
800 De Oliveira (2000, p. 147).
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According to the planners involved in these events, Mayor Requiio set January
31 st, 1987 as the date when he would enact the changes he intended. Planners at
URBS had two months to polish the proposals by figuring out the rationale and the
arguments needed to convince the operators, and conduct the negotiations with them.
First, Requiao wanted to change the cost structure and pay the operators according to
the distance logged by the buses.801 Planners analyzed the situation and discovered
that the problem went beyond including certain items in the cost structure-incentives
and risk played a larger role probably. At the time in Curitiba, each user paid a fare
that went directly to the fare box inside each bus. In the absence of subsidies to
private operators who want to maximize profits, this system generates several
incentives that can lower the level of service. For one, operators have an incentive to
maximize the number of passengers per bus-trip by lowering the frequency of service.
For another, operators do not have an incentive to provide service during periods of
low demand, such as at night802 and in newly developed areas. If left unregulated,
operators will oversupply in profitable areas and undersupply in non-profitable
areas-areas where there is a population that nonetheless needs service. In short,
under this system, operators assume the demand risk for their business and hence
their behavior in order to maximize profits.
Requi.o and his planners figured that a solution was to transfer the demand
risk to the city government. With a lower risk, the fare can be lower. To transfer the
demand risk to the city, two interrelated changes had to be introduced. First, the
operators would be paid according to the distance logged by the bus fleet-a figure
independent of ridership. Second, the fare box would have to go to the city, known in
Curitiba as receita piblica or public fare box. At the time, users paid the fare upon
boarding the bus, so with the change the operators would have to deposit every day
the day's revenue in a government bank account. The city government would pay, in
turn, every 10 days to the operators. By transferring the demand risk to the city the
incentives to operators radically change. Now the incentive is to comply with the
801 During his first week in office, Requido announced these measures (de Oliveira, 2000, p. 146-7).
802 Notice that one of the first demands made by users-during the demonstrations held on May 1s
1979, during Lerner's second term-was to have adequate service at night.
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schedules set by the city because revenue is contingent on logging distance and not
on carrying passengers. If the city instructs an operator to supply an area with scant
demand or at night, the operator has the incentive to comply by logging kilometers
and getting paid by the city.
Requiao's second objective, to create a city-owned bus fleet, originated in his
left-of-the-center ideology that preached that public services should to be government
owned. Requi.o, however, agreed that the operation of these services, such as
transit, could be done privately. Requi&o and his planners, as well as MAB had done
before, figured that the cost structure that determined the fare had several elements
that remunerated the capital invested by the operators in the buses. By the end of the
useful life of the bus, therefore, users had actually paid for the buses. As a result, they
reasoned, by the end of the useful life of the buses it is the bus users who should own
the fleet-or the city on their behalf. Therefore, the city should be the one that
purchases the fleet and asks the private sector to operate it. According to some
planners, this has the additional advantage that if desired, the fare can be lowered if
no return on capital is included. For this to happen, however, the city government has
to have other sources of funding beyond the fare to fund the acquisition of the fleet-
something that did not happen in Curitiba.
On January 20, 1987, Mayor Requiao convoked the representatives of the bus
operators to negotiate these and other changes to the bus system in Curitiba.
Representing the city, planners from URBS, such as Garrone Reck,8 03 Joao Carlos
Cascaes, Germinal Poca, and Assis Correia, headed by St6nio Sales Jacob.
Representing the operators Dante Franceschi and Joao Xavier Simbes from the
Association of Bus Operators of Curitiba (Sindicato das Empresas de Transporte de
Passageiros de Curitiba).80 4 In the agenda: the public fare box, the payment per
kilometer logged, changing the cost structure that determined the fare, the gradual
implementation of the public fleet, the elimination of the "selective" area principle, and
803 Garrone Reck will years later be one of the key transportation planners in the planning and design
of TransMilenio in Bogota. In Bogota the payments per distance logged became an important element
to achieve the change desired by Mayor Enrique Peialosa.
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the cancellation of the existing contracts.805 The negotiations were difficult but
planners wanted to reach a consensual agreement with the representatives of the
operators. Planners now had several advantages vis-a-vis previous attempts to
change the system. For one, as seen planners had better information on the actual
costs of operating the fleet and this allowed them to negotiate changes to the cost
structure. For another, the changes Requiao wanted had several carrots embedded in
them together with a big stick. The stick was the legally feasible threat of canceling
the contracts and leaving the operators out of the business if they did not agree to the
other changes. The carrots where in the lower risk the operators would face and in the
possibilities of freeing capital if the city owned the bus fleet.
The representatives of the operators had to convince their constituents about
the need to accept these radical changes. They used the argument that the existing
system, which assigned all the demand risk to the operators, but left the responsibility
for setting the fare in the hands of the governments was not convenient for them.
Setting the fare could always be a political issue. By transferring the demand risk to
the city and accepting the payment per kilometer logged, this potentially contentious
issue would be solely the city's responsibility-at least in theory. The operators would
receive a payment that covered costs, regardless of the actual fare or actual demand.
This payment, moreover, would adjust-in theory-automatically if the cost of the
supplies increased above a certain threshold. Regarding the public bus fleet, it was
initially appealing since as one operator told me: "Our real business is to operate
buses, not to own them. If the city puts the capital, we can put our own capital in
certificates of deposit, continue doing what we know and get paid for it."
On January 30, in the midst of the negotiations, Requido issued two decrees.
The first decree canceled the 1981 contracts and the 9 companies ceased to be
concessionaires of the city government. The second decree turned URBS into the
sole concessionaire of the city government for the provision of bus transport
804 "Ata da reunido de negociagao do novo sistema institucional do transporte coletivo do Municipio de
Curitiba," January 3 1st, 1987. (Minutes of the meetings to negotiate the new institutional system of
mass transit of the Municipality of Curitiba).
805 Neves (1995, p. 93); and de Oliveira (2000, p. 148).
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services.806 The decrees turned the companies into "permissionaires." The city argued
that a concession contract with a private company is difficult to supervise and modify,
even if the concessionaire does not perform as expected. Because URBS is a city-
owned company the mayor can modify the concession agreement as needed. In turn,
with a "permission" contract it is easy to supervise the bus companies, modify it if
necessary, and if a company does not comply, the permission contract can be
canceled more easily than the concession one.807 The second decree also canceled
the "selective" areas80-yet the "selective" area principle remained intact in
determining the allocation of service among bus companies. This decree also
established that at the end of the useful life, the city would own the buses, and
established that URBS was to start audits of the operators.809 Finally, the decrees
eliminated IPPUC's role in planning and managing the transit system, leaving this
responsibility solely in the hands of URBS.810
Probably thanks to these decrees, the negotiations between URBS and the bus
operators could not reach an agreement on all issues of interest. On January 3 1 st-
one day after the decree-the attendants to the negotiations signed a consensual
agreement regarding the "adoption of the payments per kilometer logged; the public
fare box; the gradual introduction of the public bus fleet and the elimination of the
selective area."81 1 The same agreement established February of 1987 as a transition
month and the payment per distance to start on the 1st of March of 1987. Further, the
agreement determined the value of the bus fleet and established a mechanism for
transferring the buses once their useful life expired. The issue on which URBS and
the operators did not reach agreement was the value that the city would pay the
operators for each kilometer logged-URBS would determine this value later on.
806 URBS (1998, p. 8); and Neves (1995, p. 93-95). The decrees were No. 44 and 45 of January 30,
1987.
807 Urban (1987, p. 58).
808 URBS (1998, p. 8).
809 URBS (1998, p. 8-9).
810 Brasileiro (1998, p. 481); and Brasileiro (1994, p. 92).
811 "Ata da reuniAo de negociag;o do novo sistema institucional do transporte coletivo do Municipio de
Curitiba," January 31 st, 1987. (Minutes of the meetings to negotiate the new institutional system of
mass transit of the Municipality of Curitiba).
-
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It is important to underscore one thing. The bus companies were turned into
"permissionaires" again without a competitive bid. Given the circumstances and given
that the reason to cancel the 1981 contracts was precisely that there had not been a
competitive bid, one could argue that the permissions ought to have been assigned
through a competitive process. The reason there was no competitive bid rests again
on the "selective" area principle, which gave a disproportionate amount of power to
the operators. Although canceled by the decree, the "selective" area principle was
used to assign the new pie among the operators. Whereas the old pie was measured
in terms of area of the city and each company got a slice of the total demand in that
way, with the changes the pie was measured in kilometers or distance but the shares
remained the same. As an operator told me, "If a company had 15% of Curitiba's area
before, it got 15% of the total kilometers logged by the fleet." Further, several planners
confirmed to me that even today any new service is assigned taking into account the
"selective" area principle. Specifically, whenever there is a new bus route, URBS calls
the operator in the respective "selective" area and offers it the service. If the operator
rejects the proposal, then another operator is called-"seeking to maintain the
equilibrium among the operators."
The role of planners
MAB had been successful at putting the fare issue on the political agenda. But this
civil society movement had gone farther by providing even detailed diagnostics and
possible solutions. Requiao's objectives as mayor-to lower the bus fare and to
create a city-owned bus fleet-were therefore partially influenced by MAB. Thanks to
MAB's work, moreover, Requiao's planners had better information and knowledge
regarding the distortions in the fare-setting structure. Planners now had the
knowledge they needed to figure out new solutions-in the end, the conflict protracted
in time in part due to an absence of feasible solutions. Incentives and risk allocation
where at the root of the problem in Curitiba and hence Mayor Requi.o and his
planners proposed the payment per distance logged and the public fare box.
Therefore, the interaction among planners, stakeholders-both operators and
MAB-and politicians eventually led to a new understanding of the problem and more
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importantly to solutions that were politically feasible. Solutions that contrary to
previous ones escaped from the realm of "physical" planning by centering on
economic and behavioral aspects. This interaction among actors was more balanced
than in previous instances for it included MAB, who albeit imperfectly represented the
bus user. For political reasons, however, MAB's participation in the process was not
constant. But before MAB's involvement only planners, politicians, and bus operators
participated. Hence the solutions inherently favored the operators' interests who were
more powerful. MAB and the grassroots movement altered the equation by mobilizing
to introduce users' interests in the process.
In short, the interaction among actors increased the extent to which
government policies reflected collective goals and not those of a particular
stakeholder. Notice, however, that the interaction took many forms, including the
mobilization of MAB to force other actors to hear its concerns. The extent to which
policies reflected collective goals increased because, first, MAB's effort and
participation in the process brought about the missing actor, the user; MAB also
helped generate the missing knowledge. Second, with better knowledge the planners
were able to reduce the power of the bus companies. The companies no longer
enjoyed the advantage of being the only ones who knew the costs of operating a bus.
Further, because the city would pay the bus companies per distance logged, the
companies were no longer interested in how the city sets the fare. Bus companies no
longer have to mobilize to obtain a desired fare level. Bus companies now have to
negotiate with URBS who knows their costs. In the end, the process led to an
outcome were costs and benefits were better distributed-and that did not favor
disproportionately the bus companies.
The aftermath: success then turmoil
The changes introduced by the Requiao administration were initially well received by
the bus companies and by bus riders. Operators complied with the order to deposit
the daily revenue in URBS' bank account; in turn, URBS complied with paying the
operators every 10 days. Also, compliance with schedules and frequencies
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increased812 and it is currently estimated to be around 99.6%.813 Because of this
success, several cities in Brazil, including Sao Paulo, copied the idea of paying the
operators per kilometer logged and of having the fare box go to the city
government.81 4 In fact, this innovation would prove key in Bogota for the
implementation of the TransMilenio project. Furthermore, the operators initially liked
the idea of the public bus fleet. Before these measures were introduced only 14
articulated buses were rolling on the streets of Curitiba. While the first articulated
bused had been introduced in the North-South and Boqueirao axes in 1980,815 bus
operators had been reluctant to invest in this high-capacity bus, probably because
they cost 50% more than the express buses.816 The city government, on the other
hand, was willing to purchase the buses. Through the public bus fleet program the city
bought 88 new articulated buses for the bus companies to operate.817 The number of
passengers using the system also increased (Table 10). Finally, according to several
sources, Curitiba had at the time one of the lowest bus fares of Brazil (Table 10).
Table 10. Impact of distance-based avment and public fleet
Item 1986, March 1987, March 1988, May
Before Measure First month of Over a year after
Measure measure
Weekday passengers 889,600 956,300 1,027,000
Operational bus fleet 943 997 1,074
Kilometers logged by bus fleet on a 211,500 234,200 249,800
weekday
Fare in Curitiba 1.4 2.6 25.0
Fare in Sio Paulo 1.5 5.0 50.0
Sources: Statistics compiled by URBS and supplied to author by Stenio Sales.
The Requiao administration, however, did not have all the required funding to
undertake the public fleet idea. Therefore, to finance the acquisition of buses for the
public fleet, the Requiao administration established that a percentage of the fare paid
by users would go to a fund for this purpose.818 The remainder of the fare would go to
paying the operators for the kilometers logged. By the second semester of 1987
812 Urban (1987, p. 59).
813 Interviews by author with Euclides Rovani, Director of Mass Transit, URBS, April 2002 and 2003.
814 Brasileiro (1998, p. 481). Golub and Hook (2003, p. 14) report that SAo Paulo in the mid 1990s
abandoned the per km payment and reintroduced the per passenger payment.
815 URBS (1998, p. 7).
816 Estimation based on Ceneviva (2000, p. 190).
817 Brasileiro (1994, p. 193; and 1998, p. 481); and de Souza (1999, p. 151). Each city-owned bus had
the words "People's Property" painted on the side.
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tension began to develop between the operators and the administration. Operators
claimed the administration was not adjusting the value of the kilometer logged to keep
pace with inflation-which was still high at the time. Soon the mismatch was of 23%.
The Requi.o administration, moreover, had increased the share of the fare that went
to the public fleet from 5.8% initially to 10% by December 1st, 1987 and then to 15%
one week later. This hampered the ability of the city government to increase the
payment per kilometer logged.
Franceschi, on behalf of the operators as head of their trade association,
announced that the financial condition of the operators was dire and even proposed
the city government to take over their business. Soon the operators filed a lawsuit to
get the city to readjust the value of the kilometer.81 9 In May 1988, a judge ruled in
favor of the operators ordering a 16% adjustment to the value they received per
kilometer logged. So as not to increase the fare, the judge ordered to lower the share
of the fare destined to the public fleet.820
Requiao counter attacked by filing an appeal and won.821 The administration
continued to increase the share of the fare destined to the public fleet and by August,
1988, it was 18.2%.822 A second lawsuit filed by Requi.o sought to confiscate 105
buses whose useful life had expired and according to the new rules belonged to the
city. Requi.o again won.823 What followed was a lengthy legal battle of lawsuits,
counter-lawsuits, and appeals. Further, Requi.o at one point claimed the operators
wanted to bribe him to stop his actions. The operators filed a lawsuit claiming slander.
Finally, given the inflationary environment and that finally judge rulings favored the
operators, Requi.o decided to decrease the share of the fare that went to the public
fleet by 90% in order to keep the fare constant. While not canceled, the public fleet
had no funding to continue buying buses by the end of 1988.824
818 Urban (1987, p. 61-2).
819 Interview by author with Dante Franceschi, April, 2002.
820 "Justiga freia frota pliblica in Curitiba," Gazeta do Povo, May, 4 th , 1988.
821 De Oliveira (2000, p. 146-8).
822 Brasileiro (1994, p. 93).
823 De Oliveira (2000, p. 146-8).
824 Neves (1995, p. 98); and de Oliveira (2000, p. 149).
185
These events had profound political repercussions within the operators. First,
while the idea of the public fleet had been appealing to them, as discussed above, the
uncertainty around how any administration in office would behave made the idea too
risky for them. For one, as simple operators not owning any bus, they could be fired
and changed for new ones almost at any point. For another, if the administration
decided not to readjust the value of the kilometer logged, it could put them out of
business. The operators, therefore, needed to oppose the idea of the publicly owned
bus fleet and force a change in policy towards one where the operators owned the
fleet. The payment per kilometer logged was something they wanted, so they sought
to keep it in place.
Second, de Oliveira argues that the events during the Requiao administration
showed the operators that their trade association, the Association of Bus Operators of
Curitiba, had to become politically proactive to achieve the power needed to increase
their influence on the city's public policy. Until those events, this trade association had
been reactive to the policies initiated by the city government. The trade association,
moreover, was not as strong because of the selective area scheme. Under it, any
policy initiative by the government typically affected one or two "owners" of "selective"
areas but not necessarily the rest of the operators. This facilitated the negotiations for
implementing the express bus, for example. But now the operators concluded they
needed a trade association with political strength that could assemble a winning
coalition in the City Council. The objective of having such a coalition were to protect
the interests of the operators, particularly against any effort to transfer the property of
the bus fleet to the city government, and to represent other business sectors.82 5 De
Oliveira concludes: "This coalition in the City Council, identified as "Pro-City," then
transformed itself into the most important political force in the City Council."82 6
Interviews with operators also reveal that their trade association finances political
campaigns.
In sum, Requiao was unable to assemble a coalition, let alone an alliance, as
the one Lerner had with the business sector in Curitiba. Further, Requiao's actions
825 De Oliveira (2000, p. 152).
826 De Oliveira (2000, p. 152).
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also alienated the grassroots movement, which felt excluded from the decisions to set
the fare, and which considered the enlargement of MTC to over 200 members a way
of diminishing their influence. For Garcia, Requi.o tried to de-articulate the grassroots
movement as soon as he saw them dangerous for his own objectives.8 2 7 It is therefore
not surprising that Lerner went on to win the next elections. More interesting is that
Lerner's political group has held since then the mayor's office-almost 16 years, thus
establishing itself as the hegemonic political force in Curitiba.82 8 For his part, and
despite his political troubles and style of government in Curitiba, Requiao went on to
be elected governor of Parana in 1990, for the 1991-95 period, and then Federal
Senator for two terms. In 2002 he won again the governor's office, and not
surprisingly, in his agenda figures the idea of lowering the fare for metropolitan bus
services in Curitiba.82 9 This policy will again put him in conflict with Curitiba's bus
operators and with Curitiba's mayor, Cassio Taniguchi of Lerner's group. A planner
that worked for Requido in the 1980s and who is now again in his team told me "I
have already watched this movie..."
The role of planners
Planners are conspicuously absent in this part of the account; instead, lawyers
become the main advisors to Mayor Requiao. The planning team ceases to be a
mediator between the mayor and the bus companies-the courts take over that
function. Absent the planning team to mediate between the mayor and the bus
companies the conflict escalates. Planners cannot lower power differentials. In this
case, Mayor Requiao seems too powerful and planners should have tried to reduce
the mayor's power vis-a-vis the companies. Yet Requiao's power only alienates the
827 Garcia (1990, p. 219-255); Neves (1995) agrees with this assessment.
828 Samek (1996, p. 15).
829 As governor, Requi.o has jurisdiction over the trips that between Curitiba and the surrounding
municipalities in the metropolitan area. In the 1990s, when Lerner was governor and the mayor was
part of his group, they enacted policies to integrate the surrounding municipalities to Curitiba's RIT.
While this enlarged the service area and benefited some users, it also had the consequence of
increasing the fare. According to an operator, if there was no integration, the fare could be 35% lower
for trips within Curitiba. This operator recommends having a fare scheme whereby users pay
proportional to the distance they travel-but this change could hurt the poor who live in the suburbs
and benefit the wealthy who live close to downtown. Requiao's team argues that with the integration
the fare is also inflated for the metropolitan user. To determine this, Requido's administration
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bus companies, which resort to the courts to try to balance the power differential.
Planners cannot mediate because there is little or no interaction between planners,
stakeholders, and politicians. Absent the interaction, planners obtain no feedback and
cannot figure out solutions to fund the public fleet program under high-inflation
conditions. The events, therefore, illustrate the importance of having a capable
government and interaction among actors. The mayor seems powerful but absent the
interaction his pet policy is not adopted. Paradoxically, operators initially supported
the public fleet plan. But absent the interaction and the necessary adjustments to
details in the fleet's plans the bus operators end up building a strong coalition against
the public fleet and against Requiao's movement-which has not been in office in
Curitiba since those events.
contracted for the first time the performing of an origin destination survey. The results of these studies
will be ready in 2004.
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Chapter 7
Lerner's movement back in office: Revamping the RIT
In 1989 Jaime Lerner became Curitiba's mayor for the third time. This time, however,
he was elected and not appointed as in the previous two occasions. The conflict
between the opposition to Lerner and the bus operators probably contributed to
Lerner's easy triumph. Lerner had an agenda that included city beautification and
marketing the city's image domestically and internationally. In transport, a light rail
proposal gets again in the agenda, only to be defeated by the revamping of the bus-
based RIT. It was this transformation of the RIT-which took place in the first half of
the 1990s-that turned bus rapid transit into valid alternative to light rail. After this,
Curitiba's bus transit system will be replicated with adaptations by cities such as Quito
and Bogota in the second half of the 1990s.
The Election of Jaime Lerner as mayor of Curitiba
During Requi.o's term, Jaime Lerner spent most of his time in Rio de Janeiro, helping
Governor Leonel Brizola, and eventually joined Brizola's Partido Democr.tico
Trabalhista (PDT).830 Because Lerner was not officially a resident of Curitiba, his
party831 initially did not choose him as candidate for the 1988 election. However, the
new Brazilian Constitution enacted in October of 1988, changed the rules,832 making
Lerner's candidacy legally feasible. Requiao's party, the PMDB, responded by filing a
lawsuit against Lerner's candidacy, but the judiciary cleared the way for Lerner. As a
result, Lerner started his campaign only 12 days before the elections. Having so little
time, Lerner's campaign could print few materials, but resorted to slogans such as
"This time, yes," and "Jaime Lerner, for sure,"8 33 that could ring with people.
Supporters also carried heart-shaped stickers and advertisements. The hearts made
direct reference to Lerner's campaign in 1985, when his slogan was "Curitiban
830 Lerner (1997, p. 336),
831 Democratic Workers Party.
832 See Brazil's Constitution, transition article No. 5.
833 In Portuguese these slogans were, respectively, "Agora sim," and "Jaime Lerner, corn certeza."
189
heart."834 Finally, the campaign promoted Lerner as an experienced technician and
not as a party politician. Lerner won with 48.6% of the vote. Mauricio Fruet of the
PMDB-a former mayor supported by Requio-was the first runner up with only
29.5% of the vote.835
Lerner was lucky to find that congress had enacted a tax reform that allowed
cities to increase tax revenue as of 1989-Lerner's first year in office. With ample
funding and with little need to modify the Director Plan's guidelines for Curitiba's
urban growth, Lerner adopted an agenda that emphasized city beautification and the
environment. Lerner undertook during his third term works that made Curitiba
internationally famous. These include the Botanical gardens, the Wire Opera, the 24-
hour Street,83 6 the Free University for the Environment, the "Garbage That Is Not
Garbage program," the "Garbage Purchase program," 837 and the upgrade to the RIT
with the introduction of the "Speedy service" and the tube stations.83 8 Lerner also
stepped up his efforts to market his policies to the population and to market the
Curitiba within Brazil and abroad to attract investment to the city.8 39
The end of the fight between the city and the operators
Days before taking office, Lerner was asked about Requi&o's policy to change the
contracts with the bus operators from concessions to permissions. Lerner replied: "In
Rio de Janeiro, where I worked for three and a half years on the transportation
system, bus operators want permissions and not concessions. Therefore, I am not
834 Paz (1990, ch.1). In Portuguese the slogan is "Coragao curitibano." Paz also reports that after
Lerner lost the 1985 election, some supporters created a sticker with a broken heart and the phrase
"Curitiba: you lost."
835 Paz (1990, p. 15).
836 De Oliveira (2000, p. 59-60).
837 Rabinovitch and Leitman (1996, p. 50-53). The Free University for the Environment "offers practical
short courses at no cost for homemakers, building superintendents, shopkeepers and other to teach
the environmental implications of the daily routines of even the most commonplace jobs. The courses,
taught by people who have completed an appropriate training program, are a prerequisite for licenses
to work at some jobs, such as taxi driving, but many people take them voluntarily." (Rabinovitch and
Leitman, 1996, p. 50). The "Garbage That Is Not Garbage program" promotes a voluntary separation of
solid waste for recycling purposes. 'The Garbage purchase program," designed specifically for low-
income areas, helps to clean up sites that are difficult for the conventional waste-management system
to serve. Poor families can exchange filled garbage bags for bus tokens, parcels of surplus food, and
children's school notebooks." (Rabinovitch and Leitman, 1996, p. 52-3).
838 URBS (1998, p. 9-10); and Ceneviva (1999, p. 187-9).
839 Sanchez-Garcia (1997, p. 56); and Sanchez-Garcia and Torres Ribeiro (1997, p. 107).
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worried at all about managing again the transit system I created."840 Lerner, however,
found the system highly deteriorated due to the fight between the operators and the
city government. Operators had under-invested in maintenance and bus renewal was
lagging. Service to the user was poor.84' One of Lerner's first moves was therefore to
adjust the fare upwards and update the value paid to the operators per kilometer
logged. Lerner and his planners also changed the tone of the interaction with the
operators: 'While others treat the operators as thugs, we treat them as
entrepreneurs," a planner told me. The operators also wanted to improve the relations
with the new mayor. By the end of the Requiao administration, a judge had finally
ruled in favor of the operators, ordering the city government to compensate the
operators for the unpaid amounts.8 42 According to Dante Franceschi, one of the
operators, the value of this debt was 30 million dollars or 450 new buses. The
operators decided not to recover this value as a sign of their will to improve the
relations with the new mayor.8 43 While not in a notarized document, it is clear that this
starts an alliance between the new mayor and the operators.
This alliance was reinforced by three events. First, Lerner did not like the idea
of having a city-owned bus fleet. The operators did not like the public idea either. In
October of 1990 the City Council cancelled this initiative by issuing a city law to
replace Requido's decree 45 of 1987.84 4 The new law, just as the decree, established
URBS as the sole concessionaire of the bus routes of Curitiba. The law also allows
URBS to delegate through permissions the provision of bus services. The law,
however, eliminated the idea of a publicly owned bus-fleet.845 Second, Brazil's new
constitution protects investors in that if the conditions of a contract between the
government and a private party changes, the government has to compensate the
private party. This provision lowered the risk for the operators, who now had
840 Biography of Jaime Lerner, No date, no author, mimeographed, Public Library of Paranc.
841 Neves (1995, p. 58). Press accounts at the time corroborate that the level of service was low.
842 De Oliveira (2000, p. 149).
843 Neves (1995, p. 58-9).
844 Neves (1995, p. 99-100).
845 URBS (1998, p. 9).
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constitutional backing.84 6 Finally, in May of 1989 Lerner changed the composition of
MTC by decreasing its membership to 17, lowering the user representatives from 3 to
1, and by having the remaining councilors come from within the administration and the
business sector. The mayor of Curitiba, moreover, would be the president of this
council and only one entitled to convoke a meeting.8 47 The alliance controlled MTC
because most of its members were from the growth coalition to which Lerner and the
bus operators belong.
As a result of the alliance, planners at URBS, the regulatory agency, and the
bus operators understand that if they want to be successful they need one another. A
planner at URBS told me: "URBS has an excellent relationship with the operators
because this is essential for URBS' success." And an operator told me in this regard:
"Having a good relationship with URBS is essential for us, because this is a
partnership between URBS and the operators." Another operator rounded up by
saying: "Thanks be to God for having given us a very well managed and efficient
government represented by URBS." Lerner's planners at URBS, therefore,
understand that the RIT needs to have a collaborative relationship between them and
the operators. This does not preclude innovative policies from being adopted. Quite
contrary, this is the period when the RIT got revamped and Curitiba achieved world
recognition. Notice, however, that the bus rider is again not a direct participant in the
planning process. The user is no longer motivated to participate because employers
subsidize their employees fare848 and because the level of service is high.
Revamping the RIT: Bi-articulated buses and tube stations
in lieu of light rail
Lerner's election to the mayor's office opened a window of opportunity for planners at
IPPUC-an agency that had been ignored and weakened by Mayors Fruet and
Requiao. 849 A planner who worked at the time at IPPUC told me: "Mayors always
want a project or policy that shakes the local political system, that transforms the city
846 Interview by author with Dante Franceschi, April, 2002. See also Brazil's Constitution, arts. 5 and
170-181, esp. art. 175.
847 Neves (1995, p. 99-100).
848 Neves (1995, p. 91); see also HFA (2000, p. 189).
849 De Oliveira (2000, p. 105); and Rocha (1990, p. 24-25).
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and leaves a mark." Aware of this, some planners at IPPUC bet on the light rail
project to recover the Institute's prestige and its place in the city government.8 5 0
Lerner had appointed Taniguchi as president of IPPUC-Taniguichi's second tour in
this position. Taniguichi was a staunch supporter of the idea of building a light rail line
in Curitiba. Taniguchi assembled an in-house team that carried out the preliminary
studies for the rail line.8 51
The main study, rather simple and again without using standard techniques
such as origin destination surveys, concluded that light rail was needed in Curitiba.
Planners argued that passenger traffic on the RIT had increased 12 times in 15 years
(Table 11) and that despite the RIT providing an "exemplar" service, the North-South
axis was about to become saturated.852 The study stated: "It is no longer feasible to
improve further the current solution, using buses...Of the possible alternatives, the
metro solution, elevated or underground, is not feasible because of the very high cost
and the long implementation time, in addition of being recommended for demands
above 35,000 passengers per hour per direction."853 The study then concluded:
Curitiba wants to innovate once again when opting for the at-grade solution that best
serves current and future demand: the Modern Bonde (tramway) or LVR, light vehicle
over rails. In addition to having a cost 10 times lower than a metro, it adapts to the city
scale and is entirely compatible with the existing system, both in this stage and in
future ones. Its capacity to transport people, between 300 to 400 passengers per car,
guarantees that demand will be served for the next 30 years.8 5 4
850 Interviews to planners at IPPUC, 2002. Rocha (1990, p. 20) argues that IPPUC began to lose
influence during Lerner's second term in office in 1979. He argues that the heads of other city agencies
disliked the extreme influence IPPUC had enjoyed during the last two terms. "When Jaime [Lerner]
returned to office in 1979 he was unable to guarantee IPPUC the strength it used to have within the
municipality." Rocha (1990, p. 23) also argues that planners at IPPUC were victims of their own
success and began to be afraid of making mistakes and proposing potentially erred policies. This is an
interesting contrast with IPPUC's first years when a trial-and-error approach was the norm as seen.
851 Brasileiro (1998, p. 483); and Brasileiro (1994, p. 96).
852 IPPUC (1990a, p. 6).
853 IPPUC (1990a, p. 8).
854 IPPUC (1990a, p. 9).
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11. Trios on RIT and Total Trios bv bus in Curitiba
Year Weekday trips Rate of Growth RIT share of
RIT City Total RIT City Total total
demand
1974 54,038 677,019 8%
1975 84,654 689,953 56.7% 1.9% 12%
1976 104,468 694,040 23.4% 0.6% 15%
1977 225,171 702,000 115.5% 1.1% 32%
1978 231,995 734,325 3.0% 4.6% 32%
1979 248,726 737,217 7.2% 0.4% 34%
1980 280,529 757,887 12.8% 2.8% 37%
1981 294,347 711,982 4.9% -6.1% 41%
1982 391,848 773,852 33.1% 8.7% 51%
1983 354,893 791,176 -9.4% 2.2% 45%
1984 396,000 813,789 11.6% 2.9% 49%
1985 394,728 815,708 -0.3% 0.2% 48%
1986 443,530 897,089 12.4% 10.0% 49%
1987 483,688 965,492 9.1% 7.6% 50%
1988 510,278 983,044 5.5% 1.8% 52%
1989 570,271 1,056,057 11.8% 7.4% 54%
1990 800,377 1,194,688 40.4% 13.1% 67%
1991 907,088 1,315,103 13.3% 10.1% 69%
1992 1,106,042 1,509,177 21.9% 14.8% 73%
1993 1,240,537 1,538,541 12.2% 1.9% 81%
1994 1,268,052 1,537,814 2.2% 0.0% 82%
1995 1,424,426 1,713,450 12.3% 11.4% 83%
1996 1,459,294 1,723,878 2.4% 0.6% 85%
1997 1,730,000 2,135,802 18.6% 23.9% 81%
Note: Figures are for trips where the passenger paid a fare. Because the RIT allows
free transfer between lines, the actual number of trips is higher than shown.
In 1996 the RIT was extended to the metropolitan region. Figures are for the Curitiba
part of the RIT and not for the total for the metropolitan system.
Sources: All data on ridership from URBS (1998), except 1980 data from IPPUC
(1990a). Rates of growth and share of RIT come from calculations by author.
In other studies and publications, IPPUC continued to make the case for the
light rail option on the North-South Axis.855 Even planners at URBS agreed with this
assessment: 'We have to go one step ahead: either we do the tramway or we do
something else, elevated or underground. Something has to be done in the short
range."856 This first line was to be 18.4 km in length, with 2 terminals, 5 integration
stations, and 23 intermediate stations. The cost was estimated at US$ 208.5
855 IPPUC (1990b and 1990c).
856 Rovani (1990, p. 80-1); see also Hayakawa (1991, p. 222).
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million.857 Planners were aware that because of the size of the investment the city
government would have to seek additional funding from state and federal agencies,
and even from international development banks. 5 8 By the end of 1990, IPPUC had
several studies that further defined the main elements of the light rail project for
example by establishing that it would be procured through a turnkey contract and that
parts of the alignment in downtown would be underground.859
The in-house team at IPPUC also tried to gather political support for its project
by holding hearings and meetings with interested parties-business associations and
the Contractors Association, among others, as well as neighborhood groups. The
planners also met with the bus operators and agreed to have them become the
operators of the new light rail system.8 ° Whether this was enough to bring the
operators into the coalition of support for the project is not clear, but it was probably
not enough. In the end, operators did not necessarily know about rail technology and
the learning curve could prove expensive. Further, with the payment per kilometer and
the new alliance with the Lerner administration, risk had gone down and profits up for
the bus operators.
But times had changed for IPPUC. From being the agency that supplied all the
members of Lerner's first cabinet and enjoying a high level of control over other city
agencies, IPPUC was now just one more agency. URBS and the Municipal
Secretariat of the Environment were better endowed both in terms of funding and
personnel.8 61 Lerner had appointed Carlos Ceneviva to head URBS-the agency in
charge of the RIT. In his first days in office, Ceneviva went around the city and
traveled extensively on the RIT to see what measures could be undertaken. He
noticed that users were loosing a lot of time because the busways were close to being
saturated. Ceneviva had the idea to create a new bus service he called direct service,
because it would stop only every 3-km-and not every 0.5-km as the express service
did on the busway. The direct service, however, would not use the busways, because
857 IPPUC (1990b, p. 68). The pre-feasibility study estimates the cost to be US$ 239.7 million (IPPUC,
1990c, p. 10).
858 IPPUC (1990b, p. 68).
859 See IPPUC-Protran (1990a and 1990b).
860 Brasileiro (1998, p. 483); Brasileiro (1994, p. 96).
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this would only complicate the operations of the express buses. Instead, the direct
service would use the two other roads of the trinary road system. These buses would
run on the high-speed roads, parallel to the busways, used until then only by cars,
trucks, and some conventional buses.862 Further, because of the long distance
between stops, the buses would have to occasionally stop at integration terminals to
transfer passengers to the express and inter-neighborhood services.863
Ceneviva presented the idea to fellow planners, and got a cold reception. As
Ceneviva described the situation: "Planners had turned into a dogma the idea that
buses go in the busway, and cars and trucks go in the normal street. My idea implied
breaking this dogma."864 Ceneviva started to convince his fellow planners about the
convenience of his idea, making some progress. Ceneviva also presented the idea to
Mayor Lerner. Lerner liked it immediately and added "Fantastic, I can use the tube
stations." Lerner had developed the tube station concept around 1984 when he was,
together with Ceneviva, developing some transport plans for Rio de Janeiro. Back
then Lerner drew on a piece of paper the cylindrical-shaped station and a bus by it
and showed it to Ceneviva, "What do you think?" Ceneviva liked the idea. They
studied it in more detail and found the tube stations to be feasible. Rio de Janeiro,
however, never adopted these stations.
The overall concept around a bus station is simple. By having a station, which
Lerner chose for aesthetic reasons to look like cylinders or tubes, passengers can
board the bus without having to step up. At grade boarding saves precious time and
buses take less time at the station.865 Passengers pay upon entering the station and
not when boarding the bus, which also saves time. It also saves money in the
Brazilian case. In Brazil each bus has a person different than the driver in charge fare
collection. Stations demand fewer fare collectors and therefore save on labor costs.
861 De Oliveira (2000, p. 104).
862 Interviews by author with Carlos Ceneviva, April 2002 and 2003.
863 This meant that the buses had to have the door on the left side, so that passengers could disembark
on that side of the direct bus, and walk toward the express bus, which has doors on the right side.
864 Interviews by author with Carlos Ceneviva, April 2003.
865 Embarking time from a tube station is 1/8 of the time needed to board a bus from the ground
(Ceneviva, 1998, p. 5).
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Finally, tube stations are low cost, easy to manufacture, and easy to mount over a
pre-cast foundation.866
In short, Ceneviva had an idea for a new bus service that would relieve the
crowded express service. And Lerner coupled to this proposal his own idea to have
tube stations-stations that became emblematic of Curitiba's transit system (Figure
12). Having two powerful figures as the mayor and the president of URBS supporting
the idea ensured its approval with other planners. Because Ceneviva and Lerner
supported the idea of building the tramway along the North-South Axis867 they
decided to implement the direct service first in a different one, and chose the
Boqueirao axis-a high demand corridor, nonetheless.
Figure 12. The "Speedy" service and the tube station
~
Ceneviva seized an additional opportunity created by the contractual need to
renew part of the fleet belonging to the operator of the Boqueirao axis. Ceneviva's
idea required new buses, with doors on the left side. If the operator had to renew the
fleet, the additional cost was not large. The municipality, moreover, offered to help the
operators obtain soft loans from the Brazilian development bank (BNDES). According
to sources at URBS as of then the municipality agreed to include payments to capital
for 10 years in the value of the kilometer logged. Because the repay period of these
loans from BNDES is 8 years, operators have an extra profit the last two years of the
useful life of the bus. Not surprisingly, therefore, interviews I held with the parties
involved suggest there was no particular difficulty in these negotiations. The direct
866 For other descriptions of the tube stations see Cervera (1998, p. 288-9); and Wright (1996, p. 21).
867 See Cenevlva (1990, p. 37-39) for examples of his support for the light rail alternative.
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service opened for service in April of 1991 in the Boqueir.o corridor. By the end of
1992 the city government and the respective operators had extended the direct
service to the East-West Axis.8 68 The direct service soon became a success and
users dubbed it the "speedy service,"869 because it offered significant savings in time.
The success of the direct service began to erode the argument that light rail
was the only way to enhance capacity. Adding buses on the outer roads of the trinary
road system had increased the capacity, if not of the busway, of the trinary roads as
such. The new service, moreover, was highly popular. Yet Ceneviva had another
innovation in mind to enhance even more the capacity of the bus system. Ceneviva,
together with other planners, figured that it could be possible to add an additional
body to an articulated bus, turning it into a three-body or bi-articulated bus (Figure
13). This would increase the carrying capacity of each bus to 270 passengers.
Further, Ceneviva reasoned, having proven the advantages of the tube station, why
not transfer them to the main busway? The bi-articulated bus was to have no steps;
passengers would board from tube stations, which were to be built on the main
busway.
Lerner liked the idea and went to the Volvo headquarters in Goteborg
(Sweden) to present the idea together with studies showing there would be a market
for the bus. While initially reluctant, two months afterward Volvo informed Lerner that
they were willing to develop the new bi-articulated bus in their plant in Curitiba.870
Planners then went to the Volvo factory in the Industrial City of Curitiba and presented
their plans for a bi-articulated bus. Volvo sent the idea to its Research and
Development unit, which designed and tested the new bus. There was constant
communication between Volvo engineers and URBS' planners. Planners needed the
bus to be able to make sharp turns-in fact, as narrow as a single-body bus is able to
turn. After some time Volvo came up with the final designs871--a bus for 270
passengers. Again, Boqueirao was the first axis to see the bi-articulated bus service
868 URBS (1998, p. 9-10).
869 Ligheirinho in Portuguese
870 Pereira (2003, p. 23)
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in December of 1992872-days before Lerner last term in office as mayor of Curitiba
ended. The fleet had 33 bi-articulated buses, 30 tube stations in 15 stops, and a
demand of 100,000 passengers per day.873
Figure 13. Bi-articulated bus and tube station
By the end of the Lerner administration, therefore, important innovations to
improve the functioning of bus-based transport had been adopted along the
Boqueirao axes and to a lesser extent on the East-West axis. The North-South axis
had been left alone because planners at IPPUC wanted to build there the first light rail
line. Further, the light rail idea was in the political agenda of the city. This proposal
had been studied but Lerner did not make the decision to undertake it. The high cost
of the light rail and the opposition by bus operators partially explain this outcome. Yet
it was the innovations to the bus system-that significantly increased its capacity to
move people-that explains the procrastination on the decision to undertake the light
rail. If Curitiba had not had an effective bus rapid transit system and a group of
planners willing to innovate, the decision would have probably been to undertake the
light rail project, despite its cost. But Curitiba had both the innovative planners and the
bus system, and as result the arguments supporting the light rail proposal grew
progressively weak. At one point in the process, according to sources, Lerner asked
some planners at IPPUC, "Do we really need to undertake the light rail project?"
871 Volvo only makes chassis and engines. A bodywork manufacturer had to produce the three-part
body. Planners also worked in this area with Marco Polo, a manufacturer in Caxias do Sui in the Rio
Grande do Sui State. Volvo and Marco Polo later on played a key role in the TransMilenio project.
872 URBS (1998, p. 10).
873 URBS (1998, p. 10); and Cenevlva (1998, p. 7).
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The rail project, however, was still in the political agenda and the new major,
Rafael Greca, of Lerner's political movement, had to decide what to do. Greca, a civil
engineer, was initially a planner at IPPUC and in 1982 entered electoral politics when
he successfully ran for the City Council. In 1988 he was campaign manager for Lerner
and in 1992 was elected mayor.874 Greca, another planner-turned-politician, also had
an interesting view of planning and politics: "Why are we in politics? To see things
happen, to make them happen...Politics is the reconciliation of words and actions."875
Greca appointed Rafael Dely to head IPPUC to replace Cassio Taniguchi.
Greca also asked Carlos Ceneviva to continue in charge of URBS. In the first cabinet
meeting, Greca asked for plans from each of the agencies. Dely presented IPPUC's
plans for the light rail line on the North-South axis, whose technical development
advanced significantly during Taniguchi's tenure. Ceneviva, in turn, presented a plan
to expand the Direct Service and the articulated buses with tube stations to the entire
system. Greca, however, did not know what to do for he knew Ceneviva's proposal
was a substitute of the light rail alternative. Greca decided to postpone his final
decision. Soon after Dely concluded that the rail proposal was a very large investment
that would require operational subsidies for 15 years. Dely began to withdraw his
support for the rail alternative. But Dely resigned after only 6 months.
Mauro Magnabosco, the new president of IPPUC, decided to hold hearings to
discuss the light rail on the North-South axis. The support for the idea was not great.
The cost of the light rail was US$ 280 million and it was difficult to fund it. Moreover,
the light rail needed subsidies due to its high operating costs. Further, rerouting bus
traffic during construction was difficult, and planners suspected that demand might be
leveling off. Greca, moreover, was bothered by the idea to build a large underground
station in the heart of downtown and the disruption this could cause.87 6
Almost two years into his mandate, Greca was still doubtful about which project
to undertake. By then, Alvin Toffler, a famous futurist, visited Curitiba. Mayor Greca
874 Greca (1990, p. 38).
875 Greca (1990, p. 50).
876 Wright (1996, p. 20). Brasileiro (1994, p. 96) indicates that the light rail proposal implied building a
600 m. viaduct and an 800 m. underground segment in downtown, with one station. This station was to
have two levels and a shopping mall. See also IPPUC-Protran (1990b).
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invited him to tour the city and the bus transit system, especially the corridors with the
tube stations. Greca asked Toffler if he would undertake the light rail project or a more
Curitiban solution such as the bi-articulated bus. Toffler replied, according to several
sources, "You have the best transit system because it is with buses, flexible,
accessible. The tramway has rails, it will put a straitjacket on the city." Greca replied:
"Then what do I do with the money?" Toffler said emphatically: "buses!" The meeting
with Toffler, according to several sources, tipped the balance in favor of the bus
option. The light rail project was discarded late in 1994.87 7 Greca then took the tube
station and bi-articulated bus upgrade to the North-South axis, which opened in
August of 1995.878 Greca also started a city-wide revamping of the bus system, which
included adding tube stations to the entire system-all for only 67% of building a
single light rail line, US$ 187 million.879/880
Thanks to these innovations, bus-based solutions-now fully-fledged bus rapid
transit-entered a new level. BRT became a solution appropriate for cities where
demand was fairly high, as in Curitiba, and that were seeking a high level of service.
Key decision-makers such as Greca had been finally convinced of this. Planners,
even the creators of the system, also had to change their mind in light of the empirical
evidence. Ceneviva's change of heart illustrates this well. In 1990 he strongly
supported the tramway idea and said, among others, "I think the tramway is more of
an urban vehicle than the bus."881 By the end of the Greca administration he proudly
stated:
"The bi-articulated bus, with at-grade boarding and disembarking and fare pre-
payment thanks to the simple and efficient technology of the tube stations, can play
the role up to now reserved to the tramway. Tramway technology demands long
implementation times and unbearable investment volumes for the small municipal
budgets of the vast majority of Latin American cities. A new worldwide tendency is
877 Geotecnica (1996, p. 4).
878 Ceneviva (1998, p. 7).
879 Wright (1998, p. 21-22). See also Geot6cnica (1996, p. 4) for a description of the process that led to
changing the intended loan with the IADB for funding a light rail to one funding a bus rapid transit
project.
0 On January 1st 1995 Lerner became governor of ParanA, while Rafael Greca was mayor of Curitiba.
This allowed for improved coordination of policies between the two levels of government. One outcome
was extending the RIT service to the municipalities in the metropolitan region. The agreement to
extend the RIT was signed on January 31 st, 1996 and that year the first facilities opened to the public
IURBS, 1998, p. 11).
81 Ceneviva (1990, p. 37).
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beginning to emerge in search of intermediate solutions between conventional buses
and rail systems. Many cities in many countries are exploring new paths. The city of
Curitiba found her path."882
The Role of planners
Two groups of planners are at odds and competing for decision-makers' attention to
have their pet proposal adopted. Taniguchi heads the pro-light rail group and
Ceneviva the pro-bus one. Why is Ceneviva's group more effective at taking its plans
to the decision point than Taniguchi's? First, Ceneviva is critically aware of the
importance of time in a planning process.883 Ceneviva told me 'Time is critical in a
planning process. You can't control time, you can't stop it. Conditions change. Your
solution is good at a specific moment in time and you can't miss the opportunity."88 4
Ceneviva therefore produced proposals knowing that the window of opportunity that
Lerner's election opened would not last long. The Direct Service is a fairly simple
project that effectively solves a problem. The bi-articulated bus could also be adopted
within the time remaining to the Lerner administration. On the other hand, the pro-rail
planners managed to put their proposal in the political agenda mid-way through
Lerner's term. For a highly complex project as this, this point in time is probably too
late. Further, during Greca's term-another window of opportunity-the pro-rail
planners did not move to fully convince Greca about their proposal. Ceneviva awaited
his chance, which appeared when Toffler visited Curitiba.
Second, as a result of the interaction among planners, politicians, and
stakeholders plans undergo incremental adjustments. The process resulted in
adjustments to the bus-based alternatives, for example on how to fund bus
acquisition, among others. The light rail proposal, on the other hand, remained
unchanged in light of the results of the interaction. If the underground station in
Curitiba's downtown bothered Mayor Greca, why not figure out an adaptation to the
proposal? If the cost was too high, why not introduce changes to the proposal to lower
the cost? I can't answer these questions, but what is clear is that the proposal did not
882 Ceneviva, introductory letter to URBS (1996?) "Curitiba, Rede Integrada de Transporte. Referdncia
Mundial em Transporte Urbano." Ceneviva was URBS president at the time.
883 Unfortunately for my research I was unable to interview Cassio Taniguchi for he was the sitting
mayor at the time of my fieldwork. Likewise for Rafael Greca who was a house representative. This
section, therefore, lacks their input.
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change enough to become politically feasible. One reason for the lack of change in
the project, however, lies in the lack of flexibility of rail-based alternatives. BRT, on the
other hand, is inherently more flexible on many dimensions than rail. BRT enjoys an
advantage.
Third, pro-bus planners were better able to handle risk for the key
stakeholders-the bus operators. Ceneviva told me: "Bus operators liked the Direct
Line and bi-articulated proposals because those proposals fueled the system and
extended its useful life."885 Risk went down for the operators. Pro-rail planners, on the
contrary, could handle risk as well as pro-bus planners. Pro-rail planners invited the
bus operators to consider operating the tramways and even investing in the cars. But
switching to a more complex technology was highly risky for the operators, as profits
could disappear with the mistakes that take place during the learning curve. Further,
the idea of turning the buses into feeders to the tramway was risky for the operators.
For the critical issue is how to price each service to set an integrated fare that bus
users can afford and that is profitable for the bus operators. Because the tramway
needs subsidies in any case, the operators could fear that to minimize those
subsidies, the city would not integrate the fares or leave them out of the scheme. In
the end, this has happened with most rail systems in the developing world where
integration between buses and rail never took place.886 Risk was too high for the
operators if the light rail proposal was adopted. Buses offered a lower risk.
Finally, bus-based solutions in the context of Curitiba are more likely to
convince participants in the process that they solve a problem effectively. Adding
buses on the high-speed lanes relieved the busways and increased speeds. The
tramway would also do increase capacity but after many years of construction and at
a higher cost. As a participant told me: "The tramway always left doubts about its
effectiveness." Moreover, as time passed the successful experience of the Boqueirao
axis left it clear that buses could do the job-at a much lower cost. As the evidence
grew, it was more and more difficult for Greca to decide in favor of the tramway. Mid-
884 Interview by author to Carlos Ceneviva, February, 2004.
885 Interview by author to Carlos Ceneviva, February, 2004.
8 8 See TRUHFA (1989, esp. p. 6-8-6.16, and 7.7-7.12) for a discussion of these issues for rail systems.
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way through his term he was probably desperate for making a decision in order to be
able to leave his own legacy in Curitiba's transport. Toffler showed up around that
point in time.88 7
Financing the Revamping of the RIT
Lerner's movement was out of office precisely during the time when the finances of
Curitiba were in poor shape. In 1983, when Mauricio Fruet was mayor, the total debt
of the city of Curitiba was US$ 84 million, of which 56% was with foreign creditors.
That year tax revenue was not enough to meet the debt payment schedule. In
addition, the Federal Government, in hands of the Military, had diminished the taxing
power of the local governments and increased that of the federal government. 888 At
the same time the federal government diminished the transfers to the
municipalities.8 9 This weakened the financial position of the municipalities,
particularly of the larger cities, which were receiving more immigrants from rural
areas. 890
When Lerner returned to office in 1989, the Brazilian economy was still
vulnerable, but a new Constitution, a tax reform enacted by Congress, and better
economic policies at the federal level significantly increased municipal revenue.8 91
Transfers to the municipalities from the federal government also increased.892 While
the administration of Roberto Requi.o had had maximum total revenue of US$ 74
million in a year in 1988, Lerner had during his first year in office in 1989 US$ 340
million89 3-a 360% increase. Table 12 shows the evolution of the main financial
indicators for Curitiba during the Lerner and Greca administrations in the 1990s.
During Lerner's tenure revenue grew impressively until 1991, well above the other
Brazilian capitals. Expenditure, however, did not grow as fast, and the city enjoyed a
887 specifically do not include a financial factor in the explanation for why bus-oriented planners were
more effective than rail-oriented planners in Curitiba. Table 12 below shows that during Lerner's third
term, Curitiba's government had an ample surplus.
888 Pereira (1998, p. 27-29).
889 Lowry (2002, p. 28-29).
890 Pereira (1998, p. 27-29).
891 Afonso (1999, p. 56).
892 Lowry (2002, p. 28-29).
893 Requiao (1997, p. 253).
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surplus well above that of the average Brazilian capital.894 Revenue started to grow
again during the Greca administration, at levels closer to the rest of Brazilian capitals.
Expenditure also increased and the surplus was much smaller than during the Lerner
years. The revamping of the RIT and other initiatives, such as Greca's project to
decentralize the city government, exhausted part of the surplus. Notice, moreover,
that Curitiba's expenditure in transport is not that different from the expenditure by
other Brazilian capitals in this sector (Table 12).
Table 12. Per capita total city revenue, city expenditure, surplus (deficit), and expenditure in
transport for Curitiba and Brazilian state capitals.
Mayor f Lerner Greca
Year 19891 19901 1991 1992 19931 19941 19951 1996
Total Revenue ($R/per capita)
Curitiba 234.2 336.2 388.4 308.0 240.2 305.7 377.4 401.4
State capitals in 243.0 276.1 313.3 264.6 234.6 297.4 378.4 N.A.
Brazil
Expenditure ($R/per capita)
Curitiba 203.5 215.1 227.0 258.5 234.8 306.7 337.0 371.8
State capitals in 214.2 238.2 257.1 253.0 225.0 266.6 320.2
Brazil
Surplus (Deficit) ($R/per capita)
Curitiba 30.7 121.2 161.4 49.51 5.4 (1.0) 40.4 29.6
State capitals in 28.8 37.9 56.2 11.6 9.7 30.8 58.2
Brazil
City expenditure in transport
Curitiba 20.73 40.64 47.32 51.07 34.97 60.36 31.78 29.53
State capitals in 32.83 44.78 38.38 49.59 46.16 41.76 62.73
Brazil
Source: Afonso (1999, p. 56-69).
Note: $R stands for Real, the Brazilian currency. Values are in real terms, but Afonso does not
indicate what is the base year.
Finally, during Lerner's term, the city pursued a policy of helping the operators
obtain funding from Federal agencies at subsidized rates. In 1991, the BNDES loaned
US$ 23.6 million dollars to the operators to renew most of the bus fleet.895 Lerner and
his successors-all from his party-were able to capitalize once again on Curitiba's
894 These large budget surpluses weaken the argument that financial reasons explain why the light rail
project was not adopted. Quite the contrary, they suggest there was a financial window of opportunity
to put forward proposals for adoption.
895 Neves (1995, p. 56). Apparently the bus operators inflated the prices of the new buses by 20%.
URBS, under Carlos Ceneviva, discovered this and did not accept the inflated value. However, URBS
did not accuse the operators with the respective authorities. Opposition in the City Council opened an
investigation, but the Council voted not to hear the results (Neves, 1995, p. 54-59; and de Oliveira,
2000, p. 152).
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reputation and obtained more loans from the Inter American Development Bank
(IADB), for example to revamp the entire Integrated Transit Network with a total cost
of US$ 187 million. The city contributed directly US$ 33 million, the private sector US$
46 million for buses and fare-control equipment, and IADB US$ 120 million in loans to
the city for the project.896 Table 13 shows the total cost of construction of the RIT
updated to 1999 values.
Table 13. Total Cost of the RIT in 1999
Infrastructure -Public Investment by city Quantity Unit value Total
government US$ per unit US$
(or km)
Terminals 25 900,000 22,500,000
Exclusive lanes (km) 56 800,000 44,800,000
Tube Stations 213 40,000 8,520,000
Total City 75,820,000
Buses -Private Investment by bus
operators
Bi-articulated 95 457,000 43,415,000
Articulated 73 252,000 18,396,000
Direct buses 248 174,000 43,152,000
Inter-neighborhood 159 170,000 27,030,000
Feeder 621 91,000 56,511,000
Total Bus Operators 188,504,000
Total cost RIT 264,324,000
Source: Ceneviva (1999, p. 191)
Epilogue
In 1997 Cassio Taniguchi, as well of Lerner's group, took office as mayor. In 1998 the
press began reporting Taniguchi's intention to build a metro line along BR-1 168 9 7 -an
ugly highway that cuts Curitiba in two. Around it are mostly industrial developments
and little residential and commercial use. Accordingly, few bus routes use it because
demand is low compared to that in the structural axes. Some local analysts joked that
it was a "rural metro," because of the poor alignment. Notice, however, that this
alignment did not affect the interests of the bus operators. In the 2000 election the
metro was a hot topic. Taniguchi was re-elected898 and thought he could undertake
the project. The government of Japan was willing to finance a large chunk of the US$
896 Wright (1996, p. 21-22).
897 "Curitiba vai implantar o metro." Gazeta do Povo, August 3 1 st, 1998.
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340 million project.899 Not surprisingly, when I started my fieldwork in 2002 it seemed
clear that this time, the rail solution would be adopted in Curitiba. When I returned in
2003, Curitiba was building a bus rapid transit facility on the BR-1 16 corridor thanks in
part to a loan from the IADB. Once again buses had defeated rail-and once more,
bus service for the new corridor was apportioned among Curitiba's bus operators
according to the "selective" area principle so that all bus companies had a share of
the new pie.90 0 The alliance between planners, politicians, and bus operators in
Curitiba seems to have grown yet stronger.
898 Taniguchi and Lerner benefited from a Constitutional amendment that allowed the immediate
reelection of mayors, governors, and the president.
899 "E o metro ficou para 2002..." Curitiba 310 anos, Gazeta do Povo, April 2 7 th, 2003.
900 Interview to undisclosed source.
A_~~~~~~
207
Part 3
Transit Planning in Bogota
In the period I analyze, 1986-2001, Bogota's transit planning has felt the tension
between two schools of thought, each of which has planners and politicians. First, the
school that believes a metro network ought to be the backbone of the transit system
complemented by bus-based services. Second, the school that believes buses on
exclusive busways and later on Bus Rapid Transit can do the job without the need of
heavy rail. The second school has prevailed for the most part. Let's see what role
planners played in the planning processes in Bogota and how much they had to do
with buses on busways and bus rapid transit (BRT) being the preferred option by
politicians and stakeholders.
Chapter 8
A Busway Facility in Lieu of Heavy Rail
The conflict between the pro-rail and pro-bus factions in Bogota begins when a
powerful president allied to his appointee, the mayor of Bogota, puts forward a
proposal to build a metro. This triggers a reaction by planners who think the rail
alternative is not good and maneuver to put forward their own bus-based plan.
Planners convince the first democratically elected mayor to adopt this busway facility.
President Barco's proposal for a metro
The idea of building a metro in Bogota had been studied several times901 and at least
once before it had been in the political agendas of the city and national government.
This had been during the presidency of Julio Cesar Turbay and the tenure of his
901 See Acevedo and Azuero (1979); Guhl and Pach6n (1992a, ch. 6); Acero et al. (1999, ch. 3); and El
Tiempo, "Estaciones del acuerdo SITM," February 1 t, 1998.
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appointee, the mayor of Bogota, Hernando Duran. Several detailed studies were done
to estimate the demand, the cost of the network, and how to finance the undertaking.
On the finance front, the study proposed to increase city taxes in an important way
and to eliminate the subsidies to gasoline902-a contentious political issue not just at
the city but also at the national level. Turbay and Duran could save face thanks to the
20-volume study for the Bogota metro when they left office in 1982. They claimed that
the final decision to undertake such an important project should be made by their
successors. 903
Belisario Betancur, elected president in 1982,904 was from Antioquia where
Medellfn, Colombia's second largest city is located. At the time, Antioquia and
Medellin were going through an economic crisis and the local elite saw in the
construction of a metro system the way out. The regional elite also believed that
Antioquia paid too much in taxes to the national government and received too little in
transfers. Betancur had promised in his campaign to direct more funds from the
national government to Antioquia. The Medellin metro fitted well within this promise
and the local elite mobilized to make their dream to have a metro-before Bogota
come true.905 Betancur had appointed Augusto Ramfrez as mayor of Bogota90 6 and
days after taking office Ramfrez announced that Bogota's metro would not be
undertaken. Alvaro Uribe, then the mayor of Medellin and president of Colombia at
the time of this writing, announced that his city's metro would be undertaken. In
February of 1983, just six months after Betancur took office, the city of Medellin
issued the request for proposals for building its metro through a turnkey contract. After
delays due to political problems, construction started in April of 1985.907 Sometime in
1984 or 1985, Hisnardo Ardila, who had succeeded Ramirez as Bogota's mayor,908
902 Guhl and Pach6n (1992a, p. 140-149).
903 Guhl and Pach6n (1992a, p. 142).
904 At the time, there was no immediate reelection of the president of Colombia. Former presidents who
wanted to run again had to wait one four-year term. The 1991 Constitution changed this by banning
completely the reelection of the president. As of 1994, presidents serve one four-year term and have
no possibility of seeking reelection. At the time of this writing, Congress is studying an amendment to
the constitution to allow the immediate reelection of the president for one term.
905 Acevedo et al. (1993, p. 37-39).
906 Gilbert and D.vila (2002, p. 34).
907 Acevedo et al. (1993, p. 37-39 and 154-5).
908 Gilbert and Davila (2002, p. 34).
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tried to revive the idea of building a metro in Bogota but President Betancur told him
"we will leave this issue to the next government."909
Colombia's next presidential election took place in this environment of strong
regional competition between Bogota and Medellfn for national prestige. Medellin was
leading because construction of its metro lines had started. Bogota, in the mean time,
had old buses in mixed traffic providing mass transit service to a population almost
twice as large as Medellfn's. Virgilio Barco, a civil engineer from MIT, won the election
and became Colombia's president. Barco had been mayor of Bogota between 1966
and 1969, appointed by President Carlos Lleras.910 As mayor, Barco had proposed to
construct a north-south metro line, but the idea never took off.911 Not surprisingly,
Barco supported the idea of building a metro in Bogota and had Julio Sanchez, his
appointed mayor, work on the project. Sanchez presented a basic study for the metro
on March 27th, 1987,912 seven months into Barco's four-year term. The study
proposed to use the existing rail corridors as the basis for the metro network.913 The
rail corridors were used for inter-municipal transport and as a result they served
poorly the main origins and destinations within the city. But the rail corridors offered
the advantage of minimizing construction cost since the land was already
government-owned.
Four days later the national government invited the government of 26 countries
to submit proposals to build the proposed metro. The terms of reference were vague
and left lots of discretion to the proponents. By mid June eight countries submitted a
proposal-India, Hungary, France, Italy, Canada, Belgium, Germany and a joint
proposal by Mexico, Brazil and Argentina. The national government discarded the first
two proposals for not meeting the basic expectations and proceeded to appoint a
commission to evaluate the remaining proposals, which included planners and
politicians. In the commission figured names such as Ernesto Guhl, Jorge Acevedo,
909 Guhl and Pach6n (1992a, p. 142).
910 Gilbert and DAvila (2002, p. 34).
911 Acero et al. (1999, p. 60).
912 Guhl and Pach6n (1992a, p. 153).
913 Guhl and Pach6n (1992a, p. 152).
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HernAn Cadavid, Sergio Amaya, and Humberto de la Calle.91 4 Incidentally, Acevedo
had written to President Barco claiming that the demand for the proposed metro was
estimated in a poor way. Barco then appointed Acevedo to the commission.91 5
The commission evaluated the proposals according to the following criteria:
costs and funding, technical quality, proponents' experience and managerial capacity,
technology transfer and participation by domestic contractors.9' 6 The Italian
proposal-ultimately chosen-received the lowest marks on technical quality, and
was considered average in experience and managerial capacity. The Italian proposal,
however, offered the lowest price and the best financing arrangements.9 1 7 In its
report, the commission suggested an important change to the metro's alignment by
having it enter the main area of downtown-an area not covered well by the existing
rail lines. The national government accepted this idea. The commission did not rank
the proposals in its November 1987 report. The commission considered that the
national government should set the relative weights.918
The government thought there was no fair way of ranking the proposals with
the available information and requested the proponents to update their proposals. By
the end of January the government received the new versions of the proposals. A
local firm, Ingetec, advised by Bechtel, was to carry out the evaluation due by early
April 1988. Because of the high cost, Ingetec discarded the German and the Mexican-
Brazilian-Argentinean proposals. Ingetec ranked highest the Italian proposal, by the
firm Intermetro 9 19-despite the aforementioned weaknesses in the proposal. This was
because the government had given the highest weight to financial and cost factors.920
Late in May 1988 the governments of the countries not favored objected the
evaluation made by talking to mayor-elect Andr6s Pastrana and to the minister of
public works, Luis F. Jaramillo. Pastrana and Jaramillo agreed to hire a specialized
entity to do a final review of the proposals, together with representatives from the
914 Guhl and Pach6n (1992a, p. 152).
915 Interview by author with Jorge Acevedo, July 2003.
916 Guhl and Pach6n (1992a, p. 152).
917 Guhl et al. (1992, p. 181).
918 Guhl and Pach6n (1992a, p. 152-4).
919 Guhl and Pach6n (1992a, p. 152-4).
920 Guhl et al. (1992, p. 181).
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national and city governments. In June, Pastrana and the minister approached the
World Bank to do this evaluation, but the Bank declined. By August they agreed to
hire Parsons-Brinkerhoff, which produced a report agreeing with Ingetec's
conclusions.921 Parsons-Brinkerhoff emphasized, nonetheless, that the selection of
Intermetro's proposal was the result of the financial package. This package included
subsidies from the Italian government.922 Parsons-Brinkerhoff, however, questioned
the proposal's technical quality and Intermetro's managerial capacity.923
Mayor Pastrana's response with a busway
The first elections for mayor in Colombia's history took place in March 1988.924 The
mayoral term went from July 1st 198 8 to June 30th 1990,925 a mere two years in office
without immediate reelection926 (Figure 14). The Conservative Andrds Pastrana, a
popular news anchor and the son of a former president of Colombia, won the first
election for mayor.92 7 Pastrana won thanks in part to the division of the Liberal Party,
which presented two candidates, Juan Caicedo and Carlos Ossa. Pastrana obtained
34.8% of the vote or 328,657 votes.92 8
921 Guhl and Pach6n (1992a, p. 152-4).
922 Guhl and Pach6n (1992a, p. 160-2).
923 Guhl et al. (1992, p. 181).
924 Gilbert and Davila (2002, p. 33).
925 Acevedo (1996, p. 3).
926 Gilbert and DAvila (2002, p. 33).
927 Gilbert and DAvila (2002, p. 38).
928 Botero (1998, p. 157); and calculations by author. Martin Caicedo obtained 240,458 votes and
Carlos Ossa 218,724.
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Figure 14. Time line of Mayors of Bogota and Presidents of Colombia
Year I Mayors of Bogotfa Presidents of Colombia
Andres Pastrana
07/01/88-06/31/90 (2 years)
Conservative
Juan M. Caicedo*
07/01/90-06/31/92 (2 years)
Liberal
Jaime Castro
06/31/92-12/31/94 (2.5 years)
Liberal
Antanas Mockus**
01/01/95-12/31/97 (3 years)
Independent
Enrique Pefialosa
01/01/98-12/31/00 (3 years)
Independent
Antanas Mockus
01/01/01-12/31/03
Independent
Luis Garz6n
01/01/04-12/31/07 (4 years)
Independent Democratic Pole
(PDI)
Virgilio Barco
08/07/86-08/07/90
Liberal
Cesar Gaviria
08/07/90-08/07/94
Liberal
Ernesto Samper
08/07/94-08/07/98
Liberal
Andres Pastrana
08/07/98-08/07/02
Conservative
Alvaro Uribe
08/07/02-08/07/06
Liberal dissident
Sources: Information on mayors from Gilbert and Dvila (2003, p. 34); on
presidents from: www.presidencia.gov.co/historia
*: Mayor Juan Caicedo ended his term in jail accused of trying to bribe the City
Council to pass legislation. President Gaviria chose Sonia DurAn, a close advisor to
Caicedo, to be acting mayor until the term finished (Gilbert and Ddvila (2003, p. 43).
Caicedo was later on found innocent and went on to be elected senator in 1994 and
1998.
**: Mayor Antanas Mockus resigned on April 1997 to the mayor's office.
President Samper appointed Paul Bromberg, of Mockus' political movement, to the
mayor's office. Bromberg ruled for approximately 8 months.
1988
1990
1992
1995
1998
2001
2003
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In the months between the election and the swearing in, officials in Pastrana's
campaign were worried they did not have an agenda in transportation. Paulo Laserna
and Jaime Ruiz of Pastrana's campaign and very close to the mayor elect met with
Jorge Acevedo. Acevedo had been an advisor to Ossa's campaign but nonetheless
met with Laserna and Ruiz. Acevedo, who holds a graduate degree from MIT, was by
then a recognized transportation planner and public policy analyst. Acevedo headed
the SER Research Institute, a local think tank that advised local and national
government on how to improve policies in different areas. Acevedo had been studying
Bogota's transportation problem for several years and had concluded that one of the
main problems was the lack of capacity within the city government to plan and
administer the transportation system.929 Acevedo had also been thinking about the
alternative of building in Bogota exclusive lanes for buses, following the Brazilian
experience mostly in large cities such as Sao Paulo.930
Further, Acevedo had just completed a study for Ernesto Rojas and Ulpiano
Ayala, top advisors of President Barco. Rojas, in particular, had the idea of
establishing a free mass transit corridor using buses in an important transport corridor
in Bogota.931 They hired Acevedo through the SER Research Institute to study the
feasibility of the idea. The study examined several alternatives to conclude that
exclusive lanes for buses were feasible along Caracas Avenue. This avenue is the
main corridor in Bogota and crosses the city, including downtown, from south to north.
The study proposed to have privately and city-owned buses use the exclusive lanes.
Acevedo also used the report to argue that the underlying problem was the lack of
institutional capacity to plan and manage the transport system.93 2 Acevedo saw in the
undertaking of the busway a catalyst for the required institutional change.933 Acevedo
completed the study in February of 1987, around the time when Mayor Sanchez and
President Barco were already embarked in their proposal for the metro. As a result,
the busway idea "fell on ears interested in other topics and the national government
9 29 Acevedo (1986, p. 7-9).
930 See Acevedo (1986, p. 12-13).
931 Interview by author with Jorge Acevedo, July 2003; and interview by author with Jos6 Eslava, April,
2004.
932 See Acevedo and Martinez (1987).
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took no action."93 4 The meeting with Laserna and Rufz gave Acevedo a new
opportunity. Acevedo gave them a copy of the study. Acevedo emphasized that the
busway along Caracas Avenue could be built within the two-year mayoral term.935
Rufz and Laserna took the study to Pastrana.
Jaime Rufz was close to Pastrana and had access to the mayor. Rufz was
skeptical about the extent to which building a metro in Bogota was a solution to the
congestion and mobility problems. Rufz was close to some people at the prestigious
National Planning Department (DNP), where he had worked early in his professional
career.936 DNP is a national-government agency designed to help this level of
government plan capital investments and evaluate performance. At the time, it was
becoming apparent that the Medellfn metro was running into financial trouble. The
Medellfn metro was being built under a "turnkey" contract for a fix amount of money-
US$ 655.4 million. Nonetheless, the contractors suspended work in November of
1989 alleging the initial cost estimate was too loW.937 Rufz and his friends at DNP
realized that the Medellfn metro had been an "irrational" decision. Further, building a
metro in Bogota was not a good idea either. The metro would serve at best eight
percent of the demand and its cost made it unaffordable. Rufz discovered, therefore,
that planners at DNP would not support the idea of building a metro in Bogot. 93 8
Ruiz became convinced that the metro was no solution to Bogota's problems.
The problem, according to Rufz, was that at the time there was no "rational" way of
saying no to a metro in Bogota. More so because a long tradition of studies had
concluded that the metro was the solution. According to Rufz, at the time
"transportation planning had a dichotomy, either you build metros or you build
highways; there was no intermediate path. Further, highways and metros have
international lobbying apparatuses that are too powerful and distort the local decision-
933 Interview by author with Jorge Acevedo, July 2003.
Acevedo (1996, p. 3).
935 Interview by author with Jorge Acevedo, July 2003; and interview by author with Jose Eslava, April,
2004.
936 Interview by author with Jaime Ruiz, October 2003.
9 37 Acevedo et al. (1993, p. 101-2, and 156).
938 Interview by author with Jaime Ruiz, October 2003.
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making process."939 That's when Acevedo came along with his plan for building a
busway along the Caracas Avenue corridor. Acevedo was also able to point out the
Brazilian experience with busways, in particular, Sao Paulo, a city larger than Bogota,
with high-demand corridors served by busways.94 0 /94
Ruiz went to Pastrana and presented his arguments against the metro.
Pastrana replied: "I cannot say no to the metro. If I were to say no to the metro, I need
to find something to say yes to." Ruiz initially had no answer to this request until he
found out about the busway alternative by Acevedo.9 42 Ruiz and Acevedo met with
Pastrana to present a complete strategy for building the busway during the short term
in office. The strategy had an institutional component that would start strengthening
the city government in the transport arena. Acevedo proposed to assemble a local
inter-institutional planning team reinforced by planners from Sao Paulo. This team
would be in charge of all the planning of the busway and would become the catalyst
for institutional change.943
At the same time, Ruiz and Acevedo lobbied Pastrana to go against Barco's
metro proposal, because of its poor technical quality. Acevedo had a clear strategy.
He convinced Pastrana of proposing a different but better alignment for the metro and
to carry out an update of the studies done under president Turbay and mayor Duran
at the beginning of the 1980s.944 Pastrana could therefore stand on safer ground for
his administration was trying to improve the quality of the metro and not necessarily
saying no to the project. It also helped that Pastrana and Barco belonged to different
political parties and Pastrana, a conservative, had a vested interest in opposing the
proposals of a liberal president.
Pastrana agreed to Acevedo's recommendation and to undertaking the busway
project during his term. Pastrana, however, warned his planners: "You have to show
the citizenry that Bogota does not need a metro, because there is an alternative that
939 Interview by author with Jaime Ruiz, October 2003. Ruiz refers to car manufacturers as the
lobbyists for highways; large construction companies and rail manufacturers lobby for metro systems.
For an example of what Ruiz says see Gardner (1998).
940 Smith and Heshner (1998).
941 Demand in those corridors, however, was not as high as on Caracas Avenue
942 Interview by author with Jaime Ruiz, October 2003.
943 Interview by author with Jorge Acevedo, July 2003; and Acevedo (1996, p. 3-4).
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can do the job instead."945 Acevedo's proposed busway had to meet this high
standard. In November of 1988 Pastrana officially announced his intent to study the
alternative alignment for the metro. This delayed the conversations between the
national government and the Italian firm Intermetro 94 6--the winner of the bid to build
Barco's metro proposal.
The role of planners
A first role for planners that is conspicuous in the sections above is that of opposing a
plan for a metro. The planners, namely Acevedo and Rufz, believed that the metro
was not a sound solution for Bogota's transit problems. Acevedo and Rufz were
fighting the myth that politicians, even some planners, and society at large create
around the positive impacts of a metro, regardless of alignment, cost, and
procurement strategy.947/ 948 Hence the importance of having planners that oppose
plans they consider bad for society. To oppose the metro plan, Acevedo and Ruiz
defined a political strategy nourished by technical arguments. First, aware that time is
critical, Acevedo tried to introduce delays to Barco's proposal in the hope of derailing
it. Acevedo convinced Pastrana of ordering new studies for the metro. Second,
Acevedo and Ruiz presented the busway option as an alternative solution to the
metro line. By participating in the political process and advising Pastrana with
strategies a politician in office will like, Acevedo and Ruiz were more effective than
just by trying to show "rationally" that Barco's metro proposal was a bad idea.
This strategy allowed the busway project to enter the political agenda of the
city. In this case three conditions underlie this result. First, the election of Mayor
Pastrana opened a window of opportunity for proposals in transport. Second,
Acevedo had already studied for President Barco's advisors the busway option and
found it feasible. Pastrana and Rufz were looking for an alternative to the poorly
944 Interview by author with Jorge Acevedo, July 2003; and Acevedo (1996, p. 3-4).
945 Interview by author with Jaime Ruiz, October 2003.
946 Guhl and Pach6n (1 992a, p. 154).
947 See Richmond (1991 and 1996).
948 1 am criticizing poorly planned metro proposals as the one Barco's administration put forward in
Bogota. Well planned rail proposals-with an alignment that serves main origins and destinations, with
a demand that justifies the capacity or rail service, and with a procurement strategy that minimizes
cost-are not the object of my critique.
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planned metro and found it in the pre-planned busway. Finally, Pastrana and his
advisors would have never found out about Acevedo's busway plans had they not
interacted with him. Thanks to this minimal interaction Acevedo was able to persuade
Ruiz and Pastrana that the busway option was a good solution that was feasible and
that could be implemented in the short two-year term. Once in the political agenda of
the city, the role for planners is to interact with politicians and stakeholders as the
events that follow suggest. Planners' main objective becomes to get the plan adopted
before the window of opportunity closes.
A capable planning team for the busway project
Acevedo had long argued that Bogota's congestion and transport problems emanated
from a lack of institutional capacity in the city government. In 1986 he wrote about
DATT,949 the city transport agency, "it is an entity that lacks organization, without the
minimal technical cadre to analyze problems, propose solutions, carry out actions and
evaluate results."950 Acevedo's main interest was to devise a strategy to strengthen
the government's transport institutions. He structured the strategy around the busway
project. An inter-institutional transport group would carry out the planning and
implementation for the busway. The group would have professionals from different
agencies knowledgeable in transport planning. Acevedo thought that if the busway on
Caracas Avenue was successful it could provide the political support needed to
ensure that subsequent administrations would continue strengthening the transport
agency.
While in principle Mayor Pastrana agreed with Acevedo's strategy it took more
than six months to start the planning group. Pastrana probably thought that the
busway project could be carried out by city agencies such as DATT and IDU-the
latter in charge of building urban roads. Pastrana had appointed Rubiel Valencia to
head DATT and Jaime Rufz to head IDU. Valencia became a supporter of the project,
among others because he had visited Curitiba, seen the busways and liked them.
Recall that at this point in time, Curitiba's busways had simple shelters, passengers
949 DATT is translated into Administrative Department for Transit and Transport. It was later on
transformed into the Secretariat for Transit and Transport (STT) and given cabinet status.
950 Acevedo (1986, p. 8, translation by author).
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paid upon boarding the bus, and the system was in the midst of a crisis. Valencia
called Fabio Regueros, a transport researcher at the National University of Colombia,
to tell him the administration was running out of time and Pastrana and his entourage
had decided the busway project would be the administration's flagship policy.
Regueros had recently visited Curitiba as well as Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and
other Brazilian cities that had busway facilities.951
The administration wanted Regueros to head the Inter Institutional Transport
Group or GIT, for its acronym in Spanish, which would be in charge of planning and
implementing the busway project. Jaime Ruiz resigned to his position at IDU and
became project manager for the busway project and overseer of GIT.952 Regueros
would be in charge of the technical aspects of planning the project. Rufz of the
political ones, including securing support and actions from other agencies to get the
project done before Pastrana left office. Pastrana facilitated Ruiz's task by calling the
heads of all the city agencies and telling them: "If Jaime Ruiz calls you, it is as if I, the
mayor of Bogota, were calling you. If you do not cooperate with Ruiz, I will fire you."953
Acevedo remained as a top advisor of GIT.954
Ruiz had liked the idea of bringing in Brazilian expertise and Acevedo had
contacts there, which he called to reinforce the local team at GIT. Elmir Germani,
Francisco Moreno Netto and Pedro Szas came from Sao Paulo's Traffic Engineering
Company, CET in Portuguese, for this purpose.955 In 1976 the city of Sao Paulo took
the decision to strengthen the transport planning and management sector within the
city administration by creating a city-owned company CET.956 CET's work gradually
showed results particularly regarding traffic management. Speed increased and the
existing roads were able to accommodate more than twice the number of vehicles at
higher speeds than before CET was created.957 Acevedo wanted to replicate SCo
951 Interview by author with Fabio Regueros, October 2003.
952 Interview by author with Jaime Ruiz, October 2003; and interview by author with Fabio Regueros,
October 2003.
953 Interview by author with Jaime Ruiz, October 2003.
954 Interview by author with Jorge Acevedo, July 2003.
955 Interview by author with Jaime Ruiz, October 2003; interview by author with Fabio Regueros,
October 2003; and interview by author with Jorge Acevedo, July 2003.
9 56 Acevedo (1996, p. 3-4); CET means in Portuguese, Companhia de Engenharia de Trafego.
957 Interview by author with Elmir Germani, April 2002.
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Paulo's successful strategy at institutional strengthening in the transport sector.958
The local team for GIT came from professionals employed by the Department of
Transportation (DATT), the City Planning Department (DAPD), IDU, and an
information technology company (SISE) owned by the city. Some of the planners
were Liliana Lyons, Nelson Galeano, Libardo Serrano, Jorge Aya, Efrain Acero, Luis
F. Rubiano, Jorge Diaz and Virginia Aleman.
Planning and Implementing Phase I of the Caracas Avenue
busway
Acevedo's original plan959 called for building the busway on Caracas Avenue.
Valencia had told Regueros that the administration wanted something similar to what
Curitiba had. Regueros replied that more than copying Curitiba what they should do
was to adapt Curitiba's busway technology to the local conditions. Regueros added
that Curitiba was not just the facilities that allowed buses to use exclusive lanes. The
most important thing in Curitiba was institutional. Regueros had been impressed in
Curitiba by the public fare box policy960 and by the way the city supervised the
operators.9 1 While the model to follow for Acevedo was S&o Paulo, Acevedo agreed
with Regueros that the main aspect was institutional. Ruiz agreed on the importance
of the institutional topic. As he later told me: "We knew we had to change the
infrastructure of Caracas Avenue and that we also had to strengthen the city
agencies. Equally important, we had to transform the bus companies into something
better able to manage a high-quality service. Further, we wanted a new type of bus,
hopefully with the door on the left side and stations in the median."962 Therefore,
planners wanted not only to build a facility but also to transform the public and private
institutions in charge of the transport sector. Time and political reasons, however,
forced GIT planners to introduce important changes to these ideas.
9 5 8 Acevedo (1996, p. 3-4).
959 See Acevedo and Martinez (1987).
960 Through the public fare box policy the city collects fare box and then pays by distance logged to the
bus operators.
961 Interview by author with Fabio Regueros, October 2003.
962 Interview by author with Jaime Ruiz, October 2003.
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Before continuing with the account, it is necessary to briefly explain the
arrangements in Bogota for the provision of bus services.963 In Bogota, bus
companies did not own the buses-at best a small fraction of the fleet. Instead, bus
companies "owned" routes throughout the city. The city government assigned the
routes to a bus company based on a request filed by the community that needed the
service or even by the bus company itself. To provide service on those routes, a bus
company sought owners of buses who would affiliate their bus to the company. Each
bus company allowed the bus owners to operate their buses on the company's routes
in exchange for receiving monthly fees and other charges. As a result, the gross
revenue of a bus company was directly related to the number of buses affiliated. The
company's revenue was completely separate from the number of passengers carried
by the buses. Bus companies therefore sought profitable routes from the government
to attract more bus owners and maximize their revenue. In turn, the income of bus
owners came from providing service on profitable routes-i.e. those that have high
patronage and use roads in good shape. These routes are the ones that go through
the central business district and a significant share used Caracas Avenue, which was
the main corridor in the city. Finally, owners would pay drivers according to the
number of passengers carried. This generated extreme competition, locally known as
the "penny war," which lowered the quality of service.94
The original plan for the Caracas Avenue busway called for introducing
changes to this scheme.9 65 Some planners wanted bus companies to own a new type
of bus, technically designed for mass transit, and with a different risk allocation
between the operators and the city government.966 But by the time GIT started
working in mid 1989, there was one year left in Pastrana's term. Regueros realized it
was impossible to achieve all the objectives in such a short time. Regueros met with
Ruiz and Valencia and told them: 'What we can do will not be similar to Curitiba. The
963 The TransMilenio project, implemented by the Peialosa administration, changed these provision
arrangements in three corridors. The Mockus administration tried to further change these arrangements
with mixed success.
964 Acevedo (1986, p. 3-6); and Bonilla (1997, ch. 2). In Chapter 12 1 offer a more detailed description
of the situation of bus services before TransMilenio.
965 Interview by author with Jaime Ruiz, October 2003.
966 Interview by author with Fabio Regueros, October 2003.
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most we can do is organize the flow of buses with the construction of the busway."967
This meant that the changes to the organization of the bus companies could not be
adopted.9 68 The short time left also led Mayor Pastrana to decide to implement only
the south end of the busway, from the southern end of the central business district to
an area known as Los Molinos. This segment had 8 Km. and was in the most
congested and deteriorated area of Caracas Avenue. The remaining 8 Km. of
Caracas Avenue, to the north of the city, were to be implemented by the next
mayor. 9 69
Regarding the type of bus to be used in the busway, Acevedo had originally
argued in favor of using both the city-owned trolley buses and the existing buses
owned by private investors. Ruiz and Mayor Pastrana discarded this idea early on in
the process, probably because they had plans to eliminate the City Bus Company,
which was in disarray. Regueros knew the National University had designs for a new
bus, more comfortable and suited for mass transit. If plans required a new bus for the
busway then bus operators would have to invest in the new equipment. Operators
found out about the tentative plans and responded by proposing their own new design
for a bus. This bus was not suited for mass transit because of its small size.970 The
operators probably had two objectives by doing this. First, they probably opposed the
busway project at this point in the process and their gamble was to introduce delays
by presenting a new bus. Second, if their bus was adopted and if the busway was
built, this small bus would have forced the city to allow the older buses to use the
busway to provide the necessary capacity. The operators wanted to minimize the
threat posed by the busway project. Pastrana, Ruiz, Acevedo, and Regueros soon
abandoned the idea of introducing a new bus for they saw it could build too much
opposition and delay implementation. As Acevedo said: 'We had to use the existing
967 Notice how none of the actors involved realize the importance of land-use policies in Curitiba. While
they all want to copy the busways in Curitiba, none wants to implement the land-use scheme. Further,
even if some planners had noticed Curitiba's land-use policies, it is doubtful they would work in a city
like Bogota. For one, when Curitiba began implementing its plan in the 1970s the city had a population
of approximately 500,000 people. Bogota at the time of the events described in the main text had over
4 million. For another, in the 1970s Curitiba's economy was growing very fast. This growth allowed the
construction of high-rises. Bogota does not have a similar rate of economic growth.
968 Interview by author with Fabio Regueros, October 2003.
969 Acevedo (1996, p. 5).
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buses so that we would cause the smallest possible disruption to the existing situation
and in this way make the project feasible."97 1 /972
What was clear for Acevedo, Ruiz, Regueros and Mayor Pastrana was that the
busway needed to use only the conventional buses-80 passengers per bus. At the
time, conventional buses as well as medium sized buses for 30 passengers, locally
known as busetas,97 3 used Caracas Avenue. Acevedo and Regueros told the
planners at GIT to plan the busway for this type of bus.974/975 The Caracas Avenue
corridor moved at the time close to 24,000 passengers per hour per direction976-an
impressive figure more so given that the buses traveled in mixed traffic. By using
conventional buses only, the busway could accommodate this volume of passengers
with a smaller number of buses. Reducing the number of buses is important because
the bottleneck in a busway is the stopping area. The fewer the buses that need to
stop, the less congested the stopping area and the shorter the time to maneuver in
and out of it. As a result, the capacity of the busway increases. 977 The decision to
allow only conventional buses in the busway meant an important change to the way
Caracas Avenue used to operate. The busetas would have to be moved to different
corridors, with the risk of loosing revenue by being forced to circulate on less
profitable corridors. This meant that both the bus companies and the bus owners
would oppose in principle the proposed change because the plans affected their
interests.
970 Interview by author with Fabio Regueros, October 2003.
971 Interview by author with Jorge Acevedo, July 2003.
972 Notice that at his point the plans stop being for BRT and end up being only for a busway. As said
above, BRT implies adequate buses, good service provision and supervision. In Bogota this would
have implied transforming the bus companies into modern firms and adopting a new type of bus.
Busways imply only the physical transformation of the road to generate segregated lanes.
973 The word buseta means "little bus" in English.
974 Interview by author with Liliana Lyons, October 2003.
975 Note that using buses with a capacity of only 80 passengers diminishes the capacity of the busway.
TransMilenio, years later, would use articulated buses with a capacity of 160 passengers per bus.
TransMilenio's buses, contrary to the ones used on the Caracas Avenue busway, were technically
designed to transport people in a safe and confortable way. That is why TransMilenio's standards
compare favorably to heavy rail, while the Caracas Av. busway not. Further, TransMilenio implied a
change in the contractual relations between the city and the bus operators. While the Caracas Avenue
busway preserved the extreme competition between buses-locally known as the "penny war"-
TransMilenio eliminated it. This increased the level of service significantly.
9 76 Acevedo (1996, p. 7).
977 See Acevedo (1986, p. 12-3). See also Gardner (1992).
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Planners at GIT, therefore, knew their work had technical and political
components. On the technical side, the decision to allow only conventional buses on
the new busway meant that planners had to study the routes circulating on Caracas
Avenue. The objective was to determine which routes could remain on the corridor.
On the political side, planners were aware that bus companies by law had strong
rights on the routes assigned to them. The planners, therefore, wanted to negotiate
any change to a route with the bus companies. But there was another reason to
approach the bus companies. As a GIT planner told me: "I never had the idea that
because I was the "expert" I could go to the operators and tell them this is the
solution. We carried out our technical studies and then went to the operators for
feedback. We valued their experience and know-how about the business." Planners,
therefore, tried to reach out beyond the CEOs of the bus companies to involve people
in charge of route management and even bus drivers.978
Planners first had the idea of carrying out a seminar to present the busway
project to the CEOs of bus companies and get their reactions. The idea failed
because of poor communication. The underlying cause of this failure, according to
several sources, was that when the CEOs of bus companies were together, there was
social pressure within the group not to accept any government proposal. At the
seminar, some CEOs started to say that the busway proposal was really to expel all
the buses from the Caracas Avenue corridor and leave it for the exclusive use of the
city-owned trolley buses. Planners were unable to convince them that the trolley bus
idea had been discarded and that the decision was to use the privately owned buses.
Planners then organized a seminar with Mayor Pastrana and the CEOs in Paipa, a
mountain resort close to Bogota, in an attempt to give credibility to the city's position.
No CEO showed up.
GIT planners then changed their strategy. They started to meet with one bus-
company CEO at a time, explained the project, and heard the reactions. Individually,
CEOs behaved radically different; they were more willing to hear, ask questions, voice
suggestions, and propose paths for eventual agreement. For example, the CEOs of
bus companies that operated routes served by busetas made clear that they needed
978 Interview by author with Liliana Lyons, October 2003.
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profitable routes to rent out to the owners of the busetas. Planners went and designed
new routes with this in mind, analyzing demand, under-served areas, and ridership.
As one planner told me: 'We had it clear we needed to find win-win solutions." But
even then, these CEOs were not easy to convince. The bus companies that operated
routes for conventional buses were more willing to accept the proposed project
because they stood to win from the changes. Nonetheless, they were not easy to
convince. Apparently, after a trip with other CEOs to Brazilian cities, the CEO of one
of the largest companies agreed to accept the busway project and made his position
public. This support favored planners' objectives and gradually other CEOs began to
join the coalition. The key was route design to insure profitability.
The buseta companies, however, were more reluctant and planners had to ask
Valencia, the head of DATT, and Mayor Pastrana to talk to the CEOs to help convince
them. In the end, these companies agreed to the changes in their routes and agreed
to abandon operations on the Caracas Avenue busway.979 They won, however, routes
on parallel corridors that proved to be highly profitable-at least initially. This was
because many users were not willing to abandon the buseta service for it was
associated to the middle classes. Users associated the conventional buses on
Caracas Avenue, on the contrary, to poor people.980 Time spent traveling, at least
initially, had little weight and hence the reduced travel time achieved by the busway
did not attract passengers used to riding a buseta.981
By this time, construction of the exclusive lanes had started. In essence, the
project implied increasing to four the number of lanes per direction, and segregating
two of those lanes for the exclusive use by conventional buses. Two lanes were
needed because demand was high982-recall that Curitiba and most busways in the
world, including Sao Paulo, use only one lane per direction.983 In addition, the project
contemplated a "station" every 500 meters. Each station was a lengthy bay divided
979 Interview by author with Liliana Lyons, October 2003.
980 Ardila (1995a, p. 16).
981 Value of time studies carried in the early 1980s for Bogota suggested that middle class people were
willing to spend more time traveling by car, buseta, and even walking provided they did not have to use
a conventional bus (Ardila, 1995, p. 16; and Kozel, 1981, ch. 3 and 6). There is evidence that planners
at GIT were aware of these studies.
982 Acevedo (1996, p. 5).
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into four areas, each for a different destination area.98 4 Passengers, nonetheless,
continued to board from a different height than the bus thus and paying to the driver
upon entering the bus.
As construction was taking place, some architects, including Jaime Ortiz and
Jos6 Eslava, voiced opposition. Ortiz headed the Sociedad de Mejoras y Ornato, an
agency that tries to preserve the city's urban heritage. Eslava worked at the United
Nations Development Program (UNDP) local offices in Bogota and was part of the
planning effort for the busway because the Brazilian planners had been hired through
UNDP. Eslava had opposed the busway because he regarded it as a project to
improve bus circulation without any attention to urban issues-something that was
indeed true.985 For engineers such as Regueros, and politicians such as Rufz and
Valencia, it was difficult to understand Eslava's position. Regueros told me: 'We had
different languages, Eslava spoke like an expert in urbanism, and we were
transportation engineers."986 Eslava, therefore, was unable to convince planners at
GIT and the key decision-makers to improve the urban design of the busway. Eslava's
luck changed six months before opening day when Jaime Ruiz went to a conference
in Argentina and had a chance to see Buenos Aires' magnificent avenues. On his way
back, Rufz stopped in Sao Paulo and saw the busways. Once in Bogota, Rufz called
Eslava for an urgent meeting: 'We have to do something, S.o Paulo's busways are
horrible and we can't have the same in Bogota. Can't we have something like Buenos
Aires?"987 Ru(z decided to hire and an architect, Daniel Bermudez, who tried to
improve the designs already under construction "by adding mostly works that
amounted to make up."988 While these small interventions improved somewhat the
quality of the busway, the end result was not a pleasant facility.
During the construction stage as well, the Brazilian planners members of GIT
suggested starting an outreach campaign to inform the neighboring communities
983 See Gardner (1992); and Smith and Heshner (1998).
984 Acevedo (1996, p. 5).
985 Interview by author with Jos6 Eslava, April 2004; and Interview by author with Fabio Regueros,
October 2003.
986 Interview by author with Fabio Regueros, October 2003.
987 Interview by author with Jose Eslava, April 2004.
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about the project. Members of GIT began to visit schools, neighborhoods, and even
edited a small newspaper with information on the progress of the works and their
expected impact. They also published material advertising the benefits of the project.
By June 1990, 65% of people surveyed in the vicinity of the busway knew about the
project and its benefits.989 According to Regueros, this outreach campaign was
excellent for it minimized opposition from these stakeholders and thus paved the way
for opening day.990
Thanks to the progress made by the planners negotiating the changes to the
buseta routes, planners were able to see how the busway operated with the
conventional buses at the same time that it was being built. The results were
encouraging. In March of 1990 the Caracas Avenue busway-locally known as
troncal-opened officially. Until the end of Pastrana's term, the busway had a team of
people supervising its operations, informing people, and making sure everything
worked as planned.991 Planners estimated the correct operations of the busway
demanded a team of 100 people, which would plan and supervise bus services. This
team never existed.
In parallel to these events, Acevedo and Ruiz had been working on maximizing
the chances that the northern stage of the busway would be adopted. Because the
busway was Pastrana's flagship project he had an interest in seeing the second half
built. Acevedo and Ruiz figured a two-pronged strategy. First, Rufz came up with the
idea of having the city request a loan to the World Bank for a transport project that
included phase 2 of the Caracas Avenue busway and one other corridor. Pastrana
charged Ruiz with the responsibility of getting DNP's support to convince the national
government of supplying the required guarantee. The World Bank approved this loan,
988 Interview by author with Jose Eslava, April 2004; Interview by author with Fabio Regueros, October
2003; and Interview by author with Jorge Acevedo, July 2003.
989 Ojeda (1999, p. 5-6); and Ojeda (1990, p. 9).
990 Interview by author with Fabio Regueros, October 2003. In a delegative democracy large chunks of
the population are interested in learning about the policies or decisions made, but have no interest in
affecting the decision as such. Recall that these events took place under the first democratically
elected mayor ever. As democratic practices took hold, neighboring communities and other
stakeholders will seek ways to participate and not just be informed, as I detail below for the
TransMilenio BRT system.
991 Acevedo (1996, p. 4); Interview by author with Fabio Regueros, October 2003; and interview by
author with Jorge Acevedo, July 2003.
227
but its implementation took many more years than its crafters intended and in the end,
part of TransMilenio in the late 1990s was funded by this loan.992 Second, Acevedo
convinced Pastrana that a major transformation of the city's transportation agencies
was needed. Pastrana requested special powers to the City Council to legislate by
decree on these issues. Because the City Council approved this proposal close to the
end of Pastrana's tenure, Pastrana decided it would be his successor who would
carry out the reform.993 After many problems,994 Acevedo convinced Mayor Caicedo of
enacting the reform creating the Secretariat of Traffic and Transportation (STT), a
cabinet level position. STT replaced DATT. However, STT remained a weak
agency.995 Years later Acevedo wrote: "The reform enacted was innocuous, did not
modify the weak institutions [in charge of the transport sector], nor the lack of
,,996coordination, nor the balance of power...
The role of planners
Because the busway project is in the political agenda of the city, the main role for
planners becomes one of interacting with politicians and stakeholders. The interaction
is possible because the planning team for the busway project is a capable one,
according to the definition in Chapter 1. The team has political and technical
capabilities. Notice, however, how this planning team is not within the existing city
agencies, namely DATT, which was weak and could probably not act independently of
the bus companies' interests. By creating a capable team, GIT, the city government
laid the foundation for creating a minimal space for government action.997
992 World Bank (1996, p. 15).
993 Interview by author with Jorge Acevedo, July 2003.
994 Acevedo wrote the decrees following Caicedo's orders and took them the mayor's office. Caicedo
signed the decrees. When Acevedo took a look at the text he noticed that it was not what Caicedo and
him had agreed-someone had changed the decrees without Caicedo's approval. Because the
especial powers to the mayor were still in effect, Acevedo lobbied Caicedo to cancel those decrees and
re-issue them. Caicedo, aware of powerful vested interests able to change the decrees at City Hall,
ordered to water down the reach of the legislation. This time, the signing took place at Acevedo's SER
Research Institute office (interviews by author with undisclosed sources).
995 Guhl and Pach6n (1992, p. 77-79).
996 Acevedo (1996, p. 4).
997 In Chapter 1 in the section a New framework I carefully defined government autonomy. Suffices to
say that autonomy can be understood as a continuum that goes from zero autonomy to total autonomy.
Neither of the two ends in the continuum leads to plans that satisfy legitimate goals. If the government
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Among the political planners in the capable planning team are high-ranking
planners, such as Acevedo and Regueros, together with political appointees such as
Ruiz and Valencia, who are in touch with Mayor Pastrana. As a result of the
interaction between these planners and Pastrana the busway project begins to
change. Its reach is shortened and many objectives are abandoned because of the
political consideration of showing results before the mayor's term is over. For planners
such as Acevedo the tradeoff was clear: either a part of the plan got implemented, or
all remained in plans on a bookshelf. Acevedo regarded the busway as a catalyst that
would bring about much needed institutional strengthening. The window of opportunity
Pastrana had opened lasted only two years and the next mayor might not undertake
plans done by his predecessor. A precedent was needed and this was the southern
stage of the Caracas Avenue busway.
Liliana Lyons, Libardo Serrano, Jorge Aya and others were in charge of the
technical aspects of the project such as demand modeling, route design, and facility
design. Yet some of them were also in charge of interacting with the key
stakeholders-the bus companies. Planners' role was to convince these stakeholders
of adopting one of the major changes brought about by the busway, the use of
conventional buses, and the exclusion of busetas from the corridor. Through the
interaction with the CEOs, planners discovered a way to reduce the power of this
actor. In a group, CEOs had too much power and effectively opposed the plans.
Individually, CEOs were willing to negotiate. Hence, the meaningful negotiations had
to be with individual CEOs. Planners, moreover, saw in the interaction with the CEOs
of bus companies and related actors the opportunity to nourish their technical
exercises. The planners' approach was therefore to try to find win-win technical
solutions to political problems unveiled by the interaction with key stakeholders. As
the planners found those solutions, they contributed to building support for the project
has zero autonomy then powerful interests capture the government. These interests seek to bias the
distribution of benefits in their favor. If the government is totally autonomous then politicians and
planners will have the power to pursue their own goals-which are not necessarily legitimate or
beneficial to society at-large. But if the government is somewhat autonomous-heretofore
autonomous-then it achieves a minimal space for action. Government will have the power to adopt
policies that tend to reflect legitimate goals and that satisfy collective goals. Plans achieve a relatively
fair distribution of costs and benefits.
229
and a coalition of support emerged. Finally, while the planning team was "capable" it
still lacked capacity to design a pleasant facility and not an eyesore.
The impact on Barco's metro proposal
As seen above, President Barco was promoting the undertaking of a metro system in
Bogota whose technical quality was dubious. Mayor Pastrana had responded by
putting forward his own proposal and ordering new studies, which consultants
submitted in 1992998 -years after Pastrana's and Barco's terms in office were over.
Despite Pastrana's tactic, the national government was able to start negotiations with
the Italian firm Intermetro and with Bogota's government on January 19 th, 1989. At
this point in time, Pastrana had agreed to undertake the busway, but the planning
group, known as GIT, had not been assembled yet. On January 27th, 1989, the city
government announced it could not continue paying the consulting fees resulting from
Barco's metro proposal. The negotiations could not continue and the process
stalled.9 9 9
The negotiations between the national and city governments and Intermetro
resumed in June of 1989. Because Intermetro's proposal to build and finance the
Bogota metro was so imprecise and vague, the representatives of the city and
national governments asked for clarifications. Intermetro, however, was unable to
produce satisfactory answers. Doubts on the technical specifications and costs of
Intermetro's proposal remained. This delayed the negotiations even more.
Underlying the negotiations was the critical point of how the metro project
would be financed.1000 What share of the cost would the national government
cover?'001 This issue was not clear at all due to a great extent to the situation of the
Medellin Metro, at the time under construction. As early as 1986 it became clear that
the original funding for the Medellin Metro would not be sufficient and that the national
government would have to contribute a significant amount of the funds. By November
998 See Ineco (1992).
999 Guhl and Pach6n (1 992a, p. 153-5).
1000 Because of the high cost of metros funding is the most controversial issue (Lupo, Concord and
Fowler, 1971, p. 208-210 and 218-220).
1001 Guhl and Pachon (1992a, p. 155).
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1989 construction of the Medellin Metro was halted for lack of funding.1002 The Barco
government had clear that mass transportation systems, such as metros, had
localized benefits that did not benefit the nation as a whole. As a result, the
government's policy was to have the local government pay for the majority of the cost
and have the nation contribute a small fraction.1 00 3
Congress approved a law reflecting this policy on December 2 9 th 1989.1004 The
law, known as "Metro Law," established that local governments undertaking a metro
system could raise their taxes by 20% and enact a 20-percent surtax on the price of
gasoline at the pump. The law also mandated that the fare covered all operating costs
and equipment depreciation. If this was not possible, the national government was
forbidden from providing subsidies. The Metro Law established that the local
government had to cover at least 80% of the total cost of building the metro and the
national government would cover at most 20%. The national government could back
the loans the city required for building the metro, but the city had to endorse tax
revenue and other income to the national government to pay for that debt. Finally, the
Metro Law. did not apply originally to bus-based options.1 00 5
The Metro Law aggravated the conflict between Barco and Pastrana. President
Barco promoted a metro system in Bogota but was unwilling to have the national
government under his command commit funding. But Bogot's financial situation was
deteriorating since 1985 because recurrent expenditures grew faster than the city's
revenue. The city government was funding most of its capital investments through
debt.100 6 The City of Bogota, therefore, did not have at the end of the 1980s the funds
to pay the largest share of a metro system. On January 1 1 th 1990-thirteen days after
the adoption of the Metro Law-Mayor Pastrana pulled the city out of the negotiations
with Intermetro.'007 This effectively froze the process because the national
1002 Acevedo et al. (1992, p. 156).1003 Acevedo et al. (1993, p. 113).
1004 Guhl and Pach6n (1992a, p. 153).
1005 Guhl and Pach6n (1992a, p. 64-66).
1006 Guhl et al. (1992, p. 239). In addition, the City Power Co. was incurring a large amount of debt to
fund an important hydroelectric plant, Chivor.
1007 Guhl and Pachon (1992a, p. 153-5).
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government could not continue on its own if the city-the main contributor to the
project by law-was not willing to participate.
President Barco did not like Pastrana's move. Barco had on his side the myth
around metros, which leads decision-makers and people at large to believe that any
metro project, regardless of its alignment and cost, is a good thing that will somehow
solve congestion and transportation problems. Pastrana and his planners who
opposed this proposal for the metro had this myth against them. Jaime Rufz recalls:
"Barco was furious and accused us in the city government of not wanting the metro.
But the city did not have the money. Medellin had enjoyed the advantage of having
been the first to build a metro with studies of dubious quality.1008 In addition, the metro
was the solution for eight percent of the demand-even if the alignment was optimal.
What would happen to the remaining 92 percent of the demand? So we thought, if the
president wants a metro for Bogota that the city finances cannot afford, let's propose
that the national government undertake the metro through a concession scheme. The
Pastrana administration said yes to the metro but using a concession scheme!"1009
Barco, approaching the end of his presidency, did not act on this idea.
Mayor Caicedo tries to revive the metro
Juan Martin Caicedo won the 1990 elections for mayor of Bogot.1010 His two-year
term went until June 30th 1992.1°011 Caicedo was of the Liberal Party and Pastrana, his
predecessor, of the Conservative Party. Caicedo had been minister of state during
Barco's presidency.1012 Days into his term in office, Caicedo announced that the city
government would try to undertake the construction of the metro system put forward
by President Barco,'013 who had five weeks left in office. Colombia's next president,
Cesar Gaviria was also of the Liberal Party and probably Caicedo thought this would
favor his intention of building Bogota's metro.
1008 Ruiz's argument that the planning studies for Medellin's metro were of dubious quality is supported
by careful analyses of the studies by the General Comptroller of Colombia (see CGR, 1994, esp. p.
84); and by Acevedo et al. (1993, p. 19-26 and 126).
100 Interview by author with Jaime Rufz, October 2003.
10o0 Caicedo obtained 597,295 votes, or 65.2% of the vote Botero (1998, p. 157).
1011 Gilbert and DAvila (2003, p. 34).
1012 Gilbert and D.vila (2003, p. 39).
1013 Guhl and Pachon (1992a, p. 153).
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Gaviria, however, had promised during his campaign to restart the construction
of the Medellin Metro, whose cost was spiraling out of control due to financial charges
and other reasons. By 1990, the new estimate for this metro was US$ 1.949 billion-
up from US$ 655.4 million when construction started. Of that total, US$ 725.7 million
were still not funded.101 4 The cost increase of the Medellin Metro was almost equal to
the total estimated cost, including finance charges, of building Barco's proposed
metro, US$ 1.360 billion.1015 To honor Gaviria's campaign promise, the national
government would have to make significant efforts at least to back Medellin's debt
and at most to directly contribute funds.
In this environment, the national government decided to consult four groups of
experts in order to make an informed decision on whether to support Caicedo's
initiative to build Bogota's metro. A first study, by Guhl and Pach6n concluded that
Intermetro's proposal had underestimated the cost and severely overestimated the
demand-more so bearing in mind the proposed alignment did not go to employment
areas. Intermetro's proposed financial strategy exaggerated the revenues; under
more realistic assumptions the project was underfinanced. The study also complained
about Intermetro's inability to provide the required details to clarify doubts. The study
recommended busways as a valid mass transportation alternative for Bogota, and
highlighted the Caracas Avenue busway successful experience.101 6
The second study, by Acevedo and Salazar, analyzed Intermetro's proposal
and found as well that the demand was exaggerated and the cost underestimated.
While the base estimate by Barco's government was US$ 815 million, the authors
estimated the most likely value to be US$ 1.971 billion, without including finance
costs. In addition, because of the low level of income of the users of the metro, the
fare would not be able to cover operational costs. The internal rate of return on the
project was -15.8%. Society would therefore be worse off with the project. Further,
they found that the city finances were unable to afford the proposed metro. Acevedo
and Salazar explicitly recommended not undertaking the project. They recommended
10 14 Acevedo et al. (1993, p. 116-7); CGR (1994, p. 237).
1015 Estimations by author based on data by Guhl and Pach6n (1992a, p. 159).
1016 Guhl and Pachon (1992a, esp. ch. 6).
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building a "pre-metro" using busway technology along the corridor planned for Barco's
metro, to promote densification of both housing and employment. This would
eventually increase demand to the level where a heavy rail line was justified.1017
The third study contrasted the social benefits of investing in education and
health versus investing in the metro. The study concluded that the return on investing
in these sectors was higher than the estimated return for the metro and hence "the
city's population will benefit more if the city's recurrent revenue is invested in
education instead of the metro."1018
The national government commissioned the fourth report to Professor John F.
Kain of Harvard University. He began his report by saying "I have reached the
conclusion that it would be a mistake for the Colombian government to undertake the
construction of the Bogota metro at this moment."1019 Kain pointed out that the
proposed lines, mostly at grade and elevated, might have encountered strong political
resistance once neighboring communities realized the impact and requested changes
that can increase the cost. Kain concludes: 'This planning process started with a
preconceived solution and not with the definition of the problem. As a result, it quickly
turned into an effort to justify a predetermined decision."1020
The experts turned in their reports in March of 1991 and soon after the national
government announced its decision not to support Mayor Caicedo's proposal to
undertake the metro.'10 2 The government also decided to publish these reports, which
took place in 1992,1022 and commissioned a book on the Medellin metro.'023 On
February of 1992, months before his term in office ended, Caicedo put forth the
proposal that the city could undertake the construction of the metro on its own, without
national government help.1024 Caicedo wanted to sell the city-owned Phone Company
1017 Acevedo and Salazar (1992, esp. ch. 4).
1018 Urrutia and Valencia (1992, quote from p. 343).
1019 Kain (1992, p. 352, translation by author). Kain is known as an advocate of bus-based transit. This
might have influenced the decision of the national government to hire him.
102 Kain (1992, p. 353-4, translation by author).
1021 Guhl and Pach6n (1992a, p. 153).
1022 The reports were published in the volume by Guhl and Pach6n (1992b).
1023 See Acevedo et al. (1993).
1024 Guhl and Pach6n (1992a, p. 153, 155).
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to fund the construction of the metro.1025 The City Council rejected this proposal.1026
This was a responsible action by the City Council, for during Caicedo's term the city
continued to run important deficits and its revenues were barely enough to cover
recurrent expenditures.1027 Further, investment in transportation projects was also
declining in real terms (Table 14).
In sum, the strategy followed by the planners that opposed the metro project
worked after several years of effort. The strategy included introducing delays in the
planning process for the metro, putting forward alternative proposals-the Caracas
Avenue busway-, and showing from many points of view that the metro was not an
adequate solution. At the same time, there is no evidence that President Barco
assembled a capable planning team for his pet project. The lack of such a team
deprived the project from the interaction with politicians and stakeholders (planners
opposing the metro, neighboring communities, bus companies, etc.). As seen in other
instances in this dissertation, this interaction leads to adjustments to the plans and
contributes to building a coalition of support, among others.
Table 14. Expenditure in transportation by the City of Bogoti. 1986-92.
(Billions of constant pesos of 2002)
Year Mayor Expenditure in road Percent Change from
maintenance and construction previous year
1986 J. Sanchez $59.6
1987 J. Snchez $149.9 151.4%
1988 J. Sanchez/A. Pastrana $143.5 -4.2%
1989 A. Pastrana $139.6 -2.7%
1990 A. Pastrana/J. Caicedo $108.7 -22.2%
1991 J. Caicedo $120.6 11.0%
1992 J. Caicedo/J. Castro $88.5 -26.6%
Source: Mayor column from Gilbert and Ddvila (2003, p. 34); Expenditure
figures from SHD (2003, p. 40); and calculations by author.
Planning and Implementing Phase II of the Caracas Avenue
busway
Acevedo was interested in seeing phase II of the Caracas Avenue busway
undertaken. Acevedo had advised Mayor Caicedo during the campaign and had
1025 El Tiempo, "Medio siglo detrAs del metro," February 12th, 1998.
1026 Guhl and Pach6n (1992a, p. 153, 155).
1027 Piza (1995, p. 34-6); and Cardenas et al. (1995, p. 166).
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explained the importance of the project and of GIT, the planning team. Caicedo had
appointed Gustavo Peia as the new head of GIT; Regueros continued together with
Acevedo as advisor to GIT. Pela had experience in politics but also understood
technical aspects. Pelia understood the need to continue the busway project in the
north end.1028 Jaime Ortiz, from his position as secretary of Public Works, supported
Peha's idea for he had realized the busway was a "success, even though the
operational component was completely absent."10 29 This was what probably allowed
GIT to continue the planning of phase II of the busway, three months into Caicedo's
two-year term. Mayor Caicedo, however, was not fully supportive of the project.
Because the northern part of the busway crossed downtown and reached
middle class neighborhoods,10 30 planners knew the approach had to be different. GIT
created a community liaison group that presented to the neighboring communities the
idea of building the northern part of the busway. Several changes to the project
emerged from this interaction. First, it was necessary to incorporate in the designs the
provision of parking spaces, both along the alignment of the busway and in nearby
streets, in areas that concentrated certain businesses. Second, it appeared clear that
certain mitigation measures were necessary, particularly regarding the urban design
impact of the busway. As a planner told me: "the community argued the Caracas
Avenue with its trees and ample spaces had been designed by Le Corbusier1031 and
we could not touch it." Planners pointed out that the corridor had been deteriorating
1028 Interview by author with Fabio Regueros, October 2003.
1029 Interview by author with Jaime Ortiz, October 2003.
10 30 Acevedo (1996, p. 5).
1031 In 1948 the National Government called architects Le Corbusier, Paul Lester, and Jos6 Luis Sert to
carry out an urban development plan for Bogota. Months before, on April 9 th, the liberal candidate to
the presidency was murdered. The riots that followed destroyed a significant part of downtown. To
carry out the reconstruction of the city the government needed an urban development plan. Le
Corbusier, Lester, and Sert proposed a hierarchical classification of the road network according to the
importance of the road. The plan was not implemented in its entirety. However, it had a strong impact.
For example, the existing road network is based on that plan. Further, the plan proposed to build large
avenues and ample public spaces some of which were implemented (Ariza et al., 1999, p. 59-60; and
Guhl and Pachon, 1992a, p. 14-5). The plan also proposed to regulate land use according to function
and income. Accordingly, the plan established that the wealthy were to live in the northern part of the
city and the poor in the southern. The west end would be for industry. Downtown would have mixed
uses, such as government, services, and commerce. The plan contemplated low densities under the
assumption that by the year 2000 the population of Bogota would be 1.5 million. The city reached that
figure in 1960. The plan, however, was not amended until 1970 (Guhl and Pachon, 1992a, p. 14-5). For
a brief history on urban plans in Bogota see Montezuma (2000a, esp. p. 42-51)
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gradually due to the buses having to circulate in mixed traffic. This arrangement
aggravated the competition for passengers, led to perilous driving and exaggerated
air pollution, all of which deteriorated the corridor. Key in this controversy were the
large trees that Caracas Avenue had in its median. The community wanted to
preserve them probably because they were one of the few aspects that remained
from the original design. The designs for the busway, however, called for removing
the trees because the median had to be moved to make space for the stations on one
of the sides. After a huge controversy with the community, the decision was to move
each tree to the new median trying to keep it alive. Needless to say, this increased the
cost of the project, but this mitigation measure allowed the plan to proceed.1032
Parallel to these events, Peia kept lobbying Caicedo to get construction
started. Peia highlighted to Caicedo several things. First, the southern part of the
busway ended in the southern end of downtown. At that point buses entered mix-
traffic lanes, faced congestion and lost time. But many passengers' destination was 1
or 2 kilometers to the north in the heart of downtown or even farther north.1033 The
time-savings accrued by users of the southern part were lost once the busway
finished. Some users, therefore, were demanding the construction of the northern end
of the corridor. Second, Peia apparently argued that not building the northern phase
would have a political cost that could stain Caicedo's legacy. Peia was finally able to
convince Caicedo and construction of the facilities started in November of 1991,1034
eight months before Caicedo's term finished.
With the project under construction, planners at GIT had to negotiate with bus
companies the changes to the bus routes that the project entailed. Again, only
conventional buses could use the new corridor and small vehicles such as the
busetas had to be moved to alternate corridors. The positive precedent set by the first
phase of the busway facilitated the negotiations, because speed had gone up and this
increased profitability. Only one bus company voiced strong opposition, because it
1032 Many of the trees did not survive the move to a new location. In 1997 an illness attacked the
remaining trees. When years later plans for TransMilenio called for putting the stations on the median,
the community was no longer attached to the trees (Interview by author with Dario Hidalgo, July 2004).
1033 This is corroborated by the demand measurements made by origin destination studies in Bogota.
See Ineco (1992).
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only owned buseta routes and therefore the project hurt it disproportionately. Planners
were able to find an alternate corridor with high patronage and this company finally
agreed to the change. The northern stage of the Caracas Avenue busway opened
officially in August of 1992,1035 when Jaime Castro was the mayor of Bogot.1036/ 11037
1034 Guhl and Pach6n (1992a, p. 166).
1035 Guhl and Pach6n (1992a, p. 166).
1036 Gilbert and Dgvila (2003, p. 34).
1037 The alternate corridors of the busetas had a negative impact on neighboring houses. The roads
had not been designed to move such heavy loads. The city later on had to move part of the buseta
traffic to an adjacent corridor.
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The significance of the Caracas Avenue busway
When Mayor Pastrana decided to adopt the busway project he warned his planners
that the busway ought to become a valid alternative to the metro. Did the Caracas
Avenue busway achieve this? The record is mixed and suggests that the answer is
no, but nonetheless the busway project is significant in Bogota's transportation
history. The operations of the busway did not achieve a level of service similar to that
of heavy rail. The buses used were built on truck chassis, had high entry steps and
passengers found it difficult to board. The bus engines, inadequate for public
transportation, emitted gases well above international norms. Users, moreover,
suffered pickpocketing and assaults on the stations. More important, the city
government never instituted an agency or a unit in charge of supervising the
operations of the busway.10 38 Given the high competition between operators-the
penny war-buses would stop many times per bus stop to collect as many
passengers as possible.1 0 39 As a result, the level of service decreased with time and
operations became chaotic. In addition the facility was an eyesore that probably
deteriorated the neighboring areas. Further, its design was aggressive in an attempt
to induce users to comply with certain rules.1 040 Users responded in kind and
vandalized the shelters and other facilities.
Notwithstanding these problems, the idea of segregating bus flow from mixed
traffic flow allowed buses to move a volume of passengers that previously only rail
technology was able to move. It is in this sense that the Caracas Avenue busway is
significant. The introduction of busway technology showed planners and politicians
that there was an alternative that could improve the operating speed of buses and
1 0 38 Acevedo (1996, p. 38)
1039 See Rodrfguez and Ardila (2002) for a detailed analysis of the impact of the chaotic operation on
bus travel time. See also Ardila and Rodriguez (2000) for an explanation of how despite the chaos the
busway was able to move so many passengers. Notice that the Caracas Avenue busway has two lanes
Der direction and buses can overtake one another.
040 In 1993, while working at the SER Research Institute, I attended a meeting at the City Planning
Office (DAPD). Some planners complained that pedestrians were crossing the Caracas Avenue
busway at forbidden areas. A planner replied that the designs called for installing sword-like metal
objects to create a fence around the median. The objective was to dissuade people from crossing at
forbidden areas. The planner added that the designers had calculated the correct angle to maximize
the probability that the sword-like object would actually injure a person crossing the street. Many
people learned how to cross the street despite these barriers. Further, with time metal-scalpers stole
the objects thus reducing the aggressiveness of the busway.
__
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could parallel the capacity of rail systems. But the Caracas Avenue busway was far
from providing the quality of service that rail or that a properly planned BRT system-
such as TransMilenio or the RIT in Curitiba-are able to provide. Indeed, BRT is
much more than building busways as the Caracas Av. shows. Strengthening
government agencies to plan, operate and maintain the facilities is the critical
element.10 41 Table 15 shows some indicators of the capacity to move buses and
passengers at the Caracas Avenue busway. Figures 15 and 16 show the Caracas
Avenue busway in 1999.
Table 15. Maximum passenger flow in selected cities with busways and metros
Busways Metros
City Max. Passenger flow per City Max. Passenger flow per
hour direction hour per direction
Bogota 36,500 Hong Kong 87,000
Porto Alegre 1 28,000 Mexico City 70,000
S.o Paulo 21,000 Sdo Paulo 62,000
Abidjan 20,000 Cairo 24,000
Porto Alegre 2 18,000 Rio de Janeiro 24,000
Belo Horizonte 17,000 Manila 22,500
Istanbul 12,000 Santiago 21,500
Curitiba 8,700 Singapore 15,000
Pusan 14,000
Porto Alegre 12,000
Tunis 7,000
Calcutta 5,000
QUUItI. zClUlll I .. JP. I O I 1U I ) UaCt I 1; 1/. U IUI UU II
5). Data for Bogota is for 1999; for all other cities is for 1989.
-i Ulil dl lU nUUI IyU1t: UUU, .
1041 See Chapter 12 on TransMilenio for a development of these ideas.
Figure 15. The Caracas Avenue busway in 1999, south-north direction.
Source: author.
Figure 16. The Caracas Avenue busway in 1999, north-south direction.
Source: author.
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Chapter 9
Metro Builders' Lobbing Transforms into Plans for Bus
Rapid Transit
During the Jaime Castro mayoralty interests related to the construction of metros
lobbied to get the metro in the city's political agenda. Pro-busway planners responded
by convincing Mayor Castro of opening a competitive bid for a concession for a mass
transit system, which could be bus- or rail-based. In this chapter I explore these
events and the role that planners played in them. I also describe in an "intermezzo"
the main traits of the tax reform enacted by Castro and that improved Bogota's
finances in a dramatic way. The uninterested reader can skip this "intermezzo," but
should bear in mind the lasting effect of this tax reform.
Mayor Castro and the Metro Builders' Lobby
Jaime Castro was elected mayor of Bogota early in 19921042 for a transitional two-
and-a-half-year term in office (Figure 1, above).104 3 Castro, a seasoned politician, had
been part of the Constitutional Assembly that enacted a new National Constitution the
previous year.1' 044 In his campaign Castro had said he would not undertake the
construction of a metro system because of its high cost and the unwillingness by
President Gaviria to support such a project. One of Castro's advisers in transportation
was Jorge Acevedo. Acevedo lobbied Castro to continue building busways using a
similar technology to the one used in the Caracas Avenue busway. Acevedo
convinced Castro of using the Inter Institutional Transport Group or GIT to determine
1042 Gilbert and Davila (2003, p. 34); and Botero (1998, p. 157). Castro obtained 312,803 votes or 53%
of the vote. Abstentions peaked in this election at 73.75% (Botero, 1998, p. 157; and calculations by
author).
1043 The new constitution of Colombia, enacted in 1991 by a constitutional assembly, determined that
mayors would be elected for three-year terms. The constitution also transferred the inauguration from
July first to January first. This created the need for a transitional term of only two and a half years (See
Colombia's Constitution, article 314 and transitory article 19).
'044 See Castro and Garavito (1994). Castro was two times minister of state and three times senator
before being elected to the constitutional assembly and after that as Bogota's mayor. As Minister of
Governance, Castro was responsible for pushing forward in congress a constitutional reform to allow
the popular election of municipal mayors, including Bogota's (Castro and Garavito, 1996, p. 125-130).
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the next corridors where the city should build busways. Acevedo accompanied the
process through the SER Research Institute, which had to do part of the planning.
The resulting study determined that the next corridor to get the busway technology
ought to be 8 0 th Street, which ran from the northern end of the Caracas Avenue
busway towards the west of the city along densely populated areas. The study also
recommended undertaking busway technology in a few other corridors.1045
While GIT planners and Acevedo were working on their study, large
international construction firms and suppliers of subway cars began to lobby Mayor
Castro. According to several sources, at least once a month Castro would receive one
such visit. In the meeting, these promoters of metro technology would highlight the
need for heavy rail in a city as dense and with many corridors with high or very high
passenger demand (Table 16). Some presenters would emphasize that Bogota was
one of the few cities in the World with a population of more than 5 million that did not
have heavy rail transit. In trying to sell the idea of a metro some of the proponents
mentioned that the project could be undertaken by the private sector through a
concession. The international firms promoting heavy rail in Bogota apparently had
also convinced some City Councilors to help their lobbying effort with the mayor.
Acevedo and other planners in Castro's administration argued that the metro
was not necessarily a good idea. For one, metros are expensive and difficult to afford.
For another, the single metro line that the city could eventually afford would only move
eight percent of the total demand. These two reasons meant that the city would find it
impossible to improve the service to the remaining share of the demand. Facing
contradictory opinions, Castro confronted the planners and told them about the
lobbying efforts by large international firms. The planners responded that if the
arguments by the promoters were true, then the construction and operation of the
metro could indeed be done through a concession. Castro liked the idea probably in
part because the concession alternative had been mentioned by some of these
lobbyists but mostly because the city and national finances could not afford the metro.
Castro added: "let's see if we can do something this beautiful." Castro then created a
project management team headed by Jorge Cook, who had expertise in transportation
1045 See Instituto SER (1992).
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and energy policy. Castro also appointed Mauricio Cuellar, a transportation planner,
to head the technical side of the team.
Table 16. Passenger flows in selected corridors in Bogota
Corridor Length Passengers per day Max. passengers per Commercial speed
Km hour per direction Km/Hr
Caracas Av. busway 16 372,658 36,500 18
Americas Avenue 9.8 332,454 32,647 12
80 n Street 9.9 309,573 30,405 12
1 0TAvenue 3.5 295,998 29,066 <10
68m Street 12.9 191,008 18,757 <10
7Tn Avenue 3.2 108,523 10,657 10
Source: Rebelo (2003, p. 5). Bogota's streets are organized in a system of carreras, which run
north-south, and calles, which run east-west. I have called carreras as avenues and calles as streets.
The Castro administration also hired Jorge Acevedo and Ernesto Guhl to
advise the planning team regarding how to structure the bidding process. Soon into
the process, the project management team and these advisers concluded that they
could not establish the alignment for the mass transit system nor the technology to be
used. It would therefore be the proponents who determined the alignment and the
technologies to be used (heavy rail, light rail, busways, BRT, or a combination).
Acevedo and Guhl, however, had different views on the role of government in the
economy and consequently on the procurement strategy for a metro system.10 4 6 For
Acevedo, given the conditions of the city finances and the underlying idea that it
should be a concession, the metro system ought to require no public support. Guhl
thought that this was utopian and argued that government financial support was
needed. For Guhl the fare box would never recover the construction cost. Acevedo
and Guhl reached a compromise by agreeing to recommend that the criteria for
evaluating the proposals revolved around two issues. First, the impact of the proposal
on transport demand in the city; second, the impact of the proposal on the finances of
the city government.1047 The first criteria allowed bidders to propose any blend of
1046 Both Acevedo and Guhl were involved with presidential primary campaigns at the time. Acevedo
will soon after resign to heading the SER Research Institute and became top advisor to Humberto de la
Calle's campaign. De la Calle was the pro-market, free-trade wing of the Liberal Party. Guhl was
involved with Ernesto's Samper bid, which as seen below heavily supported the construction of a metro
system in Bogota. Samper was the left wing of the Liberal Party. Samper won the primaries and then
the presidency against Andr6s Pastrana.
1047 Alcaldia Mayor de Santa Fe de Bogota (1994, p. 5-9).
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technologies they wanted. The second favored the proposal that required fewer
government subsidies. These two broad criteria, moreover, allowed in principle a
comparison among proposals comprising very different technologies.
The bidding process
In December 1993, slightly over a year before Castro's term in office was over, the
city government issued the Bidders' Guide requesting proposals for the undertaking of
a mass transit system through a concession scheme.10 4 8 By January 17 th, 1994, 32
companies-contractors, equipment manufacturers, operators of public transport, and
local and foreign consortia-registered as eventual bidders.1049 On February 18 th,
1994, the city issued the methodology for evaluating the bids. The main criteria were
the coverage of the city's transport demand, the time-savings for users, and the
amount of public assistance and compensation required by the bidder.1050 Nine
bidders turned in their proposals on June 8 th, 1994. Three of the bids were mere
letters of intent and were rejected on the spot.105 1 Table 17 summarizes the main
characteristics of the remaining six proposals. For the evaluation of the proposals the
National Government, through the National Planning Department (DNP), contributed
funds to hire Halcrow Fox and Associates (HFA). HFA, a famous British firm, had
conducted an appraisal of rail mass transit systems in developing countries a few
years early.1052 DNP was probably worried that Bogota could choose a project that
could sink the city into bankruptcy. After all, the finances of Bogota were just
beginning to recover after a successful tax reform (see "intermezzo" below).
1048 See Alcaldia Mayor de Santa Fe de Bogota (1993, p. 5-9).
1049 EPCE Ltd.-Halcrow Fox (1 994b, p. 4).
1050 Alcaldia Mayor de Santa Fe de Bogota (1994, p. 5-9).
1051 EPCE Ltd.-Halcrow Fox (1994b, p. 4).
1052 See Allport and Thomson (1989).
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Table 17. Summary bidder information
Proposal Technology Capacity Capital Subsidy Fare
(passengers per Cost Required ($ col.)
hour per (US $M) (US $M)
direction)
Metro Busway Metro Busway
(Km) or BRT (Kin) or BRT
(Km) (Km)
SNC-Lavalin 20 22 40,000 22,000 820 542 360
Metrovfas 91 (*) 0 22,000 - 411 0 300
Alcatel- 18 0 32,000 - 545 Not Not
Dragados- known known
GEC
Alsthom
MetrobUs 0 Stg. 1: 28 - 10,000- Stg. 1: 210 0 320
(CFT- Stg. 2: 12 30,000 Stg. 2: 361
Stagecoach-
Volvo)
Siemens 19 0 72,000 - 685 480 or 10 195
years of
110
Unibus- 0 87 - 7,000 22 0 250
Uniturs
(*) Metrovias' proposal is for ultra-light rail, an untested technology to be developed in Colombia.
Sources: EPCE Ltd.-Halcrow Fox (1994a, p.29-34); and EPCE Ltd.-Halcrow Fox (1994b, p. 5-10).
HFA together with the local team approached the evaluation first by seeing the
extent to which each proposal met the city's requirements. Second, by checking the
technological feasibility of each proposal. The proposals by Metrovias and Unibus-
Uniturs were disqualified because they did not meet the city's requirements of
ensuring an improvement in the quality of mass transit.10 53 When checked for
technological feasibility the evaluation team concluded "all the bids, except one
(Metrobus), were unsatisfactory in this respect, but they were not disqualified."1 0 54
Table 18 shows some results of the evaluation, which compared the bidders' demand
and cost forecasts against those of the evaluation team.
l053 Epce Ltd.-HFA (1994b, p. 11-13, 17-21).
1054 Epce Ltd.-HFA (1994b, p. 13).
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Table 18. Comparison of cost and demand of bidders' and evaluation team's estimates
Proposal Technology Capital Cost Estimate Demand Forecast
(US$ million) (000s of passengers per
day)
Bidder Evaluation Bidder Evaluation
Team Team
SNC-Lavalin Metro 820 957 410 500
Busway/BRT 550 200
Alcatel- Metro 545 1110 1,210 190
Dragados-
GEC
Alsthom
Metrobus BRT 209 217 1,090 750
Stage 1
BRT 361 631 2,570 1,500
S tagemens Metro 645 593 440 240
Siemens Metro 645 593 440 240
Source: Epce Ltd.-HFA (1994b, p. 26 and 32).
A careful reading of the evaluation reports reveals the critical dimension at
play-risk. Because it is a concession that involves private equity, risk is higher for
bidders. At the same time, the city government faces a higher risk because of the
need to offer profitable concessions. From a risk perspective, however, the planning
process seems flawed in that it does not have strong mechanisms for minimizing risk.
Specifically, in concession contracts it should be clear that the concessionaire is
interested in materializing the expected demand. The three metro proposals,
therefore, assumed that the city would enact restrictions on bus competition. The
planning team concluded: 'This assumption is regarded by the Evaluation Team as
unrealistic. None of the mass transit systems introduced recently in the developing
world have succeeded in removing bus competition and the large number of small
private operators in Bogota would make this particularly difficult."1 055 And no city has
succeeded at this task because it is not so much a technical exercise as a political
one. Clearly, the process has to involve the old operators and figure out ways of
removing them from the corridors where the new systems are built without hurting
them disproportionately. The process in Bogota did not have these mechanisms in
place, nor the political will needed, as it became evident a few months later.
1055 Epce Ltd.-HFA (1994b, p. 31).
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By the end of the evaluation process in October 1994, the evaluators
concluded that none of the proposals had an economic positive net present value.
Further, they criticized some of the proposals for not reaching the main business area
or for not complying fully with the requirements of the tendering process.105 6
Nonetheless, the evaluators considered that MetrobUs could be feasible, because
among others it required no city subsidies. The planners recommended the city to
continue the negotiations with this proponent.1057 By this point in time, Jorge Cook
who headed the city transportation planning team resigned to become minister of
state for Ernesto Samper's. Samper swore in as president on August 7 th , 1994. Mayor
Castro appointed German Silva to head the planning team and carry out the
negotiations with MetrobUs.
Signing the Contract
Metrobus had filed a proposal to build a network of exclusive busways. Metrob6s
articulated and bi-articulated buses would operate on that network. In the first stage
MetrobUs proposed to build eight lines and four in the second stage. MetrobUs
proposed bus stops every 400 meters and "Curitiba style 'tube' stations on the main
corridors."1058 Metrobcis was a consortium of international and local organizations. On
the international side were Volvo Bus Corporation and Stagecoach International,
which together held 50% of the shares. On the local side were the Transportation
Finance Corporation and four trade associations that represented bus companies.
The Transportation Finance Corporation financed bus companies' bus renewals.
Among the trade associations were Conaltur and Fecoltran. In theory, Metrob6s
included the critical stakeholders-the bus companies and bus operators who could
oppose any scheme to alter the status quo if not included in the plans.
The negotiations between MetrobUs and the city government started early in
November of 1994.1059 The negotiations centered around two critical issues. First was
the alignment of the busway network. Metrobes wanted to gain exclusive access to
1056 El Tiempo, "Metro, Troncales y Solobus, La Soluci6n," October 11, 1994.
1057 Rodrfguez (1999, p. 7).
1058 Epce-HFa (1994a, p. 32).
1059 El Tiempo, "Metrobus, Se Acaban Sus Dias," November 25 th , 1994.
248
the Caracas Avenue busway, which was the most profitable corridor in the city.
Planners knew this implied eliminating the existing routes and buses from that
corridor. Mayor Castro did not agree probably because eliminating the route and
buses was a highly contentious political issue. Planners then offered Metrobas a
semi-exclusive use of the corridors. On Caracas Avenue and other corridors, such as
8 0 th street and on Jimdnez Avenue, Metrobas buses would have exclusive access to
the infrastructure built by Metrobis. But in parallel lanes built by the city, existing bus
routes could operate. This minimized the impact to the existing bus companies and
bus owners. Mauricio Cuellar defended this by saying it would give options to
consumers who could choose their preferred bus service. In the end Metrobis agreed
to a network that implied building 40 kilometers of new roads in the city.1 060
The second critical issue in the negotiating agenda was the fare. Metrobas
wanted the contract to establish a fare equal to US$ 0.45, which was above what
users paid at the time. Metrobas also wanted to peg the value of the fare to the
exchange rate to the dollar and to Colombian inflation. Metrobus wanted these
clauses in the contract to reduce its risk exposure. For instance, the city government
could not arbitrarily change the fare if its value was established in the contract. Mayor
Castro objected strongly to Metrobas' desires. Castro argued that the fare should be
set according to a regime known in Colombia as "supervised freedom." In this
regulatory regime Metrobas could propose a fare. The city government, in turn, could
reject the proposed fare if it did not agree with the value. The city could then order a
lower fare. If the government agreed with the value it would voice no objection. This
was the regime for the better bus services, which charged the higher fares.10 61 The
representatives of Metrobas objected strongly. Risk went up for Metrobas. Metrobas
argued it would not be able to raise the required funds in the international market to
finance construction and bus acquisition. Planners went to Mayor Castro who said: "it
is fine with me if this [not raising the funds in the international market] happens."
Planners then pressured Metrobs to accept these terms. Metrobas representatives
agreed to sign the contract on the condition that if they were unable to raise the
1060 El Tiempo, "Sistema MetrobUs Encendi6 Motores," December. 10, 1994.
1061 El Tiempo, See "Hubo Acuerdo: No Hay Paro De Transporte Hoy," December 1 4 th, 1994.
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necessary capital there would be no penalty. While Mayor Castro agreed to these
terms, planners such as Silva and Cuellar strongly suspected that the project had died
that day-time will prove them right.
As the negotiations were advancing MetrobUs went through a major internal
crisis that almost disbanded its members. Conaltur was a member of MetrobUs and
was one of the trade associations that represented bus companies. Members of
Conaltur elected a new administration with the mandate to withdraw Conaltur from
MetrobUs. Days after this, the remaining three trade associations in MetrobUs
withdrew as well from the consortium. At the negotiations one representative of the
trade associations said: "the project is good for the city, good for the people, but very
bad for the bus companies."10 62 The Transportation Finance Corporation was also
shaken by the news but in the end its shareholders decided to remain in the
consortium. The trade associations now began to actively oppose the project and
even participated in the organization of strikes and protests to demand changes to the
project.1063 Bus owners also opposed the MetrobUis project. Recall that in Bogota bus
companies "own" bus routes; and small investors own the buses that have to be
affiliated to a bus company to operate on a route.
On December 9 th, 1994, MetrobUs and the city government signed a
concession contract in which MetrobUs agreed to build a network of busways,
purchase 1,200 new articulated buses, and operate them for 20 years.1 064 The bus
companies and owners were against the project and were organizing a strike to bring
the city to a standstill. Paradoxically, the head of Fecoltran, which was originally part
of MetrobUs, claimed in a newspaper interview that the Castro administration was
favoring international interests by not allowing local bus companies to present
alternative proposals.'0 65 Clearly this change of heart, from supporting to
vituperatively opposing, shows that the trade associations had not been in close
contact with the bus companies they represented. The bus companies opposed the
project all throughout the process.
1062 See also "La Suerte Del Solobus Se Definird Este Midrcoles," November 19'h, 1994.
1063 El Tiempo, "Sistema Metrobus Encendio Motores," December 10, 1994.
1064 El Tiempo, "Sistema Metrobis Encendi6 Motores," December 10, 1994.
1065 "Sistema Metrobus Encendio Motores," December 10, 1994.
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By the 13th of December the threat of a strike forced Castro and Metrobds to
agree to consider changing the contract signed. The existing bus companies and bus
owners wanted, first, to minimize the impact of the Metrobis project on their interests.
Specifically, bus companies wanted to protect their routes and bus owners wanted to
keep their buses circulating.10 66 The bus companies and bus owners demanded that
Metrobds be excluded from any road the city had built. Metrobds buses could only
use the roads built by Metrobds and where no previous bus traffic existed. The Castro
administration and Metrob6s did not agree to the changes. But it was clear that the
project had to start on a corridor built by Metrobds. Otherwise, the opposition by the
existing bus companies and bus owners would not allow the project to proceed. The
chosen corridor was an old railway line connecting the southwest end of downtown to
a densely populated area in the southwest of the city. Antanas Mockus, Castro's
successor would have to handle the rest of the process. I cover this topic in the next
chapter.
The role of planners
In the sections above, we see again planners opposing the idea of adopting a metro
in Bogota. Given the strength of the idea, planners resorted to making proponents
honest. They do this by convincing Mayor Castro of procuring the metro through a
concession scheme. Concessions require high-quality information to lower risk. In
addition to seeking ways to keep metro promoters honest, these planners also
opened the way for other technologies-busways and BRT-to enter the competition.
Mayor Castro agreed. Given the incentives generated by the concession, planners
hoped that a bus-based alternative won the competition. After a detailed evaluation,
planners choose Metrobcs, a BRT project, as the winner. Metrobds entered the
political agenda of the city.
On of my main arguments is that planners' main role is to interact with
politicians and stakeholders, because the interaction is a source of feedback that
reduces power differentials and leads to adaptations to the original plans, reduces risk
for all parties involved, and helps assemble a coalition of support. The interaction
1066 See El Tiempo, "Hubo Acuerdo: No Hay Paro De Transporte Hoy," December 14 th , 1994.
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seen above is very limited. Planners interacted with trade associations believing the
associations were sound representatives of their affiliates. They were wrong. The bus
companies actually opposed the Metrobuis project all along. There was no direct
interaction with the bus companies-the key stakeholders. Absent this actor from the
process, the planners could not figure out a way to reduce the power of the bus
companies. Furthermore, the plans for Metrobas reflected only the interaction
between the city and the concessionaire. As a result, the bus companies resorted to
strikes demanding changes to the plans, which they achieved.10 67 Because of the
incomplete interaction risk is going up for investors in Metrobos, who face a limited
market share and increased costs. Worse, the limited interaction leads to a powerful
coalition against Metrobus. The incomplete interaction can be explained in part by the
lack of "political planners" and/or a project champion in the planning team. While
Mayor Castro did support the project "it was not his flagship infrastructure project. His
flagship project was the sewer treatment plant to clean the Bogota River," a planner
told me. The planner added: "the sewer treatment plant had a clear project champion
helping the project navigate the political process. Metrobus, on the contrary, never
had a project champion to defend it and push it forward."
Intermezzo: Mayor Castro and a critical political and tax
reform
Some of Jaime Castro's main objectives were to reform Bogota's charter and the
main elements of the city's tax code. Castro had been elected in 1990 to the
Constitutional Assembly that enacted a new constitution on July 1991. Castro was
aware that many of Bogota's problems were the result of the city's 1968 charter,
which among others created a very powerful City Council and a weak mayor. In effect,
this regime was known in Bogota as "co-administration" because the legislative and
executive powers were not as separate as desired. When Castro got to the
constitutional assembly, he lobbied to pass a couple of articles specific to Bogota,
1067 This corroborates the conclusion reached by Feldman and Milch (1982, esp. 4 ch and 6) that
affected interests usually find a way of participating in the planning process even if intentionally (or
unintentionally) excluded from it.
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including one to force Congress to change the city's charter.1068 Castro also got the
Assembly to enact a transitory article1 069 establishing that Congress had to enact the
new charter for the city within a certain period of time. Otherwise the president of
Colombia would enact the charter by decree.1070
The initial version of Bogota's charter under discussion in Congress left Castro
dissatisfied for he knew it did not have the reach, in political and fiscal matters, that
the city urgently needed.'071 Castro, however, knew very well how the Colombian
Congress worked. Castro had been senator and minister of government. As minister,
Castro had been in charge of lobbying Congress to pass the president's legislative
agenda. Castro used his knowledge to filibuster the passing of the city's charter in
Congress. In the meantime Castro wrote his own version of Bogota's new charter and
presented it to President Cesar Gaviria. The national government had its own version
in mind. The two sides negotiated, with President Gaviria having an advantage
because the Constitution allowed him to issue the decree. In July of 1993 the national
government issued the city's new charter. The new charter achieved an effective
separation of powers between the City Council and the mayor's office. The City
Council would be the place for enacting legislation and exerting political control. The
mayor's office would be the executive power in the city.1'072 The new charter also
created new mechanisms for citizen participation.1 073
The new charter also updated the city's tax legislation. For example, until then
the property tax raised very little revenue because Bogota's cadastre was outdated,
among others.1074 Updating it up would have cost too much in physical and political
terms. In effect, Mayor Pastrana had tried but the political reaction had stopped his
efforts. Castro faced as well a huge political controversy, which presidential
candidates such as Pastrana and Samper helped fuel. Castro resisted the pressures
1068 Castro and Garavito (1994, p. 29-30). See Constituci6n Polftica de Colombia (1991, articles 322-
327).
1069 A transitory article is valid only during the transition from the old constitution to the new one. It
usually has a sunset clause. See Constituci6n Politica de Colombia (1991, transitory article 41).
1070 Castro and Garavito (1994, p. 46-47).
1071 Castro and Garavito (1994, p. 47-48).
1072 See Estatuto OrgAnico de Bogota (1993, articles 8-26 and 35-38).
1073 Castro and Garavito (1994, p. 56-59); and Piza (1995, p. 17).
1074 Piza (1995, p. 20).
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to halt the reform.1075 Bogota's charter established that it would be each property
owner who would self-appraise its property and in this way update the cadastre.1076
Regarding the sales tax, the new charter established that businesses would have to
file this tax every two months1077 and not yearly as it happened before.1078 When the
filing was yearly, businesses had an incentive to leverage their operations with the
sales tax collected and then declare a smaller amount. By paying this tax every two
months these incentives were eliminated. Notice that this tax reform focused on
improving the tax collection mechanisms and not on increasing the tax rate.1079 At the
same time, the city government pursued policies to reduce the city's recurrent
expenditures and streamlined its administrative expenditures. These savings together
with the increased tax revenue expanded the possibility to spend in new projects,1080
including road maintenance. Table 19 summarizes the results of the tax and
expenditure reforms enacted in 1993 and implemented in 1994. The city government
now had money for capital expenditures (Figure 17), including increased expenditures
in transport (Table 20). Notwithstanding these achievements, by 1997 the rate of
growth of the revenue from property and sales taxes slowed down. The
administrations following Castro's had to increase taxes, create new ones, such as
the tax on fuels, and privatize city-owned companies to raise revenue.10 81 After 1997
the tax on fuels has been particularly dynamic (See Table 22 in Chapter 12).
1075 Castro and Garavito (1994, p. 81-93).
1076 Piza (1995, p. 20-1). See also Estatuto Organico de Bogota (1993, article 155, especially
paragraph 1, which creates the self-appraisal mechanism for the property tax).
077 Piza (1995, p. 21-2). See also Estatuto Organico de Bogota (1993, article 154, especially
paragraph 1, which establishes the payment of the sales tax every two months). The City Council can
change the periodicity of payment of the tax and change the tax rate.
1078 Piza (1995, p. 20-22). For a detailed analysis of the tax reform of 1993 see Cardenas et al (1995).
1079 Castro and Garavito (1994, p. 48).
1080 Castro and Garavito (1994, p. 85-86); Piza (1995, 18-34); and Cardenas et al. (1995, p. 181-3).
1081 Interview by author to Enrique Penalosa (June 2004).
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Table 19. Summary financial indicators for the City of Bogota, 1991-1997 (Values in billions of
constant Colombian pesos of 2002)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1,996
A. Total Revenue 857 937 1,036 1,758 1,994 2,904
(Tax + transfers +
privatization)
Tax revenue 654 739 765 1,355 1,251 1,527
Property tax 123 179 175 327 326 379
Sales tax 297 310 331 659 569 701
Tax on fuels 108
B. Recurrent expenditures 741 792 819 1,057 996 1,115
C. Capital expenditures 445 377 598 778 1,169 1,929
Surplus (Deficit) (A-B-C) (329) (232) (380) (76) (172) (140)
Real increase over 1993 values (1993 values = 100)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1,996
A. Total Revenue 83 90 100 170 192 280
(Tax + transfers +
privatization)
Tax revenue 85 97 100 177 164 200
Property tax 70 102 100 187 186 217
Sales tax 90 93 100 199 172 212
Tax on fuels . 108
B. Recurrent expenditures 91 97 100 129 122 136
C. Capital expenditures 74 63 100 130 195 323
Surplus (Deficit) (A-B-C) (87) (61) (100) (20) (45) (37)
Source: World Bank (2003, p.105); and calculations by author.
Figure 17. Evolution of capital expenditures by Bogota's Government, 1991-96
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Source: World Bank (2003, p. 105); and calculations by author.
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Table 20. Expenditure in transportation by the City of Bogota. 1992-1997.
(Billions of constant pesos of 2002)
Year Mayor Expenditure in road maintenance Percent Change from
and construction previous year
1992 J. Caicedo/J. Castro $88.5 -26.6%
1993 J. Castro $229.4 159.4%
1994 J. Castro $365.9 59.5%
1995 A. Mockus $206.6 -43.5%
1996 A. Mockus $449.2 117.4%
1997 A. Mockus $473.1 5.3%
Source: Mayor column from Gilbert and DAvila (2003, p. 34); Expenditure figures from SHD (2003, p.
40); and calculations by author.
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Chapter 10
A Philosopher in the Mayor's Seat
The third round fought between pro-metro and pro-bus proponents took place during
the administration of Mayor Antanas Mockus. Mockus found upon arriving to the
mayor's office the concession contract with Metrobes. Mockus also found President
Samper's proposal to build a metro system with heavy support from the national
government. The Metrobds project encountered many obstacles and was finally
abandoned. This could have strengthened the position of the metro project if it had
not been for a series of planners who argued the metro was not a good solution for
Bogota's mass transit problems. Planners' arguments convinced Mockus, who fought
hard against the metro proposal.
The election of Antanas Mockus and some of his views on
planning and politics
The Liberal Party had had comfortable majorities in most of the elections held in
Bogota until 1994.1082 The Liberal Party had only lost when it presented more than
one candidate, as when Andrds Pastrana won the election in 1988. For the 1994
election the Liberal Party presented a single candidate, Enrique Pefialosa, and yet it
lost the election.083 The winning candidate was Antanas Mockus (Figure 1, above).
Running as an independent, Mockus obtained 492,389 votes or 64.5% of the vote.1084
Mockus had never been elected to office before.
It is important to examine some of Mockus' views on planning and politics to
understand why planners in general played a critical role during his tenures as mayor
of Bogota (1995-97 and 2001-03).1° 85 First, Mockus-a mathematician with graduate
1082 Botero (1998, p. 144).
1083 Botero (1998, p. 143-4); and Querubin, Sanchez, and Kure (1998, p. 133).
1084 Botero (1998, p. 143-4). The liberal candidate, Enrique Peialosa, received 30.1% of the vote and
the conservative party candidate, Carlos Moreno, 2.7%.
1085 Mockus' views on planning and politics are based on my interview with him (October, 2003) where I
specifically asked him how he made decisions and what factors he took into consideration.
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studies in philosophy' 08 6 -believes that public policy should be the result of sound
argumentation and not the product of negotiation. By sound argumentation he means
that the strength of the technical argumentation should carry the day. Mockus
distrusts negotiation because parties involved tend to reach the decision on the
grounds of a give and take in which technical rationality is lost. "I give you this if you
give me that." As mayor, Mockus therefore tried to create processes that privileged
communication, that allowed arguments to emerge, and that tried to decrease the
impact of political and economic power.1087
Second, Mockus strongly reacts against political pressure. During his tenure,
other politicians, including President Samper, pressured Mockus to favor certain
policies. However, Mockus immediately reacted by saying "hold on a minute, we need
to look at this issue closely." Again, his concern is that this pressure, sometimes
called "political will," can lead to decisions that are not grounded on a solid technical
analysis. Third, and related, Mockus believes that a decision he makes should be
robust. That is, if later on in time a person questions the decision, the person should
agree the decision was a sound one. Conversely, he dislikes thinking that later on in
time people would regard his decisions as capricious. Mockus emphasizes that his
view on decision-making might just mean that he has embedded into this
management style the notion of accountability.
Fourth, Mockus' tenure as mayor was framed by the requirement, for the first
time in Colombian history, to govern according to a government plan or development
plan. The law requires that this plan be crafted and turned into city law during the first
months in office. The law also requires that the plan be consistent with the platform or
program presented by the candidate to the voters during the election.1088 Lack of
compliance with the plan or the program is ground for holding a recall election.108 9
Within this context, Mockus believes that the policies derived from his government
plan should not change as a result of power relations as implementation takes place.
1086 Rojas (2002, p. 8).
1087 To the informed reader, the view of the planning process expressed by Mockus sounds like the
communicative rationality idea by Habermass. Indeed, in my interview with Mockus he mentioned
Habermass and acknowledged this philosopher had an impact on his views.
1088 Secretaria de Gobierno (1997, p. 84); and C6rdoba (2003, p. 41).
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Instead, for him what ought to change is the way of presenting the policies to different
audiences. Each audience has a different context and therefore the information given
to each audience ought to be different to ensure that each audience understands the
policy. But the essence and objectives of the policy remain the same. By
communicating the policy in different ways depending on the context, Mockus seeks
to build consensus regarding the objectives of the policy. However, Mockus
understands that in each context people would justify the policy in different ways.'090
In sum, Mockus' views privilege technical rationality and sound argumentation,
two areas where planners can have an advantage. He dislikes power relations
altering his ideas and policies and uses his power as mayor to bring back a balance in
which the power of the best argument prevails. Finally, Mockus views his role in the
policy process to be analogous to the role of an educator.10 91 As he told me: "I have to
understand what the technical planners tell me and then I have to adapt it to present it
to my constituents. I am therefore a "pedagogy subject" that seeks to simplify complex
ideas so that they are understood in different contexts."092 Finally, while Mockus
encourages his team to present a plan in different terms depending on the audience,
he is also reluctant to allow changes to the plan in response to power relations that
materialize during implementation. The former probably facilitates the work of
planners but the latter makes it more difficult for it introduces rigidity.
"To Form a City:" Mockus' Development Plan
Once in office, Mayor Mockus and his team, advised by planners, crafted the
development plan following the platform laid out by Mockus as candidate. This
platform was centered on the idea of improving citizen behavior and the way citizens
regulated each other's behavior.10 93 The resulting development plan had the name
"Formar Ciudad" or "to Form a City," which Mockus used to transmit the idea that not
only the city but also the citizens were being formed or shaped. To craft the transport
1089 C6rdoba (2003, p. 41).
1090 Mockus has been influenced by the thought of sociologist Basil Bernstein. For an elaboration on
how he understands Bernstein's concepts as applied to policy making see COrdoba (2003).
1091 See Rojas (2002, p. 8-9).
1092 Interview by author with Antanas Mockus (October, 2003).
1093 Cordoba (2003, p. 45); and Secretaria de Gobierno (1997, p. 84).
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part of the plan, Mockus sought the advice of a group of experts that included Fabio
Regueros, former head of GIT, Jorge Acevedo, and German Ospina, among others.
This group met on several occasions to analyze the causes of Bogota's transportation
problems and propose guidelines for solutions. The group of experts ranked the
causes of Bogota's transportation problems. First was the lack of institutional capacity
among the city agencies in charge of the sector in particular STT. The experts
recommended the city to give priority to public transport and to curb car use, the latter
for example by charging for its use.1094
The plan "Formar Ciudad" incorporated in one way or another most of the
recommendations by the experts. The plan's main objectives regarding transport
were, first, to increase institutional capacity of the government agencies in charge of
the transport sector. Second, to create the plans and instruments to cater to the
demand for public transport. The plan estimated capital expenditures in the transport
sector during the three-year term for 857 billion pesos (US$ 980 million
approximately0 95). This included investments in busway facilities, bike paths, and two
new urban roads. The plan also contemplated a megaproject dubbed "integrated
transit system," with capital expenditures for 918 billion pesos (US$ 1.05 billion
approximately). The national government was expected to contribute 30% of the value
of this megaproject. The plan mentioned and allocated small amounts of funds for the
Metrobis and Metro projects.10 96 However, the plan did not mention them specifically
under the megaproject "integrated transit system." Hence, the plan in theory left open
the possibility that these funds went either to bus- or rail-based alternatives.
The Demise of the Metrobus project
Upon taking office, Mayor Mockus disbanded the small planning team headed by
German Silva. Silva together with Mauricio Cuellar had been in charge of the process
that led to signing a contract with Metrobus. Mockus transferred the responsibility to
the STT. STT was a weak agency, as the panel of experts pointed out, and had many
1094 Ardila (1995b, p. 78-82).
1095 Assuming a exchange rate of 875 pesos per dollar (source: www.altin-
focus.com/latinfocus/countries/colombia/colexchq.htm)
o6 Ardila (1 995b, p. 76-78).
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additional responsibilities, such as administering the entire transport system in the
city. STT assigned one planner, Luisa Flechas, to be in charge of the technical
aspects of the process. But the main problems were political. Recall that when Castro
left office, the bus companies had mobilized to impose constraints on the Metrob6s
project. The Metrobus buses could only use corridors built by Metrobas itself; and
Metrobus could only build on corridors not used by existing public transport. One such
corridor was an old railway line connecting the southwest end of downtown to a
densely populated area in the southwest of the city that became known as Corredor
Ferreo (CF) or railway corridor. The CF had two major problems. First, the land of the
CF belonged to the national railway company, Ferrovias, and not to the City of
Bogota. Second, hundreds of families had built squatter settlements along areas of
the railway corridor.
While Ferrovias was willing to transfer the railway corridor to the city
government, it could not give away the land without violating Colombia law.
Negotiations between the city and Ferrovias took place during all of 1995. At the end
the parties agreed to exchange the corridor land for land in the outskirts of Bogota
suitable for the construction of an alternative rail line. On January 12 th, 1996,
Ferrovias transferred the CF land to the city. The city in turn promised to give the land
to Metrobds once other conditions were met.1097 The original agreement between the
city and Metrobds, however, stipulated that the city had to give the land to Metrob6s
on June 8 th , 1995.1098 The city and Metrobus were reluctant to let the project die and
agreed to modify the contract by postponing this and other deadlines.
More important, poor people had built slum dwellings by the tracks on the CF.
These people scavenged garbage in search of recyclable materials to sell. This
community was organized and its work had won an award by the Ministry of the
Environment. Ferrovfas as the legitimate owner of the land initiated the legal
procedures to evict the dwellers. The dwellers responded by filing a series of lawsuits
known in Colombia as accidn de tutela. This type of lawsuit is filed by individuals who
feel state action is violating their fundamental rights-to work, to receive education, to
1097 "Entregan rieles para MetrobUs," El Tiempo January 1 3 th, 1996.
098 El Tiempo "Preocupacion Por Metrobus y Metro." April 9 th 1995.
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due process, etc. On June 13 th, 1995, the Administrative Court of Cundinamarca ruled
in favor of the dwellers. The court argued that no state activity could justify crushing
individual rights established in Colombia's Constitution.1099 The city filed an
appellation to the ruling. Other dwellers filed more tutela lawsuits. The courts had not
resolved the situation by mid-November 1995. As a result, the city and Metrob6s
negotiated a new delay in the date established to begin construction to July 1996.1100
On December 1 3th, 1995, the Constitutional Court of Colombia, the court of last resort
for tutelas, ruled in favor of the dwellers. The ruling directed the city government to
relocate the dwellers into adequate and decent housing.1101
By January 1996 the path seemed finally clear for Metrobas for the land was
owned by the city and the city was relocating the slum dwellers.'102 By then the city
government and Metrobas had agreed to change the type of bus to a smaller one
because of the lower demand on the CF corridor. The city government and Metrobis
agreed to keep the fare at US$ 0.45-still higher than what users paid for the existing
bus services. Finally, Mockus stated to the press that 'While it would take 7 or 8 years
for the first metro line to open, in just three we will have 7 lines of Metrobas with the
same ease to board and descend from the buses as in a metro." Mockus, therefore,
believed the Metrobas project would take off and become the solution Bogota needed.
Despite Mockus' optimism just two months later the Metrobas project entered
into a crisis. The first stage had a cost of US$ 40 million out of a total cost of US$ 150
million for the entire project. The financial scheme contemplated using equity, supplier
loans by Volvo-one of the partners of Metrobas-and loans from international
banks.'103 The Metrobas consortium requested a six-month extension to start
construction on the CF. Metrobas informed that the international banks were
questioning the profitability of the project and were therefore reluctant to issue the
loans.1 104 The city government, represented by Efrain Becerra, secretary of
transportation, offered to help. Becerra requested information on why specifically the
1099 El Tiempo "Cartoneros logran frenar MetrobUs." June 14'h, 1995.
100 El Tiempo, "Aplazado seis meses el proyecto Metrobtis." November 17, 1995.
11 El Tiempo, "Deben reubicar a comuneros: Corte." December 14'h, 1995.
1102 El Tiempo, "Reubicadas 44 familias de comuneros." February 12 , 1996.
1103 El Tiempo, "Antes de diciembre, el Metrobirs no empieza." july 28th, 1995.
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international banks were unwilling to finance the project. By mid-April the Metrobis
consortium had not produced satisfactory answers and Becerra threatened with
canceling the contract.1 105 On April 22nd Metrobus representatives met with Mockus
and other officials to announce Metrobus had been unable to secure the required
loans from international banks. Finally, on the 25th of April the Metrobus consortium
requested the city to cancel the contract because of the total inability to secure the
required funding.1 1 0 6
Several reasons were behind the banks' reluctance to finance Metrobis. First,
the banks questioned the high fare would-be users were expected to pay.1 107
Because the expected users were poor it was probable that demand estimates would
not materialize.10 8 Second, and related, the banks questioned the power given in the
contract to the city government to modify the fare established by Metrobos.1109 As
seen above, Mayor Castro did not agree to set the fare in the contract. He argued
instead in favor of the "supervised freedom" arrangement. Third, the banks
questioned the decision to allow Metrobus and the traditional operators to supply
competing services. The CF corridor did not have this problem. But the subsequent
stages of the project did." 10 Finally, the banks questioned the lack of participation of
the existing bus operators in the Metrobis project.1 1 1 Absent the local operators, the
chances of having a strong opposition to the project were high. In sum, the banks'
reluctance to finance Metrobis stemmed from the high risk embedded in the project.
By the end of April the press considered the Metrobus project dead. The Mockus
administration announced that it would undertake instead the construction of two
busway projects on 8 0 th and 6 8 th streets-two corridors with very high demand (see
Table 16, above). 1112
104 El Tiempo, "El Metrobas choca con su primer escollo." March 18th, 1996.
1105 El Tiempo, "En la cuerda floja proyecto MetrobUs." April 17th, 1996.
1106 El Tiempo, "Razones para no financiar el MetrobUis." April 2 6 th 1996.
1107 El Tiempo, "Razones para no financiar el Metrobils." April 2 6 th, 1996.
1108 Planners had found that the price elasticity of bus users was high and that therefore lowering
MetrobUs' fare would increase the ridership and probably revenue (Epce-HFA, 1994, p. 33).
109 El Tiempo, "En la cuerda floja proyecto Metrobius." April 17th, 1996.
11"' El Tiempo, "En la cuerda floja proyecto Metrobus." April 17th, 1996.
1111 El Tiempo, "Razones para no financiar el Metrobus." April 2 6 th, 1996.
1112 El Tiempo, "Metrobus era una salida al trancon." April 27th, 1996; and El Tiempo, "Las troncales
remplazarian al Metrobus." April 27th, 1996.
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The role of planners
After Mockus disbanded the original planning team, STT was in charge of the
MetrobUs project within the city government. Only one "technical" planner was
assigned to the effort. There was no political part in the planning team. Yet the tasks
were mostly political and not technical. The resulting interaction between planners,
politicians, and stakeholders was highly incomplete. The interaction was mostly with
Ferrovias and the squatter settlers, who eventually agreed to allow the project to
proceed. But planners did not address the key opponents to the project-the bus
companies and bus owners. Absent any interaction, bus companies and bus owners
continued to oppose the project. Further, the MetrobUs project did not change to
include the operators in the scheme. Risk was too high, as the banks correctly pointed
out, and the project was cancelled.113 Put differently, the lack of interaction between
planners and stakeholders led to a coalition against the MetrobUs project. This
coalition was powerful enough to eventually stop the project. Further, the lack of a
capable planning team did not allow the government to lower the power of the actors
that opposed the plan. The final outcome reflects not what the government wanted but
what the most powerful stakeholder, the bus companies, wanted.
President Samper's proposal for a subway in Bogota
Ernesto Samper narrowly defeated Andr6s Pastrana in the presidential elections of
1994. Both candidates were from Bogota. To win the election, Samper promised that
he would finally support Bogota's effort to build a subway network.1114 Samper had
supported the metro project since his days as City Councilor in Bogota, starting in
1984. For him, it was evident that a city the size of Bogota needed a rail-based
solution. During the campaign Jorge Acevedo ended up advising Samper after the
1113 Attentive planners and politicians following the Metrobus saga could have extracted several
lessons for any future attempt to build a high-quality BRT system. First, the local bus operators had to
be part of the project. Without them risk is too high and expecting foreign investors is not realistic.
Second, the project has to use high-demand corridors. This implies introducing the new technology on
corridors such as Caracas Avenue or 8 0 th Street. Third, and related, the new buses have to have
exclusive rights to the busways and face no competition from existing operators. Fourth, the contracts
have to establish clear mechanisms for determining the fare so that risk is minimized. The TransMilenio
BRT system undertaken during Mayor Peialosa's tenure incorporated all of these lessons.
Interestingly, it was not so much the precedent set by Metrobus as the rich interaction between
planners, politicians, and stakeholders that shaped the project to reflect these lessons.
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candidate Acevedo supported in the primaries, Humberto de la Calle, became
Samper's vice-presidential candidate. Samper found the campaign desperate for
winning in Bogota against Pastrana, a former mayor. Samper and his advisors had
decided to set up billboards with a map with the proposed alignment and stations.
Acevedo thought setting up the billboards was irresponsible because the map
lacked any technical backing. Acevedo had long ago concluded that the metro was
not a convenient project because of its cost and because there were other more
important needs to satisfy. But Acevedo also knew that he was an advisor and
Samper the decision-maker. For Acevedo, Samper had the right as a candidate to
propose to build the metro. Acevedo wrote a memorandum to Samper and then met
with him. Acevedo explained that if Bogota was going to have a metro, then it should
be the best possible metro. Acevedo also informed Samper about the impending start
of the Transportation Master Plan. Acevedo had convinced Mayor Castro of
requesting a grant from the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) for
this purpose. Castro did not object because the cost for the city was very small even
though the plan offered no benefits to his administration. Acevedo explained to
Samper that JICA planners would have to collect information that the metro studies
could use. Acevedo, therefore, recommended Samper to offer the metro in the
campaign and once in office carry out good studies to determine the alignment of the
metro. Samper liked the idea and abandoned the idea of putting up billboards with a
non-technical alignment. After the campaign Acevedo stopped advising Samper.
Once in office, President Samper started to honor his promise. Samper knew
he needed the full support of the Mayor of Bogota. As councilor he had seen how the
opposition of Mayor Pastrana had helped derail President Barco's metro proposal.
During Samper's first months in office Jaime Castro was the Mayor of Bogota. The
relations between the two were soured by Samper's attacks to Castro's tax reform
during the presidential campaign.1 115 Moreover, Castro had his own mass transit
proposal underway, Metrobis, and his own pet mega-project, the sewer treatment
1114 Acevedo (1996, p. 32).
1115 See Castro and Garavito (1994, p. 203-206). The most polemic articles of tax reform are articles
154 and 155 of Bogota's charter (Estatuto de Bogota).
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plant. Castro therefore did not support Samper's proposal.'116 Samper had to wait for
the new mayor. Samper, however, saw his purposes curtailed by the election of
Antanas Mockus, who defeated the Liberal Party candidate, Enrique Pefialosa.
Samper now had to make his best effort to convince the new mayor, a philosopher
who believed in the power of the best argument and disliked political pressure.
Samper appointed Jaime Ortiz to represent him in the planning effort regarding
the metro for Bogota. Ortiz had participated in Samper's presidential campaign and
had promoted the idea of building a metro in Bogota. Contrary to Acevedo, however,
Ortiz continued in Samper's government. Ortiz, an architect, had a long experience in
urban and transportation planning issues. Early in the 1970s, Ortiz convinced Mayor
Alfonso Palacio of closing to car traffic a major street for one time, on a Sunday.
Pedestrians and bike-riders were the only ones allowed to use the road. Ortiz wanted
to demonstrate the convenience of this idea. In 1975 he organized a demonstration to
favor and promote bicycle use. In 1976 he conducted the first study to build a bike
path network in Bogota. His efforts to promote bike use paid off. In the early 1980s,
Mayor Augusto Ramirez adopted the policy of closing a series of major arteries to car
traffic on Sundays and holidays and giving them for most of the day to pedestrians
and bicyclists. This policy was a huge success, was copied by many cities in
Colombia and is still in place. Ortiz had been secretary of public works under Mayor
Caicedo. 11 7 Finally,
Ortiz knew several planning studies had to be carried out in order to the get
plans for the metro rolling. First, a feasibility study followed by conceptual designs of
the first stage. The national government would finance for the most part these studies.
Bogota would cover the rest of the cost. The national and city governments, therefore,
would have to agree on the terms of reference for the study before it could start.
Second, the city needed a Transportation Master Plan. Until then, according to Ortiz,
the lack of a Transportation Master Plan hindered the efforts to undertake large-scale
projects and diminished the impacts of those undertaken. For example, Ortiz argued
1116 Interview by author with Ernesto Samper (October, 2003). Press account corroborate Castro's lack
of support for the metro. See for example El Tiempo, "Castro: No a metro por concesi6n." September,
8 th , 1994.
1117 Interview by author with Jaime Ortiz (October, 2003).
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that planners were trapped in the dichotomy of believing that the solution was either
rail based or bus-based. For him, trains and buses have different functions and
therefore serve different elements of an integrated transit system. 1118
Ortiz was therefore President Samper's point man for the political aspects of
the planning process for his pet project, the Bogota metro. Ortiz also had technical
responsibilities, but his task was mostly political. For example, Ortiz had to interact
with city officials and convince them of the convenience of the metro. Implicitly,
Samper assigned the technical aspects of this process to the prestigious National
Planning Department (DNP). DNP is a cabinet-ranking office that analyzes from a
technical perspective the different projects presented to the National Government for
funding. DNP offers recommendations on which projects are convenient. The ultimate
decision, however, is political. Finally, Samper also appointed Ortiz to represent the
national government at the steering committee of Bogota's Transportation Master
Plan, which started during Mockus' tenure as mayor.
Mayor Mockus' response: "planning first, politics second!"
Once Mockus was in office, President Samper approached the new mayor to push his
metro proposal. Samper used the argument that "political will" was what had been
missing in the long history of Bogota's metro.1119 "Political will," therefore, would get
the metro built this time. Samper erroneously thought Mockus was a traditional
politician who would automatically support the metro. Mockus, as seen above, was
the exact opposite. Mockus therefore reacted by "intuitively opposing the metro
proposal because it was a political idea and not the product of technical reasoning."
1120 Mockus told Samper: "You cannot skip technical rationality in favor of political
will." 1 1 2 1 Mockus wanted solid planning studies to determine if the metro was indeed a
good proposal, affordable and that solved a problem.
1118 Interview by author with Jaime Ortiz (October, 2003).
1119 Interview by author with Antanas Mockus (October, 2003).
1120 Interview by author with Antanas Mockus (October, 2003).
1121 Interview by author with Antanas Mockus (October, 2003).
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At the time, the Mockus administration was crafting its development plan-
which framed the city government's actions for the next four years.1122 Mockus called
Mario Noriega, an architect, to help with this planning effort. Specifically, Mockus
asked Noriega to design a methodology for articulating the different elements of the
plan with one another. Mockus also asked Noriega to represent him in the steering
committee of the transportation master planning exercise, which was due to start in
July of 1995. Noriega thus became one of Mockus' top transportation advisors and
helped the mayor develop his positions regarding Samper's metro proposal. Noriega
agreed with Mockus on the necessity of carrying out feasibility and planning studies
for the metro proposal.
President Samper acquiesced to Mockus' desires for without the city's
cooperation his pet proposal would go nowhere. Moreover, Samper's top planner,
Ortiz, and Jorge Acevedo, who had advised Samper's campaign, had recommended
Samper to do a comprehensive study on the metro. The contentious issue between
the national and city government was defining the terms of reference for the study. In
essence, the National Government wanted the study to be for the feasibility and
design of the first metro line. The City Government opposed this on the grounds that
the study had to examine other options, such as busways. Moreover, the City
Government wanted the study to look at an integrated transit system and not just at a
metro line. Underlying the discussion were several technical issues.
First, Mockus and his planners regarded the metro, and in particular the first
line, as an element in the solution to Bogota's mass transit problem. But they knew
the solution involved building an integrated system that included rail- as well as bus-
based solutions. Further, they suspected buses on busways could substitute for the
metro if planned adequately-at least in the short and medium range. Therefore,
busways should be built first; the metro lines should be built in the long term. Samper,
according to several sources, was obsessed with building the first metro line and
1122 The mayoral term at the time was three years. Colombian law, however, orders city governments to
write development plans that include the first year in office of the next term. In this way, the new mayor
will find a plan to execute while the new administration crafts its own new plan. Once this is done, the
new plan is valid as of that date and replaces the old plan. Because the old development plan framed
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thought he would make history in this way. But Ortiz, Samper's transportation advisor,
agreed in principle with the city's view. For Ortiz it was a matter of priority. Would the
metro line be the backbone of the system or would it be buses on busways? For Ortiz,
busways could not do the job. Consequently, the metro line would be the backbone
and it would have to be undertaken first. Samper liked Ortiz's view, which favored his
intention of starting construction of the first metro line during his tenure. Yet the
conflict with the city remained.
Second, the city government was worried about the funding issue. For one, the
finances of the national government were weakening and it was not clear what share
of the costs the national government would actually contribute. For another, the city
feared the national government was interested in funding only the first metro line and
not a share of the integrated transit system. It was clear the city would get a smaller
transfer of funds if it accepted the national government's view. Mockus wanted to
maximize the contribution by the national government to address Bogota's mass
transit problems.1123 Mockus therefore pushed for the idea of building an integrated
transit system. The national government, in turn, seemed to be aware of its
deteriorating fiscal position and wanted to minimize its expenditures.
Finally, Mayor Mockus and Noriega doubted the metro was an effective
solution. Mockus and Noriega thought that because of its high cost, building a single
metro line would absorb most if not all of the funding the national government and the
city government could devote to mass transit projects in the foreseeable future. This
single metro line could cater to eight to ten percent of the city's demand. The
remaining 90% of the demand would not see any improvement in the quality of
service.112 4 On the national government, Ortiz adamantly opposed this view. For him it
was quite amazing that a single metro line could capture as much as 10% of a city's
demand. He pointed out that Mexico City's Subway with a vast network carries only
the budget for that first year, the new administration has to go to the City Council to amend the budget
and align it with its own development plan.
1123 See for examples of this: El Tiempo, "El metro depende del aporte de la naci6n," June 17'h, 1995;
and El Tiempo, "Metro requiere apoyo de la naci6n," May 2 6th, 1995, and El Tiempo, "Habr. metro si la
naci6n pone el 60 % para el SITM," May 17 'h , 1995.
1124 See Mockus (1995, p. 158-9); and interview by author with Antanas Mockus (Octobe 2003).
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16% of the total demand.1 2 5 Table 21 shows some statistics on metros in Latin
America available at the time of these events, which tend to corroborate Mockus and
Noriega's views.
These three issues framed the controversy between the national and city
governments throughout Mockus' term. As a result, there was an important
controversy around how to structure the terms of reference for the metro study.
Planners consulted with their bosses but they could not reach an agreement. Samper
and Mockus had to meet several times to discuss the issue. Finally, late in September
1995, the City and National governments agreed on the terms of reference. The study
would emphasize the metro but would examine the issue from an integrated transit
perspective. 1 2 6 The study would also examine the feasibility of building a metro
system, determine the first line to be built, the cost of the project, and its impacts.1127
In mid December 1995 the national government opened the bidding process for this
study.112 8 A consortium of three firms submitted the winning proposal. These firms
were Ingetec (Colombia), Bechtel (U.S.A.), and Systra (France) (IBS heretofore).11 2 9
On July 29, 1996, IBS started working on the first phase, locally known as Phase 0.
Mayor Mockus appointed Mario Noriega to represent him in the steering committee
for the metro study. President Samper appointed Jaime Ortiz to that steering
committee.
1125 Interview by author with Jaime Ortiz (October 2003).
1126 Interview by author with anonymous source; and interview by author with Jaime Ortiz (October,
2003).
1127 El Tiempo, "Metro, via libre para el estudio de factibilidad," September 2 1 st, 1995.
1128 El Tiempo, "La naci6n abri6 licitaci6n para estudio sobre el metro en Bogota, December 1 2 'h , 1995.
Interestingly, the Ingetec's CEO and Director of the Metro study had participated in Samper's
presidential campaign as an advocate in favor of the metro.
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Table 21. Length of metros in Latin America and share of public transit demand
City Population Length of metro Share of public transit demand(Millions) lines Metro Buses Other
(Km)
Mexico 18.5 135.7 25% 71% 4%
Sho Paulo 15.0 28.5 12% 77% 11%
Rio de Janeiro 13.0 26.9 7% 71% 22%
Buenos Aires 9.0 35.4 6% 86% 8%
Santiago 4.5 27.4 16% 84% 0%
Caracas 3.5 28.0 11% 89% 0%
Source: Figueroa and Henry (1990, p. 16 and 18).
Note: Shares by mode of total demand are lower because figures only include public transit.
Figure on buses refers to buses of different sizes but all running on internal combustion
engines. The figure for "other" can include commuter rail and trolley buses.
Finally, it is worthwhile to point out that in November 1995 President Samper
inaugurated the first metro line in Medellin. Construction had started in 1986, funding
had run out in 1989, and works were stopped until 1993. In 1993 Samper was
ambassador to Spain and was instrumental in carrying out the negotiations with the
Spanish and German firms in charge of building Medellfn's metro. The cost of this
project had escalated from US$ 654 million, to over 2 billion." 30 Further, planners at
the National Planning Department had lowered demand expectations significantly to
300,000 passengers a day from above 900,000 a day when the decision was
made.1131 The significant cost increases and the lowered demand made many
planners wary about building a metro in Bogota. Planners, and some politicians,
feared Medellin's experience would be somewhat repeated by Bogota's metro.
Mockus commented in this regard: "[The Medellin Metro] was a project started without
having answered a series of questions and because of that it has had enormous cost
increases."11 3 2 Samper, on the other hand, used the opening of the Medellin metro as
an opportunity to reinforce his position that Bogota ought to have a metro. But
Samper did not stop there. He also gave hope to cities such as Cali and Barranquilla
of receiving support from the national government for their metros.1133 /1134 The Cali
1130 El Tiempo, "Doce anos para montarse al metro," April 30th , 1998.; and El Tiempo, "Metro paisa
entra a vias judiciales," April, 30 th, 1998.
1131 Acevedo et al (1993, p. 42).
1132 Mockus (1995, p. 159).
1133 See El Tiempo, "Habra metro en otras ciudades," December 1 s t , 1995; El Tiempo, "Habra metro
para Bogota," December 1', 1995; and El Tiempo, "Metro espera el si de Samper," August 29 th, 1995.
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metro, moreover, was strongly supported by Jose A. Ocampo, Samper's finance
minister. Soon after, therefore, the Cali metro was in the national political agenda.
The Transportation Master Plan
The transportation planning exercise started in July of 1995 and officially finished in
December of 1996.1135 Planners followed standard practice by collecting a significant
amount of information to diagnose the operations of the transportation system in
Bogota. With this understanding, planners prepared 17 alternative plans for proposals
that combined different projects, rail, bus, and highways, and that achieved different
results.1136 Planners presented these alternative plans in several meetings to Mayor
Mockus, his top advisers and cabinet throughout 1996. According to sources, Mockus
was very interested in learning about the impacts of metros and of busways. Mockus
questioned during hours the planners trying to see if the "rational" decision was to
support the metro or busways. Mockus concluded that busways could satisfy the
mobility needs of the city in the medium term. A metro line might be needed in the
long run. Mockus' conclusion seems to match his previous views. But what is
important is Mockus' lengthy questioning of the planners to convince himself that
choosing buses over rail was a "rational" decision.
The final plan proposed 67 different components with a total cost of US$ 9.2
billion. If adopted, the implementation of the plan demanded the support of eight
consecutive administrations. The proposed projects were classified in three broad
areas. First is the traffic management component, which included improved traffic
controls, parking schemes, and even plans for a bike path network.1137 Second, the
plan proposed improving the road network by widening some roads, building 400 km
of new roads, and a series of over passes. The most controversial proposal was
building elevated highways over six major streets, including 7 th Avenue, a relatively
elegant street that crosses the expanded downtown.1138 The third element of the plan
1134 Cali had requested funds for its metro in June of 1995 (El Tiempo, "Metro espera el si de Samper,"
August 2 9th, 1995).
JICA-Chodai-Yachiyo (1996b, p. i).
1136 JICA-Chodai-Yachiyo (1996a, p. 235-252).
1137 See JICA-Chodai-Yachiyo (1996a, ch. 13).
1138 See JICA-Chodai-Yachiyo (1996a, ch. 11).
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pertained to mass transit. ' 13 9 In the short range the plan proposed measures to
reorganize the more than 700 bus routes-formal and informal-into fewer routes
following a trunk and feeder pattern. The plan also called for changing the fare
structure to one that charged proportionally to distance traveled.1140 This would hurt
the poor who lived outside the central business district. Accompanying these two
measures was the proposal to transform the bus companies into operators
responsible for service. As seen above, bus companies rent out routes to bus owners.
To achieve the change, the plan proposed creating a fiduciary company. Bus owners
would trust the buses to this company. The trust would then rent out the buses to the
bus companies.11 41 Finally, in the short range the plan proposed the construction of a
network of busways and bus lanes that covered the main transportation corridors in
the city.'1 42 The plan estimated the cost of the busway network at only US$ 44
million.1143 The planners scheduled this short-term component, including the busway
facilities and the transformation of the bus operators, to be completed by the end of
the year 2001.1144 While the Transportation Master Plan is rich in measures such as
transforming the bus operators it lacks any specificity regarding how these measures
would be achieved.
In the medium and long range, the master plan contemplated the construction
of fully segregated busways and one metro line. The plan forecasted that by the year
2020 the number of transit trips would have increased by 35% and length of the
average trip would have increased by 23%.1145 These increases meant that the
busways built until the year 2001 would not be able to cope with the demand. The
plan argued that busways such as the one on Caracas Avenue had a maximum
capacity of 30,000 passengers per hour per direction. For demand above this value,
the plan recommended building heavy rail lines. However, because the city could not
afford building so many metro lines, the plan proposed to increase the capacity of the
1139 See JICA-Chodai-Yachiyo (1996a, ch. 12).
1140 JICA-Chodai-Yachiyo (1996a, p. 304-6).
1141 JICA-Chodai-Yachiyo (1996a, p. 305-6).
1142 call the proposed facilities busways because they do not meet the specifications for being BRT, as
I defined it in the introduction.
1143 JICA-Chodai-Yachiyo (1996a, p. 302).
1144 JICA-Chodai-Yachiyo (1996a, p. 388).
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busways by introducing grade separations at intersections. As demand continued to
increase, the plan established that heavy rail, complemented by busways, were the
only way to provide adequate service.11 46
Mayor Mockus wanted feedback from outside experts and organized a seminar
to discuss the Transportation Master Plan in January of 1997. Local experts such as
Acevedo and Pach6n focused on questioning some of the results of the demand
modeling exercise. They also questioned some of the proposed projects, including the
elevated highways. The Mockus administration also invited some foreign experts. One
was Slobodan Mitric a senior transportation planner at the World Bank. Mitric argued
that the city should select the elements of the plan it found more attractive and reject
or postpone the remaining ones.1147 Carlos Ceneviva, then in charge of the upgrading
of Curitiba's bus system (see chapter 7, above), commented that the proposed plan
for Bogota was highly scientific, theoretical, and profound. But he cautioned: "I hope
this is the last time you organize a seminar to discuss a plan. The next time you invite
me, it should be to show me the results." Typical of Curitiba planners, Ceneviva's
advise was to start implementing something, receive feedback, adjust the plans and
give political momentum to the implementation of the resulting plans.1 48
Thanks to the seminar, Mockus discarded the idea of transforming the plan into
a city law-to be enacted by the City Council. Instead, Mockus held more meetings
with the Japanese planners and with Mario Noriega and Fabio Regueros. The
discussions that followed seemed to have paid attention to Mitric's advise. The
decision was to emphasize the busway component of the plan and a couple of road
construction projects. The remaining components of the master plan were not rejected
but simply not given strong attention.11 49 Mockus ordered more planning studies and
the preparation of a proposal to update the Master Road Plan-the law that guided
145 See JICA-Chodai-Yachiyo (1996a, p. 308).
1 146 JICA-Chodai-Yachiyo (1996a, p. 308-17).
1147 El Tiempo "Estas son las supervfas para salir del tranc6n," May 8th, 1997.
1148 Interview by author with Carlos Ceneviva (February, 2004).
1149 According to sources, Mockus did not reject the elevated highways because he thought they were
needed to attract foreign direct investment. Expatriates living in Bogota would own cars. The highways
were therefore a way of saving time for these people. In this way Bogota would be competitive in the
international arena.
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road construction in Bogota. The idea was to introduce the busway projects in this
law. 1 50
As part of these discussions a new idea circulated. It was to introduce on the
new busways buses with doors on the left side that passengers would board from
stations located in the median. This would save space and require a narrower
alignment for each busway. Mockus and some planners thought they could apply this
idea to the 80th Street busway project, then under design as part of the World Bank
loan to Bogot. 11 51 Fabio Regueros argued that introducing left-door buses only on
the 8 0 th Street corridor would hurt passengers who wanted to reach the downtown
area. The left-door buses would not be able to use the facilities on the Caracas
Avenue busway, which required doors on the right side. Passengers would therefore
have to transfer, losing time in the process. Further, introducing this change on the
Caracas Avenue busway would take time because it affected the most profitable
corridor in the city. Operators would be reluctant to accept the change. Politically
speaking, therefore, the idea was difficult to carry out in the remaining months of the
administration. Mockus and his planning team abandoned the idea of changing the
type of bus.'152 There is no evidence that the idea of using buses with doors on the
left side was ever made public by the Mockus administration. The designs for the new
busway on 80th Street followed the same pattern as the existing Caracas Avenue
busway. 1153
1150 However, there is no evidence that the busway plan went beyond the physical component, which
as seen has some advantages in terms of improving bus flow. But absent the institutional
transformation that BRT demands, building busways can have serious drawbacks in terms of quality of
service and negative impact on the environment. See Alcaldfa Mayor de Bogota (1997).
1151 During 1996, the Mockus administration had reached an agreement with the World Bank regarding
the loan that the Pastrana administration had originally sought in 1990. This loan had been on standby
because the city government did not comply with some of the requirements imposed by the Bank,
among others. Mayor Mockus introduced the changes and the World Bank allowed the loan to proceed.
This project contemplated the construction of a busway on the 80th Street corridor. See Duarte
Guterman & Cia. Ltda. (2002, p. 3, 12-15); and World Bank (1996, p. 15).
1152 Inteview by author with Fabio Regueros (October, 2003); and interview by author with anonymous
source.
1153 El Tiempo, "En que van las troncales?," May 8 th, 1997.
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The Metro Study
Parallel to the events in the last section, the national government had been preparing
the ground for the president's pet project, the first metro line. Recall that late in
December of 1989 Congress had passed the Metro Law. This law capped the
contribution of the national government for any heavy rail system to 20% of the total
cost. This law limited Samper's capacity to convince the mayor of Bogota of
undertaking the metro, for the city would cover the majority of the cost. The Samper
administration presented a project to Congress to amend this law. Congress approved
it on August 1996 and it is known as law 310 of 1996. The law establishes that the
national government has to contribute a share equivalent to between 40 and 70
percent of the debt service of the project. This law, however, is confusing for it does
not clarify exactly what debt service is.154 As a result, from this point on, planners and
politicians for the city government will understand something different than planners
and politicians for the national government.
During 1996 the national government also signed a contract with Ingetec-
Bechtel-Systra (IBS) to carry out the planning studies for the integrated transit system,
which included the first metro line. IBS finished the first phase of this study in
February of 1997. The study found that an integrated transit system combining rail
and busways was needed to address the mobility needs of Bogota. The study found
that the city government could afford the undertaking of the integrated transit system,
with some help of the national government within the terms of Law 310. The study
proposed building three metro lines. The first line would have a cost of US$ 1.7 billion
and would serve 300 million passengers per year.1155
Mockus and his planners received this study. Immediately they questioned
IBS's alignment for the metro lines. The point was that the network looked too similar
to the one proposed in 1981.1156 The 1981 network had assumed that the City of
Bogota would develop toward the southwest. But Bogota developed toward the south
and southeast. And yet, IBS planners, for reasons not well understood chose an
1154 See Ley 310 de 1996.
1155 See IBS (1997a, esp. p. 61-83, and 101-103).
15' See IBS (1997a, p. 21-29); and JICA-Chodai-Yachiyo (1996, p. 229).
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alignment that did not reflect this development. Second, the first metro line was
designed to cross downtown along 7th Avenue. However, it was Caracas Avenue the
main public transportation corridor in the city. BS planners and Jaime Ortiz argued
that this choice was to prevent the city from collapsing during the construction of the
metro line. Noriega argued that if so much money was going to be spent, then the
metro should go precisely along Caracas Avenue.
Reading the metro study between the lines, one gets the feeling that IBS
planners choose 7 th Avenue instead of Caracas Avenue because of the record of
metros in the third world. Typically, metros are planned under the assumption that
competing bus routes will be removed from the metro corridor. Yet this is rarely the
case.11 5 7 Because IBS planners were already thinking about a concession scheme for
procuring the metro, competition had to be minimized. One way to do this was by
choosing 7th Avenue. In turn, because of the reduced competition in that corridor,
demand estimates could be more reliable. But actual demand would be lower than on
Caracas Avenue.
Mockus by then was convinced that busways were the best alternative and that
the metro should be built years later when demand truly justified it. Buses on good
busways could handle Bogota's demand. As Mockus told me, '"The Transportation
Master Plan showed that busways were a good option. I felt on safe ground choosing
them over the metro."'1 58 At one point, Mockus asked IBS planners to prove that US$
2 billion spent in the metro were better than spending the same amount in busways.
According to witnesses, IBS planners were unable to provide a convincing answer.
Mockus, moreover, was not convinced that the national government would be able to
afford its share of the metro's cost. Mockus told me: "Some people in the national
government told us to sign on the metro. When I questioned the affordability of the
project, they replied, "who cares, someone else will pay for it." But in government you
have to think about future generations. The metro [in Bogot's case] infringes
people's freedom because it will take generations to pay for it. In water and energy
you have to build specific facilities to address demand. But in transport there are
1157 HFA and TRL (1989, p. 6.8-6.16); Figueroa and Henry (1989); and Epce Ltd.-HFA (1994b, p. 31).
1158 Interview by author with Antanas Mockus (October, 2003).
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options, you have alternatives to choose from."'159 Finally, President Samper and
Mayor Mockus met several times to discuss the metro and the integrated transit
system. Samper, according to sources, in one meeting said: "Antanas, let's make
history by starting the construction of the metro." Mockus replied: "We will make
history if we build busways, not the metro."1 160
Mockus resigns: Paul Bromberg Appointed Mayor
On April 1997 Antanas Mockus resigned to the mayoralty to run for President of
Colombia.'161 Surveys indicated that Mockus had a chance at winning the presidential
election in 1998. Regarding his resignation Mockus told me: "I made on my own the
decision to resign. Afterwards I felt ashamed of not having consulted the citizenry. It is
the only major decision that I have made without asking anyone and I had to ask for
people's forgiveness." Indeed, many people felt Mockus had abandoned his job as
mayor to further his personal agenda. In so doing people felt Mockus had endangered
the city's governance.1 62 Mockus ended up as vice presidential candidate of Nohemi
Sanin, and independent candidate. The Sanin-Mockus formula almost makes it to the
second round of the election.'1 63
By Constitution it fell on President Samper to appoint the new mayor of Bogota,
who would complete Mockus' term. Samper appointed Paul Bromberg, physics
professor at the National University of Colombia, who was part of Mockus' cabinet. By
law Samper had to appoint someone of Mockus' political group. In the transportation
agenda, Bromberg received four items. First, Bromberg received further refinements
1159 Interview by author with Antanas Mockus (October, 2003).
1160 Time will prove Mockus right to some extent. While Mockus speaks about busways, there is little
evidence that he was thinking about a fully-fledged BRT project as the plans for constructing the 8 0 th
street busway indicate. Mayor Peialosa, on the other hand, understood very well from before taking
office what BRT implied and had his own proposal in that regard-the TransMilenio BRT project.
Pefialosa became world famous in the field of transportation planning. After leaving office, planners at
the World Bank, World Resources Institute and ITDP have hired Pefialosa to present his experience in
Bogota. Their intent is to have Peialosa convince key decision-makers. According to several sources,
Perialosa has been instrumental in helping cities such as Lima and Hanoi to decide to undertake BRT.
1161 EFE "Fiscal aspira a la presidencia," may 8 th, 1997. In
http://www.caipe.ora.pe/rii/BASES/NOTICIAS/col/noti12.htm. Colombian law does not allow sitting
officials to run for office without resigning six months to a year before the election.
1162 Botero (1998, p. 145).
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of the Transportation Master Plan and continued to interact with these planners. By
mid-December 1997, weeks before leaving office, Bromberg and JICA signed a
cooperation agreement to carry out feasibility and design studies for six of the
busways established in the Transportation Master Plan. This study was scheduled to
begin in April, during Enrique Pefialosa's term.' 16 4 The study was never carried out as
intended because Mayor Peialosa had his own plans for a BRT system--
TransMilenio. 165
Second, Bromberg received the 8 0 th Street busway project. The city
government had hired an engineering firm to carry out the designs and was
purchasing all the necessary properties in the areas where the corridor was not wide
enough. The project had a length of 10.3 Km. and an initial cost of US$ 50 million.
Due to increases in the cost of property takings, the new estimate was US$ 96 million
approximately.1 66 The Bromberg administration expected to contract the works
before its term in office expired, something they barely achieved.1167 The designs for
this busway were similar to the Caracas Avenue busway. Therefore, the new busway
had only positive consequences for the existing bus operators who could continue to
use their old buses. They voiced no opposition to the new busway. The user,
however, would experience little improvement in service other than speed gains since
the project was only for a busway and not for a BRT system-i.e. there would be any
institutional change.
Third, Bromberg received the project to change the city's road plan by enacting
a new city law. The old road plan, enacted in the early 1980s,116 8 contemplated the
construction of roads for mixed traffic but never mentioned busways. The proposed
1163 Colombia' Constitution establishes the ballotage system for the presidential election. In this system,
if no candidate gets more than 50% of the votes, there is a second election between the two
candidates with the highest vote counts O'Donnell (1 997a, p. 294).
164 El Tiempo, "Firma acuerdo para estudiar seis troncales," December 18h, 1997.
1165 Pefalosa instead asked JICA planners to look at the feasibility of building a highway through the
high mountains that border Bogota on the east. Pefalosa believes is essential to study this road, which
will provide access to the eastern plains of Colombia and eventually Bogota new airport. Pefalosa
wanted this road to have also busway lanes for TransMilenio buses (Interview by author with Enrique
Pehalosa, June 2004).
1166 El Tiempo, "En qu6 van las troncales?," May 8th, 1997.
1167 El Tiempo, "ICA hara primer tramo de troncal de la calle 80," January 3 rd , 1998.
1168 Acevedo (1996, p. 34).
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road plan incorporated the results of the Transportation Master Plan. The new road
plan proposed the construction of 15 busways, 62 grade-separated intersections, and
15 transfer terminals, as well as the construction of a couple of roads for mixed
traffic.1169 Bromberg presented the plan to the City Council in early November of
1997. At one of the hearings in the City Council, the Chamber of Commerce strongly
objected to the plan on the grounds that it proposed to build busways. For the
Chamber, the metro was the only valid solution to address mass transit needs and the
plan did not mention it.1170 Mayor-elect Peialosa agreed with the Chamber's position.
Pefialosa, moreover, argued that a decision as important as a new road plan should
be made by his administration and not by one with only six weeks in office left.1171 The
City Council rejected the plan.1172
Finally, Bromberg had to handle the negotiations between city and national
government regarding the metro line and the integrated transit system. President
Samper approached Mayor Bromberg by suggesting they should reach an agreement
by August 6 th, Bogota's birthday.1173 "It will be our birthday gift," said Samper. In the
negotiations participated Samper and Cecilia Lopez, the head of the National
Planning Department. For the city participated Mayor Bromberg and Mario Noriega,
who had continued in the Bromberg administration together with most of Mockus'
team. Samper offered to support 70% of the cost of the project. Samper assumed the
cost of the project was around US$ 1.5 billion dollars, as the IBS pre-feasibility study
1169 See Alcaldfa Mayor de Bogota (1997). Again, the plan implied only the construction of busways but
did not address the institutional transformation that BRT requires.
1170 The Chamber of Commerce's position emerged from a competitiveness study it contracted to
Michael Porter's Monitor International (See Camara de Comercio de Bogota, 1998, p. 36-39). The
resulting study criticized the lack of decision on a metro and argued that Bogota's competitiveness was
hindered by the lack of a good mass transit system. For Monitor planners, the only option was the
metro.
1171 Peialosa's program-his electoral platform and basis for his government plan-contemplated
revising the city road plan. Specifically, Pehalosa wanted to have a plan that would allow the widening
of many roads (See Peialosa, 1997, p. 39).
1172 Peialosa, however, lobbied hard to get the City Council to increase the tax on fuels to 20%, as I
detail below.
1173 The City of Bogota was founded by Gonzalo Jimenez de Quesada an Spanish conquistador in
1938. The original name was Santa Fe de Bogota. With independence from Spain, the name was
changed to Bogota. The Constitutional Assembly of 1991 reinstated the Santa Fe de Bogota name. A
subsequent constitutional amendment restored the post-independence name of Bogota. This is the
name at the time of this writing.
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had determined."7 4 Bromberg replied that the city could not invest 30% of such an
expensive project. Bromberg suspected, moreover, that the costs were
underestimated. Indeed, IBS's next studies estimated the cost of the first metro line at
US$ 2.5 billion.1 17 5 Bromberg 's proposal was to have the national government
contribute 70% of the cost of the integrated transit system, which included both
busways and the first metro line. Samper replied that the national government could
not finance road construction in Bogota. Bromberg said that the law spoke of
integrated transit systems and not of metros specifically. Bromberg added that funding
70% of the integrated transit system was equivalent to paying for 90% of the metro
line. Samper did not agree for he wanted the metro and not busways.1 17 6
By October 1 st, 1997, the possibility of reaching an agreement between the two
levels of government was one step closer. Bromberg announced that the first metro
line was part of the approaching agreement. Bromberg and Samper, however,
announced that the full package of projects to be included in the agreement was not
completely defined. Bromberg complained that the planners for both levels of
government had not been able to reach an agreement because they were combining
technical (i.e. which projects) and financial issues (i.e. the projects' cost). Samper and
Bromberg agreed to separate the two and have the planners work on which projects
to include in the package. Once this was agreed, planners and decision-makers would
look at the financial aspects.11 7 7
By October 1 5 th the planners for both levels of government submitted a
technical proposal that included the first metro line, 15 busways, grade-separate
intersections, and terminals. The cost was US$ 4.3 billion.1178 On that day Bromberg
sent a letter to Samper proposing that the national government funded 90% of the first
metro line, equivalent to 51% of the integrated transit system's cost.117 9 The city
1174 See IBS (1997a, p. 58).
1175 See IBS (1997b and 1997c, esp. ch. 5, p. 5-14).
1176 Interview by author with Paul Bromberg (November, 2001).
1177 El Espectador, "Definen primera lifnea metro," October 2 n", 1997; and El Tiempo, "Metro sf, pero
como parte del sistema," October 2n d , 1997. The technical teams included Dario Hidalgo, among
others, for the national government, and Luis F. Rubiano, and Jorge Rodriguez Mancera, among
others, for the city government.
1178 El Tiempo, "Se abre debate por financiaci6n del metro," November 2 7 th , 1997.
1179 El Tiempo, "Las troncales primero que el metro," November 11 h, 1997.
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government would cover the rest of the cost. At a meeting, Bromberg, advised by
Noriega, stated his position that the national government should fund the busways
first. Samper did not like this position and chose to wait to see the outcome of the
elections for mayor just 11 days away.1 80 On November 10 th , 1997, Bromberg
reiterated his position to undertake first the busway component of the plan. Bromberg
told the press 'While many are obsessed by the metro, in the year 2006 [expected
opening day] the metro would mobilize only 8.6% of the population. The metro can be
postponed." 1 81 However, Bromberg made his proposals to a president who was now
paying attention to Enrique Peialosa, elected Bogota's mayor on October 2 6th, 1997.
On November 2 5 th, mayor-elect Pefialosa and Samper reached a tentative
agreement. The total cost of the package was US$ 3.5 billion and included the first
metro line. While Pefialosa acknowledged that other complementary works-i.e.
busways-were needed, the agreement lacked any specificity. Carmenza Saldfas, the
city's treasury secretary, argued the city would have to treble its tax revenue to fund
the agreement.'1 82 Pefialosa had spoken about funding the city's share through a
betterment tax, a historically controversial proposal in Bogota, and by increasing the
gas tax.1 8 3 Peialosa scored a victory on the financial front early in December.
Pefialosa had been lobbying the City Council to approve an increase to 20% of the
gasoline tax and devote half of the funds to the metro.1184 The polemic, nonetheless,
continued. Fedesarrollo, a prestigious economic think tank, questioned the financial
feasibility of the metro.11 85
On December 14 th, IBS turned in its last report, six months behind
schedule.1 1 86 IBS proposed procuring the first metro line through a concession, in
which a private consortium had to design, build, provide the rolling stock, and operate
the system for 20 or 30 years. The concessionaire would procure the finance for the
project in the international market and assume most of the risks. In exchange, the city
1180 Interview by author with Dario Hidalgo, July, 2004.
1181 As quoted by El Tiempo, "Las troncales primero que el metro," November 11t h , 1997.
1182 El Tiempo, "'no hay plata para el metro', C. Saldias," November 27 h,1997.
183 As quoted by El Tiempo, "Se abre debate for financiaci6n del metro," November 2 7th, 1997.
1184 El Tiempo, "El concejo aprob6 la sobretasa," December 10t h, 1997; and Pefialosa (2003, p. 84).
1185 El Tiempo, "Fedesarrollo cuestiona el metro," December 18th , 1997.
186 El Tiempo, "Con retrasos llego estudio del metro," December 22 d,1997.
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and national governments would pay periodically during the duration of the
concession a determined amount to cover capital costs. The concessionaire would
also receive the fare box revenue.11 87 The cost of the project was US$ 2.5 billion and
it would have been the second largest transport concession in the world after the
Chunnel, the tunnel between England and France.
Finally, on December 1 8 th mayor-elect Pehalosa announced, first, that he was
creating a project management office for the metro, to be headed by Alberto
Velasquez. Velasquez was a career businessman who had participated in the
campaign to elect Peialosa.1 8 8 Velasquez announced he hoped that by the end of
1998 the city could sign a contract with the concessionaire.'18 9 Second, Peialosa
announced a radical transformation of the bus system.1 1 90 Pefialosa appointed Carlos
G6mez to head the bus-based initiative. Velasquez and G6mez started working with
very small staffs.1191
The role of planners
The sections above show two factions, pro-bus and pro-metro. Each faction has
politicians and planners. President Samper backs the metro. Samper assembled a
one-person planning team for handling a mega-project as the Bogota metro. Planner
Jaime Ortiz is certainly capable, and knows how to tackle the political side of
planning. But he lacked direct mechanisms to control and interact with the many
planners at DNP that were involved with the technical side of the project. Many of
these planners actually opposed the project, as I show in the next chapter. The
planners that supplied the technical capacity were de facto divorced from the political
planner. There was therefore no "capable" planning team for the metro project. As a
result, the planning for the metro relied on consultants that have little access to the
interaction with other actors and the resulting information that a capable planning can
provide to enrich the consulting exercise. One example is how the consultants chose
the concession to procure the metro. The studies by IBS reveal little interaction with
1187 IBS (1997c, p. 5-2).
1188 Interview by author with Dario Hidalgo, June 2004.
1189 El Tiempo, "Reencauchan empresa del metro," December 19' h, 1997.
190 El Tiempo, "Revolc6n en transporte," December 19 t'h, 1997.
1191 Gomez initially was also in charge of getting the city council to privatize the Phone Company.
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would-be concessionaires. In theory the scheme is adequate, but little is known on
whether it would actually be feasible.
Opposing the metro were Mayor Mockus and his advisor, Mario Noriega.
Noriega and Mockus agree that the metro is not a good solution to Bogota's mass
transit problems. In essence, the metro costs too much and offers little coverage.
Busways seem better for Bogota's conditions-i.e. larger coverage for the same
investment than a metro. Mockus used the Transportation Master Plan to study in
depth the convenience of busways vis-a-vis metros. The conclusion was that busways
could supply Bogota's transit needs in the short and medium term. However, this
planning exercise, like the one for the metro, lacked the benefits the interaction
between planners, politicians, and stakeholders can render. As a result, the master
plan is replete of objectives and proposals but says little on what adopting these
proposals actually entails. For example, the Master Plan shows little interaction with
bus companies regarding the proposed busways and related changes to bus services.
Consequently, the plan embeds a high level of risk and uncertainty. This weakness
will prompt Pefalosa to disregard the master plan, as I discuss in the next chapter.
The controversy on what technology is better for Bogota--metro or busways-
took place therefore between political heavy weights and their advisors. There was
little or no interaction with stakeholders. The interaction with stakeholders can help
assemble a coalition of support. Absent the interaction, for President Samper it is a
matter of "political will," and for Mayor Mockus a matter of "rationality." In reality, I
argue, it is a matter of power represented not as much by politicians' own power but
by coalitions of support. Politicians are parts of those coalitions. Mockus favored
busways but his planners interacted little with the critical stakeholders-the bus
companies. Bus companies implicitly supported busways but absent the interaction
they do not mobilize to offer public support. The metro also lacks a strong coalition.
Mockus can therefore voice his opposition to the metro and still enjoy high approval
ratings that allow him to run for president. Mockus' resignation and Bromberg's
appointment do not change the balance of power. Samper therefore prefers to wait for
the next mayor, Enrique Peiialosa. In a planning community that is divided between
metro-first and buses-first positions it seems as if Pehalosa's power will tilt the
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balance. This is an illusion as the events that follow show. In the end, there was
consensus in the planning community that buses were part of the solution. The
planning community did not agree on the metro and partially as a result of the
planners' division the metro will not be adopted.
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Chapter 11
A Determined Politician in the Mayor's Seat
The election of Enrique Peialosa and his actions even before taking office suggested
to many that Bogota would finally have a metro line. Yet the conflict between pro-
metro a pro-bus factions continued during his tenure. To some extent, the conflict
reached a peak because of the momentum the metro proposal had. In the end, for
diverse reasons the metro proposal was not adopted. Because of the number of
events during Pehalosa's tenure, in this chapter I analyze the metro story only. In the
next chapter I focus on the planning process for TransMilenio, the bus rapid transit
proposal put forward by Peialosa.
The election of Enrique Penialosa and some of his views on
planning and politics
In 1997 Enrique Pehalosa ran for the third time for the Mayor's office in Bogot.1 92 In
his previous two attempts, Pefialosa ran with the Liberal Party. In 1997 he ran as an
independent. Peialosa baptized his political movement "For the Bogota that we
want," or "Por la Bogota que queremos." Peialosa won the election with 46.95% or
the vote or 619,086 votes in an elected that pitted at least six other candidates. 193
Pehalosa is a historian and economist from Duke University and holds a doctorate in
public administration from the University of Paris.'1 94 Before becoming mayor,
Peialosa had been City Councilor, member of the House of Representatives, and
delegate to the Assembly of Cundinamarca,'1 95 the province that surrounds
Bogota.11 96 Pehalosa, however, is a politician very interested in urban affairs. This is
1192 Beccassino (2000, p. 13).
1193 Botero (1998, p. 143-147). Abstentions were at 57.94%, compared with 68.78 and 73.75% in the
previous two elections. Despite this, abstentions were higher than in the 1988 and 1990 elections,
when they reached the level of 40.18 and 52.08%, respectively (Botero, 1998, p. 157).
1194 Unidad de Atencion al Distrito Capital (1997, p. 35).
1195 Pehalosa (1997, p. 35).
1196 Bogota is the capital of Colombia and also the capital of the province of Cundinamarca. However,
the governor of Cundinamarca has no jurisdiction over Bogota. Further, the citizens of Bogota cannot
vote in the elections for governor and state assembly of Cundinamarca. For all practical purposes
Bogota is a separate jurisdiction. As a result, the mayor of Bogota in addition to having the powers
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probably because of his father's influence on him. Pefialosa says in this regard: "In
my education the time my father was United Nations sub-secretary for human
settlements and Secretary-General of the Habitat World Conference had a great
impact. During that time I understood very clearly that the most important topic of our
time, more so in our country, was the urban topic. Everything else was temporary. But
cities, the way they were made or not made, would determine behavior in a
fundamental way. Because people, to a large extent, behave according to the
surrounding environment. Therefore, the kind of cities we build would determine the
civilization, the quality of life..."1197
Pefalosa believes, among others, that dense cities allow a better quality of life
for people have better chances of interacting. Further, Peialosa favors mass transit
over car-based transport. He considers the automobile to be instrumental in the
destruction of cities.11 98 1 199 Pelalosa believes that cities ought to be more egalitarian
not in terms of income but in terms of how cities treat people. For instance, for
Peialosa cars parked over sidewalks in Bogota show how the strong that own a car
can hurt the weak that walk. And it constitutes "flagrant evidence that our democracy
is formal but not real." Consequently, for Peialosa public spaces such as sidewalks,
bike-paths and mass transit systems are examples of an egalitarian society "because
in them we all meet as equals." 1200 Pefialosa, therefore, does not emphasize income
generation among his policies. For him, "if we really want to be happy, we must build
a different way of life, less materialistic, closer to the enjoyment of activities that fill our
spirit, such as growing flowers, painting, reading poetry, sporting, composing."120'
Finally, Pelalosa admires urban planners such as Haussman and Robert Moses
because of the way they transformed Paris and New York City, respectively.1202
attributed to a city mayor by Colombian law also has the powers of a governor (See Colombia's
Constitution arts. 322 and 327 and Bogota's Charter (Decree 1421), arts. 35-38).
1197 As told to Beccassino (2000, p. 104, translation by author).
1198 See Beccassino (2000, esp. p. 104 -106, 37, 17-20). See also Pefialosa (2000, p. 77).
1199 For a description of Peialosa's policies in transport see Ardila and Menckhoff (2002).
1200 Both quotes from Peialosa (1998, p. 26). See also Dallas (2000).
1201 Becassino (2000, p. 25).
1202 Santamaria (2000, p. 16).
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Pefalosa's other views on planning and politics are the following.1203 First, he
believes in the importance of having an active civil society that discusses plans and
proposals to reach a consensus of what is to be done. He says in this regard: "The
important thing, I insist, is to elevate the level of the [public] discussion, that we think
how is it that we can build a well planned city, how to avoid illegal developments,1204
what transport we want for the next 50 years. The fundamental issue is to have a
dream, a vision, because only by knowing what we want to build, we can work to get
there. It is very important to move towards a shared vision, towards a shared dream. I
have my ideas on what it is that we have to do in the city so that we will be happier.
But it might be that the people think that it is another city the one it wants. The
important thing is that whatever the result, it be the result of what we decide and not
simply something that is imposed on us little by little without anyone knowing why,
what were the options, or the consequences."20 5
Second, Peialosa is aware that Colombian democracy is limited. This
limitation has privileged powerful minorities and has eliminated discussion on the
options that exist. Peialosa's ideal of having an active civil society does not happen in
Bogota. Penalosa is therefore aware that as a politician he has to put forward quite
structured proposals that reflect his own view of how the city should be. Peialosa
laments: "the ideal is not to have a mayor with a series of ideas on topics that had
never been discussed before." He then uses as example some of the policies he
undertook such as recovering sidewalks or the importance of parks, or the bike-paths,
or the restriction on car use. For him, the ideal would be that those policies had been
the result of lengthy discussions by society at large. He concludes: "In Switzerland,
each decision would be a process of 10 or 15 years of debates and referendums.
Here [in Bogota] unfortunately there is no time for that, and one has to make a
number of strategic decisions in a rather undemocratic manner."120 6
1203 1 extract Peialosa's views on planning and politics from the lengthy interview he gave to Angel
Beccassino. In my interview with Pefialosa he directed me to the publication of this interview
¶Beccassino, 2000). See also Pefalosa (2001?; 2002?; and 2003).
Approximately 50% of Bogota has been developed outside of city regulations and plans (Pefalosa,
1997, p. 44).
1205 As told to Beccassino (2000, p. 20, translation by author).
206 As told to Beccassino (2000, p. 21, translation by author).
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Third, while Pefialosa argues that he needs to put forward rather structured
proposals, he is aware that there is a political process to follow. This process will lead
to enacting his proposals or a modified version. Pefialosa is therefore aware that
plans or proposals can change in this process. Peialosa says: "Democracy exists
when there is discussion on what are the norms [policies] that we have to establish,
not after the norms have been established. That is, in Congress we can discuss any
regulation, and at the City Council we can decide if cars should be allowed to park or
not on sidewalks, or if informal vendors can work on sidewalks, whatever they want,
we can discuss any topic, but once enacted the job of the Mayor is to enforce."1 207
Further, Pefialosa knows that the political process involves controversies and political
battles that he has to fight to defend his ideas. For Pefalosa, the mayor of a city such
as Bogota "has to make decisions where he will have to confront powerful minorities,
without the benefited majorities supporting or backing the mayor. The mayor has to be
willing to fight many tough battles, with high political costs."1208
Finally, Pefialosa integrates all the previous points by being aware that
planning and politics are linked. A good process demands a solid technical
component. But the decisions are ultimately political. "The most critical decisions are
not made, as many people think, by planners. They are political decisions." Pefialosa
uses an example from the planning of TransMilenio. "I remember a long conversation
with Carlos Emilio G6mez [a planner for TransMilenio] to decide the first routes for
TransMilenio. He insisted that the preferable one was 7th Avenue, because it was the
corridor that implied less conflict with the existing bus operators. I argued that it was
precisely for that reason that we had to do TransMilenio on the Caracas Avenue:
because it was the most difficult route. Frankly, I knew myself and doubted any other
politician would be willing to give the necessary battle afterwards. If I did not fight that
battle, no one would fight it afterwards. Why was I more willing to fight this battle?
Because I was in love with the project, more committed with it. If the most difficult
1207 As told to Beccassino (2000, p. 96, translation by author).
1208 As told to Beccassino (2000, p. 51, translation by author).
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battles are fought at the beginning, it is easier to carry out successfully the
subsequent ones."1 209
To some readers, Pehalosa's views on planning and politics resemble what I
found for Jaime Lerner in Curitiba.1210 For instance, for Lerner and Pefalosa it is
important to have a proposal. Both are also aware that politics and planning are
integrated and that decisions are ultimately political. Both agree that in society in the
developing world action that leads to change is needed; time wasted just hurts the
people. Finally, both agree that as a result of politics a proposal might change in the
path to adoption. All these characteristics favor planners' work and the adoption of
plans. Because time matters, having a proposal almost ready when the window of
opportunity saves time. Further, if the proposal is flexible it will adapt as the political
forces that materialize during the window of opportunity react to the proposal.
There is, however, a difference between Pelialosa and Lerner.1211 It is
regarding the extent to which they effectively use marketing to sell policies and gather
support. People close to Lerner repeatedly refer to him as a marketing genius.'212
Asked about the lack of effective communications to gather support during his term in
office, Pelalosa replied: "I think it is necessary to both seduce [through effective
communications] and impose [through authority]. In effect, it would be much better if
the people were convinced, persuaded, seduced towards change, but there are
certain battles one has to fight...There are certain interests with which one has to
fight...But maybe what's missing is to seduce people so that they understand the
rationale underlying many things that happened here [i.e. the policies Pelalosa
1209 Peialosa (2003, p. 86, translation by author).
1210 See the section 'The appointment of Jaime Lerner and his views on planning and politics," in Part
II, above.
1211 There might be another difference between Peialosa and Lerner. Each values differently the
importance of pursuing from government income generation policies. In his first tenure as mayor,
Lerner implemented the Industrial City of Curitiba, which brought higher paying jobs to the city. As
governor, Lerner brought the Renault assembly lines to the Curitiba Metropolitan Region, turning it into
the second largest car-manufacturer region in Brazil after S.o Paulo. Pehalosa, like Lerner, believes in
the role of public space, good public transit, and good entertainment as the mechanism to attract
foreign direct investment. But Peialosa does not believe in government policies that directly target
income generation, such as promoting industrialization-something that Lerner strongly believes in.
1212 See Sanchez-Garcia (1997).
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pursued]."1 2 13 Put differently, Peialosa is more confrontational and less prone to
assembling coalitions of support than Lerner is.
Further, while Lerner followed a mostly incremental approach spanning a long
period of time, Pefialosa pursued an ambitious policy package that affected many
vested and entrenched interests. For example, Peialosa pursued policies to free
sidewalks from street vendors and cars parked on them.121 4 Retail strongly opposed
the second part on the grounds that it affected business because customers could not
park. Compounded with the problems his administration had at communicating the
mayor's objectives, Peialosa faced strong opposition particularly during the first two
years in office. To make matters worse, the people of Bogota had no point of
reference to understand what Pefialosa's policies meant.1 215 Half way through his
administration Penalosa had an approval rating of 26% and 67% of respondents had
a negative image of the Mayor.1216 Some councilors backed by retail interests
spearheaded an effort to recall the mayor. The Peialosa administration changed its
communications strategy. Part of the change was to have so many construction fronts
at the same time as to force the media and the people to talk about the mayor's
performance.'217 Graffiti sprung up declaring "promises, yes, construction, no."'2 18 As
Peialosa was able to show the results of his policies his approval ratings
improved.121 9 The initiative to recall the mayor did not succeed.122 0 By the end of
January 2000, Peialosa's approval rating had increased to 53% and his negative
image had decreased to 35%.1221 Further, 40% of respondents to a survey said the
Peialosa administration had been excellent.'222
12 13 As told to Beccassino (2000, p. 56-7, translation by author).
1214 For an analysis of Bogota's public space policies see Donovan (2002).
1215 Montezuma (2003, p. 50).
1216 "Peialosa, disparado." www.semana.com.co (2000, edition 924).
1217 Interview with anonymous source.
121 8 Ardila (2003, p. 35).
1219 See Portafolio "Sale el Sol en Bogota," August 1 1 th, 1999.
1220 Montezuma (2003, p. 51).
1221 "Peralosa, disparado," www.semana.com.co, 2000, No. 924.
1222 Montezuma (2003, p. 51).
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"For the Bogota that we want:" Penalosa's Development
Plan
As seen, Colombian law establishes that candidates for mayor have to register a
program or platform. In theory, citizens vote not only for a candidate but also for the
proposals contained in the candidate's program. The program is the basis for crafting
the city development plan, which is enacted during the first months of a new
administration. Not carrying out the proposals contained in the plan are grounds for
holding a recall election. But if a mayor is uncompromising in the quest to achieve the
goals in her platform, then her popularity might suffer. In mass transit, Pefialosa's
program emphasized starting construction for the metro and revamping of the bus-
based transit system. Regarding the metro, Pefialosa argued that if the national
government had contributed US$ 2 billion to the Medellfn metro it should contribute
US$ 6 billion to Bogota's. Pehalosa promised that: "As Mayor, I will lead the pressure
groups to have the Nation [national government] give Bogotanos a fair treatment in
this and other topics."1223 Regarding the buses, Pehalosa argued that even after
building a couple of metro lines, the buses would continue to be the main transit
system in the city. "To reform the bus-based transit system in its entirety is one of the
highest priorities of my project."1 224 Peialosa proposed to give buses a preferential
use of the road network, pay the operators per kilometer logged, have bus drivers
earn a salary and not a commission per passenger, and to have clean and well-lit
buses. He also proposed to have adequate bus stops and allow free transfers
between routes. 1225 /1226
Based on this program, the Pealosa administration passed in the City Council
its development plan dubbed "For the Bogota that we want" in June of 1998. In mass
1223 Peialosa (1997, p. 37).
1224 Peialosa (1997, p. 38).
1225 Peialosa (1997, p. 38).
1226 Pehalosa also proposed to turn into high-speed roads two of the main avenues that run north-
south, Boyaca Avenue and 6 8 th Avenue. His idea was to build bridges at the intersections. Pefialosa
also proposed to review the city road plan. Specifically, he wanted to widen many of the streets that run
east-west. This implied purchasing many properties and demolishing them. Pefalosa also proposed to
define the alignment of all future roads and the metro in order to freeze the properties in the vicinity or
have the city government purchase them. Finally, Peialosa proposed the construction of two large
highways one on the east end and another one on the west end of the city. "It is necessary to promote
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transit, the development plan contemplated the creation of two new city-owned
companies, the Third Millennium Transit Company or TransMilenio Co., and the Mass
Transit Company of Bogota or Metro Co. The first would be the base for the reform to
the bus system and the second would be in charge of the metro. The plan argued that
the metro "was the best alternative to achieve an optimal mass transit system. The
metro constitutes an element to promote the urban renewal and modernization
process that the city requires and deserves."'227 The plan established as specific
goals to purchase all the required land for the metro and to contract its construction
through a concession.12 2 8 The plan made reference to an agreement signed in
February of 1998 between Mayor Peialosa and President Samper in which the
national government agreed to fund 70% of the value of the project.1229 I explain the
events leading to this agreement below.
Regarding the reform of the bus system, the plan elaborated with respect to
Pehalosa's electoral program. Specifically, the development plan spoke about the
construction of busways, feeder routes, and stations. The plan also specified that the
city would define the new type of bus that could operate on the new facilities. The plan
also established that the Third Millennium Transit Co. would be in charge of
contracting out with the private sector the operation of the new bus system. Finally,
the plan established that the operators would be paid per distance logged. The plan
was refining something that Mayor Pehalosa had clear: TransMilenio was more than
building busways, as had happened with the Caracas Avenue project. TransMilenio
was a change of paradigm that implied new contractual and institutional
arrangements, as I show in the next chapter. The plan proposed to build 70 km of
busways and to have the private sector purchase 2500 new buses to serve a demand
of 1.2 million daily trips. While the plan mentioned some possible corridors for the
busways, it did not establish in which order they would be undertaken.1230
a large highway on the west, above the current Cincunvalar Avenue, with several tunnels and large
bridges, through the concession system." (Pehalosa, 1997, p. 39).
1227 Concejo de Bogota (1998, p. 13).
1228 Concejo de Bogota (1998, p. 15 and 26).
1229 Concejo de Bogota (1998, p. 26-7).
1230 Concejo de Bogota (1998, p. 13-15 and 25-26).
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The City Council enacted the "For the Bogota that we want" plan on June 8th,
1998, five months into Pehalosa's term. The total cost of the investment plan,
exclusive of recurrent outlays, was 13.5 trillion pesos1231 (approximately US$ 9.3
billion over 4 years1 2 32 ). This amount was more than twice the cost of Mockus' plan
and was the largest in the city's history.1233 Indeed, Peialosa received the city
finances at their peak (Table 22). Notice, however, how the revenue from the property
tax and sales tax begin to decrease. It is the revenue from new taxes such as the tax
on fuels that ameliorate the decrease in tax revenue.1234 Furthermore, transfers from
the national government and revenue from privatizing city-owned companies
contributed close to 50% of total revenue. Specifically, in 1999, the city received a
windfall of 1.24 trillion pesos of 2002 (approximately US$ 689 million1235). This
amount came from a reduction in capital of the Bogota Power Company.1236/1237 The
good financial situation allowed Peialosa to carry out the largest capital investment
program in Bogota's history (Figure 18). The investment in transportation experienced
a similar situation (Table 23). Finally, it is important to point out that during Peialosa's
term Colombia's and Bogota's economies experienced deep recessions. In the case
of Bogota, income per capita fell from almost US$ 4,000 in 1997 to US$ 2,690 in
1999. Equally worrisome, the share of the population living below the poverty line
1231 Concejo de Bogota (1998, p. 38).
1232 Assuming a exchange rate of 1,400 pesos per dollar (source: www.altin-
focus.com/latinfocus/countries/colombia/colexch.htm)
1233 El Tiempo, "Bogota ya tiene plan de desarrollo," May 27 th , 1998.
1234 Notice the increased importance of the tax on fuels. For a city curbing car use, it is paradoxical to
increasingly rely on revenue generated by car usage. Bogota's finances might be becoming addicted to
gasoline. The fight against the car might be lost unless the economy grows and other sources of
revenue grow.
1235 Assuming a exchange rate of 1,800 pesos per dollar (source: www.altin-
focus.com/latinfocus/countries/colombia/colexch .htm)
World Bank (2003, p. 105-106); and calculations by author.
1237 The government of Bogota owned the Bogota Power Company. The company, however, was in
financial trouble in part because of the mismatched construction of a hydroelectric plant. The solution
was to privatize part of the company. This brought new capital that paid off most of the debt. When
Pefialosa was mayor, the Power Company realized it had too much capital. The shareholders wanted
their capital back to invest in other markets. Because the city government owns slightly above 50% of
the company, half of any reduction in capital goes to the city government. See Orozco (2004); and El
Tiempo "Sirvi6 la capitalizacion de la EEB?," December 1 8th, 1998.
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increased from 42% in 1997 to 55% in 1999.1238 Had it not been for the city's ability to
expend more than ever, the situation would have probably been even worse.1239
Table 22. Summary financial indicators for the City of Bogoti, 1996-2001 (Values in billions of
constant Colombian pesos of 2002)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2,001
A. Total Revenue 2,904 2,991 3,211 4,183 3,400 2,950
(Tax + transfers +
privatization)
Tax revenue 1,527 1,572 1,644 1,508 1,492 1,451
Property tax 379 409 441 441 401 375
Sales tax 701 723 720 611 619 623
Tax on fuels 108 119 158 169 181 187
B. Recurrent expenditures 1,115 1,106 1,108 1,032 990 1,058
C. Capital expenditures 1,929 2,097 2,360 3,258 2,804 2,130
Surplus (Deficit) (A-B-C) (140) (212) (256) (107) (394) (129)
Real increase over 1996 values (1996 values = 100)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
A. Total Revenue 100 103 111 144 117 102
(Tax + transfers +
privatization)
Tax revenue 100 103 108 99 98 95
Property tax 100 108 116 116 106 99
Sales tax 100 103 103 87 88 89
Tax on fuels 100 110 146 156 167 173
B. Recurrent expenditures 100 99 99 93 89 95
C. Capital expenditures 100 109 122 169 145 110
Surplus (Deficit) (A-B-C) (100) (151) (183) (76) (281) (92)
Source: World Bank (2003, p.105); and calculations by author. The City Council approved the tax on
fuels in 1996. The Council also approved to increase the rate for the tax on fuels from 15 to 20%,
effective January 1 st, 1998.
1238 World Bank (2003, p. 105-106).
1239 For example, Fedesarrollo (2000) found that the construction of TransMilenio BRT generated
17,000 jobs per year.
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Figure 18. Evolution of capital expenditures by Bogota's Government, 1996-2001
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Source: World Bank (2003, p.105); and calculations by author.
Table 23. Expenditure in transportation by the City of Bogota.
(Billions of constant pesos of 2002)
Year Mayor Expenditure in road Percent change from previous
maintenance and year
construction
1997 A. Mockus $473.1 5.3%
1998 E. Penalosa $551.3 16.5%
1999 E. Penalosa $975.1 76.9%
2000 E. Penalosa $802.7 -17.7%
2001 A. Mockus $353.4 -56.0%
2002 A. Mockus $352.3 -0.3%
Source: Mayor column from Gilbert and Davila (2003, p. 34); Expenditure figures from SHD (2003, p.
40); and calculations by author. Figures as of 1999 include expenditures in TransMilenio, bike-paths,
and sidewalks, important elements of Penalosa's program.
BRT or metro? Both!
When Penalosa took office two plans were on the city's political agenda. First,
Mockus and Bromberg were considering the network of busways proposed by the
Transportation Master Plan. Second, the metro project promoted by President
Samper. Penalosa had a radically different view on the types of solutions for Bogota's
transportation problems. First, Penalosa quickly rejected the Transportation Master
Plan. Penalosa found the plan's proposals to be very crude and therefore difficult to
implement. For example, the plan's proposal for transforming the bus companies in
Bogota lacked any detail.124o Further, the plan did not consider in depth the impact on
1240 See JICA-Chodai- Yachiyo (1996b, p. 305-6).
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the critical stakeholders, the existing bus companies, nor the way to negotiate with
them.1241 Peialosa also found unacceptable the plan's proposal to charge a bus fare
proportional to distance, which would have the poor subsidize the wealthy. Finally,
Pehalosa did not agree with the plan's proposal to build elevated highways throughout
the city.1242
Second, Peiialosa even before taking office voiced strong support for Samper's
metro proposal. For Peialosa, however, the metro "made no sense only as a means
of transportation because of its high cost." 124 3 It was the metro's urban renewal
impacts and the possibilities to structure the city's growth around its alignment that
justified the project. This made the metro project very attractive for Peialosa.
Pehalosa explains his position: "President Samper wanted to honor his campaign
promise and offered Bogota to share up to 70% of the debt service [for the metro].
The alternative was to reject the President's offer, or receive these resources from the
national government for a project that in any case would benefit the city and whose
construction would contribute to reactivate the local economy."'24 4
But Peialosa also had plans for a bus rapid transit system.12 4 5 Long before
becoming mayor, Peialosa was convinced that bus rapid transit was the future of
mass transit. First, Pehalosa published an article in 1985 with his proposal for
restructuring Bogota's public transportation system. Pehalosa argued "the problem
will not be solved by the mythical metro, which lies beyond the financial possibilities of
the country." He then argued: "if [the city] gives priority to public transport for the use
of roads, it is possible to design an excellent urban transport system, fundamentally
based on buses and trolley-buses."' 2 4 6 Second, Pelalosa had been to Curitiba and
1241 El Tiempo, "Sin plata de Naci6n para troncales," January, 27 th , 1998; and Suburbia, "Estamos
aburridos de ser la vaca de ordeio del pals: Conversaci6n con el alcalde Peiatosa," January 23 rd to
February 5th edition, 1998.
1242 Interview by author with Enrique Peialosa, January 2003; and Pelalosa (Forthcoming, p. 48-50).
1243 Suburbia, "Estamos aburridos de ser la vaca de ordeio del pals: Conversaci6n con el alcalde
Pefialosa," January 23 rd to February 5 th edition, 1998.
1244 Peialosa (2003, p. 84).
1245 Recall the difference between busways and BRT. Busways are just the segregated lanes for buses.
BRT includes busways but adds the transformation of service provision by requiring modern buses,
stations, fare collection technology, and adequate supervision (see Wright, 2002a, p. 2-3).
1246 Peialosa (1985, p. 4).
_____II_ _
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had seen the recently revamped BRT system.'2 4 7 As seen in Part II, these were the
innovations that truly put Curitiba in the international stage. These included the
introduction of the speedy bus service and the tube stations in the early 1990s and
the upgrading of the entire bus system in the mid-1 990s. Getting to know what
Curitiba had achieved had a great impact on Peralosa. "Once I found out about
Curitiba's BRT system and learned the essential about its functioning, to implement
something similar in Bogota became an almost obsessive illusion."1248 In effect,
Peialosa would tell his planners in Bogota: "What I want is what exists in Curitiba but
with overpasses for passengers in all the stations." Pefalosa, however, knew that the
busways-the physical component-were one element. What mattered the most were
the institutional transformation BRT implied and the significant improvement in
service.
Penalosa, therefore, structured his public position in the earlier months of his
administration around the metro, with his envisioned BRT project being a complement
to the metro. If Peialosa could secure an agreement with President Samper, the
construction of the first metro line in Bogota could eventually start. To give strength to
this position and because the BRT project was not yet in the city's political agenda,
Peialosa let the media believe that the BRT project was going to be complementary
to the metro.1249 Privately, however, Peialosa always supported the BRT project.
Therefore, there was a gamble embedded in this strategy. On the one hand, the
strategy could materialize as planned and Bogota could end with a metro line and a
BRT system. On the other, given the high budget deficit of the national government,
the next president might not honor Samper's agreement with Peralosa. In this case,
Peialosa could use the agreement as a bargaining tool to obtain a smaller but
nonetheless significant transfer of funds from the national government to the city. In
the end, the national government had not invested significantly in Bogot in
1247 Pehalosa (2003, p. 83 and 100); and Peialosa (Forthcoming, p. 39). In Curitiba, it was Carlos
Ceneviva, then head of URBS, who toured Pefalosa around the city (Interview by author with Carlos
Ceneviva, February 2004).
1248 Peialosa (2003, p. 83).
1249 See for example El Tiempo, "Se descarrilaria el metro de Pehalosa," January 28 t h , 1998; El
Espectador, "Complemento, los buses," February 13th, 1998; and Portafolio, "Samper se casa con
metro de Bogota," February 13 th, 1998.
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decades.12 50 Further, Peialosa also knew his envisioned BRT project could move
thousands of passengers. Consequently, the metro was not the only alternative to
address Bogota's mass transit problem. In sum, Peialosa could support the metro
knowing that if the process for the metro did not work he still had the BRT project to
rely on. Risk for Peialosa was therefore low in supporting the metro.
Pefialosa instructed his team to negotiate an agreement with the national
government for the funding of the first metro line. In the negotiations participated
Alberto Velasquez and Carlos G6mez, among others, representing the city.
Velasquez headed the metro planning team and G6mez the team for what became
TransMilenio. For the national government participated planners from the National
Planning Department (DNP). Occasionally, President Samper and Mayor Pefialosa
had to meet when planners could not reach an agreement. The city's position was
that the national government should fund 70% of the total cost of the project. This
included any cost overruns. Planners at DNP strongly objected. For them, the national
government should only cover 70% of an agreed value. The city should pay any cost
overrun. The national government and the city of Cali had recently signed an
agreement with these conditions for the funding of that city's metro.2 51 Pefialosa
argued that Bogota's finances could not fund the project in those conditions.1252 To
strengthen his bargaining position, Pefialosa announced on January 2 8 th, 1998, that
all negotiations would cease. Mayor PeFialosa would negotiate with the new president,
to be elected in a couple of months.1 2 53
Samper, however, ordered the negotiations to continue. The crux of the issue
was the cost overruns. Planners and politicians assumed that in the construction of
the Bogota metro there would be significant cost overruns. Therefore, the funding
strategy had to consider how to fund them. The experience of Medellfn's metro had
1250 See for example, Suburbia, "Estamos aburridos de ser la vaca de ordeio del pals: Conversaci6n
con el alcalde Pefialosa," January 2 3rd to February 5 th edition, 1998; and Peialosa (1997, p. 35).
1251 The agreement signed between the National Government and the City of Cali included a series of
conditions and called for additional studies. DNP planners included these terms in an effort to avoid
repeating Medellin's metro history (Interview by author with Dario Hidalgo, July 2004).
El Tiempo, "Se descarrilarfa el metro de Pefalosa," January 28'h, 1998; El Espectador, "Utopfa de
un mes con metro," January 2 9 th, 1998; El Espectador, "Cali "embarcada" con un proyecto," January
2 9 th, 1998.
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clearly impacted Bogota's process for the better. The cost of the Medellin metro had
ballooned to over US$ 2 billion by this point in time from the initial estimate of US$
653 million.1254 The national government had ended up paying most of the bill.1255 The
solution planners found was to transfer any cost overrun to the concessionaire.125 6
Recall that IBS planners had proposed to procure Bogota's metro through a 20- or 30-
year concession. The concessionaire would finalize the designs, find in the
international market most of the funds for the project, build the metro, and operate it
for the specified time. In return, the national and city governments would make
periodic payments to the concessionaire to cover capital costs and make a profit. The
concessionaire would also keep the fare box.
Thanks to assigning construction risk to the concessionaire, the city and
national governments were able to sign an agreement on February 12th, 1998. The
agreement established that the national government would fund 70% of the cost of
the project. The City of Bogota the remaining 30%. The estimated cost for the first
stage was US$ 2.72 billion.1257 In addition, the plan contemplated the construction of
a bus-based system to complement the metro service with 29.1 Km. of busways and
120 of other bus routes. In total the three stages of the metro had an estimated cost of
US$ 4.59 billion. 58 The next step in the process was to get the National Council of
Economic Policy (Conpes) to issue a document assigning resources for the project.
In sum, Mayor Peialosa set the course for his administration in mass transit.
Peialosa rejected the transportation master plan because the plan lacked enough
detail to be adopted and ran against many of the mayor's values. Further, Pehalosa,
1253 The first round of the presidential election were scheduled for May of 1998, and the second round if
needed for June.
1254 El Espectador, 'Transporte masivo a ritmo paisa," January 2 9 th, 1998.
1255 By June 30, 2003, the national government had paid US$ 2.187 billion and the Medellin metro had
paid 460 million, for a total of 2.647 billion. However, law 310, or the metro law, established that the
national government should have only paid US$ 1.059 billion and that the Medellin metro should have
paid US$ 1.588 billion. The difference, 1.128 billion, emerges because the national government
continued to pay the international loans, even though Medellin stopped paying its dues to the national
government in 1997. Source: http://www.presidencia.gov.co/cne/2003/julio/04/04042003.htm
F26 El Tiempo, "Centimetro a centfimetro otra vez arman el metro," January 31st, 1998.
1257 El Espectador, "Bautizo del metro fue en Monserrate," February 13 h,1998; La Reptiblica, "iQue
viva el metro!: Samper," February 13th, 1998; El Siglo, "Primer milimetro del metro," February 13'h ,
1998; and Portafolio, "Samper se casa con el Metro de Bogota," February 13 th, 1998.
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contrary to other mayors, had developed mostly on his own a rather complete set of
policies to change the face of the mass transit system in Bogota. However, for
strategic reasons, Peialosa wanted the metro and the BRT component.12 59 Planners
appear as negotiators for the city and national governments, each set of planners
trying to protect the interests they represent.
Penialosa assembles a planning team for the metro.
Soon after, Mayor Pefalosa and Velasquez started to assemble a planning team for
the metro. By April 1st they achieved this. Dario Hidalgo would be the technical
advisor. Hidalgo holds a Ph.D. in transportation planning. Hidalgo had worked at DNP
between 1988 and 1991 and then after completing his Ph.D. after 1997. At DNP
Hidalgo had participated in the planning of the Cali and Bogota metros. Mauricio
Arcini6gas would be the financial advisor. Arcini6gas had also worked at DNP
between 1987 and 1992, and had worked on finding solutions to the Medellin Metro
financial problems. Hidalgo and Arcini6gas shared the vision that the metro had to be
planned carefully to avoid the recurring problems with metro planning.12 60 And Elena
Escobar would be the communications advisor.1261 Peialosa charged the metro
planning team with the following responsibilities. First, to negotiate with planners for
the national government and get the National Council of Economic Policy (Conpes) to
issue what is known in Colombia as a Conpes document.1 262 The document would
determine the total contribution of the national government to the project. Second,
1258 El Siglo, "Primer millmetro del metro," February 13th, 1998; and Portafolio, "Samper se casa con el
Metro de Bogota," February 13th , 1998.
1259 Peialosa's strategy in transport, as seen, went beyond a BRT and a metro project. It included
favoring non-motorized transport by building a vast bike path network and improving sidewalks. The
strategy also included curbing car use (see Ardila and Menckhoff, 2002).
1260 Interview by author with Dario Hidalgo, July 2004. For problems with metro planning such as cost
increases and lower demand see Allport and Thomson (1989); and Pickrell (1992).
1261 Hidalgo (2000?, p. 1).
1262 The Conpes gathers the president of Colombia and several cabinet members and the head of
DNP, among others. Together they analyze projects requiring funds from the national government,
such as metros. By issuing a Conpes document the Council sets policy that directs public investment.
See http:llwww.dnp.aov.co/03 rod/conpes/Conpes.htm. Congress, however, has the last word when
approving the yearly budget. The budget process in Colombia is radically different than in countries
such as the U.S. In the U.S. congress gets to discuss which project will receive funds and in what
amount. In Colombia, congress only allocates broad expenditure items. Technical planners are the
ones that actually decide how to allocate these funds between projects.
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metro planners were to agree with the national government on a schedule of
payments by both levels of government. I cover the first of these tasks in this section.
First, metro planners approached planners at DNP and the ministry of finance
to negotiate the text of the Conpes document. At a meeting, the minister of finance,
Antonio Urdinola, announced that the fiscal situation of the national government was
precarious. As a result the national government could not contribute resources for the
metro project during the next four or five years. The minister offered, however, that
the national government would cover the additional interest charges this approach
would generate to the concessionaire. Planners for both levels of Government also
agreed to set at 17% per year the rate of return the concessionaire would expect from
its investment in Bogota's metro.1263 Despite the financial situation, Metro planners
requested a small contribution from the national government during the first four years
for the acquisition of the land needed for the project. The minister agreed. Planners
also requested funding for the BRT element of the plan, but there minister made no
decision.
The Metro planners kept Mayor Pefialosa informed of these negotiations. By
this time the planners in charge of the BRT project had slowly advanced in the
concept of what the project would be. Aware that the national government would not
contribute to the metro project during the first four years, Peialosa decided to
introduce changes to the BRT project, by then known as Transmil. Specifically, the
national and city governments had agreed to study the possibility of changing the
metro alignment to the Caracas Avenue corridor. Mayor Peialosa decided not to
carry out these studies. Instead Transmil would use this corridor, the one with the
highest passenger throughputs in the city. Metro planners informed their counterparts
at the national government of this decision. The metro would go instead on 7 th Avenue
and would be underground in that segment. This increased the cost of the project and
the risk for the concessionaire, at the same time that demand went down.
The Conpes issued the document for the Bogota metro on April 2 8th , 1998.
Following standard practice, the document offered a technical justification for
1263 Hidalgo (2000?, p. 2).
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undertaking the project.12 64 The cost of the first metro line was now US$ 3.041 billion,
after a cost update done by the Transportation Research Laboratory. Including the
busway elements, the total cost of the first phase was US$ 3.278 billion, of which the
national government would contribute 70%.1265 The Conpes document indicated that
the national government would only contribute to the project after the year 2003. The
document also called for enacting constitutional amendments and reforming other
legislation so that the national government would enjoy a better financial situation by
the year 2003. The document estimated that enacting these reforms would take three
or four years126 6-but someone other than Samper would be president. The document
mentioned the concession as the only procurement strategy.1267 Finally, the document
suggested that the national government would have to obtain loans to fund its
payments to the concessionaire.1 2 6 8
Concerned about the lack of adequate funding and the concession strategy for
the metro project, a group of students and faculty1269 at the Los Andes University in
Bogota organized the conference 'The Bogota metro: how can it be financed?" The
event took place on May 14th and 15th , 1998. Three of the presenters directly or
indirectly questioned the convenience of the concession scheme. Daniel Rodriguez
analyzed several rail and BRT concessions in Latin America. He concluded: "Projects
with considerable investment support required by the concessionaire, long payback
period, and high revenue risk...are more difficult to finance than projects that require
small capital and a shorter payback period."270 The concession for the Bogota metro
exhibited the characteristics that Rodriguez identified as making it more difficult to
finance a project. Jorge Taboada, a lawyer, argued that it would be very difficult to
find loans in the international market for an amount as significant as that needed for
1264 See Conpes (1998, esp. p. 1-15).
1265 Conpes (1998, p. 25).
1266 Conpes (1998, p. 16-17).
1267 Conpes (1998, p. 17-18).
1268 Conpes (1998, p. 17-18).
1269 1 was one of the faculty members involved in organizing this conference. I also presented a paper
dealing with a general diagnosis of why Bogota suffered an exaggerate congestion (Ardila, 1998b). My
presentation sought to set the stage for the discussion and did not have to do with the core question of
the conference which was how to finance the Bogota metro.
1270 Rodriguez (1998, p. 75, translation by author).
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the Bogota metro-approximately US$ 2.7 billion.1271 Finally, Israel Fainboim of
Fedesarrollo, a prestigious think tank, looked at the feasibility of the concession for
procuring the Bogota metro. Fainboim concluded that the concession scheme would
very unlikely attract private investors, even with the promised periodic payments by
the national and city governments. He recommended abandoning the concession
scheme. Instead, he proposed a more traditional approach in which each stage of the
project-definitive engineering designs, construction, and equipment purchases-
would be treated separately. That is, Fainboim proposed to unbundle the project to be
able to minimize risk, delays, and construction costs.12 72 The impact of the conference
was minimal because by that point the choice of the concession as the procurement
strategy almost definitive.
At the conference, Mayor Peialosa spoke about the benefits the construction
of a metro line would bring. Peialosa also mentioned the TransMilenio BRT project,
using probably for the first time in public the name he had given to this project. Yet it
was the head of the National Planning Department (DNP), Cecilia Lopez, who
delivered the bombshell at the conference. Planners at DNP convinced Lopez of
announcing at the conference information the planners had sneaked in one of the
footnotes of the Conpes document for Bogota's metro.12 73 That footnote explained
that the financing of the metros in Bogota and Cali absorbed 49% of the available
funds for capital expenditures of the national government for several years. Put
differently, the national government would devote half the amount it had for
investment in infrastructure and other projects to just two metros for a significant
number of years. Lopez presented these figures at the conference. The next day, El
Tiempo, one of the main newspapers in Colombia, had a front page headline
announcing that the two metros would absorb 50% of the available funds in the
national government.12 74 Lopez's statements led to a conflict between Mayor
Pehalosa and Lopez that almost topples the process-probably what planners at DNP
1271 Taboada (1998, p. 86).
1272 Fainboim, Alonso and Rodriguez (1998, p. 59).
1273 See footnote 28 in Conpes (1998, p. 16).
1274 See El Tiempo, "50% de inversion de la naci6n ira a los metros," and "Para metros, mitad de libre
inversion," May 16 th , 1998.
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wanted. Samper intervened and ordered Lopez and the DNP to work with Peialosa to
achieve an agreement regarding the schedule of payments for the project-the next
step in the process.
Negotiating the payment schedule with the National
Government
For many planners at the National Planning Department275 BRT was a better solution
than heavy rail. Yet instead of taking an open position against the Bogota metro, they
opted for trying to obtain the best possible metro. For them, the decision was political
and President Samper and Mayor Peialosa had already made the decision.276 As
planners, all they could do was to ensure that the planning for the metro was done
correctly. With good planning, they thought, the experience of the Medellin Metro
would not happen again. Acting along these lines, DNP planners requested a revision
of the cost IBS estimated for the Bogota metro. DNP hired the British Transport
Research Laboratory (TRL). TRL argued that the cost estimates were reasonable but
given the lack of final designs, the construction risk was high. For this reason, among
others, TRL increased the estimated cost of the metro project to US$ 3.041 billion.277
Velasquez and his planning team received the new cost estimate and realized
the metro project was no longer feasible. The rate of return for the private investor in
the concession would go down to 8 percent per year-too low for the high risk. The
metro planning team went to see Mayor Peialosa and the secretary of finance of the
city, Carlos Sandoval. After two weeks of discussions, Pehalosa agreed to increase
the contribution of the city government to the project by US$ 120 million over the
years 2000-01. By then, Peialosa would not be in office. The additional funds
increased the profitability of the concession. With this information, planners drafted
the terms of the payment schedule by the National and city governments.
1275 Sadly, it is for safety reasons that I am completely omitting the identity of any DNP planner. While
many agreed to be named as source, several requested total anonymity. To grant the wish of the latter
group, I decided not to mention any DNP or national government planner by name. Further, I always
use the term in plural even if it was only one planner that performed the action.
1276 As I show below, while planners at DNP thought the decision was made, in reality the project was
only in the political agenda.
El Tiempo, "Conpes dijo si al metro de Bogota," April 29 th , 1998.
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On June 12th, 1998, DNP on behalf of the national government sent a counter
proposal. DNP proposed that the national government would finance 70% of the "debt
service," and the city government would finance the remaining amount. The city
objected because the National Government had agreed to fund 70% of the total cost
of the project. The draft also contained a tentative schedule for the payments by the
national government. These were lower than expected. Metro planners again
concluded that the project was not feasible because the concessionaire would obtain
a return lower than 10% on its investment.12 78 On June 16, Mayor Peialosa, the
metro planning team, and Secretary Sandoval, for the city government, met with
Cecilia Lopez and other DNP planners, as well as representatives of the ministry of
finance, for the national government. Lopez announced that the proposed payment
schedule was not negotiable. Pehalosa argued that President Samper had agreed in
December of 1997 to fund 70% of the total cost of the project. Unable to reach an
agreement, PeFialosa and Lopez left the negotiations in the hands of planners.
Planners could not agree on the meaning of the term "debt service." Indeed,
Law 310 was not clear in this regard.1279 Planners also disagreed on the amounts the
National Government had to transfer for the project. DNP planners wanted to
minimize the impact on the already precarious finances of the national government.
Metro planners, on the other hand, needed larger transfers to make the concession
profitable and therefore feasible. Planners finally agreed that the payment schedule
should translate into a reasonable rate of return for a private investor in the
concession, 14.17% per year. To reach an agreement, metro planners had to
increase the contribution of the city government to the project.1280 The cost for the city
continued to increase. On June 24th, days after the presidential election, the National
and city government signed the payment schedule.1281 This achievement was
important for it showed the willingness of the national government to make the
1278 Hidalgo (2000?, p. 8-9).
1279 El Tiempo, "Un proyecto para salvar el metro," October 1 3 th, 1998.
1280 Hidalgo (2000?, p. 9-10).
1281 Hidalgo (2000?, p. 10-11).
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payments. However, Colombia law does allow the government to modify the payment
schedule.1 2 8 2
The role of planners
The planning community involved with the metro project is divided. On the one side
are the DNP planners who do not believe the metro is a sound solution given the
conditions of the country. On the other side are the planners in the metro planning
team. DNP planners cannot openly oppose President Samper's pet project nor they
find this to be an effective route. Instead, DNP planners assume the decision to adopt
the metro project had already been made. Their strategy is then to improve the quality
of the planning process. This strategy has two consequences. First, it introduces
delays in the process. Second, it improves the quality of the information for the actual
decision to adopt the project. But contrary to what DNP planners assumed, the
decision to undertake the metro project has not taken place yet. The metro project is
merely on the political agenda. The likelihood of reaching a decision to adopt the
metro is less as information improves. Improved information unveils the true costs of
the project. The planners in the metro team are unable to counter the arguments for
improved information presented by DNP planners. Nor do the metro planners want to
because they also want "the best possible metro," and for that good information is
critical. Further, to be feasible, the concession strategy requires excellent information
on the cost of the project, the expected demand, and the construction conditions,
among others.
A reality check: Pastrana President of Colombia
Andr6s Pastrana won the second round of the presidential election of 1998 by
defeating Horacio Serpa, Samper's candidate. In his campaign in Bogota, Pastrana
had vowed support for Bogota's metro.1283 Pastrana took office on August 7th , 1998
(Figure 1 above). Pastrana received the economy in a precarious situation with a
recession looming. The Colombian economy experienced an economic boom in the
1282 I have called payment schedule what in Colombia is known as "vigencias futuras." I did not use a
more technical and close translation of the term (future budget allocations) to avoid technical
terminology.
1283 El Tiempo, "Hablan los candidates," April 29th , 1998.
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first half of the 1990s. Yearly income per capita reached a peak of US$ 2,145 in 1995.
But by the year 2000 income per capita was only US$ 1,798 per year1284-a 16%
drop in real terms. The economy began to decelerate in 1996, during Samper's term,
and entered into a deep recession in 1999 (Table 24). As a result of the economic
slowdown, unemployment skyrocketed to 20.5% by the year 2000. Likewise, an
additional 10% of the population fell below the poverty line. By 2000, 59.1% of the
population lived below the poverty line.1285
The finances of the national government suffered a severe impact.
Expenditures grew faster than revenue. The national government had to resort to
increased taxes, revenue from privatization, and issuing debt to cover its
operations.1286 Consequently, the government had to devote an increasing share of its
revenue to paying interest1287 (Table 25). In 1994 the debt of the national government
was equivalent to 10% of the GDP. By 1998 the ratio had increased to 22% and by
2001 to 45%. 1288 In addition, at the beginning of Pastrana's presidency and as a result
of the recession, the banking system collapsed. The national government had to
intervene the sector and contribute resources equivalent to approximately four billion
dollars1289-a figure well above the cost of the first metro line. Finally, months into
office, an earthquake struck the city of Armenia and its surrounding area. The national
government had to spend almost a billion dollars in reconstruction.129 0 This was the
economic and social context in which Pastrana governed, forcing his administration to
cut capital expenditures (Table 25) and introduce structural reforms to the social
security system.1 29 1
12 84 Garay (2002, p. 11).
1285 Garay (2002, p. 11).
1286 Fainboim and Rodriguez (2000, p. 140-141).
1287 Garay (2002, p. 629).
1288 Garay (2002, p. 616).
1289 Portafolio. "Hechos que sacudieron al pats," September 1 5th, 2003. The figure in this article is 9
trillion pesos distributed over several years during which the exchange rate fluctuated. The overall cost
of the banking crisis was between 6 and 7% of the GDP (Ordoez, 2003, p. 7).
1290 El Tiempo, "Investigaci6n de la ONU refleja la debacle del Eje Cafetero en la iltima d6cada, "July
3r, 2004.
1291 See also Fedesarrollo (1999).
of Growth of Gross Domestic Product of Colombia and Bogota and Growth in
GDP per capita
Real GDP Growth
(percent er year)
Year Colombia Bogota
1995 5.2 2.7
1996 2.1 -1.4
1997 3.4 3.3
1998 0.5 0.5
1999 -4.3 -5.7
2000 3.0 3.5
Source: Secretaria de Hacienda de Bogota (2000, p. 21).
Table 25. Revenue, Expenditure, Deficit and Debt of National Government
share of Gross Domestic Product
of Colombia as a
Year Tax Expenditure Capital Deficit Debt
revenue (percent of Expenditures (percent of (percent of
(percent of GDP) (percent of GDP) GDP)
GDP) GDP)
1995 11.28 13.57 2.07 -2.29 13.80
1996 11.96 15.67 2.30 -3.71 14.40
1997 12.56 16.26 2.60 -3.70 17.90
1998 11.98 16.82 1.62 -4.84 22.00
1999 12.59 19.78 1.51 -7.19 29.60
2000 13.36 19.80 1.58 -6.44 40.00
2001 14.65 21.55 1.55 -6.90 45.20
Source: Garay (2002, p. 629).
Jaime Ruiz appointed head of DNP
Pastrana appointed Jaime Ruiz to head the National Planning Department (DNP).
Ruiz had headed the effort to implement a busway on the Caracas Avenue during
Pastrana's term as mayor of Bogota. As head of DNP, Rufz was responsible for
helping the president decide the infrastructure and social expenditures of the National
Government. Ruiz received the metro project, which had significant political
momentum given the agreement reached by Mayor Pehalosa and President Samper
weeks before.
Recall that when Pastrana was mayor, Rufz had found out that planners at
DNP opposed President Barco's proposal for building a metro. When Rufz became
head of DNP, he called these and other planners and asked them why they had
allowed the metro project to get to such advanced state. Planners replied that the
circumstances and to some extent President Samper had forced them. Rufz and
Table 24. Rate
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these planners shared the belief that BRT was a better solution to Bogota's
transportation problems. They also agreed that given the financial situation of the
national government, metros were a lavish investment. Further, Ruiz believed that
Bogota should develop its own solutions and not copy what other cities were doing.
For Ruiz, BRT offered the opportunity to innovate locally. Metros did not. Ruiz, like
Mayor Peialosa, agreed that public investment in transport should go primarily to
public, and not private, transportation. But while at this point PeFalosa's solution for
Bogota included both heavy rail and BRT, for Ruiz it only included BRT (or most likely
busways only). Finally, Ruiz believed that the construction of the metro in Medellfn
had contributed to worsening the economic and social situation in that city. This
outcome had been the result of the cost overruns and probably because metros did
not deliver the expected benefits.1292/1293
Ruiz, therefore, did not want the National Government to support the
construction of the Bogota metro. Planners at DNP supported Ruiz's position.
However, president Pastrana had pleaded support for Bogota's metro during the
campaign.1294 Equally important, the metro project had a significant political
momentum. Ruiz could not go against this reality. But Ruiz had the power from his
position to maneuver to delay the process for the metro. Further, from his position
Ruiz had access to decision-makers such as Pefalosa. Rufz, moreover, knew about
Peialosa's proposal for TransMilenio and trusted Pehalosa would be able to carry it
out during his term. If Ruiz delayed the process for the metro, TransMilenio might be
ready and people might think BRT was the solution. For Ruiz the problem was
convincing other actors that BRT was a better solution than the metro.1295 The fiscal
crisis of the national government provided Ruiz with the opportunity to indirectly
oppose the metro. Rufz would let the process continue, for example by allowing the
required studies, investment banking, demand modeling, urban impact, etc., to
1292 Interview by author with Jaime Ruiz, October 2003.
1293 For a theoretical discussion of why metros in Latin America have not delivered the expected urban
transformation see Montezuma (2000c).
1294 El Tiempo, "Hablan los candidates," April 29 th, 1998.
1295 Interview by author with Jaime Ruiz, October 2003.
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proceed.1296 But he would question the availability of resources to finance the
metro. 1 297
Peialosa, in the mean time, both in public and private was pressuring the
National Government to continue supporting the Bogota metro. Peialosa spoke to the
media seeking a definitive decision. Pefialosa also mobilized Bogota's delegation to
Congress, which held hearings to question Ruiz.12 98 Rufz was feeling the pressure. In
private meetings, Ruiz tried to convince Pefalosa that undertaking both the metro and
TransMilenio was impossible. Ruiz preferred TransMilenio, the BRT project, which
was in Pefialosa's agenda. Moreover, Rufz would guarantee contributions from the
National Government to that project. Ruiz also made clear that he opposed the
national government contributing to the metro project.
Ruiz also knew Peialosa valued the metro more for its urban impact than for
its capacity to move people. Further, Rufz knew Peialosa had opposed the
construction of the sewer treatment plants. These plants had an estimated cost of
over US$ 1.0 billion. Even after building all the plants, the Bogota River-located on
the outskirts of the city-would continue to be polluted. For Peialosa this was a highly
ineffective solution and probably other technologies could do a better job. In fact, at
the ceremony to inaugurate the first plant, Peialosa was vocal about his poor opinion
on the plants.1299 Rufz therefore argued that the metro was analogous to the sewer
treatment plants. Specifically, after investing three billion dollars the metro would only
transport eight percent of the demand. BRT, on the other hand, could provide a
similar level of service to the metro. And for the same amount invested, BRT could
provide service to a larger share of the demand. Peialosa understood that the
national government was not willing to support the metro but was willing to support his
pet project, TransMilenio.
1296 See Hidalgo (2000?, p. 15-19); and Hidalgo (2000, p. 10-8) for examples of some of the studies in
the process of being contracted out during the first month of the Pastrana administration.
1297 Lupo, Concord and Fowler (1971, p. 208) argue that "transit disputes boil down to a question of
cost-who will pay how much for existing or proposed new service." See also p. 208-210 and 218-220.
The Bogota metro case corroborates this conclusion.
1298 Hidalgo (2000?, p. 13-14).
1299 El Tiempo, "Esta planta no era urgente," September 1 3 th, 2000.
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The problem, however, was that Peialosa had accepted Samper's offer to
finance the metro and had reached an agreement. Peialosa knew very well he could
not renounce to those resources because of the political cost and because those
funds could help Bogota in any case. Peialosa therefore would pressure the National
Government to transfer the funds initially earmarked for the metro to TransMilenio.
But there was a problem. Announcing this would mean that the metro project was
canceled. This would have a large political cost for Peialosa and for President
Pastrana. Pehalosa, therefore, could not simply change course. Peialosa had to
continue lobbying for funds for the metro and await the opportunity to announce the
change of destination for the funds. Rufz had a similar plan in mind. Rufz was willing
to have the national government fund BRT systems but not metros. But announcing
that the Bogota metro was cancelled was politically expensive. Time had to pass
before the decision could be announced. Peialosa met with Alberto Velasquez, the
head of the metro planning team. Peialosa commented to Velasquez that he
regarded the metro as highly unfeasible given the current conditions. On December
23rd, 1998, Velasquez resigned to heading the planning team.'300
Planners vs. Planners
Rufz and DNP planners continued their actions to derail the metro project. They
seemed to have followed a strategy with the following elements. First, Ruiz and the
planners supported the concession strategy because it was a way of sliming the
chances that the metro would be adopted. For one thing, to lure the private sector a
concession needs high-quality information and sound technical studies. Carrying out
these studies takes time. As time passes, the window of opportunity for the project
might close. At the same time, the BRT project, TransMilenio, would be almost ready
for service. For another, the information requirements of the concession might show
decision-makers that the project is not convenient. Under the concession strategy,
therefore, the process can be more transparent and accountable.1 301 Finally, the
1300 See also Pefialosa (Forthcoming, p. 52-7) for Peialosa's account of the metro's demise.
1301 See Flyvbjerg et al. (2003, ch. 9-11) for why concession and similar schemes can bring
accountability. Clearly, the advantages of concessions including efficiency gains cease to exist If the
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concession strategy increased the cost of the metro project. Specifically, the scheme
required the concessionaire to obtain loans in the international market to fund the
project. The interest rate for these loans was probably higher than that for sovereign
debt. But given the precarious financial situation, the national government had to
obtain other loans to cover its payments to the concessionaire, as the Conpes
document acknowledged.1302 /1 303 That is, the concession under the dire financial
situation implied obtaining two sets of loans and not one to fund the project.
Consequently, the national and city governments would pay a premium for
undertaking the concession strategy.'304 Ruiz and the DNP planners hoped the
studies for the concession would find the scheme infeasible.
The second element of the strategy by Ruiz and DNP planners was to
generate conditions so that the concession strategy would be the only feasible
procurement strategy. Specifically, DNP and other government planners figured that
the concession scheme allowed keeping the debt incurred in financing the metro off
the accounting books of both levels of government. The payments to the
concessionaire would appear, however.1 305 Removing the debt from the books was
necessary because otherwise the government of Bogota and probably the national
government as well would violate their debt ceiling. Hence any strategy different to the
concession would be infeasible because the debt was too high. With this in mind,
Rufz and DNP planners expected the consultant in charge of finalizing the
procurement strategy to declare that the concession was also not feasible. Put
differently, the strategy was to limit the flexibility of the procurement strategy for the
project. Financial planners would face too many restrictions and have few or no
feasible options.
government offers poorly designed guarantees (see Zegras, 2002, esp. p. 3 and 20; see also Kerf et al.
J1996, esp. ch. 6). For a critique of privatization in general see Sclar (2001).
302 Conpes (1998, p. 17-18).
1303 Given the size of the project, Bogot's government might have had to do the same.
1304 It is important to emphasize that because of the deep recession of the economy and the bail out of
the banking system, the national government did not have funds for the metro. If the economy had
continued to grow and the banks had not required close to US$ four billion, the concession strategy
might have lowered the cost of the project. But in a recessionary environment the concession raised
the cost of the project.
1305 See Rothschild Group (2000, p. 2 and 15).
-
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Finally, Ruiz hired Fedesarrollo, in his quest to question the availability of
resources to finance the metro. Fedesarrollo is a highly respected non-partisan think
tank. Fedesarrollo would determine if the National Government was able to comply
with the long-term commitments established by the Samper administration for the
construction of metros in Bogota and Cali.'30 6 In reality, Ruiz wanted Fedesarrollo to
say that the national government could not afford the metro.1307
Dario Hidalgo's tenure as head of the metro planning team started precisely
with Ruiz announcing that the decision of the national government to support
Bogota's metro project was contingent on the study by Fedesarrollo. In effect, Mayor
Peialosa appointed Dario Hidalgo to head the metro planning team in January of
1999. Hidalgo vowed, "to work without rest to build the metro."1308 Hidalgo also
promised not to repeat Medellin's debacle and to achieve a "very good metro."
Hidalgo, however, was not fully aware of Pefialosa's change of position. More so
because Peialosa continued to support the metro in public. But his support was to get
the funds of the national government transferred from the metro to TransMilenio.
Hidalgo was not fully aware either that Ruiz was slowly but effectively assembling a
coalition against the metro.
In March 1999, Juan Echavarrfa and Israel Fainboim of Fedesarrollo presented
the conclusions of the study on the metro.1 309 The conclusions were that the impact of
the Bogota and Cali metros on the finances of the national government was not
excessively high, particularly when compared with the future expenses in social
security and pensions.1 310 However, the overall financial situation of the national
Government was very precarious and not sustainable in the long-term. Unless the
pension system and other long-term commitments were reformed, the Government of
Colombia would not be able to pay its local and international debts or obtain new
loans.1311 Finally, the Pastrana administration had undertaken some steps to reduce
the deficit and reduce public spending. However, the effect of these reforms would
1306 Fainboim and Rodriguez (1999, p. 115); and interview by author with Jaime Ruiz, October 2003.
1307 Interview by author with Jaime Ruiz (October 2003).
1308 Hidalgo (2000?, p. 20).
1309 Hidalgo (2000?, p. 29).
1310 Fainboim and Rodriguez (1999, p. 148).
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only last until the year 2003. This was precisely the year that the national Government
had to invest the most in the Bogota and Cali metros.1312 Given this situation,
Fedesarrollo concluded the expenditures in the metros were irrelevant. The finances
of the national government were unsustainable with or without the metros.1313
This part of Ruiz's strategy failed. For one, Fedesarrollo did not say that the
metro could not be undertaken. Fedesarrollo said that the national government was
facing bankruptcy with or without the metros unless a structural reform was
undertaken. Moreover, Fedesarrollo considered the Bogota metro in particular a
sound project.131 4 For another, Ruiz received many criticisms in the press and from
politicians. Ruiz defended his position by arguing that the national government was
just doing what the previous government should have done before committing such a
large amount of funds. Specifically, the national government must be sure it can pay
its long-term commitments to the Bogota and Cali metros.1315 At the same time, these
commitments must not mean reducing the funding to other key sectors such as health
and education.1 3 6 The polemic continued and the metro project was still in the
political agenda-just as Hidalgo and his team wanted.
Ruiz and DNP planners also had hoped that the consultant in charge of
finalizing the procurement strategy declared this strategy, and hence the metro, as
infeasible. On the contrary, the consultants, Rothschild & Sons-Louis Berger
International-Selfinver (RLBS), found the concession scheme to be feasible. To find
the concession feasible, RLBS together with the metro planning team and DNP
planners shortened the metro line from 30 Km and 24 stations to 23.4 Km and 20
stations. As a result, the cost estimate went down from to US$ 2.30 billion. In total the
city government would contribute US$ 1.35 billion over 25 years, starting in 2001. The
national government would contribute US$ 2.17 billion over nine years stating in
1311 Fainboim and Rodriguez (1999, p. 140-2).
1312 Fainboim and Rodriguez (1999, p. 127 and 141-2).
1313 Fainboim and Rodriguez (1999, p. 148). For an update of this study see Fainboim and Rodriguez
(2000).
314 Fainboim and Rodriguez (1999, p. 115-31).
1315 See Penagos (1998) for a cost benefit analysis of the Cali metro. Penagos found the metro not be
desirable from a CBA point of view because the return on the investment was negative. Society was
worse-off with the project. One reason for this result was the low value of time of the would-be users of
the metro.
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2003.1317 The studies also found that the concession scheme did not need a
guarantee from the national government to be feasible.1318 This part of Ruiz's and
DNP planners' strategy had not worked either. RLBS had found, at least in theory,
that the concession scheme was feasible.13 19 1320 The metro project continued in the
political agenda of the city.
The role of planners
Jaime Ruiz and the DNP planners are examples of planners that oppose a plan. They
long ago concluded that the metro is not a sufficiently sound solution for Bogota. They
consider BRT a much better solution. Broadly speaking, they followed a three-
pronged approach. First, they introduced delays in the process so as to stop the
metro project and to give time to TransMilenio-Pehalosa's pet project-to show
results. Second, Ruiz in particular slowly assembled a coalition against the metro.
The end result, will not be a matter of rationality but of power. The position espoused
by the most powerful coalition will win. Third, Ruiz and DNP planners wanted to back
their position with studies that should have concluded that the metro was not feasible.
This last element worked out partially for the studies did not arrive at the conclusion
Rufz and DNP planners wanted.
The planners that support the metro are effective at maintaining the metro in
the political agenda of the city. Keeping the project in the agenda is critical for
1316 El Tiempo, "Deuda de la naci6n no deja arrancar el metro," January 22nd, 1999.
1317 RLBS (2000, p. 5, 11, 24). The amount for each level of government includes capital and financial
cost and hence the cost surpasses the initial amount.
1318 Rothschild Group (2000, p. 16).
1319 There is no way to know if the concession strategy was indeed feasible, because the actual
tendering never took place. I consulted three experts in concessions in Latin America, who wanted to
remain anonymous. All three coincided that the concession scheme was likely infeasible, because of
the risk for the concessionaire. The main risk was that the Colombian government would not honor its
commitments to the concessionaire given the near bankruptcy of the government. Interestingly, all
three pointed out the need to have a guarantee and argued that it would be difficult to find a guarantee
for several billion dollars. All three commended, however, the Colombian government's idea of not
having a guarantee. The lack of a guarantee allows the market mechanism embedded in a concession
scheme to work better and chose only projects that are truly good. See Cahillane (no date) for an
example of how the Inter American Development Bank offered a guarantee to support the concession
of a water treatment plan in Bogota.
1320 A big assumption of the study by RLBS was that the Colombian economy would recover by 2003.
As a result, the Colombian government would be able to issue debt at a reasonable price. Otherwise,
the concession seems infeasible (see Rothschild Group, 2000, p. 102). The Colombian economy did
not recover as expected and the finances of the national government are still weak.
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otherwise the window of opportunity for the metro closes. The project would be
cancelled. But Hidalgo and his planners seem unable to assemble a sufficiently
powerful coalition in support of the metro. Rufz and his planners have a stronger
coalition against the metro. The only way to change Ruiz's mind is by having a
coalition powerful enough to make not supporting the metro politically very expensive.
There is no such coalition.
The demise of the metro project
In June of 1999 the Pefialosa administration presented a proposal to pass legislation
in the City Council creating the Metro Co. The metro planning team was in charge of
getting the legislation passed. The councilors decided not to vote the legislation.
Mayor Pefialosa decided not to present again the legislation to create the Metro Co.
to the council.'32 1 By not supporting the creation of the Metro Co., Pefialosa was
showing more signs that his decision was not to support the metro project. PeFialosa's
strategy now shifted to increasing the pool of funds for his pet project, TransMilenio.
Ignacio de Guzman, the political head of the planning team for TransMilenio,
proposed in August of 1999 to shift the destination of some funds of the tax on fuels
from the metro to TransMilenio. Peialosa charged IDU, the agency in charge of
constructing the TransMilenio facilities, with the responsibility to pass the required
legislation in the City Council.'322 The Council interpreted this as a sign that Pefialosa
was burying the metro project. Hidalgo had to intervene by saying the city government
was awaiting the decision by the national government. In the mean time, it was better
to use the funds in TransMilenio.13 23 On December 2 3 rd , 1999, the City Council
approved making flexible the use of the fuel tax revenue. The city government could
now devote the 50% of that revenue, originally assigned to the metro, to either the
metro or TransMilenio. The remaining 50% continued to be devoted to road
maintenance. The Peiialosa administration lobbied hard to get this legislation
1321 Hidalgo (2000?, p. 40, 42-3).
1322 Incidentally, by the time of these events Pefialosa had appointed de Guzm.n to the board of
directors of IDU (Hidalgo, 2000?, p. 46). From there de Guzman has influence over IDU.
1323 Hidalgo (2000?, p. 46-7).
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approved. Peialosa himself,13 24 as well as de Guzman, Hidalgo, Andrds Camargo,
head of IDU, and other cabinet members participated in the lobbying effort.1325 No
similar lobbying effort was seen a couple of months before for the metro.
In parallel, Mayor Pehalosa began to meet with the new head of the National
Planning Department, Mauricio Crdenas. President Pastrana had shuffled his
cabinet. CArdenas went from being minister of transport to head of DNP. Jaime Ruiz
stepped down as head of DNP to become one of Pastrana's top advisors, with
decision-making power. Penalosa wanted the national government to finally decide if
it was going to fund or not the Bogota metro.1326 At the same time, Pefialosa wanted
to secure additional funds for TransMilenio.1327 The national government offered a
smaller amount of funds for the next fiscal year (2000) but earmarked for TransMilenio
and not the metro. The reason was that TransMilenio, under construction at that point,
would generate much needed employment whereas the metro would not (the metro
would purchase land with that money). De GuzmAn proposed to devote 70% of the
transfer to the construction of TransMilenio's busway and 30% to the acquisition of
land for the metro. Cardenas and Peialosa agreed to this arrangement.13 28
Regarding the decision on the metro, the national government also claimed
that it could not make a decision because the studies to structure the concession
were not ready. Hidalgo argued that the studies had enough information to make a
decision.1329 To strengthen his case, Hidalgo had leaked to the press earlier in
November the preliminary results the studies by RLBS. The press published articles
indicating the concession scheme was feasible.1330 The national government,
however, remained silent fearing a public backlash if it announced it would not finance
the metro.1331 By now Cardenas, Ruiz, and Pefialosa all agreed that the national
funds ought to go to TransMilenio and not the metro. But the national government did
1324 See for example of Peialosa's way to lead the council to believe that the metro was still in his
agenda his Sate of the City Speech in October of 1999 (Pefalosa, 1999, p. 47-8).
1325 Hidalgo (2000?, p. 55-6).
1326 Hidalgo (2000?, p. 52-3).
1327 Interview by author with Enrique Peialosa, January 2003; and Peialosa (2003, p. 84-5).
1328 Hidalgo (2000?, p. 52-53).
1329 Hidalgo (2000?, p. 52-53).
1330 El Tiempo, "Metro por concesi6n sf es viable," November 9 th, 1999.
1331 Penalosa (2003, p. 84-5); sources at DNP confirmed this.
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not make a final decision. Cardenas had to resign to heading DNP in the midst of a
corruption scandal. Mayor Pefialosa kept pressuring for a decision.
Worried that the metro project was close to being cancelled, Hidalgo worked
hard to convince Mayor Peialosa of keeping the project in the agenda. For example,
in February of 2000, Hidalgo arranged a meeting between the mayor and a group of
planners of the University of Pennsylvania. This group had been planning the metro
station localities and had presented in the past its results. Ralph Gakenheimer, an
MIT professor, was part of the group.1332 At the meeting these planners defended the
metro given its positive impact on the urban quality of Bogot. 1 33 3 Penalosa, however,
replied with the following question: "'why should I spend US$ 100 million per km on a
metro when I could have BRT for US$ 5 million per km? Gakenheimer replied "Well,
with the metro you can bring 70,000 passengers per hour per direction into the city
center without reducing street capacity."1334 This did not change Peialosa's position.
Pefalosa was now pressuring hard the national government to transfer the
funds from the metro to TransMilenio. In March of 2000 there was another meeting
between Pehalosa, Rufz, Juan Echeverry, the new head of DNP, and a couple of
planners. Notice that no one invited Hidalgo to the meeting. Peialosa presented a
new plan to build a network of 24 TransMilenio busways throughout the entire city.
The cost of the project was US$ 2.387 billion-less than the cost of the first metro
line. This was clearly convenient to the national government because it implied
smaller expenditures.1335 Rufz then intervened. "The metro has become a political
problem and we have the perfect way out of it-TransMilenio. Let's decide to transfer
the funds of the national government for the metro to TransMilenio." The national
government had finally made a decision-it would not support the metro but it would
support TransMilenio.
1332 Prof. Gakenheimer is also the advisor of this dissertation.
1333 El Tiempo, "Metro evitara polarizaci6n," February 1 9 th, 2000. For the results of the study see DCRP
(1999)
334 Interview by author with Ralph Gakenheimer, May 2004.
'335 El Tiempo, "TransMilenio matarfa metro," April 6 ', 2000; and El Tiempo, "Bogota debe olvidarse
del metro por 6 afos," July 27 th, 2000.
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Because no one in the national government announced the decision, Peialosa
then decided to make the announcement himself: "there will be no metro." 1336 The
financial situation of the national government did not allow the large expenditures in
the metro.13 37 But the national government could possibly finance a US$ 100 million a
year contribution for TransMilenio 338 -not yet operational. The metro project was
cancelled.1339 Even then, the Peialosa administration had to lobby hard the national
government to get the agreement to fund TransMilenio.'340 Most likely, the national
government was awaiting the outcome of the election for mayor, which Antanas
Mockus, an independent, won against Emma Mejfa of the party contrary to President
Pastrana's. In November, weeks before TransMilenio opened doors, the national
government finally issued the Conpes document stating its commitment to fund
TransMilenio. The Conpes document summarizes the quandary between metro and
TransMilenio in the following way:
The estimated cost of the infrastructure for TransMilenio is US$ 1.970 billion of 2000
whereas the estimated costs for the first metro line, including financial costs (US$
1.421 billion), are US$ 4.007 billion of 2000. The capital costs of the first metro line,
including equipment depreciation, are US$ 2.586 billion of 2000. The estimated cost
per kilometer for TransMilenio is US$ 5.0 million, equivalent to 5% of the estimated
cost per kilometer of the first metro line (US$ 107 million).1 341/1342
The role of planners
The coalition against the metro finally won thanks to the power it had. Ruiz headed
this coalition. This coalition prevailed by sticking to its strategy of introducing delays to
the process and supporting the concession strategy. The concession strategy brought
1336 Peialosa (2003, p. 85).
1337 Hidalgo (2000, p. 130).
1338 El Tiempo, "Bogota debe olvidarse del metro por 6 ahos," July 27 th , 2000.
1339 Pehalosa disbanded in July of 2000 the metro planning team by moving most of its members to
TransMilenio Co. Hidalgo became deputy manager; Arciniegas became chief financial officer; Sandra
Navas and Leonardo Vasquez moved to bus operations planning, and finance, respectively.
1340 See El Tiempo, ",Ni metro ni TransMilenio?," July 26 h , 2000; and El Tiempo, "Bogota debe
olvidarse del metro por 6 anos," July 27th, 2000.
1341 Conpes (2000, p. 6, translation by author). The Conpes document also found that the internal rate
of return-a measure of profitability of the investment-was 15.8% for the metro and 61.1% for
TransMilenio (see p. 36).
1342 The financial situation of the national government did not improve as expected. By 2003 the
national government under president Alvaro Uribe renegotiated with the city government to postpone
the transfers for TransMilenio (Custodio and Mongui, 2003, p. 28).
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accountability to the process and reduced the flexibility for pro-metro planners.13 43
Pro-metro planners could not change the procurement strategy for one less
expensive.1344 Neither could they resort to artificially lowering the cost estimates in
order to make the metro appear feasible. Pro-metro planners did not want to do that
either-they vowed not to repeat the Medellfn Metro debacle. The metro planning
team defended the metro even by bringing world experts to present arguments. But
metro planners did not have a political coalition supporting them. The end result was a
matter of relative power. The decision to cancel the metro was announced by Mayor
Pefialosa only when TransMilenio was months away from opening. An alternative
solution to Bogota's mass transit needs existed using buses and not rail.
With the advantage of hindsight, even the planners that supported the metro
agree the outcome was the most convenient for the city and the country. Undertaking
the metro was not convenient given the economic conditions. Further, the Colombian
economy has not recovered as expected and the government continues to have large
deficits. While the election of Samper to the presidency opened a political window of
opportunity for the project, there was no economic window of opportunity because of
the deep recession of the Colombian economy. Notice that despite the deep
recession, anti-metro planners had to work hard to fight a project they believed would
hurt the interests of the national economy. The recession merely fueled the
arguments by anti-metro planners, but was not enough. A powerful anti-metro
coalition was needed, together with the existence of a valid alternative to the metro-
TransMilenio.
1343 While concessions schemes have many benefits, they also entail many problems such as
opportunistic behavior and rent seeking, which increase the cost of the project and lead to efficiency
losses (see Guasch, 2004; and Garcia, Benavides and Reitzes, 2003).
1344 See BB&J Consult S.A. (2000). Even if planners want the concession scheme for the metro next
time it is in the political agenda, I argue that having the designs at the 50 to 100% level would reduce
risks, improve risk allocation, and lower the cost of the project. Colombia's experience with road
concessions led to the conclusion that designs should be at the 100% level before issuign the terms of
reference (see Lozano (2000, esp. p. 17 and 21); and DNP (2000)).
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Chapter 12
Planning and Implementing TransMilenio
Parallel to the events described in the previous chapter, the Pefialosa administration
was planning and implementing TransMilenio-a BRT project. TransMilenio was a
project that implied a change of paradigm in bus service provision in Bogota.
TransMilenio sought to replace a low-quality system that disrespected the user thanks
to lack of supervision and excessive competition among bus drivers. TransMilenio
implied eliminating the excessive competition, creating a new regulatory framework,
and providing service with modern-looking articulated buses running on exclusive
busways.
The situation of bus transport in Bogota before
TransMilenio
To understand the planning process for TransMilenio it is important to look in more
detail at the relationships between city government, bus companies, and bus owners,
among others, at the beginning of the Peialosa administration (Figure 19). The
national government through the ministry of transportation and Congress is
responsible for regulating in general terms the provision of public transportation. For
example, it is the national government that determines the number of years a bus is
allowed to provide service.1345 STT is an agency of the city government. Its
responsibilities include issuing regulations specific to the City of Bogota and enforcing
those regulations, as well as those mandated by the national government.13 46 STT is
also responsible for authorizing the creation of bus companies and for supervising
them. STT is also responsible for authorizing new bus routes and determining the
schedules, frequency, and determining the fleet a bus company needs to serve the
assigned routes. In theory STT is the central authority in charge of planning and
1345 Acero et al. (1999, p. 137-8).
1346 Alcaldia Mayor de Bogota (1999, p. 5).
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supervising the provision of bus services.13 47 STT, however, does not have the
organizational capacity to adequately perform these responsibilities. This translates
into a poor operation of the transportation system, particularly because STT cannot
supervise the bus companies or enforce regulations to the desired extent.134 8 This
organizational weakness has also led to corruption.1 34 9
Immediately under STT in Figure 19 are the bus companies. Colombian law
allows only bus companies to provide public transportation services. The bus
companies have rights over bus routes issued by STT. In theory, these bus
companies ought to own buses. In practice, 96% of the bus companies owned less
than 10% of their fleet.1350 Colombian law, however, established that bus companies
should own at least 10% of their fleet, which illustrates the lack of enforcement by
STT. The bus companies' assets, therefore, were the bus routes. As such, bus
companies would rent the routes to the owners of the buses, who by law could not
operate their buses unless "affiliated" to a bus company. The affiliation implied that
the bus owner would pay a monthly fee plus a lump sum (locally known as cupo) for
the right to affiliate the bus to the company. 1351 Bus companies, therefore, had an
incentive to increase the number of bus routes STT issued them. Because of its lack
of organizational capacity, STT could not detect the need for new routes. It was
individual bus companies that carried out a study to show the existence of an
unsatisfied demand. The bus company would present the study to STT, which would
then issue a request for proposals. In theory the bus companies interested in the
service would bid and STT would choose a winner. In practice, the company that
presented the original study would usually be the winner. The bus company would
then advertise its new route to attract bus owners. Interestingly, this arrangement
where bus companies own routes and bus owners affiliate their buses is not strictly
1347 Montezuma (1996, p. 150).
1348 Montezuma (1996, p. 150); Ardila (1998, p. 30-1); Acero et al. (1999; p. 138); and Bonilla (1997, p.
16).
346 Bonilla (1997, p. 16); and G6mez (2003, p. 13).
1350 Montezuma (1996, p. 150-1); Alcaldia Mayor de Bogota (1999, p. 8); and Acero et al. (1999, p.
138).
1351 Alcaldia Mayor de Bogota (1999, p. 8).
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contemplated in Colombian legislation.'352 Again, the lack of adequate supervision by
the government allowed this to happen. In Bogota there were 64 bus companies
varying in size in terms of routes "owned" and affiliated buses.
To increase their effectiveness at affecting regulation, the bus companies
belong to trade associations (Figure 19). The largest is Conaltur, which groups 60% of
the bus companies in Colombia. Associations such as Fecoltran, Asotur and
Asonatrac represent a smaller number of companies.1353 These trade associations
are usually headed by the CEOs of the largest companies. According to interviews
with lobbyists at these associations, the associations have been rather effective at
influencing legislation in their favor. Further, the capacity to pressure the government
together with the weakness of the state had led to a situation in which the bus
companies had disproportionate power. If the city attempted to enforce the
regulations, the ministry of transportation could intervene to defend the operators'
interests. A crucial example is when bus owners lobbied and obtained important
extensions in the allowed duration of a bus to 30 years, when 15 is considered the
norm. 13 5 4
'
3 52 Alcaldfa Mayor de Bogota (1999, p. 6 and 9).
1353 Alcaldia Mayor de Bogota (1999, p. 6-7).
1354 Pehalosa (Forthcoming, p. 33-5).
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Figure 19. Relationships between city government, bus companies, bus owners, drivers, and
users in Bogota in 1997.
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Source: Author based on Montezuma (1996) and Alcaldia Mayor de Bogota (1999).
Note: Straight lines show hierarchy or flow of funds. Dashed lines show lobbying effort to
influence policy.
As seen, bus companies are not responsible for the actual provision of bus
services; they are merely intermediaries between the bus owners and the
government.1 3 55 As a result, the bus owners are the actual providers of public
transport.'356 The bus owners invest the largest amount of capital and make critical
managerial decisions such as when and where to operate and maintain the bus. Bus
owners also require the company to have routes that have a high volume of
1355 Montezuma (1996, p. 151).
1356 Montezuma (1996, p. 153-4); and Alcaldia Mayor de Bogota (1999, p. 9).
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passengers and a high turnover.13 57 Both characteristics determine total revenue. In
1997 there were 20,764 buses of different sizes and more than 25,000 owners. Only
two percent of the bus owners owned more than 10 buses and 85% owned one bus
or less.1 358 The large number of bus owners makes it difficult for the government to
talk to them. Because trade associations represent the interests of bus companies,
bus owners were at a disadvantage. As a result, some bus owners created the
Association of Small Bus Owners, Apetrans, to help them gain leverage in
policymaking (Figure 19).1359 Given the institutional arrangements, the bus drivers
become critical actors in the provision of public transportation services in Bogota. Bus
owners usually hire one bus driver to operate their bus. Occasionally, the owner might
also be the driver.1360 With a single driver per bus, the driver has to work shifts of 13
or 14 hours a day.13 61
To motivate the driver to maximize revenue, bus owners pay drivers on the
basis of a commission per passenger.13 62 To economists this situation should
translate into healthy competition, which should increase the efficiency of the system.
To some extent this happened for the fares tended to be rather low.1363 However, the
competition is rather extreme and it has lead led to what is locally known as the
"penny war" or guerra del centavo.' 3 64 The penny war leads to perilous driving in an
attempt by drivers to pick up as many passengers as possible. The penny war also
motivates drivers to disregard schedules and to stop at any place where a prospective
passenger stands. Boarding and getting off the bus become dangerous as the driver
stops for a very small amount of time. Children, the elderly, and some women are
more likely to have accidents and face injury. In their attempt to gain the competition,
1357 Acevedo (1986, p. 4-6).
1358 Montezuma (1996, p. 153-4); and Alcaldia Mayor de Bogota (1999, p. 9).
1359 Alcaldfa Mayor de Bogota (1999, p. 6-7).
13 6 0Twenty three% of the bus owners drive their own bus. Montezuma (1996, p. 153-4); and Alcaldia
Mayor de Bogota (1999, p. 9).
1361 Pehalosa (Forthcoming, p. 35).
1362 Montezuma (1996, p. 147-8 and 155-8); Alcaldia Mayor de Bogota (1999, p. 10); Acero et al.
¶1999, p. 139-40).
363 Acevedo (1986, p. 3).
1364 To some extent the penny war is analogous to the tragedy of the commons (see Ostrom, 1990,
esp. p. 1-3). Buses circulate over roads that are a common property resource. There is therefore an
incentive to overusing the roads. The end result is quite tragic in terms of low level of service and
unsafe transport.
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drivers block other buses and race against them hence spreading the lack of safety.
Indeed, the accident rate was too high with 52,764 collisions and 1,174 deaths in car
accidents.1 3 65 Finally, when ridership is low, drivers order all passengers off the bus
and turn back to collect passengers in the opposite direction. All these characteristics
lower the quality of service.136 6
The incentives existing in the arrangement for the provision of bus service led
to oversupply-which only aggravate the dire consequences of the penny war. The
incentive for bus companies is to add routes to lure bus owners who would pay to
operate in a route. By 2000, Bogota had 631 routes legally authorized, 95 non-
authorized13 67 and 22,031 buses.13 68 Routes were long, on average 29.48 Km, and
most went through few corridors thus creating congestion and increasing
competition.1369 Because demand was not growing as fast as supply1370 adding buses
would lower revenue and profitability for bus owners. Bus companies solved this
problem by using their influence to take advantage of the organizational weakness of
STT. Specifically, after negotiations, bus companies and STT agreed to include the
average number of passengers as an element in the fare structure.1371 As the number
of passengers per bus decreased the fare automatically went up. By 1998, on
average buses mobilized 350 passengers a day, when the international standard is
around 1,000.1372 Between 1993 and 1997 the fare increased by 83% in real terms to
compensate for the lower ridership per bus. Yet the quality of service did not increase
significantly.13 73 In sum, bus users were subsidizing a significant portion of the
inefficiencies in the system.
Bus owners were subsidizing the remaining cost of the over supply and
inefficiency. Poor accounting created economic rents for bus companies, bus owners
and bus drivers. These actors were earning profits above what they would in a
1365 Hidalgo (no date, p. 2).
1366 Pehialosa (Forthcoming, p. 31-2); see also World Bank (2002, p. 96).
1367 Alcaldia Mayor de Bogota (1999, p. 11-12); and JICA-Chodai-Yachiyo (1996b, p. 82).
1368 Echeverry et al. (2004, p. 6).
1369 Alcaldia Mayor de Bogota (1999, p. 12).
1370 Alcaldfa Mayor de Bogota (1999, p. 14).
1371 Castro et el. (2001, p. 11 ); Alcaldia Mayor de Bogota (1999, p. 15).
'
372 Alcaldia Mayor de Bogota (1999, p. 19);
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competitive market.1374 Yet this rent was possible in part because neither the fare nor
the bus owners covered the depreciation of the buses. Bus owners were cannibalizing
their own bus by not saving to replace it. This accounting trick artificially increased
profits. Not surprisingly, if depreciation was taken into account most of the buses were
actually loosing money.1 375 To make matters worse, actors faced incentives to
perpetuate the arrangement even if it implied cannibalizing the system. Bus
companies wanted to create more routes. Bus owners wanted to extend the legal
useful life of buses to continue earning the rent without saving for depreciation.
Owners and companies would mobilize and get the national government to extend the
useful life of buses first to 25 years and then to 30.1376 STT tried to freeze the size of
the bus fleet. Yet this only motivated informality as "pirate" buses entered the
market.1377 Almost 9,000 illegal buses provide service.1378
In sum, the weakness of the governments of Colombia and Bogota was the
main cause of the increased fare above the true cost, the oversupply of buses, and
the low level of service. A highly regulated system in the books was in practice quite
deregulated.137 9 The user and the bus owners subsidized the inefficiency through
artificially high fares and lack of proper accounting. Vested interests against change
were strong. Furthermore, the user had (has) little or no political incidence beyond the
right to vote at elections where candidates usually presented the metro as the
solution. Most users were captive to public transportation for they could not afford a
car.1380 As a result, by 1997 the average user would spend 123 minutes a day inside
a bus.1381 Both figures can be considered excessively long because the average trip
in Bogota is less than 10 km.1382 The situation begged for change for users deserved
13 7 3 Alcaldia Mayor de Bogota (1999, p. 15); Pablo Bocarejo & Co. (1997, p. 4) reports timid
improvements in the quality of bus services as a result of better training to bus drivers.
1374 Echeverry et al. (2004, p. 26-30).
137 5 Alcaldia Mayor de Bogota (1999, p. 16-17); and JICA-Chodai-Yachiyo (1996b, p. 302).
1376 El Tiempo, "Peialosa pide mas apoyo nacional," October 13t h,1998.
137 7 Trujillo (2000, p. 122).
1378 Echeverry et al. (2004, p. 6).
1379 Bay6n (2001, p. 4).
1380 JICA-Chodai-Yachiyo (1996b, p. 50).
1381 Observatorio de Cultura Urbana (1997, p. 23). Hidalgo (nodate, p. 2) reports an average commute
of 70 minutes.1382 JICA-Chodai-Yachiyo (1996b, p. 78).
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better.1383 Mayor Pefialosa seemed to have the answer with TransMilenio. Peialosa
understood the situation: "it is not the bus operators fault, but the poorly designed
economic system. It is not feasible for the operators to change the situation by
themselves. It is not a problem of investment or of the education of the drivers. It is a
structural problem."138 4
Penalosa's proposal for TransMilenio
As seen in the previous chapter, Penalosa rejected the Transportation Master Plan
done during the Mockus-Bromberg administration on the grounds that it was too
vague and was not feasible. Indeed, Pefalosa had a deep understanding of Bogot's
transportation problems and had crafted his own solution, a bus rapid transit project.
Further, Peialosa knew that even with the metro the buses would continue to be the
main mode of transportation in the city. The metro could not offer the coverage that
buses could.138 5 But Pefalosa knew that for buses to work a change of paradigm was
needed.1386 As long as the penny war continued, improving the quality of bus services
would be impossible. Pefalosa, therefore, wanted to end the penny war and with it all
the negative incentives analyzed above. Pefalosa also knew that any solution needed
to improve the institutional side, probably more so than the physical side. On the
institutional side, Peialosa envisioned a new city agency with the capacity to plan the
system and supervise daily service. This agency would contract out service provision
with new and highly capitalized operators, collect the fares and then pay the operators
per kilometer logged. The payment per kilometer was the way to eliminate the penny
1383 See Perea (2000) for an interesting explanation of why despite the low level of service, 53% of
users qualified the bus system as good and five% as very good. Part of the answer for Perea lies in the
myth built around the metro as the only possible solution. Perea (2000, p. 75, translation by author)
admits: "we journalists allowed ourselves to be seduced by the politicians' game and we helped sell the
metro as the Promised Land."
1384 As quoted in Fuquen (2000, p. 15, translation by author).
1385 Pefialosa (Forthcoming, p. 36-7).
1386 Several analysts in Bogota, including me at one point, supported the following hypothesis.
Pehalosa initially backed the metro and not a bus-based solution. Only once he saw the metro was not
feasible Pefialosa changed his position and adopted the bus-based component of the Transpiration
Master Plan (See Ardila (2003, p. 34);and Baquero (2004, p. 50-3)). The deep review of the evidence
in this dissertation suggests that Pehalosa always backed the BRT solution and equally important that
TransMilenio was not a progression emanating from previous studies. TransMilenio was a change of
paradigm because it included all the elements of BRT and not just the construction of busways as the
previous studies suggeste.
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war complemented by the new contractual arrangements. On the physical side,
Pefalosa wanted to build an adapted version of Curitiba's system.1387 Pefialosa
envisioned high-capacity buses, articulated or bi-articulated, not used until then in
Bogota. The buses would be designed for transporting people and would use
exclusive busways; passengers would pay upon entering the station.1 388 Pefialosa
later on baptized this project as TransMilenio.138 9 In short, Pefialosa understood all
the elements of a BRT proposal, which go well beyond building a busway.139 0
Penialosa assembles a capable planning team for
TransMilenio
Pefialosa was well aware that in order to ever get his pet project implemented he
needed a capable planning team in charge.13 91 As seen, Pefialosa assembled a small
planning team for the TransMilenio project even before he took office. Pefialosa
appointed Carlos Emilio G6mez to head the team. G6mez, an engineer, had worked
with Pefialosa at Arthur D. Little. Pefialosa headed the Bogota office before running
for the third time for mayor.13 92 By March, Juan Carlos Diaz had joined the
TransMilenio planning team. Diaz is a young civil engineer with experience in project
management and finance. By June, Pilar Rodriguez, a recent graduate of civil
engineering joined the team. Soon after Catalina Valencia was hired as press
secretary.
The planning team led by G6mez determined what studies were needed to
adequately plan TransMilenio.13 93 The team also designed, together with planners at
STT, the terms of reference for contracting out these studies with specialized
consulting firms.1394 Pefialosa had also set the basic framework for these studies. In
essence, Pefialosa wanted the existing bus companies and bus owners to be the
owners and operators of TransMilenio's fleet-under completely different contractual
1387 Pehalosa (2003, p. 83 and 100). See also Hidalgo (2003b, p. 9).
1388 Pefialosa (1997, p. 38); and interview by author with Enrique Pefialosa, June, 2004.
1389 Pefialosa (2003, p. 86).
1390 For definitions of BRT see Wright (2002a, p. 2); and Pefialosa (2003, p. 86-7).
1391 Interview by author with Enrique Penalosa (January, 2003).
1392 Pefialosa (2003, p. 83).
1393 See STT-Alcaldia Mayor de Bogota (1998).
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terms.395 The team determined that the adequate planning of TransMilenio needed
the following studies. First, a detailed demand modeling of the corridors to determine
the operational characteristics of the new buses-type of bus, number of lanes per
direction, location of stations, frequency and schedules. Second, a study to determine
the characteristics of the new city-owned TransMilenio Co. This consultant would also
help the city set up this company and help coordinate the entire project to take it to
completion. Third, a study to design the busways, stations, terminals, and other
facilities.1396 Fourth, the city needed to hire legal advisors for the project. These
consultants would help structure the TransMilenio Co. and advise the critical issue of
how to negotiate with the old operators and structure the new contracts. Fifth,
because Peialosa wanted the old operators to be part of the new ones, the city
needed financial consultants. The objective of this study was to financially engineer
the project so that the "operations of the new buses are profitable for the current
operations."1397 Lastly, these planners were thinking about hiring studies to determine
the cost structure of the buses, structure the fare box collection technology, and
define the system to control the operation of the bus system.1398 Later on a set of
world-class consultants carried out these studies, as I explain below.
In the first months of 1998, the administration was designing its development
plan. Part of this exercise implied determining the availability of funds. The city's
finances were in better shape than ever (see Tables 9 and 10, and Figure 18, above).
Pehalosa, moreover, wanted to privatize the Phone Company, which could bring in a
windfall of resources.13 99 Peialosa and his planners, therefore, realized the city had
enough resources to undertake a much larger version of TransMilenio than originally
expected. The planning team for TransMilenio did not consider this feasible. G6mez
and Dfaz thought it was impossible to implement seven busways in three years, more
1394 At this point, G6mez was also responsible for passing in the city council the privatization of the
phone company. This task too up a significant part of his time.
95 See Peialosa (2003, p. 85).
1396 G6mez (2003, p. 26).
1397 Proyecto Sistema de Transporte Masivo - Buses, "Avance del Proyecto de TransMilenio, June 3 rd,
1998, p. 1.
1398 Proyecto Sistema de Transporte Masivo - Buses, "Avance del Proyecto de TransMilenio, June 3rd ,
1998.
399 Concejo de Bogota (1998, p. 39-40).
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so given the impacts of the project on the existing operators. Pefialosa was not willing
to change his position and told his planners: "You have not understood what this
project is about. It will cover the entire city and we are going to start with seven
corridors." The planners and Pefialosa agreed on the seven corridors. Fearing that
Pefialosa might change his mind and increase the number of corridors, the planners
had Peialosa sign the map with seven corridors. The planners then negotiated with
Pefialosa to have only three corridors completed during his tenure. The other four
corridors would be fully designed for the next mayor to carry out. Pefialosa agreed,
but had the seven corridors included in the Development Plan enacted by the City
Council. In the Plan, undertaking the seven corridors was contingent on privatizing the
Phone Company.1400 Notice how these planners were trying to make the plan more
realistic by lowering Pefialosa's expectations.
The Development Plan was flexible in that it did not establish in what order the
TransMilenio corridors were to be built. G6mez and Diaz wanted to start with 7 th
Avenue. As Diaz told me: "We chose 7th Avenue in essence out of fear. Our argument
was that on that corridor we could easily "test" the TransMilenio technology, see if it
worked and then implement it in other corridors." Indeed, a relatively small number of
bus routes used the 7 th Avenue corridor. Displacing the existing operators from the
corridor would therefore be easier than on Caracas Avenue, the backbone of the
system and the corridor Pefialosa wanted. Dfaz continued his reflection on those
days: 'We lacked experience. We did not know Bogota; we knew only the section
where 7th Avenue is located. We really did not have major technical arguments to
suggest this corridor. We feared making mistakes and we wanted to test the
technology."'401 G6mez supported this position and tried to find other arguments to
back his position. G6mez consulted even some outside experts who recommended
the Caracas Avenue corridor and not 7 th Avenue.
Mayor Peialosa was not willing to do a test busway to see if TransMilenio
worked. Rather, Pefialosa would instruct these and other planners to think in terms of
1400 Concejo de Bogota (1998, p. 25-6).
401 Interview with Juan Carlos Diaz (October, 2003).
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planning a project that achieved the objectives he had set.1402 Pefialosa wanted the
Caracas Avenue to be the first corridor where TransMilenio was implemented.
Peialosa knew this would imply a strong conflict with the operators. But Pefialosa,
contrary to G6mez and Diaz, argued that it was precisely for that reason that
TransMilenio should target that corridor first. First, Pefialosa had the political will to
support the negotiations with the old operators and induce them to change. Second,
Peialosa was aware that if he did not carry out the most difficult part of the project his
successor would not do it either. In the end, TransMilenio was Pefialosa's pet project.
Third, Pefialosa knew that if TransMilenio worked as intended, choosing the Caracas
Avenue corridor would probably force his successor to continue the project. Finally,
Pefialosa wanted the Caracas Avenue corridor because communities of different
income levels neighbored the alignment. Peialosa did not want the people to
associate TransMilenio to transport for the poor. For him, TransMilenio ought to be
"the place where the vice-president of a large corporation or the doorman of a building
would feel good. A place where they would meet as equals in an environment that
respected human dignity."14 03
Even then, G6mez continued to argue in favor of the 7 th Avenue corridor.
G6mez even toyed with the idea of proposing a rail-based instead of a bus-based
system. Probably, a rail option would avoid much of the conflict with the existing
operators that implementing TransMilenio implied. Finally, Peialosa told the planners:
"TransMilenio is like the new kid in school. On the first day, the new kid has to look for
the bully and go fight that kid. In that way the other kids respect the new kid."
Peiialosa then added: "Do not waste time. Every time you think about implementing a
corridor different to the Caracas Av. you waste precious time." Pefialosa then chose
the three corridors he wanted: first, Caracas Avenue, second, 8 0 th Street, and third,
Auto Norte. Once Pefialosa chose Caracas Avenue the other two corridors followed
automatically. For one, the two corridors are connected to Caracas Avenue.
Implementing the TransMilenio technology only on Caracas Avenue would
inconvenience passengers on those two corridors by forcing them to transfer. For
1402 See G6mez (2003, p. 26).
1403 Pefalosa (2003, p. 86, translation by author).
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another, the Mockus-Bromberg administration had contracted out the retrofitting of the
80th Street corridor to busway technology-not the BRT technology TransMilenio
eventually built.1404 Further, the Mockus-Bromberg administration had purchased the
necessary properties to widen the corridor in certain areas so that the busway lanes
could fit. G6mez accepted Peialosa's decision sometime in July of 1998 (see Figure
20, for a map of the TransMilenio network actually built and the feeder routes).
In August 1998 Mayor Pefialosa decided he needed to change the leadership
of the team. Peialosa was aware that the main aspects to get TransMilenio
implemented were political.1405 Specifically, Peialosa knew that the negotiations with
the bus operators had to lead to one outcome: the involvement of the operators in
TransMilenio. The support of the operators was essential to insure TransMilenio's
political feasibility. Peialosa believed that the size and importance of the TransMilenio
project was such that he could not delegate the responsibilities to a member of his
cabinet. Cabinet members already had too many responsibilities running their
agencies. Instead, Peialosa wanted to create an independent unit that could
coordinate the many city agencies involved in the project.1406 Finally, Pelalosa was
looking for "a creative executive, action oriented and focused on results, experienced,
with contacts among the business elite, and with a great capacity to communicate
ideas and convince."1407
14 0 4 A World Bank loan was funding the retrofitting of the 8 0 th Street Corridor. The TransMilenio team
had to convince World Bank planners that upgrading the designs to TransMilenio's standards was
feasible. World Bank planners were reluctant to accept designs for buses with doors on the left side
and stations on the median. By then Mauricio Cuellar worked for the World Bank's office in Bogota in
charge of the projects in transportation. Cuellar was instrumental in convincing other Bank planners of
accepting TransMilenio's designs.
1405 Prieto (2001 b, no page numbers).
1406 Montezuma (2003, p. 49). According to this author Peialosa created several teams outside the
existing agencies to handle the main projects in his administration's development plan.
1407 Penalosa (2003, p. 87, translation by author).
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Figure 20. TransMilenio Network Phase I.
Source: TransMileno Co.
Note: Maps of Bogota usually have the North direction pointing toward the left side of the page
and not the upper end.
Peialosa found the person he was looking for in Ignacio de GuzmAn. De
GuzmAn holds degrees in law and political science.14 08 De Guzmdn has a long
experience in private business. Initially, de GuzmAn managed the Center for
Research and Social Action, a non-governmental organization owned by the Jesuits.
This NGO would later on become CINEP, a well-known think tank and human rights
center.1 40 9 He then managed the Workers Circle Foundation, also owned by the
Jesuits.'410 From this position, de GuzmAn and others founded the Social Group
(Grupo Social). The Social Group owns several banks, insurance companies, and
other large corporations. Owned by the Jesuits, the Social Group directs all of its
profits towards the poor and other social programs. De Guzman headed the group for
more than ten years. Additionally, de Guzm.n had been CEO of one of the largest
privately owned financial groups in Colombia.1411 De Guzmdn's experience is
therefore one that blends private enterprise with an emphasis on social issues.
1408 Montezuma (2000b, p. 15).
1409 Penalosa (2003, p. 87).
1410 Montezuma (2000b, p. 15).
1411 Montezuma (2000b, p. 15); and Peralosa (2003, p. 87-88).
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Pehalosa admired the GuzmAn's "ability for dialogue without losing his temper and his
capacity to convince others." Peialosa wanted de Guzman to head the planning team
for the TransMilenio project.1 41 2 Peialosa wanted Carlos G6mez to be second in
command, but G6mez had an offer to go to graduate school in the U.S. and resigned.
Pehalosa and de GuzmAn agreed to the following at the outset. First, de
Guzman would have a high level of autonomy and direct access to the Mayor.
Second, de Guzman would have a highly qualified planning team complemented by
best consultants in the world. The bidding processes for several studies started by
G6mez yielded the consultants. By November, de GuzmAn hired Catalina Navarro,
German Lleras, Felipe Camargo, Rafael Arango and Jose A. Torres. De GuzmAn
organized the planning team so that each planner would accompany the work of one
or more consultants. Each planner would know what the consultants were doing. This
allowed the planning team to coordinate the many studies needed for planning
TransMilenio. Thirdly, Peialosa granted de GuzmAn direct access to the main city
agencies that would have to do with implementing TransMilenio. Pelalosa had
already appointed de Guzman to the Board of Directors of IDU, the agency in charge
of building a physical infrastructure of TransMilenio. The Mayor also granted de
GuzmAn access to the STT's Secretary.1413 Incidentally, there was a turf war between
STT and the nascent TransMilenio planning team over which agency would be in
charge of TransMilenio.1414 Maria Elvira Perez, then STT's secretary would have to
resign soon after for an unrelated issue. During Pehalosa's three-year term, he had
six secretaries of transportation.415 Secretaries would not last in office in part
because of their lack of support for Pehalosa's pet project. This partially hurt the
implementation of TransMilenio.1416
Mayor Pefialosa and de GuzmAn also agreed on the next steps. In the short
term, the objective was to put TransMilenio in the political agenda of the city. While
Peialosa had been talking about his intention to transform the bus-based transport
1412 Pehalosa (2003, p. 87-88).
1413 Interview by author with Enrique Peialosa, June 2004; and G6mez (2003, p. 26).
1414 Peialosa (Forthcoming, p. 41).
'
415 Ardila (2000, p. 59)
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system since the election, people were paying more attention to the metro. De
Guzman and his team needed to figure out how to put the people to talk about
TransMilenio. Second, de Guzmn and his team needed to get approved in the City
Council the creation of the Third Millenium Bus Company, TransMilenio Co. This
company would be in charge of planning the system and concessioning the new and
exclusive routes to the private sector. Finally, before Peialosa's term ended, de
Guzm.n and his planning team had to carry out all the necessary tasks to implement
TransMilenio and open it to the public. There were 26 months left in Peialosa's
administration. Among the tasks needed to implement TransMilenio one was critical. It
was to negotiate with the bus operators, convince them of investing in the new buses,
and finding ways to finance the then under-capitalized bus companies and bus
owners.
De Guzman had his own view on how the planning process for TransMilenio
ought to take place. De Guzman believed that the planning process ought to be
dynamic and rich in feedback from stakeholders. To assemble the project, de
Guzmdn needed feedback from several stakeholders. But for the feedback to be
useful, de Guzman needed to understand very well the problem. More importantly, for
de Guzmdn it was critical to understand very well the interests of each stakeholder.
Furthermore, for the Guzman TransMilenio was not only a solution to a transportation
problem. TransMilenio had clear political, economic, and social components that the
planning team had to address. For all these reasons, de Guzmn needed an
interdisciplinary planning team backed by the "best consultants in the world."1417
Indeed, by that time Steer Davis Gleave was working on the transportation planning
aspects of the project; McKinsey on the organizational aspects; Capital Corp. on the
financial analysis; and Durn, Acero and Osorio on the legal aspects.1 418
The planning team would therefore devote its initial efforts to understanding the
problem and in particular the interests of the critical stakeholders. At the same time,
the planning team would engage these stakeholders in order to get to know them,
1416 According to sources, career bureaucrats at STT issued permits and other documents to operators
at a point in the process when this could hurt TransMilenio.
1417 Interview by author with Ignacio de Guzmcn, June 2001 and August 2000.
1418 Pehalosa (2003, p. 86).
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build relationships, and obtain feedback. For de Guzman if in a planning process "one
has to use force, something was done badly." Therefore, de Guzman wanted a
planning process that involved the key stakeholders. His experience at CINEP and
Social Group had taught him the importance of finding simple yet creative solutions to
problems. Equally important, de Guzman knew that the process had to lead to win-win
solutions. But finding these solutions required involving key stakeholders. However,
for de GuzmAn the participation of stakeholders is meaningful only if the planners and
the politicians have absolute clarity on the strategic objectives.1419
Peialosa agreed with de Guzman's broad approach. For both men it was
essential that the existing operators participated in the process. Peialosa, however,
wanted to follow what I dubbed the "good cop, bad cop" strategy. In this strategy, the
bad cop approaches suspects with the intention of scaring them. The good cop then is
nice to the suspects and usually obtains cooperation. Mayor Peialosa would be the
bad cop. Since the campaign Pefialosa had told the existing operators that he would
do TransMilenio "with them, without them, or even against them." As the planning
process advanced, Pefialosa would repeat this message, among others in the same
line to reinforce his image.1 420 De Guzman, on the other hand, would be the good cop.
De Guzman would emphasize to the operators that the TransMilenio project was "for
them," that the reform of the transportation industry had to be done with the industry
and not against it, and that it was possible for the operators to transform into modern
and profitable bus companies.1421 Peialosa summarized the approach by saying: "I
built an image of being a tough guy while de Guzman built the image of being
approachable and trustworthy. The operators figured it was infeasible not to
participate in TransMilenio." 142 2
The role of planners
The previous section tells the story of how Mayor Pefalosa assembled a capable
planning team for TransMilenio. Peialosa knew that a solid team was needed.
Leaving the project in the hands of a weak agency like STT would probably result in
1419 Interview by author with Ignacio de Guzman, June 2001 and August 2000.
1420 Interview by author with Enrique Pehalosa, January 2003.
1421 Interview by author with Ignacio de Guzman, August 2000.
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the quasi capture of the agency by the bus operators, as I showed above. The
capable planning team for TransMilenio increases the chances that the government
would the able to plan independently of vested interests. Yet at the same time, de
Guzman is aware of the need to interact with the critical stakeholders in order to get to
know them and obtain feedback. By knowing the stakeholders the planning team will
figure out ways of lowering power differentials as I show below. By obtaining feedback
the team will be able to find out a project that is politically feasible.
The planning team also had to negotiate with Mayor Peialosa-with limited
success. Planners want to be cautious while the mayor is overly confident. Planners
use a different political assessment than the mayor. Planners want to reduce risk for
the city government in adopting TM. Peialosa is aware of the risks and the political
requirements. While Peialosa agrees with the planners to implementing only three
corridors, he wants planners to tackle Caracas Avenue-the corridor that embeds the
highest conflict with the existing operators. Pefialosa's solution is to increase the
political capacity of the planning team by appointing de Guzmdn to head the team. De
Guzmdn is someone able to understand basic technical aspects. More important, de
Guzmdn is also an excellent negotiator and has excellent political abilities. De
Guzmdn values feedback and the participation of stakeholders in the planning
process, provided there are clear strategic objectives. De Guzmdn is a clear example
of a project champion. As such, de Guzm.n assembled an inter-disciplinary planning
team to tackle the several aspects that planning a large transportation project entails.
Putting TransMilenio in the political agenda
As seen above, one of the objectives was to put the TransMilenio project in the
political agenda of the city. To achieve this, de Guzman and his planners followed a
two pronged approach. First, they began their approach to the operators in order to
get to know them, understand their business "even better that the operators
themselves," and obtain some feedback. This alerted the operators. The Pefalosa
administration was serious about TransMilenio. Second, the planning team staged a
lavish event at the Municipal Theatre on December 1 0 th, 1998. Inside the theater a
1422 Interview by author with Enrique Penalosa, January 2003.
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video showed how TransMilenio would look. Peialosa spoke and announced his goal
of building 104 Km. of busways on seven corridors.1423 Yet the main event was
outside the theater. Twenty two buses, mostly articulated and even one bi-articulated
from Curitiba, were parked ready to ride people to the Bolivar Square, the main
square in the city.1424 The objective was to give people the chance to see high-quality
buses, used in actual BRT projects around the world, and imagine the city with
TransMilenio. As a result, the media began to report on the plans for TransMilenio.
The planning team had plans to exhibit the buses in several other places in the city
with high affluence of people. People began to talk about the new buses.
TransMilenio was slowly creeping into the political agenda of the city.
Juan Carlos Dfaz, who continued to work in the planning team under de
Guzman, had been responsible for bringing the buses from abroad to Bogota. D(az
had started to learn about buses with the intent of figuring out what would be the
optimal design for TransMilenio's buses. Diaz contacted 22 manufacturers in 12
countries. He visited many of the manufacturers and showed them the plans for
TransMilenio. Diaz also convinced many of the manufacturers to send a bus to
Bogota not only for the December 10 th event, but more importantly for testing.
TransMilenio planners needed to know how these buses would work at the altitude of
Bogota. Planners, moreover, needed to determine the costs of operating those buses
in Bogota. The TransMilenio team hired the Mechanical Engineering Department at
Los Andes University to carry out the tests.1425 Hence, the media event that helped
put TransMilenio in the political agenda of the city was in reality part of a broader
effort to learn about the buses that could be used in TransMilenio. The ultimate intent
was to design the ideal bus for TransMilenio and to learn on the actual operating
costs of operating the buses.1 4 2 6
1423 Pefialosa (2003, p. 90).
1424 Surrounding Bolfvar square are the mayor's office, the supreme court, the capitol building and the
national cathedral.
1425 Interview by author with Juan Carlos Diaz, November 2001 and October 2003. See Huertas et al.
1 999).
426 See Huertas et al. (1999, esp. ch. 2, 4, and 5).
340
Creating TransMilenio Co. in the City Council
The second objective established by Mayor Peialosa and de Guzm;n was to pass in
the City Council the law creating the TransMilenio Co. This step was needed for two
reasons. First, Peialosa believed that the existing city agencies lacked the capacity to
be in charge of the TransMilenio BRT project. Second, if the City Council approved
the creation of the new agency the project would receive a huge political boost.1427
De Guzmn started to plan the strategy for passing the law in the City Council.
No one in the planning team at the time knew well how the City Council worked. De
Guzm.n therefore hired Pedro Rodriguez to complement the planning team.
Rodriguez had been Budget Director for the city government for five years. From this
position he had been able to learn how the City Council worked.1 42 8 Rodriguez told
the team that a common held belief in Bogota was most likely untrue. Many people in
Bogota believe the City Council is in the hands of the bus companies and bus owners
who hold a monopoly on the city's transit system.142 91 430 Rodriguez argued that the
influence of the bus operators on the council was much smaller. For Rodriguez, the
councilors responded to any interest that mobilized but was not hostage of any
particular group. Rodriguez therefore warned that the City Council would introduce
amendments to the law creating TransMilenio Co. The team should be open to
negotiating in order to secure the necessary support. De Guzman then decided to
approach the council by constantly having members of the planning team at the City
Council to address any question the councilors might have.1431 De Guzmdn would
later on recall: 'We literally moved our quarters to the council." And a planner told me:
'We were at the council from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m., talking to the councilors, answering
1427 G6mez (2003, p. 27).
1428 Pedro Rodriguez became a City Councilor in the next election. He was in the third line in a list that
got enough votes to elect one councilor. The first in the list could not swear in because he was under
disciplinary investigation. Mockus appointed the second in the list to his cabinet. It fell of Rodrfguez to
take office as councilor. He is currently Secretary of Finance in the administration of Mayor Luis
Garz6n.
1429 See G6mez (2003, p. 27-38).
1430 Montezuma (1996, p. 155, translation by author, emphasis in original) says in this regard: "Ideas as
popular as "the existence of a monopoly in Bogota in transport" and that "renowned politicians are
linked to the transport sector because they own buses" are not quite correct. The people who own
more than two dozen buses are very few, marginal. There is some concentration of the most profitable
routes in the hands of some companies, but the ownership [of the buses] is not concentrated."
1431 Interview with Pedro Rodriguez, October 2003; and other sources.
341
their questions, thinking about our next steps, and thinking how to best structure our
arguments."
The Pefialosa administration submitted the draft legislation for the first time in
November of 1998, but the council did not consider the bill.1432 This happened two
other times. Nonetheless, some council members began to gather opinions on the
content of the proposed legislation. At the same time, the bus companies and bus
owners began to draft their positions and demands in response to the bill. The original
legislation submitted in November by the Pefialosa administration proposed the
creation of a city-owned transportation company known as TransMilenio and defined
the tasks it could carry out. The bill had seven articles.1 433 Following usual practice,
the administration attached an analysis to justify the creation of TransMilenio Co, as
well as the project's outline at the time.1434
The document explained that TransMilenio Co. would be in charge of
managing and planning a BRT system that included new institutional arrangements
for the provision of bus services.14 35 The remaining description contained several
messages for the existing companies and bus owners, probably seeking to appease
them. For example, the system would have feeder routes, initially operated by the
existing buses.1 43 6 TransMilenio Co. would contract with private bus companies the
acquisition and operation of the bus fleet.1'4 37 The document also mentioned that
TransMilenio Co. would assume in its entirety the demand risk. TransMilenio Co.
would pay the operators per kilometer logged and would guarantee a minimum
payment enough to cover costs and a minimum profit.1438 Further, the payment per
1432 G6mez (2003, p. 27).
1433 See Alcaldfa Mayor de Bogota (1998).
1434 See Alcaldfa Mayor de Bogota (1998, p. 29-44).
1435 Lacking better pictures to illustrate their plans for a busway with modern buses, the planners used
a diagram taken from the Transportation Master Plan done a couple of years before by JICA-Chodai-
Yachiyo (See Alcaldia Mayor de Bogota (1998, p. 36); and JICA-Chodai-Yachiyo (1995, Figure "Vista
Perspectiva del Proyecto de Buses Expresos Propuesto," located at the beginning of the document).
Notice that using a picture from the Transportation Master Plan that Mayor Pefialosa rejected can be
interpreted as evidence that TransMilenio was originally conceived by the Transportation Master Plan.
This is misleading since the TransMilenio project is quite different from what appears in the
Transportation Master Plan.
1436 Alcaldfa Mayor de Bogota (1998, p. 31).
14 3 7 Alcaldia Mayor de Bogota (1998, p. 32).
1438 Alcaldia Mayor de Bogota (1998, p. 34).
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kilometer would cover the depreciation of the bus,14 3 9 something that did not happen
under the old fare structure.1 440 The document specified that the current bus owners
and bus companies should assemble to form the new operators. But contrary to the
prevailing arrangement, the bus companies would own the buses and could not
affiliate other people's buses.1 44 1
Many of these elements of the TransMilenio project alerted the bus companies
and bus owners because of the impact on their interests. But it was probably three
additional elements that not only alerted but also alarmed the bus companies and bus
owners because they could entail the demise of their industry. First, the document
mentioned that the TransMilenio project implied renewing the bus fleet with modern
buses. Equally important, the document outlined plans for using a fleet of single-body
buses for the off-peak and a separate fleet of articulate and bi-articulate buses for the
peak period.1442 Requiring one set of new buses for the off-peak period and a different
set of buses for the peak period increased the capital investment beyond the
possibilities of the existing operators. Most likely they would not be able to participate
in the project. Foreign-owned companies would have to invest in TransMilenio.
The second aspect that alarmed the bus companies and bus owners was the
centralized collection of the fare box by a concessionaire contracted by TransMilenio
Co.1443 In the existing system, the fare box money was always in the hands of the
three actors involved in the provision of bus services in Bogot--driver, bus owner,
and bus company. But TransMilenio was proposing to handle directly the fare box and
not allowing the new bus companies or drivers to be involved. Further, TransMilenio
would only make periodic payments to the new bus companies. Based on their
experience with STT and other government agencies, the bus companies and owners
had reasons to doubt the proposed system would work. Risk was too high.
The final aspect that alarmed the bus companies and bus owners was the
implementation schedule. The document established that by June of 2000 the city
1439 Alcaldia Mayor de Bogota (1998, p. 42-3).
1440 Alcaldfa Mayor de Bogota (1999, p. 18).
1441 Alcaldia Mayor de Bogota (1998, p.34-5).
1442 Alcaldia Mayor de Bogota (1998, p. 38).
144 3 Alcaldia Mayor de Bogota (1998, p.39-41).
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government would retrofit seven corridors with the TransMilenio technology. By the
end of year 2001 the plan established that three additional corridors would be
transformed into TransMilenio's technology. Finally by the year 2006 the TransMilenio
network would cover 90% of the trips in the city. This accelerated pace meant that the
local transportation industry would have to invest very large sums of money in very
short periods of time if they wanted to participate in TransMilenio. Because the
existing bus companies and bus owners were undercapitalized, this pace of
investment was out of reach for the existing operators. Most likely, an international
investor would have the capital and obtain the concessions. Further, as structured in
this plan, they would have no alternative corridors in which to operate in just eight
years. The local bus companies and bus owners would disappear.
Councilman Alejandro Ortiz contacted the bus companies and the bus owners
and heard their opinions on the TransMilenio project. Councilman Ortiz was in
constant contact with de GuzmAn and the planning team. Ortiz found that the
companies and owners seemed to agree that the bus system needed to change and
that TransMilenio could offer a way out. But underlying was the fear that TransMilenio
would be for foreigners and that the existing companies would not be able to
participate in the project. Apetrans, the association of small bus owners, whom Ortiz
had also contacted, shared this concern. Apetrans argued that TransMilenio would
displace old buses. Given their lack of capital, the small owners would not be able to
invest in the new buses. Miguel Angel Perez, the head of Apetrans, warned that
TransMilenio would leave thousands of people without a job. This argument ringed
with Ortiz and other councilors.1444
Ortiz consulted with Councilman Samuel Arrieta and with de GuzmAn.
Together they came up with the idea of including in the law that created TransMilenio
several provisions to maximize the chances that the existing bus companies and even
the bus owners would become the concessionaires of TransMilenio. The bus
companies and bus owners agreed in principle. Ortiz and other councilors then
amended the proposed bill to reflect the discussions with the bus companies and bus
1444 Interview by author with Miguel Angel Perez, October 2003.
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owners.1445 First, the bill now specified that TransMilenio would contract bus services
taking into account in the bidding process the experience operating buses in Bogota.
The bus companies and bus owners had that experience and could bid with or without
an international investor. But an international investor could not bid without the local
companies and bus owners. Second, the bill now specifically prohibited TransMilenio
from directly operating buses. TransMilenio had to contract out the services with the
private sector. This prevented TransMilenio from becoming a state-owned monopoly.
Third, the bill included provisions that forced TransMilenio to adequately manage the
revenue raised in the fare box and insure prompt payment to the concessionaires. In
sum, the amendments introduced by Ortiz and other councilors reflected many of the
concerns of the bus companies and bus owners mentioned above. Moreover, the
changes lower the risk to these stakeholders.
Councilman Mario Upegui, of a left-wing party, introduced another modification
to the bill. Upegui had held hearings to understand the position of the bus owners.
The bus owners pointed out that they were victims of the lack of proper state action.
The bus owners argued that several provisions in Colombian law ordered the creation
of escrow accounts to save funds for replacing the buses. However, neither the bus
companies nor the state agencies had created accounts that worked to benefit the
bus owner. The bus owners complained "Instead of promoting, supervising and
enforcing the creation of the escrow accounts to renew the bus fleet, the state goes
after the bus owner threatening to remove the old buses from the streets."14 46 Upegui
therefore introduced an article in the bill to protect the bus owners. The article
established that the Mayor of Bogota would create an escrow account that would
purchase the old buses displaced by TransMilenio. The account would also be used
to help the bus owners and drivers become part of TransMilenio's
concessionaires..1447
'445 Interview by author with Councilman Alejandro Ortiz; and Ortiz et al. (1999, p. 113).
'446 Upegui (1998, p. 3); see also P6rez (2001).
'447 See Ortiz et al. (1999, p. 1 15-6).
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Finally, Ignacio de Guzman also modified the bill that created TransMilenio.1448
His change sought to give TransMilenio Co. the possibility of receiving funds from the
National Government.1 449 Recall that by this point in time, January of 1999, Peialosa
had decided he would not support the metro. Instead, Peiialosa wanted the national
government to transfer the funds promised for the metro to TransMilenio. By
amending the bill, the national government would be able to transfer the funds to
TransMilenio.
The modified bill reached the Governance Committee of the City Council by the
end of January of 1999. In the debates, de Guzmcn spoke to defend the TransMilenio
project and emphasize that the bus companies and bus owners would be included in
TransMilenio. In turn, several representatives of the bus companies and the bus
owners spoke opposing the project or some of its aspects. Finally, the article
introduced by Upegui generated a large controversy. Thanks to the discussion, the
councilors modified the article so that the escrow account could be used to
compensate the bus owners affected by TransMilenio. As originally drafted the article
forced the city to buy the buses. This gave planners the flexibility to use the funds in
the escrow account to compensate the bus owners or transfer that responsibility to a
third party--i.e. the new concessionaires.145 0 The committee approved the bill with 12
out of 13 votes.1 45 1
The next step to approve the bill took place in the plenary session of the City
Council. There, Councilman Bruno Dfaz questioned the responsibilities assigned to
TransMilenio. Diaz argued that STT was already supervising and planning the public
transit system.145 2 The bill remained intact, however, because the Council's rules
establish that the plenary may not modify the text of a law approved by a
committee.'453 11454 Other councilors raised the question of the impact of TransMilenio
1448 De GuzmAn used the structure for the Metro Co. found in the draft bill to create this company. As
seen, the City Council never created this company.
1449 GOmez (2003, p. 30).
1450 The planning team chose the latter approach because it reduced the chances of corruption.
145' G6mez (2003, p. 31-35).
1452 G6mez (2003, p. 37).
1453 Miranda (2001, p. 19-20).
1454 Yet this issue would play out years later when a court suspended the law that created TransMilenio
Co., precisely because the Council had assigned TransMilenio Co. responsibilities that belonged
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on the bus owners and drivers. The bill, however, already had measures that tried to
protect the interests of the existing bus companies, owners, and drivers. In parallel to
these events, Mayor Peialosa smoothed the process by allowing some councilors to
name people of their clientele to the city's bureaucracy. Peialosa told Miranda: 'What
we gave [some councilors] was support for their candidate for local mayor,'455 third-
level jobs or lower, and long-term contracts for some blue collar workers."1 456
Councilors interviewed by Miranda also agreed that not approving a law important for
Peialosa-such as the creation of TransMilenio-would have meant loosing
contracts and jobs that the mayor was willing to give the councilors.1457 The City
Council approved the creation of the TransMilenio Co. on February 4 th, 1999.1458
Interacting with the bus operators
The approval of the creation of TransMilenio Co. did not mean that the project could
go ahead without facing other hurdles.'459 That is why one of the broad objectives of
Mayor Pehalosa and de GuzmAn was to negotiate with the bus operators to convince
them of participating in TransMilenio.1460 Peialosa had been to Curitiba and Quito,
exclusively to STT. The City Government appealed the decision to a Superior Court (Consejo de -
Estado). This court has not made a final decision at the time of this writing. If the Superior Court agrees
that the creation of TransMilenio Co. is not valid, then the contracts between TransMilenio and the
concessionaires might be declared void. (El Tiempo, "Suspendido Decreto," March 2"d, 2004). See also
Tribunal Administrativo de Cundinamarca (2004), which contains the ruling.
1455 Bogota is divided into 20 localities. Each locality has a local mayor. Local mayors are appointed by
the Mayor of Bogota from a short-list submitted by the locality's council. City Councilor can have
influence in the locality's council (See Secretaria de Gobierno, 1997).
,456 As told by Peflalosa to Miranda (2001, p. 29, translation by author).
'457 Miranda (2001, p. 29-30).
1458 See Concejo de Bogota (1999, p. 1).
1459 Another major hurdle was the environmental permitting process. Initially the Samper government
had determined that CAR, an environmental agency not belonging to the government of Bogota, would
issue the license for the metro. CAR, however, argued that the project was local and that therefore it
should DAMA, the city's department of the environment. By the time Pefialosa became mayor, this
agency was in the hands of supporters of Jaime Castro, former major of Bogota. As seen, Castro
supported an expensive set of sewer treatment plants. CAR demanded Peialosa to invest hundreds of
millions of dollars in expanding these plants. Pehalosa did not consider the plants a good solution and
did not support CAR's petition. CAR, in turn, requested back to authority to issue the environmental
permits on the metro and TransMilenio in September 1999. Peialosa and de Guzman, among others,
lobbied President Pastrana and Jaime Ruiz to solve the issue through a decree to remove CAR from
the process. After some controversy with the Ministry of the Environment, Pastrana issued the decree
establishing DAMA as the authority, except for its own projects (see Pelalosa, Forthcoming, p. 58-60).
For a summary of how the environmental permitting process for large transportation projects works in
the U.S. see Ardila and Salvucci (2001, p. 119).
1460 Pefialosa (Forthcoming, p. 61-2).
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which had by 1995 adapted Curitiba's tube-station technology.14 61 Pehalosa was
impressed by Curitiba's system, which used private operators under strong
government supervision-major tenets of BRT service.1462 Peialosa also saw Quito's
system but did not like the public company that owned and operated the electric
buses, which did not cover operational costs.1463 Peialosa had also learned that in
Quito the army's tanks had had to intervene to crush a strike by the bus owners who
did not want to let the new system open.14 64 In Quito the existing operators were
excluded altogether from owning and operating the new buses. Pehalosa therefore
reinforced his conclusions that the private sector should own and operate the
TransMilenio buses and that the local operators should participate in the project.
Pehalosa and de Guzman were unwilling to call the army's tanks on opening day.
In addition, McKinsey, the consulting firm in charge of structuring the project
and designing TransMilenio Co., analyzed the situation and found that the bus
companies and bus owners were critical stakeholders. For one, the bus companies
and bus owners had power. First, they had established strong linkages to the ministry
of transportation and STT and were able to obtain favorable legislation and
supervision. Second, they could resort to strikes and protests that had yielded good
results in the past. Finally, the bus companies and bus owners could file lawsuits to
protect themselves against actions by the city government.14 65 For another, not
including the current bus companies and bus owners in TransMilenio could have
severe social impacts. Finally, the existing operators had some business experience
that was valuable for TransMilenio.1 466
In sum, the city government needed to interact with the bus companies to
involve them in the TransMilenio project. Otherwise, the project would not politically
feasible. But the existing bus companies could not participate unless they underwent
a major transformation. They could no longer be companies that rented out routes to
1461 See "El Trolebus," www.quito.aov.ec/upt/trole/sindex.html, accessed July, 2000; see also Arias
no date).
62 See Wright (2002a, p. 2); and Wright (2002b, p. 1-2).
1463 Peialosa (Forthcoming, p. 62).
1464 Pefalosa (2003, p. 86-7).
1465 McKinsey & Co. (1999a, p. 88); and McKinsey & Co. (2000, p. 7).
1466 McKinsey & Co. (1 999b, p. 5).
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bus owners. TransMilenio operators had to be highly-capitalized and well managed
firms that owned large fleets of articulated or bi-articulated buses, operated them, and
maintained them to provide a high quality service under strong supervision by
TransMilenio Co. Further, the new companies could no longer engage in the penny
war; instead they would pay bus drivers a salary. In turn, the city would pay the
operators per kilometer logged and not per passenger transported. The interaction
and negotiations with the existing bus companies therefore had to minimize their
opposition to the project and seek to transform them into modern firms.
Pehalosa and de Guzm.n structured the negotiations with the operators
around the "good cop, bad cop" strategy. Peralosa did not admit in public his
willingness to have the local operators be part of TransMilenio. On the contrary,
Peialosa, the "bad cop," would question the ability of the existing bus companies to
transform themselves into the modern ones required by TransMilenio. Further,
Peialosa argued that the business would go to foreign investors because the local
ones did not have the capital or organizational capacity. PeRalosa even used the
Quito experience to argue that if needed the army would intervene. De Guzman, on
the other hand, acting as the "good cop" would always encourage the operators to
transform themselves into the ones needed by TransMilenio. For de Guzman, under
different contractual conditions and incentives, the industry could be profitable and
provide a high quality service. All this without having to change the actors. As the
CEO of a bus company told me: "de Guzman always told us that TransMilenio was a
business that had to include us, that TransMilenio was for us. He never told us that
TransMilenio was going to be against us."
In order to carry out the negotiations in an effective manner, de Guzman
reinforced the planning team by hiring Jose A. Torres. Torres had just finished in
France an MBA with an emphasis in negotiation. De Guzman put Torres in charge of
the negotiations with the operators. De GuzmAn and Torres approached the bus
companies, bus owners, and the trade associations that represented them. Thanks to
this initial interaction, de Guzman and Torres discovered that the trade associations
were not truly representative of the industry. Any decisions reached with the trade
associations would most likely lack support from the bus companies. The experience
-
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with Metrobds proves this point. Second, de Guzmdn and Torres realized that the key
stakeholders were the bus companies. There were 64 bus companies and this is a
manageable number of actors to interact with. The bus owners and bus drivers, on
the contrary, were too many and, according to de Guzm.n and Torres, lacked any
representation able to negotiate meaningfully with the city. The bus owners had many
conflicts among themselves and lacked mechanisms to build consensual positions in
response to TransMilenio's plans. Miguel Perez, of Apetrans, later on corroborated
this argument.14 67 Therefore, de GuzmAn and the planning team focused on the bus
companies. Their next step was to identify who were the "natural leaders" among the
managers and owners of the bus companies. De GuzmAn and Torres figured that
these leaders would be able to influence the remaining companies and convince them
of participating in TransMilenio. Some of the CEOs of the bus companies emerged as
the main leaders to talk to.
To approach the CEOs of the bus companies without alienating the trade
associations and bus owners, de GuzmAn and Torres followed a two-pronged
approach. First, Torres and other planners went to talk to the CEOs to show them the
project and obtain their reaction. Torres found that the CEOs were initially distrustful
because of past experiences dealing with STT. Torres and his fellow planners had to
show they were different. They admitted the project was not fully structured and
needed further definition. Defining the project would be done considering the opinions
of the operators together with a solid technical component. As Torres told me, "we
approached the CEOs in a sincere, serious, and honest manner, showing managerial
capacity." Torres contacted 95% of the CEOs.14 68
These contacts led to a meeting at STT where the CEOs and TM planners
agreed to create thematic committees. This was the second part to the approach. The
committees would discuss the plans for TransMilenio with the bus companies, bus
owners, and trade associations. The parties agreed to five committees: First, the
technical committee was set to analyze the results of the transportation modeling and
planning exercises. Second, the infrastructure committee was established to analyze
JiIIo'467 Interview by author with Miguel A. Perez, November 2001.
1468 Interview by author with Jose A. Torres, November 2001.468 Interview by author with Jose~ A. Torres, November 2001.
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the proposed designs for TransMilenio's busways. Third, the financial committee was
created to study how to finance the acquisition of the buses and the profitability of
TransMilenio's concessions. Fourth, the legal committee was set up to analyze legal
aspects of the project. Fifth, a committee to analyze the restructuring of the existing
bus routes, which had to take place to guarantee that TransMilenio's buses faced no
competition.'469 Planners regarded these committees as a "source of
recommendations to support the decisions needed for planning TM."1470 Each
committee met once a week from 7 to 10 a.m., each on a different day of the week.
Torres attended each committee meeting. Torres managed to have representatives of
the trade associations, bus companies, and bus owners' attend the committees.
Torres told me: 'We had to take all these stakeholders into account and let them
participate."'471 The committees met for six months.
The objectives of holding both meetings with individual CEOs and meeting
through committees were several. First, Torres and his fellow planners wanted to
understand the transport sector. Second, the planners wanted to know what the bus
companies, owners, and trade associations believed should be the future of the
transportation system of Bogota. Third, the planners wanted to obtain feedback on
their tentative ideas on how to structure the many details of a complex project like
TransMilenio. Fourth, the planners wanted to build a strong relationship with these
stakeholders in order to build trust. Fifth, de GuzmAn, in particular, wanted to
convince the transport stakeholders that the planning process was going to take them
into account in a meaningful way. Finally, de GuzmAn wanted to convince them that
TransMilenio was the way to continue in the business. As structured, the business of
transporting passengers in Bogota was not financially sustainable, as explained
above.
The results of this interaction in two different settings were several. First, the
planners were able to take into account the feedback from the stakeholders. The
planners then went to the several consultants carrying out planning studies. Together
1469 "lnforme de Avance del Proyecto TransMilenio," February 17th, 1999.
1470 "Informe de Avance del Proyecto TransMilenio," March 3, 1999.
1471 Interview by author with Jose A. Torres, July, 2001.
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they analyzed the feedback from the stakeholders. At the next meeting, the planners
presented an updated version of their plans in order to obtain more feedback and
reactions. In many occasions the stakeholders agreed to the changes. But in many
others, the stakeholders were reluctant to accept the proposals by the planners. One
example was the financial projections that the planners with the help of consultants
were building. These projections suggested that investing in the new buses and
operating them under TransMilenio's conditions would be profitable. The stakeholders
would suggest changes to the model. But very frequently they doubted altogether the
figures used by the planners. As the CEO of a bus company told me: "in paper you
can write any result you want, we wanted hard evidence and the TransMilenio
planners did not have it." Slowly, therefore, the planners were defining the many
details of TransMilenio aided by a constant interaction with the critical stakeholders.
This interaction allowed planners to validate their ideas with the critical stakeholders
and in the process make progress at convincing them of investing in TransMilenio.
Yet doubts on the profitability of TransMilenio remained.
Second, the planners, but in particular Torres and de GuzmAn, noticed that
when they held meetings with a single CEO, the CEO was rather enthusiastic about
participating in TransMilenio. At the committee meetings, however, probably as a
result of peer pressure, the CEOs were less likely to be supportive of TransMilenio.
De Guzmn realized that the negotiations where effective decisions would be made
would have to be held CEO by CEO. "Never negotiate with a group of CEOs," said de
Guzman. Just as the planners for the Caracas Av. Busway in the late '80s, the
TransMilenio planners had discovered that when in a group the representatives of the
transport sector rarely agree with the Government. But individually these very same
representatives were likely to agree to negotiate meaningfully with the city
government.
Third, de Guzmn and Torres discovered that many CEOs were the sons and
daughters of people who had started as bus drivers. Through sacrifice and saving,
these drivers had managed to acquire several buses and even establish bus
companies. With time, the sons and daughters of these former drivers became the
CEOs of the bus companies. Some of these people had university degrees. But, due
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to the poor image of the transport sector, the children of the current CEOs were not as
likely to be proud of their parents' business. In fact, many hid from their friends what
their parents did because they felt ashamed. De Guzman figured that TransMilenio
offered the opportunity to change this situation around. If the bus companies
modernized and transformed into a real industry, then the children of the current
CEOs would be proud of their parents business again. This argument helped lure
some CEOs into paying attention to the proposal made by TransMilenio. As the CEO
of a company that invested in TransMilenio told me: "people regarded us before as
peasants who owned buses; now they see us as industry captains."147 2
In the mean time, de Guzman and some of the planners in the planning team,
such as Jose A. Torres, Catalina Navarro and Pilar Rodriguez, met every week with
Mayor Pefialosa. In those meetings, de GuzmAn and his team reported on the
progress of the planning for TransMilenio.147 3 There is evidence that the planners
informed selectively the mayor on the results of their interaction with the transport
stakeholders. For example, Pefalosa wrote regarding how de Guzmdn and the
planning team convinced the bus companies of participating in the project: "How he
[de Guzman] did it, I still cannot imagine it. But he did it."1474 The planners reported
some of the results but did not provide a detailed account. The constant interaction
with the mayor, nonetheless, served the planners to contrast the demands of the
stakeholders with those of the mayor. Pilar Rodriguez, one of the planners, told me in
this regard: "Peialosa had a very clear idea of what he wanted and it was very difficult
for us to maneuver outside his objectives. The process with the citizenry, the bus
operators, and others, was one of negotiating, of convincing them little by little that we
were taking them into account so that at the end the conclusion they reached was the
same one we wanted."1475 Through this constant interaction with both the mayor and
the stakeholders the planners were able to understand what was feasible and what
1472 For an example of how the media now regards those that invested in TransMilenio as industry
captains see Revista Dinero, "Un empresario Innovador," December 2002. This article talks about
Victor Raul Martinez, whose story I tell below.
1473 See Pefalosa (Forthcoming, p. 76).
1474 Pehalosa (2003, p. 90).
1475 Interview by author to Pilar Rodriguez, June, 2004.
353
was not; at the same time that they convinced the stakeholders of the convenience of
TransMilenio.
The role of planners
The previous sections illustrate very well the main arguments of this dissertation.
Planners' main role is to interact with politicians and stakeholders. A first forum for this
interaction is the City Council. A second forum is the individual meetings with CEOs
and the committee meetings together with the periodic meetings with Mayor
Pefialosa. The interaction shows planners ways of lowering the power of the critical
stakeholders. The prime example is planners' discovery that meaningful
negotiations147 6 had to be held with individual CEOs. At the same time, the interaction
allows planners to expose their plans, persuade stakeholders, and discover what
adjustments are needed. As a result of the changes, risk for the stakeholders is going
down, as is the extent to which they oppose the project. Notice, however, that the
changes are not major ones. The planners change some of the aspects the
stakeholders care for. The broad essence of the plan remains. Yet this small changes
are enough to lower stakeholders' risk and increase support for the project. At the
same time, planners have in the mayor someone who knows very well the broad
objectives of the project. The mayor does not allow planners to change these
objectives and therefore offers planners a useful benchmark. The TransMilenio
project, however, is flexible in many of its details. That is were planners have leverage
and introduce small changes resulting from the interaction while keeping the broad
objectives constant.
Finally, this entire dynamic is possible because the planning team is highly
capable. The interaction validates plans formulated by the technical side of the
planning team and suggests necessary adaptations. Notice, however, that this
technical capacity is useful in the context of the interaction with politicians and
stakeholders. Absent this interaction the technical capacity is not productive in terms
of lowering risk and building support. The political side of the planning team, on the
1476 This conclusion on the meaningfulness on the negotiations with individual stakeholders is valid only
for the conditions of Bogota. It is by no means a call to negotiate at the back of other stakeholders. The
point is just that by interacting planners discovered ways of minimizing power differentials.
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other hand, is in charge of interacting with politicians and stakeholders. At times this
interaction demands "body-contact" politics, which many planners can find difficult to
cope with. But the planning team has a high level of political capacity that is able to
carry out the "body-contact" politics with the stakeholders-and with the mayor.
An operator says Yes to TransMilenio
By May of 1999 a group of bus companies incorporated a consortia known as S199, or
Integrated System 1999. The name embeds a symbol, for sf is yes in Spanish. This
group of bus companies was saying yes to the plans for TransMilenio. S199
manifested its interest of participating as a concessionaire in TransMilenio. Part of the
reasons that explain why the companies assembled S199 lies in the planning process
followed by de Guzman and his team. The constant interaction of planners and
stakeholders through direct meetings and the committees gave information to the
CEOs of the bus companies. Further, the interaction showed the CEOs that the plans
for TransMilenio were flexible and could be adapted to incorporate many of the
stakeholders' concerns. Further, it showed the CEOs that the TransMilenio planners
were different to other planners they had seen before. For example, many CEOs I
interviewed argued that the Metrobes project a couple of years before had set a
negative precedent. In addition, the CEOs were used to a city agency, STT, which
frequently demanded bribes and that they could not trust. "If TransMilenio had been
planned by STT we would have never participated," one CEO told me. The
TransMilenio planning team changed this around thanks to its leadership and the
blend of capabilities of its members.
While the work of the planning team played a critical role, there was also an
interesting process led by the CEO of one company and her siblings.1477 The Martinez
family interacted with other bus companies and convinced them of participating in
S199. Recall that the planners had had trouble showing financial figures that the
transport stakeholders would believe. The planners had financial models suggesting
the profitability of becoming an operator for TransMilenio. But the transport
1477 This section is based on interviews by author with Milena Martinez, Victor Raul Martinez, and Otto
Sarmiento, aide to Mr. Martinez.
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stakeholders doubted for the most part these analyses. The Martinez family, on the
other hand, owned a bus company, Sotrandes, which years before had started a new
practice after Milena Martinez, one of the siblings, returned from a Masters in
Transportation Engineering in Israel. Sotrandes invested in a fleet of busetas, paid its
drivers a salary and not on a commission basis, and had computers installed in each
bus to supervise the operation. As a result of these changes, the quality of service
had gone up. The user had noticed and rewarded Sotrandes by preferring this
company's buses. Ridership went up as did profitability. The Martinez family,
therefore, had the balance sheets suggesting that modernizing the industry would be
profitable.
At the same time, the Martinez were among the leaders of Asonatrac, an
association of bus companies. The Martinez started to promote their experiment but
other members were reluctant to believing a company that owned buses would be
profitable. Milena and her brother Victor Raul Martinez organized more than 10 trips
to Quito, Curitiba, Sdo Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro, among others. Victor Raul used to
work for British Petroleum and holds an MBA. At the same time, Victor Raul began to
argue with the other CEOs in Asonatrac about the business, its profitability and the
need to change. The CEOs were reluctant to admit the need for change. Victor Raul
and Milena then began to organize conferences and seminars with the CEOs of the
bus companies grouped under Asonatrac. At the conferences, they would question
the current model, argue the need for change, and present the figures from
Sotrandes' balance sheets. Finally, in Rio de Janeiro, Victor Raul and other CEOs
met with Eurico Divon Galhardi, owner of a large bus company in that city. Galhardi
showed his company's facilities and told them the business was quite profitable.
Galhardi recommended the CEOs to invest in TransMilenio.1478
Through all these mechanisms Victor Raul finally convinced the members of
Asonatrac to form a group to bid for TransMilenio's concessions. Victor Raul came up
with the name, Sistema Integrado 99, Sl199, in November of 1998. Victor Raul would
be the CEO of Sl199 and his mission would be to assemble a team capable of
negotiating with the TransMilenio planning team. In March 1999 de Guzman
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convinced several CEOs of travelling together to Curitiba, Sao Paulo, and Quito to
see together those successful experiences.147 9 On May 1 3 th, 1999, the members of
S199 officially announced they would incorporate the firm. Victor Raul called the
mayor's office and spoke with Edgar Sandoval, then private secretary of Mayor
Pefialosa. Sandoval and Pefialosa could not believe it. Pefialosa said: "These people
have to be crazier than me!" The approval rating for Pefialosa was very low. The
movement to recall the mayor had enough momentum to make even Pefialosa fear
the election would take place. Peialosa might not finish his term in office. Moreover,
TransMilenio Co. had not been incorporated yet, despite the City Council's approval
to create it, because the funds from the reduction in capital of the Power Company
were not available yet.
In conclusion, the Martinez family knew that modernizing a bus company by
acquiring buses and operating them under sound managerial practices was profitable.
The Martinez family was awaiting an opportunity for expanding their practices. Mayor
Pefialosa's idea to implement TransMilenio presented that opportunity. Three factors
allowed the Martinez family to finally create S199-the would-be largest operator of
TransMilenio. First, the leadership of Milena and Victor Raul Martinez to pull together
the companies belonging to Asonatrac into S199. Second, Milena and Victor Raul
could use the experience of their own company, Sotrandes, to backup their claims
that a modern bus company was profitable. Third, the planning team for TransMilenio
was open to interacting with stakeholders such as the Martinez family. The
significance of S199 in the process is high for without it "the definition and execution of
the BRT project would have been much more difficult, almost impossible."14 8 0
Planners in the TransMilenio planning team agree with this statement.
Shaping the TransMilenio project
Parallel to these events, the TransMilenio planning team and the teams of consultants
were advancing in defining many details of the project such as the terms of reference
1478 Interview by author with Eurico Galhardi, April 2003.
1479 G6mez (2003, p. 38); and Pefialosa (2003, p. 90). Notice that many CEOs had already travelled on
their own to many of the cities they visited with de GuzmAn.
1480 Montezuma (2003, p. 60).
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for the concessions to operate the TransMilenio buses. The shaping of the project,
however, did not happen in a political vacuum. There was a constant interaction
between planners, Mayor Pehalosa, and stakeholders such as those related to the
transport sector as well as neighboring communities. The team of top-level
consultants helped the planners resolve the technical problems that the interaction
with other actors continuously unveiled.
At one of the first meetings of the consultants and the planning team, Peialosa
emphasized that he did not want consulting reports that recommended solving the
problem by calling "customer" the bus passenger. Penalosa, further, did not want the
consultants to follow the usual planning approach of studying the problem,
establishing alternatives, evaluating them, making a recommendation, and having the
decision maker choose one for adoption. Peialosa knew that the solution was BRT.
Instead, Peialosa wanted the consultants to establish how to get this BRT project
implemented. Pelalosa told the consultants that they should be working out of the
offices of the TransMilenio planning team, side by side with the planners. Notice that
Peialosa narrowed the broad options planners could consider to BRT and its
implementation. This decision by Peialosa to narrow planners options can be
understood in the context of the criticality of time and the limited duration of the
window of opportunity. Peialosa himself had chosen BRT before the election and
therefore it is this proposal that can be considered during the window of opportunity.
Allowing planners to consider other alternatives will only waste precious time towards
achieving the mayor's main goal of seeing TransMilenio implemented.
By telling the consultants to focus on how to implement his plans and by having
consultants and the planning team work together, Peialosa achieved three things.
First, the planning team and the consultants had to think in terms of how to implement
what they were planning. Planning and implementation were strongly linked together.
This brought about technical, political and financial realism, among others. Second,
the consultants benefited from the interaction by the members of the planning team
with relevant stakeholders and the mayor. Each planner in the planning team was a
liaison to one consulting team. The liaison could report any new information to and
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from the consultant. The consultants were able to provide better recommendations
than if they had been working alone from their offices.
The third point is a result of the previous two and is the most important one. At
the same time that the interaction between planners and stakeholders enriched the
consultants' work, the recommendations by the consultants forced the planning team
to interact further with stakeholders. The end result was a continuous interaction
among actors that generated further feedback for all parties involved and that
continuously shaped the project. The final reports by the consultants certainly capture
some of this interaction. But because the interaction among actors went beyond, the
final reports fall short of the work actually developed by most of the consultants.1481
Put differently, the consultants' work improved in quality because of the proximity to
the planners who were interacting with the mayor and relevant stakeholders.
To illustrate the three previous points I use examples from one of the most
important consulting studies done for the planning of TransMilenio. This study did the
transportation planning for the project. The British firm Steer Davis Gleave (SDG)
carried out the study. The study implied estimating the demand, designing the
busways, determining the size of the bus fleet, and planning the operations of the
system and its implementation.1482 This study was critical because its results served
as inputs to the other studies. For example, the demand estimates were needed for
the financial structure of the project and to design the stations. SDG subcontracted
most of the work with the firms Logit of S&o Paulo and Logitrans of Curitiba.1483 To
head the project SDG hired Paulo Custodio who had ample experience in BRT
planning in the city of Sao Paulo.148 4 Custodio believes that technical models are
limited. Therefore, stakeholders and politicians need to validate any technical
result.'4 85 And Custodio and his team offered a solid technical foundation to plan and
1481 The dynamic process involving consultants did not occur in Curitiba. According to several sources,
the City of Curitiba has made little use of consultants for its planning needs.
1482 See Steer Davis Gleave Inc. (2000).
1483 Custodio and Mongui (2003, p. 13).
1484 Pedro Sazs, also from Sao Paulo, was part of the team. Sazs had participated in the planning of
the Caracas Av. busway in Bogota 10 years before. For Logitrans participated planners such as
Garrone Reck and Eraldo Constanski, both of whom had worked with Mayor Roberto Requiao.
1485 Interview by author with Paulo Custodio, November 2002
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engineer TransMilenio. SDG started its work in January of 1999 and turned its final
report in April of 2000.
First, because planning and implementation were linked together, SDG
planners faced strong pressure to produce results that would allow the project to open
before the mayor's term was over. SDG's report, therefore, consistently made
reference to issues that will only happen if the project is implemented. For example,
the report states that "the main obstacle for the [TransMilenio] project lies in traffic
management and control of the existing bus system."148 6 That is, the expected
demand on TransMilenio's busways depended on whether the existing routes were
modified to eliminate direct competition. SDG planners found that if the existing bus
route system was not modified then demand on TransMilenio would go down by 10%,
the fare would go up by 15%, and risk would increase by 25%.1487 The adequate
implementation of TransMilenio was contingent, therefore, on modifying the old route
system.
Second, an example of how the interaction between planners, stakeholders,
and politicians benefited the consultants' work comes from the location of the stations
along the busways and the design of the feeder routes. As the community began to
learn about the plans to build the busways, some people requested information at the
TransMilenio offices. Some people even requested the planners to go to the
neighborhood to present the project and the designs. At these meetings planners
received feedback from the community. In all, TransMilenio planners held more than
300 meetings with the community.1488 Planners would face the problem of convincing
the community that it was still possible to introduce some changes to the project.
People were used to past practices where government representatives would come to
inform decisions already made. Planners for TransMilenio then went to talk to SDG
consultants who would provide a technical opinion. The location of some stations as
1486 SDG (2000b, p. 24); and SDG (2000a, ch. 3). exucutive summary.
1487 SDG (2000b, p. 38).
1488 At one point, the TransMilenio planning team sent "technical" planners to the meetings with the
community. These planners did not know how to interact with a community and how to present the
project. The community got irate because the planners suggested all the decisions had been made and
the project could not change. Aware of the potential political cost, de Guzman sent "political" planners
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well as the designs of the accesses to some stations were changed as a result of this
interaction. This brought about political support from these communities for the
project. In other cases, however, it was impossible to agree to the change suggested
by the community. In these cases, planners offered to explore the issue and see if
there was another way of addressing the community's concern. Occasionally,
planners could not do much and had to go against the community. En example is the
location of one of the bus depots on 80th Street. This last case, however, was not
frequent, according to my interviews. But the interaction was not limited to
neighboring communities. Members of the planning team also reached out to
community-based stakeholders such as associations of handicapped people in order
to improve the design of the stations and buses.
Planners also interacted with the mayor and the nascent technical team of S199
and other would-be concessionaires. Mayor Pefialosa had been to Curitiba and had
decided he wanted a similar system but with pedestrian overpasses to access the
stations. Passengers would therefore use a pedestrian bridge to enter the station. In
that way passengers would by pass traffic to enter a station. This idea was feasible
only in the 80th Street and Auto Norte corridors. But along the Caracas Av. Corridor it
was not feasible because to build the over passes, the city government would have
had to demolish several houses. SDG planners argued that with traffic lights and
proper signage passengers would have safe access to the stations. The team of
architects supported this position. Pefialosa did not want to change his original idea.
Finally, de Guzman and other planners figured that building overpasses along
Caracas Av. would delay the project because the city would have to expropriate
hundreds of properties. This argument convinced Pefalosa.
For the design of the operations of the buses, the SDG team benefited from the
interaction between the TransMilenio planners and the would-be concessionaires.
The would-be concessionaires did not have the equivalent technical capacity of SDG.
Their main interest was to learn and voice initial concerns. For example, the original
plan for TransMilenio called for having two sets of buses, one for the peak and
to the same community. This time, the planners followed the approach described in the main text of
suggesting that there was a possibility to modify the plans for TransMilenio if needed.
-
361
another for the off-peak period. Would-be operators argued that this would
unnecessarily increase the cost of the project. SDG planners agreed after some
analysis. The solution was to have only one set of buses. Initially SDG planners
wanted to use bi-articulated buses as in Curitiba, given the high ridership. Planners
from McKinsey objected on the grounds that only Volvo in Curitiba manufactured the
engines and chassis for bi-articulated buses. The limited competition would increase
the cost of the project. SDG planners argued that this had not happened in Curitiba. In
the end Mayor Peialosa backed McKinsey planners and the decision was to use only
articulated buses for the main corridors. The scheme benefited also the stakeholders.
Victor Raul Martinez, of S199, summarizes the process: 'The discussions with
TransMilenio and its consultants was very valuable, because they were the ones with
all the theoretical knowledge and we had the local experience and the will to
learn.,,1 4 89
A similar debate between planners and would-be concessionaires took place
regarding whether the buses should be high-platform or low-platform. Many would-be
concessionaires wanted low platform buses, because they could be resold once the
contract with TransMilenio Co. expired. High-platform buses, on the other hand, had
no value because they can only be used if there is a station. Mayor Peialosa wanted
high platform buses, with doors on the left side, to minimize the chances that the
existing buses could use TransMilenio's facilities. Further, Pehalosa believed the
high-platform buses prevented the driver from stopping outside the station and
minimized user fraud. Technically speaking there was not much difference between
the two types of buses. However, planners estimated that low platform buses could
cost US$ 10,000 to $20,000 more per bus. To ensure the support of the would-be
concessionaires, the decision was to allow proponents to decide which type of bus
they wanted to use. The conditions of the bidding process would then have a clearly
defined process for determining which type of bus would be finally used. Bidders
proposed to use the high-platform bus, the one Peialosa and the planners favored.
Finally, as said above, the process was such that the recommendations by the
consultants motivated the planners to interact further with relevant stakeholders. A
1489 Prieto (2001 a, no page numbers).
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critical example is the finding by SDG planners that the project would be feasible only
if the existing routes where modified to eliminate direct competition with the new
system.1490 Once TransMilenio Co. assigned the concessions, de GuzmAn, Torres,
and other planners devoted most of their energy to convincing the CEOs of the bus
companies to accepting changes to the routes that competed with the project. I
describe these negotiations below to maintain the chronological development of the
case.
While I used the example of the transportation planning study, it is important to
highlight also the roles of the other consultants. One example is McKinsey & Co.,
which was in charge of designing and helping set up TransMilenio Co. In addition,
McKinsey provided advice on many issues that emerged as the process advanced.
Penalosa wanted a large consultant such as McKinsey because of the pool of
expertise world wide it could use. 14910ther studies were the financial one done by an
investment banking firm, Capital Corp, and the legal advisor, Duran, Acero & Osorio.
BRT projects are highly complex and they entail much more than building busways.
Further, the planning cannot be limited to standard transportation practice. Legal,
financial, and other issues are part of adequately planning a BRT system. In
particular, the institutional arrangements are critical. For one, a capable agency is
needed to supervise the operators and plan bus service. For another, the participation
of the private sector is essential in cities such as Bogota and Curitiba where private
investors already operate buses.
Finally, it is important to offer a counterexample. The consultants that won the
bid to carry out the architectural designs, Gufa, were from Medellin and carried out
most of their work from that city. Consequently, these consultants did not interact as
much with the planning team. As a result, the designs Gufa submitted had two flaws.
First, the level of detail did not allow IDU-in charge of building TransMilenio-to
contract out the manufacturing of the metallic stations (Figure 21). The lack of detail
1490 Planners estimated that the first phase of TransMilenio, with three busways, would affect the routes
owned by 51 bus companies. Twenty companies had to eliminate and modify routes; and 31 only had
to modify routes (McKinsey & Co., 2000, p. 6).
1491 Pehalosa (Forthcoming, p. 64); and Peialosa (2003, p. 85-6).
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could have delayed opening date beyond Penalosa's term in office.1492 Second, the
original designs had a cost the budget allocation for TransMilenio could not afford.
Planners at IDU and TransMilenio, including Andres Pacheco, Carlos Torres, Marla
Bolanos, and Pilar Rodriguez, had to contract out the detailing of the designs and
figure out ways of lowering the costs by 60% or more.1493
Figure 21. TransMilenio Station Inside
Concessioning TransMilenio's bus routes
To design the concession contracts and the terms of reference for the competitive bid,
de Guzman and his planning team followed the same approach described in the
previous section. First, the team had talked for months to the bus companies and bus
operators and knew what they could accept. Second, legal consultants, mostly lawyer
Nohora Acero, structured the backbone of the concession contracts.1494 To maximize
the level of feedback, de Guzman and his legal advisers had the idea of issuing an
1492 Penalosa (Forthcoming, p. 80-4); and Penalosa (2003, p. 88-9).
1493 Interview by author with Pilar Rodriguez, February 2001.
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informative memorandum. This memorandum contained the draft terms of reference
for the bidding and a draft contract. Not only would-be concessionaires but also a
series of interested parties and citizens reacted to the memorandum. The planning
team issued the memorandum in June 1999.
The memorandum established that out of the 1200 total possible points for
awarding a concession, 400 were for showing experience operating bus routes and
buses in the City of Bogota.'4 95 Any interested investor would have to make an
alliance with local bus companies. The local bus companies, moreover, had the
highest chances of ending up being the concessionaires of TransMilenio's bus
services. The CEO of a bus company told me: "the informative memorandum showed
us that the city government was honoring the commitments made by de Guzmn and
his team." Another one told me: "some of us suspected the city government had pre-
chosen the concessionaires from international investors. The informative
memorandum showed us the process would be competitive and local bus companies
had the best chance." Further, the memorandum also gave 50 points to proponents
that bought their bus fleet in Colombia.1496 Indeed, planners had also interacted with
the manufacturers of bus body works who convinced the planners about their
eventual capacity to produce the articulated buses-the first time this would happen in
Colombia. 149 7
The bus companies submitted a set of comments to the draft contracts and
terms of reference, many of which were incorporated. Specifically, the bus companies
wanted to minimize their risk on investing in the new buses. The bus companies
suggested a demand guarantee, which TransMilenio planners rejected. The bus
companies then suggested that the city paid a minimum of 850,000 Km during the
lifetime of the bus. The city accepted but on the condition that once the fleet reached
1494 See Baquero (2004, p. 86) for why a concession scheme was the most convenient from a legal
perspective.
95 TransMilenio (1999, p. 55).
1496 Trans Milenio (1999, p. 55).
1497 S199 is the only operator that used Brazilian-made buses. The other concessionaires used buses
assembled in Bogota on Brazilian-made chassis and engines. Indeed, TransMilenio generated a south-
south technology transfer between Brazil and Colombia. Ardila and Morrison (2002) explore the
reasons why the technology transfer was. successful.
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850,000 km of usage the concession will come to an end.1498 By now TransMilenio
planners had assigned the demand risk to the operators and not to the city as
originally intended.1499 Some bus companies accepted this because their own
analysis indicated that demand was going to be higher than originally estimated. If this
happened then profits would be higher. Further, the bus companies had learned that
the operational measures proposed by the SDG study would lower the costs of
operation. Risk was low, therefore.
Other issues were the following. The draft contract specified that the operators
would be paid once a month for the number of km logged during that period. The bus
companies, used to seeing the money on a daily basis, balked at the idea. Finally they
agreed that the payment would be every week. Further, the operators, as seen above,
were reluctant to have the city government manage the funds directly. TransMilenio
planners proposed that a fiduciary company be in charge of managing the funds and
paying the operators. The bus companies were glad to see that the contract included
provisions for setting the fare in a technical way. Before it was a political game
between the city government and the bus companies. Finally, Otto Sarmiento of S199
noticed that the environmental management provisions were not stringent enough and
recommended changes. Sarmiento, as Victor Martinez, had worked in the oil industry
and knew the damage the improper handling of lubricants can do to the environment.
TransMilenio planners accepted and expanded the recommendations. S199 also
recommended to establish an anti corruption agreement for the bidding process. De
Guzman called Transparency International, an NGO that fights corruption, to oversee
the bidding process but they could not reach an agreement. The parties then agreed
to put in the contract clauses to prevent corruption.
The informative memorandum and subsequent adjustments to the contract
lowered enough the risk for the would-be proponents. In September 1999, 25 bus
1498 See TransMilenio (2000, p. 147).
1499 See TransMilenio (2000, p. 132). Note that as in Curitiba, in TransMilenio the payment to operators
is per distance logged. But contrary to Curitiba where the city bears the demand risk, in TransMilenio
this risk is assigned to the operators. In Curitiba operators receive a payment per km logged regardless
of actual demand. If demand is too low the city has to find the additional funds. In TransMilenio the
agreed payment per km logged is the basis, but what determines the final payment to the operator is
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companies and over 500 bus owners incorporated S199,1500 the first proponent. In that
same month, a group of 28 bus companies created Express del Futuro. Soon after a
large industrial group from Cali and CGEA Transport from France partnered with
Sidauto, a large bus company, to create the Consorcio Internacional del Transporte
Masivo, the third bidder. A fourth bidder, MetrobQs S.A., assembled later on, involving
again large local investors partnering with some bus companies.1501 In total, 58 out of
the 64 bus companies became part of these four bidders.
On October 13 th, 1999, the city government officially incorporated TransMilenio
Co. Mayor Peialosa appointed Edgar Sandoval as TransMilenio's first CEO. De
GuzmAn continued as general coordinator of the project, without an official post at
TransMilenio. On Dec. 6, 1999, TransMilenio Co. issued the request for proposals for
the concessions to own and operate the new buses.1502 By April, 2000, TransMilenio
Co. signed contracts with three of the aforementioned bidders. S199 won the
concession for the largest number of articulated buses with 160. Express del Futuro
won a concession for 120 buses; and Consorcio Internacional del Transporte for 100
buses. The bid, however, was not as successful; planners expected four proponents
and only three submitted a bid. The city government had to open a new bid, which
Metrobes won for 90 buses.1 50 3
TransMilenio opens doors
Parallel to the events in the previous section construction of the three busways
advanced at full steam. The objective was to have them ready before the mayor's
term was over. IDU, headed by Andr6s Camargo, was in charge of the
construction.1 50 4 This objective was partially achieved late in December of 2000. Pilar
Rodriguez was the liaison between the TransMilenio planning team and IDU; Maria
the actual demand. If demand is above the estimated one, the operators receive a higher payment per
kilometer logged.
1500 Prieto (2001a, no page numbers)
1501 This MetrobUs S.A. company has nothing to do with the MetrobUs company that won the bid during
the Castro administration and unsuccessfully tried to plan and implement a BRT system during the
Mockus administration.
1502 G6mez (2003, p. 41).
1503 Fuquen (2000, p. 43). For TransMilenio's second phase the existence of a precedent, and planners
work at structuring the terms of reference, resulted in five bids for three slots.
1504 Penalosa (2003, p. 88).
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Bolahos was the IDU liaison for TransMilenio. This structure insured a good
communication and cooperation between the two organizations.
Three critical issues remained to be solved before TransMilenio could open
doors, however. First, the local banks were not willing to lend millions of dollars to the
concessionaires for purchasing the buses. The bus companies participating in the
concessionaires lacked, for the most part, proper balance sheets and could not show
sufficient assets. Members of the concessionaires had to look for additional funds and
negotiate with the banks. In parallel, Mayor Peialosa began to pressure the banks to
issue the loans. In turn, de GuzmAn and Sandoval explained the TransMilenio project
to the banks trying to convince them of issuing the loans.1505 Specifically, they
explained the way McKinsey had designed the formula to compensate the operators.
As said, the payment per kilometer logged is only the basis for the payment; the final
payment depends on actual ridership, which resulted higher than anticipated.150 6 The
banks agreed to finance all four concessionaires.1 507 S199 had to go to Brazil in
search of supplier loans and loans from the National Development Bank of Brazil
(BNDES). In the end, the project was so successful because ridership exceeded
expectations that the concessionaires obtained better loan terms and paid some loans
in advance.
Second, the existing bus routes needed to be changed to eliminate any direct
competition with TransMilenio's busways. Trade associations such as Conaltur
argued that the CEOs should not negotiate any change. This would force the city to
modify the routes on its own. This could allow the bus companies to file lawsuits
seeking compensation.1508 The city government, on the other hand, had legal studies
and even a ruling by the Supreme Court suggesting that it could modify the routes on
1505 Peialosa (2003, p. 90-1).
1506 Financial planners designed the payment to cover operational and capital costs plus a profit under
the assumption that demand in the first three busways in TransMilenio was going to be around 672,000
passengers per day. Actual demand is close to 760,000. Profits are higher than initially estimated.
Notice, however, that risk was also high and that therefore higher profits compensate for the risk.
1507 Anecdotal evidence indicates that Express del Futuro and Metrob3s are now owned mostly by
large capitalist investors who bought out the original bus companies they partnered with. S199
continues to be owned entirely by the bus companies that created it, and Consorcio Internacional del
Transporte Masivo continues to have the original property structure, with one bus company.
1508 See Trujillo (2000, p. 126-7).
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its own.1 509 However, to minimize risk for the city the TransMilenio planning team
decided to negotiate with the CEOs. Recall, however, that earlier on the planners had
discovered that the CEOs would agree in private to things they would reject in public.
De Guzmn and his team met with each CEO and offered them to negotiate the
changes to the routes. De Guzman, moreover, played a trick on the CEOs. He told
each CEO that he or she was the first one his team visited. This would translate into a
first mover advantage. De GuzmAn also told the CEO not to communicate with other
CEOs, because this might endanger the entire scheme. All of the CEOs believed this
plot. Once the routes were changed, the CEOs discovered that the excessive number
of buses in the city made most of the routes marginally profitable. None of the CEOs I
interviewed complained about de Guzmn's strategy. One told me "de Guzmn got to
know us very well and simply used our internal divisions to achieve peacefully
something that was needed to make TransMilenio work." The last CEOs signed the
changes to the routes on December 15, 2000-three days before TransMilenio's first
buses started rolling.15' 0 Conaltur's strategy of seeking compensation did not work.
Third, and related, the bus owners knew the TransMilenio project would
displace them. They demanded compensation from the city government. TransMilenio
planners estimated that the first three busways would displace 5000 old buses. But
TransMilenio planners had negotiated for the most part with bus companies. It was
therefore up to the bus companies whether they would include or not the bus owners
in the new operators. As seen, S199 included more than 500 bus owners. Express del
Futuro might have included a few hundred, and the other two included none. The bus
owners were therefore the ones excluded and most affected by TransMilenio. The
negotiations at the City Council to approve the creation of TransMilenio Co. resulted
in the creation of an escrow account that could be used to purchase the buses
displaced by TransMilenio. Mayor Pefialosa and planners for TransMilenio were
reluctant, however, to use these funds to acquire buses. In essence they feared a city
agency could mismanage the funds. Because of these reasons planners proposed
1509 Penalosa (Forthcoming, p. 78).
510 The corridors on which the old buses displaced by TransMilenio operate now have deteriorated
because of the increased traffic, associated pollution, and road damage.
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that for each new articulated bus, the concessionaires would have to purchase and
destroy 2.7 old buses. Showing proof of the destruction of the old buses would be a
requisite for the city to allow a concessionaire to start operating a new articulated bus.
This mechanism compensated 1,318 bus owners for the removal and complete
destruction of their old bus.1511 In addition, to mitigate the impact on bus owners,
planners had foreseen the use of 1,500 of the existing buses to serve the feeder
routes. This mechanism worked partially because companies such as Sotrandes and
Sidauto offered to provide the service with new and better-designed buses.
Bus owners led by Miguel Angel Perez, of Apetrans, led the demand for
compensation. Apetrans organized several strikes. Some strikes targeted directly
TransMilenio's plans. Yet most of the strikes sought from the national government
provisions to extend the useful life of the buses and to create a fund to finance the
acquisition of new buses.151 2 As the day to open the project loomed, the strikes
became more frequent1513 forcing Mayor Peialosa to negotiate with Apetrans. The
Mayor and Perez agreed to create a commission to study how to mitigate the negative
impact on the bus owners.1514 But because Peialosa was days away from leaving
office, the agreement had little value-it was up to the new mayor, Antanas Mockus,
to follow through. Perez was aware of this reality but showed the agreement as a
victory. For Perez it was clear that the bus operators had no choice but to seek ways
to participate in TransMilenio. As structured, the business of owning old buses was
not sustainable. TransMilenio's future stages offered the way out for them. Perez told
me: "the future of the bus owners is to organize themselves and become part of the
1511 G6mez (2003, p. 54).
1 5 12 Apetrans soon convinced the Ministry of Transportation and Congress of enacting a law extending
the useful life of buses to over 30 years (El Tiempo, "Pebalosa, mas criticas al Ministerio de
Transporte," June 23rd, 2000. On August 23rd , 2001, Congress passed a law creating a national fund to
renew the bus fleet. The law also established that for the first time the fare charged to the user would
have a component to compensate the capital invested in the bus. Bus owners are expected to deposit
daily in the bank this amount. Bus companies are responsible for supervising this operation (see Law
688 of 2001).
1513 See El Tiempo, "Bogota fue bloqueada," December 5th, 2000; and Portafolio, 'TransMilenio
aseguro recursos por tres ahos," December 5th, 2000.
1514 El Tiempo, "Arranca TransMilenio," December 16 'h, 2000.
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concessionaires of the new stages of TransMilenio. We want to be part of
TransMilenio. They have to let us in. 1515
Pefialosa understood the need to involve the bus owners in the next stages of
TransMilenio. From his position as a former Mayor and creator of TransMilenio, he
lobbied Sandoval and other planners at TransMilenio Co., now working for Mayor
Mockus. Peialosa wanted TransMilenio to establish as a condition for the new
concessionaires to have bus owners among the shareholders.1 51 6 Mayor Mockus
supported the TransMilenio project as a candidate. Mockus instructed his team to
work towards carrying out the second stage of the project, which included three new
busways. Indeed, the coalition supporting TransMilenio was strong enough to insure
that the project continued at least during the Mockus administration.517 For the
second stage of TransMilenio, the three new concessionaires have 1,850 bus owners
1515 Interview by author with Miguel Angel Perez, December 2001.
1516 Peialosa (2003, p. 93-4).
'517 Claudia Vasquez, Secretary of Transportation during Mockus' second term argued that
TransMilenio's first stage improved the service to less than 10% of demand. Vasquez also argued that
the subsequent stages of TransMilenio would take much longer to complete than originally planned.
She proposed to implement an intermediary system that would improve the quality of service while
TransMilenio arrived to those corridors. Originally, Vasquez's plan implied the construction of small
facilities and re-assigning the bus routes to the bus companies that offer to use the newest part of their
fleet. She called the project the Circuitos project. Vasquez assembled a planning team with "technical"
planners only, and no "political" planners. The technical planning team designed its plans with little or
no interaction with the key stakeholders, the bus companies (or the users). The bus companies were
split. A few supported the idea. But most companies saw in the Circuitos project a threat. Specifically,
after investing in TransMilenio many lacked the required capital. Bus owners also regarded the initiative
as a way of accelerating the pace of change, which was already hurting them. Finally, Peiialosa saw in
the initiative a direct threat to TransMilenio. For Pefialosa the Circuitos project was a way of
empowering the regular bus companies and making them impregnable. Peialosa moved his allies in
the City Council and told them to oppose any initiative Secretary Vasquez presented. At the same time,
many bus companies and bus owners demanded Mockus to fire VAsquez. Interviews with the CEOs of
the bus companies reveal that they missed someone like Ignacio de Guzman or Jose A. Torres in the
planning team. CEOs complained of finding no planner willing to listen in a meaningful way. As the
CEOs voiced concerns about the initiative, the response by the planning team was, "we can introduce
these changes, because we are the government and we know what is better for you." Early in 2002
VAsquez resigned. Vdsquez's successor, Javier Hern.ndez, implemented a watered down version of
the project that implied the construction of no facilities. Some bus companies liked the idea and
invested in new bus fleets. Others still adamantly opposed the initiative. Lawyers filed lawsuits and the
courts struck down several measures. The city government appealed and the cases are still in litigation
at the time of this writing. Not knowing the final outcome is the reason for not including this case in
more detail in this research. Further, much of the implementation of this policy is in the hands of the
new mayor, Notice, however, how the Circuitos initiative fits some of my conclusions. First, to become
feasible the policy had to change. Second, the lack of a planning team able to manage the political part
of the project led to unnecessary conflict. While VAsquez managed to hire many of the same
consultants that participated in TransMilenio they did not benefit from a team that interacted.
___
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among the shareholders, including members of Apetrans. The bus owners provided
between 20 and 30% of the capital. Furthermore, for the new feeder routes
TransMilenio planners established similar requirements and close to 4600 bus owners
are involved.1518 For the second phase, moreover, TransMilenio planners required
that for each new articulated bus, 7.7 old buses were scrapped. This would
compensate 2,588 bus owners."519
The role of planners
Underlying the TransMilenio project was a solid technical component that involved
first-class consultants. The work of these consultants, however, did not take place in a
political vacuum. The existence of a planning team willing to interact with stakeholders
and politicians supplied the consultants with political feedback on their proposals.
Consultant's advice is therefore more realistic, better informed and tightly suited to the
client's needs. The feedback resulting from the interaction served to adjust the plans
incrementally, but the planning and the consultants discussed any adjustment. The
solid technical component gave power to the team, which only accepted the changes
that were convenient for the project and that maximized the chances that
TransMilenio would be implemented. This interaction between consultants and the
planning was possible because the two groups worked side-by-side and their
mandate was to focus on implementation. Again, the changes to the plan were small
but on areas that mattered to stakeholders. The interaction preserved the broad
objectives of the project thanks to a solid technical component and a constant
interaction with Mayor Pefialosa.
The interaction between planners, politicians, and stakeholders had an
additional consequence. The interaction generated a coalition of support for
TransMilenio. On the one hand, planners got to know the stakeholders and persuaded
key actors of participating in the project. Further, planners went to communities to
present the project and discuss any concern. At a minimum, communities would not
oppose the project and at best they would support it. On the other hand, as planners
and politicians were able to incorporate stakeholders' feedback they reduced the
1518 G6mez (2003, p. 55).
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opposition to the project. The interaction among actors and the resulting changes to
the project also reduced the risk of supporting or participating in the project. The
critical stakeholders, the bus companies, are the main example. At the beginning of
the process they were for the most part opposed to TransMilenio. But as the planning
team was able to interact and incorporate their feedback, the bus companies found it
attractive to transform themselves into modern firms and become TransMilenio's
concessionaires. TransMilenio planners, however, interacted mostly with bus
companies and very little with bus owners. The planners left it up to the bus
companies to decide whether or not to involve the bus owners in the new
concessionaires. This was probably a mistake. Yet even if it was, the resulting
coalition of support was strong enough to counter the bus owners' opposition.
Pefialosa realized that the subsequent stages of the process couldn't exclude the bus
owners. Planners also realized they needed to involve the bus owners and the second
stage specifically required their participation.
The significance of TransMilenio
The first section of TransMilenio's first stage opened to the public on December 18th,
2000, 12 days before the end of Peialosa's term in office. Initially users were allowed
to ride for free. Revenue service started on January 6 th, 2001. Gradually, the
remaining segments opened and by early 2002 the three busways with 41 kilometers
in length were ready.1 520 The cost of the infrastructure was US$ 213 million;1 521 the
bus fleet had a cost of US$ 112 million.1522 The idea of giving buses exclusive lanes,
having passengers pay upon entering a station, and having passengers board and
exit from a station at the same height as the buses translated into significant time-
1519 G6mez (2003, p. 54).
1520 TransMilenio (2002, p. 5). The first three lines also have 65 stations, including 8 integration points
with feeder buses (Hidalgo, 2003b, p. 16). See also Hidalgo (2004a) for a description of the
implementation of phase 2 of TransMilenio.
152 TransMilenio (2002, p. 6). The US$ 213 million figure includes about US$ 80 million for the
rehabilitation of the mixed traffic lanes adjacent to the busways (Ardila and Menckhoff (2002, p. 133)).
The figure does not include US$ 38.8 million for property takings. Including them, the total cost of the
civil works is approximately US$ 254 million (see Custodio and Monguf, 2003, p. 21).
1522 Custodio and Mongui (2003, p. 21). The first three busways used originally 470 articulated buses
(Hidalgo, 2003, p. 16).
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savings.1523 Before the TransMilenio busways, buses achieved a speed of 12
kilometers per hour on 8 0 th Street and 18 on Caracas Avenue. Articulated buses on
TransMilenio busways go on average at 26 kilometers per hour.1524 A survey in March
of 2002 indicated that 83% of the people surveyed used TransMilenio because of the
time-savings they could accrue.1 525 Figures 22 to 25 show pictures of TransMilenio's
facilities and buses.
Demand estimates indicated the three busways in the first stage would move
672,813 passengers per day.1526 By February 2002, barely a year into operation,
ridership was already above 600,000 passengers per day-twice the total ridership of
the two lines of the Medellfn Metro.1527 By October 2002 the system was moving
760,000 passengers per day1528 -close to 110,000 trips above average ridership for
the Washington DC metro system,15 29 which has a network roughly 4 times
TransMilenio's. Further, TransMilenio was moving 35,000 passengers per hour per
direction, most than most metros in the world.1530 But while metros rarely cover
operating costs with the fare they charge, TransMilenio covered operational and
capital costs of the bus fleet charging a fare of approximately US$ 0.40. Further, the
infrastructure cost per kilometer was less than a tenth of the cost of a metro line. The
city will be able to cover a larger share of the demand with BRT technology than with
heavy rail. Further, surveys showed that TransMilenio was attracting even car users
because of the savings in time.1531 Over 60 technical missions from over 30 countries
have visited Bogota to see TransMilenio first hand.1532 In addition, the project won the
Stockholm Partnerships Award in recognition to TransMilenio's contribution to
1523 For an ex-post cost benefit analysis of TransMilenio see Hidalgo and Illera (2001); and Chaparro
(2002).
524 TransMilenio (2002, p. 8).
1525 G6mez (2003, p. 68).
'
5 26 SDG (2000, p. 3.1)
1527 Ardila and Menckhoff (2002, p. 133).
1528 TransMilenio (2002, p. 1).
1529 The Washington D.C. Metro moved on average 650,000 passengers per weekday during the fiscal
year 2003-4. See "June Metrorail Ridership shatters records," See
http://www.wmata.com/about/MET NEWS/PressReleaseDetail.cfm?ReleaselD=443, July 2, 2004.
153 Hidalgo (2003b, p. 16).
1531 El Tiempo, "Demanda, 40 por ciento por encima de lo previsto," March 29'h, 2001.
1532 Penalosa (2003, p. 98).
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sustainable urban development.153 3 TransMilenio's buses and stations are accessible
by handicapped people (Figure 25). Further, properties neighboring the stations have
increased in value.153 4 TransMilenio's success-and other policies in transportation
followed mostly by the Peialosa administration-put Bogota on the international map.
Finally, while Curitiba is a medium sized city, Bogota showed that similar innovations
are possible in large cities. Peialosa says:
"The World Bank and the Inter American Development Bank cast TransMilenio as an
example for cities in the rest of the world. What is particularly interesting is that it was
adopted in a large city, poor, with grave transportation problems, where the system
typical to third-world countries prevailed, namely a myriad buses and busetas owned
by small investors competing strongly in the penny war. And it was done within a
democratic system."1 53 5
Epilogue
By March 2004, with the first busway of the second phase open, ridership reached
900,000 passengers a day. On March 9 th, 2004, the users of TransMilenio
"spontaneously" walked out of the stations and sat on the busways to protest a
decrease in the level of service-overcrowded buses seem to have been a critical
issue. A delay in the service caused by an accident on a busway sparked the protest
that extended to all three lines in less than an hour.1 53 6 In addition, for the last couple
of months repairs to the pavement on the three busways had disrupted service.1 53 7
The user was not experiencing the level of service it had become used to.153 8 All
these problems can be solved. More so because TransMilenio Co. instituted
mechanisms for allowing the user to input its opinions on the level of service.
Hopefully these mechanisms will empower the user. The example of Curitiba,
however, suggests that occasionally users have to mobilize to achieve enough power
to generate change for the better. User pressure in Curitiba eventually led to the
adoption of the payment per kilometer logged and a lower fare. In Bogota users have
1533 See http://www.partnerships.stockholm.se/index.html and El Tiempo, "'Es una recompensa a
Boota': A. Mockus," June 12 , 2002.
153 See Rodrfguez and Targa (2003).
1535 Peialosa (2003, p. 98).
1536 El Tiempo, "Crean Defensor del usuario en TransMilenio y aumentarAn la frecuencia de las rutas,"
March 11 th, 2004.
1537 El Tiempo, "Alcalde de Bogota, Lucho Garz6n, exige a contratistas de TransMilenio
responsabilizarse por danos," March 12th , 2004.
538 El Tiempo, "Caos durante 4 horas por bloqueo en el sistema de TransMilenio," March 10' h, 2004.
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already started user associations and TransMilenio together with the Chamber of
Commerce created an Ombudsman position.1 539
While user dissatisfaction is certainly one interpretation for the protest in March
of 2004, Pehalosa and his supporters claim that members of the party controlling the
mayor's office staged the walk out.1540 Whatever the true version, what is at stake is
the political survival of the system and of BRT as the solution for Bogota's mass
transit needs. Indeed, while Mayor Garz6n has voiced support for continuing the
system,15 41 councilors of his party have proposed a light rail solution instead of
BRT.1542 The debate between rail and bus-now fully fledged BRT-continues. But
what underlies the debate, I argue, is not which technology is better for Bogota but the
political support of the old bus companies and bus owners. As in Curitiba, the political
support of the operators is becoming critical in determining who wins an election. But
contrary to Curitiba where the operators always back Lerner's group, operators in
Bogota are divided between those who invested heavily in TransMilenio and support
Pehalosa and those who invested marginally and could benefit from policies that
preserve the status quo or that decrease the pace of change. Most likely the actions
by Peialosa and his political group as well as those by Garz6n's group will determine
whom the bus companies and bus owners ultimately support. In turn, this will probably
determine the shape of Bogota's mass transit.
1539 El Tiempo, "A partir de agosto 150 cmaras de video vigilardn portales y estaciones de
TransMilenio," July 20'h, 2004.
1540 Among the evidence in support of Pehalosa's claim are that to negotiate with the protesters went
the Secretary of Transportation and not the Head of TransMilenio Co. and that within the committee
that represents the user are a couple of unionists. See Semana, "Sehales de alerta,"
www.semana.com.co, 2004, No. 1143.
1541 See El Tiempo, "Alcalde Luis Eduardo Garzon continuara TransMilenio por las Carreras 1 Oa., 7a. y
la Calle 26," March 1 st, 2004; El Tiempo, "Garz6n reafirma su compromiso con TM," May 18th, 2004; El
Tiempo, "Fase III the TM es irreversible," May 30th, 2004.
1542 Dfaz (2004); El Tiempo, "El Polo pide frenar TransMilenio," May 1 7 t h, 2004; and El Tiempo, "'Freno
de mano' a TransMilenio," May 18th , 2004. For a response from Penalosa's group see Hidalgo (2004b).
Figure 22. TransMilenio Station
Source: Author
Figure 23. TransMilenio busway and s~ation on 80th Street
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Figure 24. TransMilenio's articulated buses
Source: Author. Notice the door on the left side of the bus.
Figure 25. Transmilenio's stations and buses are handicapped accessible
Source: Author
377
378
Part 4
Conclusions
In this part I bring together the themes I analyzed in the sections the "Roles of
planners." I try to offer an answer to my guiding research question: "What is the role of
planners in the planning process?" I build a single representation of the roles of
planners by comparing the two cases in search of commonalities.
Chapter 13
The roles of planners in the planning process
In the previous two parts I explored in detail the planning processes in Curitiba (1955-
95) and Bogota (1986-2001) by looking at the actions by planners, politicians, and
stakeholders. From a process perspective the planning processes in Curitiba and
Bogota were quite similar. In the instances where the end result was the adoption of a
plan, Curitiba and Bogota had similar processes, particularly regarding the roles of
planners that supported the plans, the flexibility in the original plans, the interaction
between planners, stakeholders, and politicians, and political continuity during key
phases. Likewise, the processes in the two cities were rather similar when the
outcome was the plan not being adopted. Specifically, opponents tended to keep
proponents honest, sought ways to reduce the flexibility of the plans, and sought to
build a coalition against the plan. Consequently, the similarities between the two
cases allowed me to build a single representation of the roles of planners in the
planning process. 5431544
1543 From a process perspective, the roles of planners went beyond roles already in the literature, such
as being advisors, technicians, administrators, analysts, communicators, advocates, negotiators, and
__·__
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Some of the similarities between the two cases, however, put planners' roles in
special context. First, in both cases the mayors were strong leaders, particularly
Jaime Lerner and Enrique Peialosa. Their strong leadership benefited planners' work
by offering a benchmark against which planners contrasted stakeholders' demands.
Further, these mayors pressured planners to think in terms of implementing their
plans and not just of crafting plans. This action strongly linked planning, decision-
making, and implementation turning them into a single process-i.e. the planning
process. Second, many of the mayors had firm understanding and appreciation of
technical planning services, thus being receptive to interacting with planners. The
significance and unusual nature of this situation cannot be overemphasized. At the
same time, these politicians understood that planners needed to interact with
stakeholders.
Third, the cases were framed by innovative technologies entailing large scale
system changes such as Bus Rapid Transit (BRT).1545 In effect, Curitiba practically
invented the BRT concept with the introduction of tube stations and at-grade bus
boarding. Bogota then adapted this concept to a larger scale-one where metros
were thought to be the only feasible alternative. Because of the innovations
embedded in BRT, planners had difficulty producing credible forecasts on revenue
and demand, among others. This uncertainty forced planners to interact more with
stakeholders and politicians to build credibility. Fourth, at the same time, BRT offered
the advantage of being highly flexible, particularly when compared to heavy rail
proposals. This flexibility allowed planners to adjust the plans in response to the
mediators, among others (Stevens, 2001; and Hoch, 1994). Certainly, planners' roles cannot be
summarized as planners supplying technical advice to decision-makers (see Meyer and Miller, 2001,
ch. 2).
1544 It is important to stress that my intent is not to explain why a plan was adopted or rejected. The
decisional outcome is just a marker in my analysis but not the object.
1545 Bus rapid transit (BRT) is a technology designed to increase the overall efficiency of bus traffic.
BRT has three complementary elements. First, BRT involves the construction of busways or
segregated lanes for buses. The busways can be either at-grade or grade-separated. Second, BRT
implies comfortable and modern buses, stations that facilitate passenger boarding and alighting, fare
collection technology, modal integration, a marketing identity, and overall excellence in customer
service (Wright, 2002a, p. 2). Third, BRT usually implies an institutional transformation that implies the
creation and/or strengthening of the city agency in charge of managing the BRT system. This agency
usually contracts out and supervises the operations of the new buses with the private sector (Pehalosa,
2003, p. 86-7).
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feedback produced by their interaction with politicians and planners. The discussion
that follows on the roles of planners, therefore, builds on the commonalities between
the two cases. At the same time, however, the discussion reflects the special context
in which the cases place planners' roles.
Recapping the framework
In the introduction I put forth a framework. Here I offer a summary. A simple model of
a city government would assume a city government consists of elected and appointed
politicians, and planners. In theory, the city government is interested in enacting
policies that satisfy legitimate and collective goals and not just the preferences of
particular individuals such as politicians, planners, or stakeholders.154 6 If policies and
plans follow the preferences of a particular stakeholder, then most likely the plan will
disproportionately benefit that stakeholder at the expense of other actors in society.
Likewise, if the plan follows the preferences of particular politicians or planners there
is no assurance that once adopted the plan will benefit collective and legitimate goals.
For one thing, what is a legitimate goal for politicians or planners need not be a
legitimate goal for stakeholders or even society at-large. For another, plans that follow
politicians' or planners' goals need not have a relatively fair distribution of costs and
benefits. Put differently, for the plans of a city government to reflect collective and
legitimate goals, the government needs a minimal space for action.1547
A city government achieves this minimal space for action, first, by building
capable government agencies and, second, by promoting the interaction between
planners, politicians, and stakeholders.' 54 8 Capable government agencies have the
structure, funding, human resources15 49 and knowledge1550 needed to craft plans that
are technically sound. Capable agencies also have the knowledge to counterbalance
the power of capable stakeholders. Absent this capacity in the government agency, a
capable stakeholder can capture the agency and bias the allocation of benefits in its
1546 My argument builds on the idea of state "autonomy." See Chapter 1.
1547 I mean two things by plans that satisfy collective and legitimate goals. First, government plans do
not reflect the individual preferences of planners, politicians, or stakeholders. Second, the distribution
of costs and benefits is relatively fair.
1548 See Evans (1995, p. 12 and 57) for an analogous argument.
1549 See Goggin et al. (1990, ch. 5).
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favor.1551 Government agencies also need to interact with stakeholders and
politicians. By interacting, members of these agencies-i.e. planners-build the
channels for negotiating goals and policies so that policies do not favor any participant
disproportionately. The interaction, therefore, allows agencies to build a minimal
space for government action and obtain plans that reflect collective goals.
Finally, organizational capacity and interaction reinforce one another in the
objective of creating a minimal space for government action.1552 Absent a capable
organization, the interaction will probably lead to capture by interests that stand to
benefit from the plan. Similarly, a capable agency that does not interact misses out on
the opportunities for obtaining feedback from politicians and relevant stakeholders.
The agency will be unable to lower power differentials among actors and adapt the
plan according to the results of the interaction. But if there is a capable planning
organization that interacts with politicians and stakeholders then planners can
mediate between actors, lower power differentials, and adjust the original plan. Plans
then reflect legitimate interests and not just the preferences of any particular actor.
The second element in the framework introduces the idea of process. I use the
notion of window of opportunity. Windows of opportunity are junctures in time where
there is a chance that a plan will be adopted. I conceptualize the planning process as
consisting of two stages that occur recurrently. The first stage is before the window of
opportunity opens and the second is during that window. The planning process spans
over long periods of time during which windows of opportunity open and close.
Windows of opportunity open because of political reasons, such as elections, or
because of crises. When the window of opportunity opens, actors begin to interact
and the plan begins to evolve as a proposition. This interaction can put the plan in the
political agenda of the city, which in turn intensifies the interaction because the
chances of adoption are even higher. When the window closes, the interaction ceases
or becomes minimal, because the chances of adoption are virtually zero.
Time is critical: windows of opportunity
As said, the planning process can be understood as a series of windows of
opportunity that open and close. As a result, planners' roles are not constant in time;
they differ depending on whether a window of opportunity has opened. Before the
window of opportunity opens, planners for the most part are those who craft plans or
1550 See Ardila (2002, ch. 2).
1551 See Ardila (2002, esp. ch. 2).
1552 These ideas comes from Evans (1995, p. 56-58).
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proposals, among others. The election of a politician to office or a crisis typically
opens a window of opportunity.1553 Windows of opportunity last for limited amounts of
time. During the window of opportunity plans can enter the political agenda of the city
and stand a high change of being adopted. During the window, therefore, the main
objective of planners in the cases was to get the plans adopted. Planners' roles
therefore changed once the window of opportunity opened. The cases show that
planners' main role, then, was to interact with politicians and stakeholders, as I
explain in detail below.
Let's see some examples that illustrate how windows of opportunity matter in
the planning process. Recall in Curitiba in the 1960s how Mayor Arzua opened a
window of opportunity when he announced the need to revise the Agache Plan-not
to change it for a new plan. Further, when Arzua and Garcez announced the
construction of disruptive works in downtown Lerner and his fellow planners mobilized
seeking a new plan-one that would not disrupt downtown. By interacting with the
mayor and other stakeholders such as CODEPAR's Rischbieter, Lerner and his
partners put the need to change the plan in the political agenda of the city. After a
series of interactions with politicians and stakeholders, they got the Director Plan
adopted and enacted by the city council as a city law. But when Mayor Arzua resigned
the window of opportunity closed. The plan was no longer in the political agenda and
despite being a city law the plan was not implemented. The new mayor, Omar
Sabbag distrusted the planners, IPPUC, and probably the plan itself. Planners at
IPPUC, including Lerner, devoted their time to refining the plan, adding components
such as busways, and defending IPPUC from Sabbag's attempts to eliminate it.
The next window of opportunity for the plan came when Lerner was appointed
mayor of Curitiba. Lerner understood the criticality of time and therefore pressed his
team to show results. To put the plan in the political agenda Lerner and his team of
planners started to interact with the retail interests on XV of November Street. Retail
interests opposed the plan to pedestrianize the street. They were too powerful and the
plan could not proceed. Lerner started a strong marketing campaign and figured that
a demonstration of the actual plan was needed. Lerner's objective was to diminish the
1553 See Kingdon (1995, ch. 8).
383
power of the retail interests. Lerner ordered the pedestrianization of a short 100-meter
leg of the street. The demonstration was a success; sales increased and quickly retail
interests demanded the expansion of the pedestrianized area. The Director Plan
entered the political agenda of the city. The Director Plan remained in the agenda
during the extraordinary length of 12 years thanks to a large extent to the continuous
interaction between planners, politicians and stakeholders, the resulting adaptations
to the plan, and the gradual implementation of specific elements of the plan. The
window closed when Mauricio Fruet was appointed mayor of Curitiba. Lerner and his
team went back to crafting new proposals, such as the tube station. The next window
of opportunity for Lerner's plans opened in 1989 when he was elected mayor of
Curitiba. During this period Curitiba witnessed the adoption of a set of innovative
transformations-tube stations, bi-articulated buses, and fully-fledged BRT-that put
the city in the international arena.
In Curitiba, further, not only the mayor but also the planners were aware of how
windows of opportunity and the plan being in the agenda affect planning practice.
Recall what Rafael Dely said: 'What troubled us [the planners at IPPUC] the most
was the question: What is a plan in paper and what is a plan that can be
implemented? Things completely change in the second part because it is then
necessary to take into account economic, political, and operational conditions."1554
Dely later on added: "The proximity of implementation [because of the window of
opportunity] generated realism."1555 Carlos Ceneviva, another planner, told me "Time
is critical in a planning process. You can't control time; you can't stop it. Conditions
change. Your solution is good at a specific moment in time [during the window of
opportunity] and you can't miss the opportunity."1556 Dely and Ceneviva therefore
produced plans that were possible to implement during the limited duration of the
window of opportunity.
In Bogota, Enrique Pelalosa ran three times for mayor carrying around his
plans for upgrading the bus-based transit system. People paid little attention, because
.554 Dely (1990, p. 13, translation by author).
1555 Interview by author with Rafael Dely, April 2003.
1556 Interview by author to Carlos Ceneviva, February 2004.
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the plan that was in the city's political agenda was for a metro line. Until Peialosa got
elected and opened the window of opportunity for the plans for TransMilenio.
Peialosa assembled a capable planning team for the project. This team began to
interact with stakeholders such as the bus companies and other politicians such as
the city councilors. In December 1998 the team staged a lavish marketing event. The
interaction and the marketing finally put the plans for TransMilenio in the political
agenda of the city. The interaction among actors intensified as a result of the plan
being in the agenda. As seen, TransMilenio was adopted and implemented after a
complex process rich in interaction among actors. Pefialosa's successor, Antanas
Mockus, offered support for TransMilenio and hence the window of opportunity
continued open. Mockus could not have done otherwise because TransMilenio
enjoyed large political support.1557
The brief narrative from the two cases illustrates my claim that time matters in
the planning process. Before a window of opportunity opens planners' roles are
mostly to elaborate proposals, circulate them within the planning community, and
convince fellow planners that the proposals are sound solutions. But once the window
of opportunity opens planners' main role changes to interacting with politicians and
stakeholders. This interaction allows planners to lower power imbalances between
stakeholders and politicians. Further, the interaction allows planners to persuade
stakeholders about the soundness of the plans. But persuasion is not enough. The
interaction is a source of feedback for all parties involved. This feedback allows
planners to slowly adjust the original plans. The interaction and the resulting changes
lower risk for all parties and help assemble a coalition of support. Put differently, the
interaction with politicians and stakeholders helps the planning team arrive at plans
that benefits legitimate interests.
The analysis, therefore, identifies a relationship between windows of
opportunity, interaction among actors, and the minimal space for government action.
1557 At the time of this writing it is uncertain whether the window of opportunity has closed or not. While
Mayor Luis Garz6n has offered support for the project, he has also cautioned that the pace of
implementation will be slower. Other proposals for light rail and watered-down busways--not bus rapid
transit-float in the air. Will Garz6n open a window of opportunity to those alternative plans? Will
Pefialosa and his supporters mobilize to oppose these plans? Time will tell.
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The opening of a window of opportunity generates interaction among actors because
the plan stands a chance of being adopted. The interaction allows planners to
mediate between politicians and stakeholders and to introduce adjustments to the
plans. These actions create the space for government action that allows plans to
satisfy legitimate goals. This legitimacy, in turn, engenders political support that can
extend the duration of the window of opportunity, thus extending the interaction and
the space for government action.1558 Hence window of opportunity and space for
government action are interrelated concepts via the interaction among actors. The
opening of the window of opportunity generates the conditions for seeking this space
for government action. In turn, the space for government action can extend the
duration of the window. And this result occurs to a large extent because planners
interact with politicians and stakeholders.
Finally, the analysis suggests that windows of opportunity can be, one, quite
conspicuous or, two, difficult to notice. The appointment of Jaime Lerner in 1971 and
the election of Enrique Pefialosa in 1997 opened windows of opportunity for the
Director Plan and TransMilenio, respectively. Both politicians knew the plans they
wanted to see adopted during their tenure. Both took advantage of the opportunity.
Further, both knew the importance of having a capable planning team that would
interact with stakeholders and politicians. Other windows of opportunity, however, are
not as evident. Take Mayor Arzua's statement in 1962 that Curitiba's master plan
could be modified. Lerner and his fellow planners took advantage of this event to
begin interacting with planners in office and other politicians. Slowly they widened the
window of opportunity until they created the conditions for crafting a new master
plan.1559 It takes very creative people-project champions such as Lerner-to notice
the less conspicuous windows of opportunity. By interacting with other actors, project
champions can therefore extend the window of opportunity. I now turn to discussing
1558 Notice that if the window of opportunity extends in duration it means that subsequent mayors will
offer support for the implementation of the plan. In Curitiba, Mayor Saul Raiz continued the
implementation of the Director Plan, in part because the plan had ample political support after Jaime
Lerner's first tenure. In Bogota, Mayor Antanas Mockus continued with the adoption of TransMilenio
thanks, in part, due to the political momentum the project had after Peialosa's tenure.
1559 Notice that because there was interaction, the master plan was not what Lerner and his fellow
planners wanted, but a plan that gathered input from a diverse, but limited, array of actors.
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the roles of planners before the window of opportunity opens and then focus in depth
on the roles during the window of opportunity.
Planners' roles before the window of opportunity opens
The analysis of the cases indicates that before the window of opportunity opened
planners played several roles in the planning process. First, in the cases planners
analyzed problems and crafted tentative solutions. For example, in Curitiba planners
crafted the Director Plan in 1965 and began to refine it during the Sabbag
administration.1560 These refinements added a mass transit component to the plan
that included building an exclusive busway. Lerner before becoming mayor for the
third time had an idea for a tube station that could be used to speed up bus services.
In Bogota, Jorge Acevedo had a plan for a busway along the Caracas Avenue
corridor. Peialosa had a well-structured idea of how a BRT solution ought to be like in
Bogota. All these plans were waiting for a window of opportunity. Because the
proposals were minimally ready before the window of opportunity opened they stood a
better chance of being ultimately adopted.
The cases therefore reveal the importance of having a somewhat crafted plan
before the window of opportunity opens. Contrast with these experiences. In Curitiba
during the tenure of Mayor Fruet planners lacked a proposal to address effectively the
continually increasing bus fare. Thanks to organized civil society, namely MAB-a
neighborhood movement representing the user-Roberto Requi.o and his planners
were able to conclude that to address this problem part of the solution was to pay the
operators per kilometer logged. Requido's election opened the window of opportunity
for this measure. In Bogota Mayor Mockus tried to carry out two "rational" planning
exercises-i.e. analyze the problem, design alternatives, evaluate, and decide on one
alternative. These exercises took most of Mockus' term in office. By the time he left
office a single busway was approaching adoption. On the contrary, in Curitiba the
Director Plan, the mass transit plan and Lerner's idea for a tube station, and in Bogota
Acevedo's plan for a busway and Pehalosa's plans for TransMilenio were somewhat
ready before the window of opportunity opened. Notice also the difference mayors
1560 Citations from the cases are limited to points not documented previously.
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Lerner and PeFalosa made because they believed in the importance of taking an
existing proposal, instead of carrying out new studies to determine what to do.'5 61
A second role for planners before the window opens was to introduce flexibility
into the tentative plans they craft. In Curitiba planners fought a hard political battle at
the city council to defend a scantily detailed master plan. 'We were not going to send
a straightjacket to the city council...we would do the detailing [of the plan] later on,"
said a planner. The plans for TransMilenio also incorporated a high degree of
flexibility. Despite being flexible, in both cases the plans also incorporated a set of
specific but broad goals that had political significance. During the window of
opportunity planners interacted with stakeholders that demanded adaptations to the
plans. These broad goals were important because they defined the lines along which
the plan could and could not change. And it was politicians in office who knew the
goals that mattered, hence the importance of planners' interaction with politicians
(more on goal setting and its importance below).
Finally, the cases reveal a third role for planners before the window of
opportunity opens-to build a minimum consensus in the planning community
regarding the validity of the proposed plan as a solution to one or more problems.'562
The cases suggest that achieving this consensus is easy to say but more difficult to
achieve. Yet it is critically important. In Curitiba, the planning community slowly
accepted the idea of undertaking a bus-based solution. In contrast, the planning
community never reached consensus regarding the validity of rail as a solution to
Curitiba's mobility problems. Likewise was the situation in Bogota. The planning
community slowly accepted the convenience of improving bus services through plans
such as the Caracas Avenue busway and TransMilenio BRT. But the planning
community was always bitterly divided on the validity of the metro. The existence of
consensus among the planning community, or lack thereof, affected the events during
1561 A corollary emerges from the importance of having a somewhat ready proposal before the window
of opportunity opens. Planners can approach politicians running for office to convince them about the
soundness of a plan. If the politician is convinced and results elected, chances are that a window of
opportunity will open for the plan.
1 6 See Gakenheimer (1990) for an example of how the transportation planning community has two
very different views on mass transit.
388
the window of opportunity. Neither Curitiba nor Bogota has a rail solution in part
because of the lack of consensus in the planning community.
Planners' roles during the window of opportunity
In Curitiba and Bogota the appointment or election of a particular politician opened
windows of opportunity. During the window of opportunity the interaction among
planners, politicians, and stakeholders began to take place because actors noticed
that the plan had chances of being adopted. This interaction eventually led to the plan
entering the political agenda of the city. Once in the agenda, there was a clear chance
that the plan would be adopted. The objective of planners that supported the plan was
precisely to have the plan adopted. As a result of the possibility of adoption, politicians
and stakeholders responded to the plan because of the plan's impacts on their
interests. Before the window opened, planning and the decision to adopt were
divorced. During the window of opportunity planning and the decision to adopt were
linked and the bond grew tighter as the process advanced, depending on planners'
actions among others. The linkage between planning and the decisional outcome
motivated stakeholders and politicians to participate in the planning process. The
cases reveal that during the window of opportunity planning, decision-making, and
even implementation were linked.
Interacting with politicians and stakeholders therefore becomes planners' main
role during the window of opportunity. Interacting with politicians and stakeholders is
critical, among others, because it is a way of reaching an adopted plan that benefits
collective goals and not just the interests of individuals and private parties. How do
planners increase the chances of adoption of a plan and increase the scope for
government action by interacting with politicians and stakeholders?
The cases show that the interaction between planners, politicians, and
stakeholders is above all a source of feedback or information for all parties involved.
In Curitiba and Bogota most of the planning teams promoted this interaction with
stakeholders and politicians. Planners used the information or feedback obtained
through the interaction for two interrelated tasks. First, planners figured out ways of
reducing the power of stakeholders that initially resisted the plan. If the stakeholders
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were too powerful then the government would not have any space for its actions. The
plan might not be adopted or if adopted it could disproportionately benefit these
powerful interests. Similarly, if the politicians appeared all too powerful the
stakeholders might not want to cooperate and could oppose the plan. Planners
needed the cooperation of these stakeholders for example because the plans
required their participation as investors.15 63
Broadly speaking, therefore, one key planners' role was to mediate between
politicians and stakeholders. This mediation, however, did not follow necessarily the
standard cannons of mediation and consensus building. These cannons call for the
participation of the relevant stakeholders at the negotiating table and the presence of
a professional mediator whose role is to reduce power imbalances and improve
communication among participants. These cannons also include stringent conditions
such as "An understanding that 'consensus' is only reached when all interests have
been explored and every effort has been made to satisfy these concerns."1 564 In the
cases, instead, planners mediated between politicians and stakeholders by interacting
in different forms and settings with them over long periods of time. Planners figured
out who were the critical stakeholders and their legitimate representatives. As they got
to know the representatives they figured out strategies for lowering the power
imbalances. These strategies included finding ways to hold meaningful negotiations
and persuading actors on the convenience of the plan.
Second, planners also used the information resulting from the interaction to
figure out incremental adaptations to the original plan. The original plan was crafted
with imperfect information regarding how the plan would impact different stakeholders
and how those stakeholders would respond. Stakeholders sought changes for
example to minimize the negative impacts of the plan. Therefore the interaction led to
incremental adjustments to the original plan. These adjustments shaped the plan and
helped it take its final form. Planners, however, could not accept all the changes
1563 One can argue that planners also need to increase the power of parties with too little power in order
to eliminate this power imbalance. The cases, however, do not reveal this action by planners. The
reasons are probably, first, the "strong-executive" democratic setting, which limits participation to the
most powerful actors. Second, weak actors such as the bus user tend not to have an organized form of
participating.
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required by the stakeholders. Planners had to bear in mind the broad strategic-
sometimes implicit and changing-objectives embedded in the plan. Planners
therefore had to negotiate with stakeholders balancing the requests for change
against the strategic objectives of the plan. Ultimately, it was the politician who knew
or interpreted the objectives of the plan. Hence the importance of planners' interaction
with politicians in office.
As the plan adapted, it gained political feasibility. The interaction and the
resulting adjustments lowered risk for all participants in the process and contributed to
assembling a coalition of support. This coalition was strengthened by planners' ability
to persuade key stakeholders of supporting the plan. That is, planners had to sell, and
even market15 65 the idea that their plan was a valid solution to one or more problems.
At the outset or without interacting with the political side, the plans formulated by
planning teams-or any other actor-need not be considered a sound solution,
because the plans have been drawn with incomplete information. The interaction and
the resulting adjustments shaped plans so that actors considered them a valid
solution, that entailed low risk, and worth supporting. Notice that because the
interaction among actors leads to continuous adjustments to the original plan it is
important to have a flexible proposal.
Therefore, when planners interacted with politicians and stakeholders the end
result was a somewhat inclusive planning process. A planning process in which
planners, politicians, and stakeholders interact and where a plan is adapted to the
political reality unveiled by the interaction respects two basic democratic principles.
First, in principle in a democracy "all citizens have an equal opportunity to affect public
choices through established institutions."1566 Second, costs and benefits should be
fairly distributed throughout the population.1567 This of course is the outcome when the
planning process is such that government plans benefit legitimate goals, as argued in
1564 Innes (2004, p. 104-5, quote from page 104).
1565 Media and marketing campaigns were important in the cases because expecting to involve the
entire citizenry in the process is unrealistic. Only major stakeholders participated, but the public at large
had the right to be informed and contingent on that information, decided to mobilize to participate in the
process.
566 Feldman and Milch (1982, p. 181).
1567 Feldman and Milch (1982, p. 181).
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the framework. If actors participate in the planning process these principles begin to
be respected. However, stakeholders can be allowed to participate, receive
information on the plans, and be heard. But if stakeholders' feedback is not
incorporated in a meaningful way, then most probably neither democratic principle is
truly respected. If, on the other hand, the process is such that the interaction leads to
adaptations to the plan, then at least the first one and probably the second principle
are respected.'5 6 8
In sum, planners' roles during the planning process are difficult because the
process embeds several somewhat contradictory yet complimentary parts. Planners
had to mediate between stakeholders and politicians with the objective of reducing
power imbalances. At the same time, planners wanted to find a plan that was
politically feasible, minimized risk for all actors involved, and facilitated assembling a
coalition of support. To complicate matters, stakeholders could contradict one another
in their requests for modifications to the plans. And planners had to take into account
the broad objectives of the plan implicitly or explicitly established by politicians in
office. Planners achieved all these tasks by interacting with politicians and
stakeholders. The information resulting from the interaction allowed planners to figure
out ways of reducing power imbalances-i.e. mediate between politicians and
stakeholders. At the same time the interaction allowed planners to adapt the plan to
make it politically feasible by reducing risk for all parties involved and showing that the
plan solved a problem. Support for the plan followed. Because of the necessary
adaptations, a flexible plan facilitated planners work. Planning teams with high levels
of technical and political capacity had a better chance of fulfilling these tasks. The end
result, for the most part, was an adopted plan that benefited collective goals and not
just the interests of the most powerful participants. Hence the interaction created the
space for government action. Because of the complexity of these arguments I discuss
them in depth below offering evidence from the cases.
1568 While the changes resulting from the interaction tend to mitigate negative impacts and hence
achieve a certain equality of treatment, achieving full equality is very difficult if not impossible.
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Planners roles in interacting and reducing power
imbalances
The interaction allows planners to mediate between stakeholders and politicians. This
mediation is necessary to reduce power imbalances and achieve outcomes that
satisfy collective goals. If a stakeholder is too powerful it can oppose any government
plan or capture the government and obtain disproportionate benefits. Likewise, if the
government is too powerful, the relevant stakeholders will see little chances of
modifying the plan to mitigate negative impacts. The stakeholders will oppose the
plan. Finally, very weak actors can stand to loose disproportionately if the plan is
adopted because they have no power to modify the plan. By reducing these power
imbalances, planners help society adopt a plan that benefits collective and legitimate
goals-and not the particular goals of a stakeholder or of a powerful politician (or
planner). The cases suggest that planners resorted to different strategies in order to
reduce power imbalances. I begin with examples in which planners were not able to
reduce the differentials to contrast with instances where they were.
In Curitiba the policies followed by Mayor Braga in the late 1950s strengthened the
bus companies by giving them a temporary monopoly over the "selective" areas. In
1960, during the tenure of General Iberd de Mattos, the bus companies wanted to
extend the duration of the concessions-and of the accompanying monopoly-,
increase the fare, and extend the useful life of the buses. Absent a capable planning
team to mediate between the mayor and the bus companies what followed was a
deep conflict. Absent the planning team there was no way to reduce the power of the
bus companies, which pressured the governor of Paran. to take control of mass
transit planning in the city of Curitiba. The companies then scored a series of victories
such as having the city government agree to declare the "selective" areas as a
"principle" that does not expire in time. This change made the companies de facto
owners of the "selective" areas for good. Further, the bus companies significantly
increased their profitability by extending the useful life of the buses and by inflating
the costs of operation and transferring the cost to the user.
Like in Curitiba, the bus companies in Bogota also took advantage of the
weakness of the city government, represented by the Secretariat of Traffic and
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Transportation. The bus companies were able to create a system that had mostly the
user and to some extent the bus owners subsidize the inefficiencies in the
arrangement. Bus companies sought to increase the size of the bus fleet, even if
demand did not increase. The larger the bus fleet, the larger the profits for the bus
companies. Bus companies in Bogota rented out to bus owners bus routes issued by
the government to the companies. But service quality went down because the larger
fleet aggravated the penny war or extreme competition by bus drivers for every
passenger. The penny war promoted perilous driving, a high accident rate, and
disrespect for the user, among other dire consequences. The bus companies seemed
impregnable. In sum, the power imbalance in both cities favored the bus companies
and allowed them to quasi capture the state to regulate in their favor. The institutional
weakness of the city agencies meant that there were no planners able to reduce
power imbalances. Absent planners who could do reduce the power of the bus
companies, the state's policies benefited disproportionately the bus companies at the
expense of the user (and the bus owner in Bogota).
Contrast these examples with the following ones, where there is a planning
team that mediates between politicians and stakeholders to reduce power
imbalances. In 1971-1975 during Lerner's first term in office in Curitiba, the city
government achieved enough space for action to start the transformation of the city's
bus system. To get this space for action, Lerner assembled a capable planning team
that blended political and technical capacity. The technical capacity allowed the
planning team to craft plans that were technically sound. The political capacity
allowed the team to interact with Mayor Lerner and with the critical stakeholders-the
bus companies affected by the plans for the express bus service. The planners had a
clear strategy for negotiating with the operators. Equally important, Mayor Lerner and
the planners took advantage of the expiration of the concession contracts in 1974. If
the two bus companies affected by the plans were unwilling to accept at least some of
the changes, the city could, in principle, concession the services to other parties. This
threat helped planners lower the power of the bus companies. In parallel, planners'
interacted with the CEOs of the bus companies affected by the express service to
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persuade them. Once the affected companies got on board the other companies had
less power to oppose.
In Curitiba during the 1980s the system entered into a crisis because of the
high inflation, lower user income, and inflated fare. The bus companies had an
advantage thanks to knowing the costs of operating their buses better than the
government did. The absence of the user as a political actor aggravated the situation.
The bus companies were too powerful. It would be MAB that discovered how the fare
was inflated and that generated parts of the necessary knowledge to address the
problem. With better knowledge planners were able to reduce the power of the bus
companies and mediate better between this actor and the mayor. In Bogota, similarly,
in the planning of TransMilenio planners made a purposeful effort to learn about the
costs of operating both the old conventional buses and the new articulated buses. By
knowing the true costs of operating a bus, planners lowered the power of the bus
companies who could not claim costs higher than they actually were.
In Curitiba, Mayor Requiao tried to adopt his pet plan of having a city-owned
bus fleet. Initially the plan worked and it seemed as if it was going to be adopted. But
Requiao was not willing to let the planners interact with the bus companies. Planners
could not mediate between him and the companies. Planners needed to reduce the
power of the mayor vis-a-vis the companies but they could not. Further, the lack of
interaction did not allow the planners to figure out solutions to the problem at the root
of the conflict-how to fund the public fleet in an inflationary environment and an
economy in a recession. The power imbalance seemingly favoring Mayor Requiao
and the lack of adaptations to the original plans for the bus fleet led to strong coalition
against the plan and Requiao's political movement-which has not been in office ever
since in Curitiba.
As in Curitiba, in Bogota planners also mediated between politicians and
stakeholders by interacting with both actors so as to reduce power imbalances. In
both the Caracas Avenue busway and in the Transmilenio BRT project planners
interacted extensively with the CEOs of the bus companies-the critical stakeholder.
Thanks to this interaction planners discovered that when in a group, CEOs were
reluctant to accept the proposed plans, probably because of peer pressure. But
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individually, the CEOs were more enthusiastic about the proposed changes. As a
result of this discovery, planners concluded that meaningful negotiations were
possible only with individual CEOs and not with a group of them. With this strategy
planners reduced the power of the CEOs with respect to the government. CEOs
agreed in private to the changes but could not communicate with other CEOs.
Planners and the mayor began to believe less and less in the public statements
against the plans. Notice, however, that planners could not have discovered this
characteristic of the CEOs unless they had interacted extensively and in different
settings with the CEOs. Further, in the TransMilenio case, de Guzman and
Pefialosa agreed to the "good cop, bad cop" strategy in order to strengthen their
bargaining position and diminish the power of the bus company CEOs. In this strategy
in general, the bad cop tends to remind the suspect of the cop's authority and of the
regulations he must follow. The good cop, on the contrary, reminds the suspect of the
advantages of doing the right thing. The end result of the strategy is convincing the
suspect of collaborating with the interrogators. In the planning of TransMilenio, Mayor
Peialosa was the bad cop and de GuzmAn and Torres, members of the planning
team, were the good cops. Pefialosa would threaten the operators with extinction by
bringing in foreign capital to operate TransMilenio's buses. De Guzmn, on the
contrary, would treat the operators as "entrepreneurs" and "industry captains" by
reinforcing the point that TransMilenio was the opportunity for the operators to
transform themselves into modern and profitable enterprises. Facing contradictory
opinions, CEOs were motivated to pay attention to the proposals put forward by the
planners.
At the same time, the "good cop, bad cop" strategy allowed the planners to
diminish the power of the mayor. Mayor Peialosa, as part of the strategy, addressed
the CEOs as if it was possible to exclude the existing operators from participating in
Transmilenio. Planners would tell the CEOs that provided the CEOs agreed to
participate in the project, the planners would be able to convince the mayor of not
excluding them from Transmilenio. In the planning of TransMilenio, as well, the
interaction among actors allowed de Guzman and Torres to identify the "natural"
leaders among the CEOs. The natural leaders were different from the formal leaders,
396
who headed the business associations. By excluding the formal leaders the planners
weakened that power structure. In turn, by recognizing natural leaders they
empowered the actors they wanted to negotiate with.
As said, the cases show how planners reduced power imbalances between the
most powerful stakeholders and government. However, the cases show less of an
effort to promote the participation of the general public or the bus user, for example.
The general public and the bus user are less powerful and face the possibility of
assuming a disproportionate allocation of costs and benefits. In principle, to achieve
an outcome that truly satisfies collective goals, planners ought to reduce this power
differential as well. Put differently, at the same time that planners reduce the power of
strong stakeholders and powerful politicians, they ought to heighten the strength of
the weaker actors. Both actions are needed to reduce power imbalances. In the
planning of TransMilenio, planners made an effort to ask civil society associations
about bus and station design. This participation influenced the final designs.
One has to question, however, whether planners could have done more in
Curitiba and Bogota to empower the user and other representatives of the general
public. The answer is probably very little. First, the political context of the cases-
strong executive-tends to limit participation in plan making to the most powerful
actors. That is why the most conspicuous stakeholder were the bus companies in
both cases. Second, truly involving the bus user-or any other broad stakeholders-in
the process is difficult because users have no organized form for negotiation. Absent
from the process, bus users can end up bearing a disproportionate amount of the
costs (and risk as argued below).1569 Transportation planners should think how to
meaningfully involve the "bus user" and other broad stakeholders in the planning
process. While this breakthrough occurs,1570 what should be clear is that the user
needs to have an empowered voice once the project is operational, through surveys
1569 See Richmond (2001) for example of how the user is generally excluded while ideology takes over
the planning process.
1570 The example of the Brazilian City of Porto Alegre should be studied in more depth. Thanks to the
participatory budgeting policies followed in that city, handicapped people were able to air the lack of
adequate public transit to serve their needs. As a result, the city-owned Bus Company began to acquire
handicapped-accessible buses. My source is a handicapped woman I interviewed in Porto Alegre when
I was exploring that city as a possible case for my dissertation.
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and user associations, among others. An empowered user will probably not let service
quality deteriorate. If needed, the user has the right to mobilize to demand better
service and lower fares like it happened in Curitiba and seems to be happening in
Bogota.
In sum, by interacting with politicians and stakeholders planners were able to
mediate between these two actors. One objective of this mediation was to lower
power imbalances. On the one hand, planners needed to reduce the power of
stakeholders that opposed the plan. On the other, planners needed to reduce as well
the power of the mayor. The cases suggest that both were needed to insure the
support and cooperation of the critical stakeholders and reduce opposition to the plan.
At the same time, planners in Bogota made an effort to empower the user-the
weakest stakeholder. By empowering this actor, planners reduce a power differential
that can run against user's interests. However, the political environment and the lack
of organized form of negotiation ran against this empowerment. Planners could not
effectively reduce the power differential. The resulting allocation and costs and
benefits is not as fair as when the user is empowered.
Finally, note also how planners had to be good at persuading stakeholders,
politicians and the public at large-the later through marketing campaigns.
Persuasion therefore appears as one more tool planners used to mediate and lower
power imbalances. But mediating to reduce power imbalances is not enough.
Planners needed to continue the interaction with stakeholders and politicians. The
interaction rendered other benefits that contributed to taking the plans to the decision
point and to have plans that benefited legitimate goals and not just those of individual
participants. I now turn to analyzing the other benefits of the interaction between
participants in the planning process as shown by the cases.
Planners' roles in interacting and shaping the plans
As seen, the interaction between planners, politicians, and stakeholders is a source of
information for all parties involved. Stakeholders learn about and react to the plan;
politicians learn about and react to stakeholders' positions. By interacting planners
obtain critical information and feedback that otherwise they would not obtain. Before
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the window of opportunity opened, planners crafted their plans mostly from their
desks with little or no interaction with politicians and stakeholders. Politicians and
stakeholders were not interested in interacting with the planners because the chances
of adoption were minimal. Planners therefore had highly incomplete information.
Planners did not know what stakeholders would respond to the plan or how.
Once the window of opportunity opened politicians and stakeholders were
interested in participating in the process, because the plan had a chance of being
adopted. Planners now had the opportunity to obtain feedback by interacting with
other participants in the process.1 57111572 The feedback resulting form the interaction
allowed planners to shape the original plan by adjusting it incrementally in light of
what seemed to be politically feasible.1 573/1574 Decision-makers and stakeholders, in
turn, reacted to the changes and suggested new modifications given their own
interests and objectives. This created a dynamic process of interaction among the
actors that extended over time and that shaped the plans.1575 /1576
1571 Stevens (2001) analyzed an extensive body of literature on planning to determine how theorists
understand effective planning. He found in his review of the literature that (pg. 13, my emphasis) "None
of the publications that refer to feedback suggest that it should be incorporated into the planning
process. Likewise none of them suggested that it should be incorporated into the planning process only
before implementation." According to Stevens (2001), some authors recommend to have a source of
feedback regarding the consequences of planning actions, that is, after implementation of those actions
has taken place. During the planning process as such, most of the literature therefore tends to ignore
the possibilities for obtaining feedback and introducing it into the process.
1572 Brooks (2002) put forward a model of the planning process dubbed the "feedback strategy." While
Brooks recognized the importance of feedback in the work of planners, his model is disconnected from
an empirically based model of the planning process. Brooks' proposal is centered on the idea that
planners can decide to implement a "trial-balloon proposal" in order to get feedback from other actors.
Brooks' assumes that because it is a trial balloon the process will be easier. In light of my results, I
doubt this is the case, except for very minor policy initiatives. My view, as seen in the main text, is that
the feedback needed to make the process advance is not contingent on having a trial balloon
implemented-the planning process itself offers that opportunity.
157 Luberoff and Altshuler (1996, p. vi-15) argue: "project advocates test ideas and strategies until they
arrive at politically acceptable solutions to the problems at hand." My argument is analogous to theirs,
only that I see this as one of the roles of the planning team, who are among the "project advocates."
1574 Bolan and Nuttal (1975, chapter 3) argue that for a decision to happen the original idea of plan has
to be modified both in the goals and the means as a result of negotiations among stakeholders.
1575 The pattern I unveiled in the cases somewhat resembles the normative one Lupo, Concord and
Fowler (1971, p. 234) put forward to achieve a coherent metropolitan transportation policy. These
authors see three "logics" in the political system: planning, political, and technical. The goal of a
coherent policy can only be achieved by "democratic communities with a strong tradition of local
decisionmaking by utilizing the logics of the technician, the planner, and the politician in a proper
combination. The planner must forecast the future growth and development of the community, identify
its future needs, and come up with creative solutions to accommodate that growth and those needs.
The politician must provide the leadership to help accomplish the goals and to modify the goals in a
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The process was incremental because information was imperfect for all actors
involved and to minimize risk participants tended to prefer to define gradually the
details of the overall project.15 77 Participants emphasized in particular the
consequences that specific aspects of the project entailed for them and demanded
changes to mitigate any negative impact. Stakeholders did not oppose necessarily the
entire plan as such; they cared mostly about the impact of specific details of the plan.
Hence the importance of interacting with stakeholders to find out how they respond to
certain details of the plan and if they demand changes. Without sufficient interaction,
stakeholders might resort to opposing the entire plan instead of aspects of it. The
planning team usually could not accept all the changes suggested by the stakeholders
because frequently politicians and stakeholders were at odds and therefore the
feedback was contradictory. Consequently, planners' role was finding a technical
solution that fitted the constraints imposed by the other actors. In some cases
planners innovated to find the technical solution that was politically feasible.
Notice the importance of having flexible plans, easy to adapt to the political
exigencies unveiled by the interaction between actors. Several authors who have
analyzed the planning processes for large transportation projects have arrived at
manner consistent with the realities of political consensus. The technician's job is to find the most
creative workable solutions to the goals agreed to politically." My cases show that a pattern similar to
this normative model occurred in limited democracies like the ones in Curitiba and Bogota (when
compared to the U.S. local democratic tradition). My findings therefore validate these authors'
normative model and extend its validity beyond the U.S. local democracy.
1576 See also Luberoff and Altshuler (1996); Sagaris (2001); Bianco and Adler (2001); and Allard (2003)
for examples of how plans change in response to the interaction between planners, politicians, and
stakeholders.
1577 See Lindblom (1959). It is interesting to see that the literature in transport and urban planning when
it presents Lindblom's model tends to minimize the political aspects of this model (an exception is
Forester, 1989). Examples are Meyer and Miller (2001, p.64-65) and Brooks (2002, p.99-101). These
authors focus on aspects of the incremental model such as that a small number of options are
considered by decision-makers and that decision-makers compare and evaluate increments only,
among others. They ignore, however, the critical role that Lindblom assigns to political actors such as
interest groups and watchdogs as they exist and operate in the U.S. political context. Lindblom also
refers implicitly to the interaction among these groups and the decision-making process and to the
resulting feedback. For example, Lindblom (p. 204) says "Mutual adjustment is more pervasive than the
explicit forms it takes in negotiation between groups; it persists through the mutual impacts of groups
upon each other even where they were not in communication. For all the imperfections and latent
dangers in this ubiquitous process of mutual adjustment, it will often accomplish an adaptation of
policies to a wider range of interests than could be done by one group centrally." Altshuler (1981) has
an argument that corroborates this view of the U.S. political system in that it tends to advance
incrementally, with the intent of not disturbing existing arrangements.
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similar conclusions in that they call for projects to be flexible.1 578 Luberoff and
Altshuler for example say "[the projects] must provide sufficient benefits (and have
such a broad base of support) that they can survive changing times and concerns. At
the same time, however, they must be flexible enough that they can be reconfigured
(or at least repackaged) to provide credible responses to the new demands and
issues."15 7 9 The BRT plans adopted in Curitiba and Bogota had a larger degree of
flexibility than the rail projects. BRT plans could change more easily in light of the
interaction than the rail plans.15 80
Let's look at some examples from the cases that support these conclusions.
Wilheim's original master plan for Curitiba called for the construction of ample
parkways, dubbed structural axes, that would have razed many houses. Planners
reduced the width of the structural axes when they got the Director Plan approved in
the City Council. Later on planners introduced busways in the plan and again the
structural axes implied demolishing hundreds of houses.1581 Mayor Lerner was not
willing to go ahead with the plan. Dely was the planner who figured out the technical
solution to this political problem. Dely's solution was the trinary road system. The
trinary road system splits one big road into three smaller roads with different
functions. The central one holds the busway and slow general traffic. The other two
roads are one-way and handle traffic to and from downtown Curitiba. The solution
reduced house demolition to a few houses. Lerner was willing to implement the
structural axes using the trinary road system.
Regarding the express bus service planners wanted to introduce a series of
changes to the bus services such as a new type of bus, switching to a trunk and
feeder system, and creating routes that would link different "selective" areas.
Negotiations with bus operators led to compromises that changed these original
plans.'5 82 Incidentally, recall the value that Jaime Lerner placed in floating a plan or
proposal to obtain a reaction from interested parties and the population at large.
1578 See Luberoff and Altshuler (1996); Goetz and Szyliowicz (1997); Langmyhr (2001); Gifford (1994);
and Flyvbjerg et al. (2003).
1579 Luberoff and Altshuler (1996, p. vi-19, my emphasis).
1580 1 expand the comparison in terms of flexibility between BRT and rail-bases options below.
1581 For details see Chapter 3.
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These reactions imply adapting the proposal or even abandoning it altogether. Lerner
and his team therefore believe that plans have to adapt as a result of the interaction.
In Bogota, Peialosa and the planners wanted a BRT project that would use
two separate fleets of buses-one for the off peak and another for the peak period.1583
Plans also called for building seven busways during Pefalosa's tenure and for
concessioning the bus routes to new bus companies that would own the buses. This
change implied a radical transformation vis-a-vis the existing situation in which bus
companies rented out routes to bus owners. Finally, Peialosa also wanted to build
pedestrian bridges at every bus station. The interaction with the key stakeholders-
the bus companies-as well as planners' estimates of the costs led to abandoning the
idea of having two fleets. Similarly, thanks to the interaction planners gradually
defined the terms of the concession contracts. And thanks to the interaction with
neighboring communities, among others, planners figured that building pedestrian
bridges on Caracas Avenue was politically infeasible. Eventually, planners convinced
Mayor Peialosa of not building these access bridges. Finally, planners consulted with
many organizations to improve the designs of the buses and stations, and
communities commented on the location of stations.
These are just a few examples of how plans changed thanks to the interaction
between planners, politicians, and stakeholders. These changes gave political
feasibility to the plans, validated them and legitimized them. Stakeholders were not
merely informed about a plan but were taken into account in a meaningful way. To
achieve these outcomes, planners had to interact extensively with stakeholders and
politicians, figure out an adjustment and then interact again to validate the adjusted
version of the plan. Critically important was that planners interacted also with
politicians to validate with them the most important changes to the plans. For
politicians are the ones that more meaningfully know what the objectives of a plan
are. In the cases, politicians in office had the power to tell planners what were the
politically meaningful objectives. Planners adjusted the plans but bearing in mind
1582 See Chapter 4.
1583 It is quite unlikely that having two bus fleets would have ever been feasible given the elevated costs
it entails.
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these broad objectives set by the politicians. Without interacting with politicians,
planners are not aware of the broad objectives. Planners then risked being captured
by stakeholders who demanded changes aware that planners had no benchmark to
contrast with. Or planners risk alienating the politician when he or she discovers the
changes the planners agreed to. If, on the contrary, planners interacted with
politicians, then the politicians could tell planners what broad adaptations to the plans
they were willing to accept and which ones not.
As part of the role of interacting with politicians and stakeholders, planners had
to negotiate. Stakeholders tended to want more than anything reasonable constraints
on the project would allow-and even politicians sometimes requested more than
what was feasible. Planners therefore needed to negotiate with these actors. Aware of
the importance of negotiation, de Guzman reinforced his planning team first by hiring
Rodriguez and then Torres, a trained negotiator. Rodriguez handled the negotiations
with the City Council and Torres with the bus companies. Further, de Guzman and
Peialosa agreed to the "good cop, bad cop" strategy in order to strengthen their
bargaining position, as I explained above. Similarly, in Curitiba planners knew they
had to negotiate the changes to the bus services with the bus companies and sent a
team to negotiate. Notice that the importance of negotiation opens a door for
approaches that improve the quality of negotiations, including the use of facilitators
and mediators.1 584
The negotiations with the bus companies in Curitiba and Bogota exhibited
several similarities worth analyzing given the criticality of this issue in replicating BRT
systems. First, planners opened the negotiations with a basic proposal of what the
BRT system entailed. This initial proposal was flexible and therefore gave planners'
margin for negotiation-again without loosing track of the key objectives. Second,
planners were aware that they presented a proposal that entailed too many changes
at the same time, particularly in Bogot. 1 585 Further, because the proposals were
1584 See Fisher and Ury (1991); Susskind Cruikshank (1987); Susskind and Field (1996); Ury, Brett,
and Goldberg (1993), Forester (1999); Willson (2003); and Innes (2004), among others.
1585 Notice that Curitiba consolidated the bus operators into a small number of large and powerful
companies in the late 1950s. In 1973-4 planners requested change such as establishing a trunk and
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innovative, planners had difficulty showing credible demand forecasts and other
relevant estimates. Planners were aware of this limitation and were willing to address
the operators' concerns. Third, and related, planners knew they needed to structure a
profitable business and negotiated with this in mind. Fourth, planners sought ways to
improve their bargaining position. In Curitiba planners used the formal expiration of
the concession contracts in 1974 as a way to threaten with calling other operators
willing to adopt the new bus and the trunk and feeder system. In Bogota, Mayor
Pehalosa and the planning team agreed to the "good cop, bad cop" strategy,
explained above. Finally, planners interacted extensively with the representatives of
the bus companies. The interaction allowed planners to introduce changes to the
original plans in light of what appeared feasible. As I detail below, the interaction also
lowered the risk exposure to the operators. Hence, the interaction together with a
clear negotiating strategy served to reach an agreement.
The interaction, however, is not limited to bargaining and negotiating. It goes
beyond. In the planning of TransMilenio planners and the CEOs of bus companies
created five committees where a huge amount of information was exchanged and little
negotiation took place. Planners and stakeholders got to know what each other
wanted and slowly figured what was feasible. Planners and stakeholders built
relationships in these meetings. Slowly, planners persuaded the bus companies of the
need for change. Planners showed operators figures suggesting the operators were
facing bankruptcy and investing in TransMilenio offered the way out. Added to
individual negotiations with the CEOs, the planning team incrementally shaped the
TransMilenio project.
The existence of a somewhat clear objective appears again. The negotiations
were more on "how" to achieve that objective than on the broad objective itself. A
similar situation took place in Curitiba where planners knew the broad objectives and
negotiated more on the details of the plan with stakeholders. Yet the plan's "details"
determine "how" a broad objective is achieved; details are therefore critical. Politicians
and stakeholders can respond to the implications of the details of plans more easily
feeder system and adopting a new bus. In Bogota these changes, as well as others, took place in a
three-year period.
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than to the implications of broad goals.'58 6 In the end, there are many ways to achieve
a broad objective and each can impact differently the stakeholders.
Given the importance of having a few broad objectives, it is important to ask
where did the objectives come from? In the cases, plans' objectives were not derived
"rationally," after a careful analysis of the problem. Nor did politicians and
stakeholders gather at the outset to define consensually the problem and then
establish desirable objectives. Instead, it was politicians in office who knew the goals
that mattered in the interaction with planners. Because the proposal was somewhat
ready before the window of opportunity, politicians took a look at the proposal and
attached what they thought were the main objectives. In Curitiba, for example,
planners' proposal was to build busways and introduce a new bus. Mayor Lerner took
this plan and defined the broad objectives. Similarly, in Bogota Pefalosa's proposal
sought to introduce a high-quality BRT system. Pefalosa defined what were the main
goals of his proposal.1 587 Put differently, planners did not set the politically meaningful
objectives-it was the politicians in power. Hence the importance of planners
interaction with both stakeholders and politicians. By interacting with the mayors,
planners gradually understood these broad objectives, which became a benchmark
against which stakeholders' demands for changes to the plan were contrasted.
This is not to say that politicians were consciously aware of the broad
objectives they attached to the proposal. Rather, as the interaction took place and
politicians heard about the results of planners' interaction with stakeholders,
politicians stated what changes they could accept. The meaningful and broad goals
emerged from that interaction. Pefialosa, for example, wanted to improve the quality
of transit service using a BRT system. As planners interacted with the mayor, they
understood that he wanted a system that involved the existing operators but that at
the same time minimized the chances that the old buses could use the busways and
stations. The solution was to adopt high-platform buses with doors on the left side.
1586 For a similar argument see Altshuler (1965, p. 306-311).
1587 Planners later on attached a myriad of goals to the TransMilenio project. The political significance
of these goals was not large. Examples are: "to improve the level of service" (minimize travel time,
lower the accident rate, affordability); "to improve the citizenry's quality of life" (less pollution, harmonic
urban development) (McKinsey & Co., 1999a, p. 34).
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The old buses had doors on the right side and at a lower height. A healthy tension
developed, therefore, between the need to adapt the plans and the broad objectives
set by politicians. Planners had to discover mostly technical solutions to this political
problem.
In this sense, the cases probably stand apart from other cases where
politicians in office do not know what they want from a given plan. Lerner and
Pefialosa had a quite clear idea of what they wanted. Both knew the plans should
result in a transformation of the bus transit system with improved quality. But Lerner
and Pefialosa helped planners' work in at least two other related ways. First, Lerner
and Pefialosa pressured the planners to show results-i.e. to get the plan
implemented. This pressure made planners more realistic in their recommendations
and forced them to interact with stakeholders. Second, Lerner and Peialosa were
willing to interact with the planning team to check periodically on their progress toward
the ultimate goal of seeing the plans implemented. The mayors also checked on the
state of the interaction with stakeholders. Planners could discover needed changes to
the plans in light of the interaction with stakeholders, but the interaction with the
mayors ensured that planners were not giving away more than they should. Put
differently, the way the mayors managed the process preserved the space for
government action because they had a capable planning team that interacted with
stakeholders and politicians.
Contrast now with the cases where the interaction took a different form than in
the aforementioned cases. In Curitiba Mayor Requiao's plan for a public fleet lacked
sufficient interaction with the key stakeholders-the bus companies. Planners were
unable to gather information to determine how to adapt the proposal to the political
and economic reality. The public fleet idea remained unchanged and led to a conflict
between the mayor and the operators in the courts. Ultimately, there was a coalition
against the public fleet idea instead of a coalition of support. The rail proposals in
Curitiba, further, were also planned without sufficient interaction with the bus
companies. As a result, planners did not change sufficiently the rail proposal to adapt
it to the political reality. Namely, that the bus operators had to be part of the new
scheme in a profitable way-something difficult for a rail system. In Bogota, the
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Metrobus project's demise occurred mostly because of lack of interaction with its key
opponents-the bus companies. Metrobus was a project to build a BRT network
started during the Castro administration and continued during Mockus tenure. Absent
any interaction, planners were unable to figure out adaptations to the project, except
for limiting its alignment to routes not used by the existing bus companies. The banks
noticed this lack of adaptation and the resulting opposition to the project. The banks
denied the loans to Metrobus and the project was abandoned.
Finally, because the interaction among actors translates into continuous
adjustments to the original plan, it is important to have flexible proposals. The Director
Plan in Curitiba embedded a high degree of flexibility, which ultimately resulted in the
trinary axes. Transmilenio also embedded a large degree of flexibility. Planners,
politicians, and stakeholders shaped the project through their interaction. But notice
that Transmilenio also had a strong planning team complemented by world-class
consultants. Hence the technical component in Transmilenio was very solid and yet it
did not translate into a loss of flexibility. Further, TransMilenio had in Mayor Peialosa
a politician not willing to cede on many points-for example the need to modernize
and capitalize the existing operators so that they could own and operate the new
articulated buses. Having a strong leader like Pefalosa did not translate either into a
loss of flexibility in the aspects that mattered to the stakeholders-e.g. whether the
bus was low floor or high floor.
Indeed, the cases suggest that BRT projects embed a larger degree of
flexibility than rail projects. The most important item is how BRT is better able to
incorporate the demands of the critical stakeholders, the bus companies, than rail. In
Curitiba and Bogota the old operators became the operators of the BRT buses. BRT
seems able to cover costs and allow a profit that entices the private sector to
participate. Rail projects rarely cover operating costs with the fare they charge. The
margin for involving the existing bus operators is thus minimal. The typical result is a
metro competing against buses, because the metro has no funds to involve the bus
operators. In this regard, plans for Bogota's metro called for the establishment of
feeder routes and the elimination of all competition from buses. But metro planners
interacted very little, if at all, with the bus companies. As seen in Chapter 11, the
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interaction was mostly with national government planners and would-be
concessionaires. The controversy was on how to fund the metro project. The difficulty
in funding the metro added to the metro's inherent inability to cover costs precluded
any interaction with the bus companies. On the contrary, for TransMilenio, as for the
RIT in Curitiba, the critical controversy involved the bus companies. Thanks to BRT's
inherent flexibility, the planning processes benefited from the interaction with the bus
companies. The planning process for the metro lacked this possibility.
In sum, the interaction among planners, politicians, and stakeholders led to
changes to the plans. Original plans were crafted with imperfect information-even if
lots of "rationality" went into crafting them. The interaction among actors during the
window of opportunity provided feedback to all parties involved. Planners discovered
what parts of the original plan were politically infeasible. Planners then found a
solution or change to the plan that satisfied the political constraint. Because planners
interacted also with politicians, they had an idea of the broad objectives of the plan.
Planners therefore knew where they could cede and where they had to look for new
solutions. The tension between what politicians and stakeholders wanted helped the
process get to a result that satisfied collective goals and not individual preferences.
The process, consequently, increased the scope for government action. Planners' role
at adapting a plan in light of the results of the interaction is clearly a technical role.
Contrary to the technical tasks done by planners before the window of opportunity
opens, the role during the window was subject to political constraints. This made the
technical role of planners more interesting and gratifying. Rafael Dely tells with pride
how he figured out the trinary road system-a technical solution to a political
problem-and how the trinary roads allowed Curitiba's Director Plan to proceed to
adoption. Dely even uses this example in his firm's brochure because it shows his
ability to find technical solutions to political problems.15 8 /1589
1588 My finding that plans need to adjust incrementally to become politically feasible stands in contrast
to some authors in planning who seem to argue against allowing plans to adjust. Hall (1981, p. 271-2),
for example, concludes that if the planner "leans over backward to accommodate political behaviour, he
will cease to be a planner, or a decision-maker of any kind; he will be rather like the politician who
never takes initiatives because he is too conscious of all the pressures, and so never achieves political
greatness. The planner is paid to make decisions (or to make strong recommendations to politicians in
favour of decisions)."
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Planners' roles in interacting and reducing risk
If a plan entails too much risk for decision-makers and stakeholders, these actors will
not support the plan. In parallel, a plan promoted by certain politicians and
stakeholders and even planners might be risky for society at large. Any plan tends to
embed high levels of uncertainty and therefore risk. Planners could have crafted plans
using poor data, inappropriate methodology, and/or unrealistic assumptions. Equally
important, as time passes factors exogenous to the plan might change.1590 Planners
and promoters can craft their proposals to reflect their experiences and beliefs, which
can be at odds with those of other actors.15 91 Finally, plan promoters might want to
inflate certain forecasts to make the plan look more attractive.'592 Indeed, vested
interests and myths can be behind the support for plans.1593 For all these reasons
plans embed a high level or risk for politicians, stakeholders, and for society at-large.
Authors such as Hall recommend improving the quality of the forecasts and
evaluation in order to reduce risk and uncertainty. "Planners need to make a more
conscious effort to forecast the world (or rather the alternative possible worlds) in
which the decision may be made and in which the consequences will then be felt."1594
Indeed, the cases suggest that one way planners lowered risk was by having a solid
technical capacity. In TransMilenio, for example the planning team hired a series of
consultants who estimated the demand, the costs of operating the buses, and the
expected financial return of the articulated buses, among others. Further, particularly
in projects that involve private sector participation, there is an advantage to identifying
and analyzing risks early in the planning process.1595 Again from the TransMilenio
case, planners at McKinsey devoted a significant amount of work to studying risk.1596
1589 Altshuler (1965, p. 306-7) argued that the planners he analysed needed precise objectives before
crafting a plan because "no one could effectively interpolate changes into a plan after it was complete
without upsetting its internal harmony."
1590 Flyvbjerg et al. (2003, p. 28-31).
1591 Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999, p. 131).
1592 Flyvbjerg et al. (2003, p. 44-48); Wachs (1990, p.144). See also Bruzelious et al. (2002); and
Pickrell (1992).
1593 See Richmond (1991, 1998, and 2001).
1594 Hall (1980, p. 268).
1595 See Mehndiratta et al. (2000, p. 29). This piece contains an interesting proposal on how to improve
risk management in the transportation planning process.
1596 See McKinsey & Co. (1 999a, 199b, and 2000) for examples throughout these studies on how risk
was taken into account.
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Likewise, for the Bogota metro, to be procured through a concession scheme,
consultants devoted a significant effort at studying risks.1597
Yet while having a solid planning practice helps, it is not enough to lower risk
for participants in the planning process and for society at large. In this regard,
Flyvbjerg et al. argue that the political and government establishment might partner
with business interests to capture the decision making process in favor of a pre-
determined alternative.1 598 "Politics is and should always be based on other input than
expert analyses, but capture by special-interest groups often results in feasibility
studies and other analyses becoming irrelevant in deciding whether or not to go
ahead with a project, and in determining which alternative to build, since special and
not public interest becomes the decisive factor."1 599 Furthermore, in the cases
planners were dealing with a new technology, BRT. If demand estimates for transport
facilities usually embed a high degree of uncertainty, for an unproven technology the
capability for forecast was even more limited. So, while efforts to reduce risk were well
undertaken and possibly effective, there still remained a very wide margin of expected
error to tolerate.
Put differently, even if there is a solid technical side to planning the government
might be captured by special interests that seek disproportionate benefits. Risk
increases for society at large because the allocation of costs and benefits is not
somewhat equitable. As argued in this dissertation, to avoid capture and lead to
government plans that benefit legitimate goals, planning teams ought to be technically
and politically capable and interact with politicians and stakeholders. It is the political
capacity of the team that allows the team to interact with politicians and stakeholders.
The interaction results in feedback that allows planners to adjust the plans in order to
lower risk. At the same time, by interacting, receiving feedback, lowering power
imbalances, and adjusting the plan, the planing team builds space for government
action that leads to a fairer allocation of costs and benefits. In adjusting the plan, risk
goes down for all actors involved. Flyvbjerg et al. agree with this approach when they
1597 See Rothschild & Sons-Loius Berger International-Selfinver (2000); and Rothschild Group (2000).
1598 Authors such as Wachs (1989, 1990, and 1995) also consider this approach incomplete.
1599 Flyvbjerg et al. (2003, p. 88).
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write: "Feedback from participating groups should be actively used in the feasibility
studies and in the decision-making process, including a constructive role for the
groups in defining the major requirements to be taken into account in the technical,
environmental and economic design of possible projects."1 0 /1 60'
Several examples from the cases illustrate these points. In Curitiba, the city
government lacked technical capacity regarding how to estimate the actual costs of
operating buses. A power imbalance emerged and while the operators did not totally
capture the government, they managed to obtain a fare that led to rents-i.e. profits
above normal. Only when the bus user, represented by MAB, participated in the
process, was this imbalance corrected. MAB discovered that the operating costs were
inflated and helped produce knowledge on how to estimate buses' operating costs.
The Requi&o administration used and complemented this knowledge to the point
where it developed the technical capacity to fully understand the cost structure of the
operators. The space for government action increased and risk went down for the
user. Requiao and his planners then came up with the payment per distance logged,
which transferred the demand risk to the city. With a lower risk, the fare could be
lower.
In Bogota, the city government sought to avoid the power imbalance that took
place in Curitiba by demanding bus manufacturers to take an actual BRT bus to
Bogota. The City hired Los Andes University to do a detailed analysis to determine
the costs of operating the buses in the streets of Bogota and at the height above sea
level of the city.1602 The study lowered risk for the would-be investors because they
had a better estimate of actual operating and maintenance costs. At the same time,
risk went down for the city, which had better grounds for estimating the amount to pay
the operators per kilometer logged. Finally, risk also went down for the user, because
the payment per kilometer logged covers fairly operating and capital costs. Yet in
1600 Flyvbjerg et al. (2003, p. 112).
1601 Flyvbjerg et al. (2003, p. 110-123, see also ch. 11 ) offer a way to reduce the risk involved in
undertaking a plan. They advocate for having a planning process that relies on four accountability
mechanisms: transparency, performance specifications, explicit formulation of regulatory regime, and
the involvement of risk capital. The Curitiba and Bogota cases are to a significant extent an empirical
corroboration these arguments on how project planning ought to happen.
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Bogota despite the city paying the operators per distance logged, the contract
assigned the demand risk to the operators. This means that if actual demand
surpasses projected demand, then the operators make an extra profit. In Curitiba, the
city bears the demand risk and hence if ridership decreases--as it is happening16 3 -
the city government has to look for funding to cover the resulting deficit. Risk
allocation in each city, in sum, was the product of technical consideration and of the
interaction among actors who negotiated the terms of the contracts.
Another example of how the interaction and technical capacity lower risk
comes from the original BRT plans in Bogota and Curitiba. These plans entailed a
high risk for the bus companies because of the many changes the plans entailed. By
interacting and negotiating with the bus companies, planners were able to adjust the
plans to lower the risk for the companies. In Curitiba the plans called for the
introduction of a new bus, the creation of a trunk and feeder system, and the
establishment of routes that went into other company's "selective" area. Risk was too
high because of the high investment coupled to the increased competition by
operating beyond each company's "selective" area. To lower risk, planners and bus
companies agreed that the "selective" area principle would prevail-buses from one
company would not operate in other "selective" area. The lower risk helped the
companies agree to the new bus and the trunk and feeder system. In TransMilenio,
Mayor Pefialosa and the planners wanted a high-platform bus, which operators
considered highly risky because these buses could not be sold in the used-bus
market. Low-floor buses, on the other hand, had value. The interaction led to
introducing in the contract a clause stating that the city would pay TransMilenio
operators a minimum of 850,000 km. logged per articulated bus. Thanks to this
clause the resale value of the bus did not matter any more. Risk went down for the
operators. But risk did not go down enough, however, because some would-be
proponents insisted on the low-platform bus. The city then allowed bidders to propose
1602 Bogota is located at 2,600 m. (8,500 ft.) above sea level. Because there is less oxygen, the
combustion of the engines changes. Hence the importance, among others, of carrying out the study.
1603 See Brasileiro (1999, p. 487-8).
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which type of bus they wanted to use. Bidders ended up proposing high-platform
buses-the ones the planners and Mayor Peialosa wanted.
In Curitiba Dely's idea for the trinary road system reduced the number of
property takings by the city. With this change to the Director Plan, risk was lower for
Mayor Lerner and for the communities neighboring the structural axes. In Bogota,
planners went to over 300 hundred public hearings with neighboring communities.
The communities were worried the city would levy a valorization tax (betterment levy)
to finance the construction of TransMilenio. The planners assured the communities
this would never happen. Risk went down for the communities. As risk went down for
the communities in both cities, the communities had less incentive to oppose the plan.
In sum, a solid technical component coupled to the interaction among planners,
politicians, and stakeholders provided information on how to adjust the plan to lower
risk for all actors involved. At the same time, the interaction and the resulting
adjustments achieved a result that benefited collective goals. Finally, if the way to
lower risk is to have a process that involves all relevant actors then the bus user
should also be called to participate in the planning of bus rapid transit systems. In
Bogota, planners consulted with many civil society associations, which supplied
feedback on how to design the bus and the stations. But as argued above, involving
the user is difficult because the user has no organized form for negotiation. As a
result, risk allocation will likely be biased against the user.
Planners' roles in interacting and coalition building
Planners that support a plan during the window of opportunity have the objective, in
general, of seeing the plan adopted. The cases show that while mayors are the
primary decision-makers at the city level other actors participate in the process. The
participation of other actors improves the quality of the plans as argued in the
previous sections but complicates the understanding of how decisions happened.
Further, the cases suggest that tracing when the decision to adopt a plan actually
occurred is difficult. Many times the mayor seemed to adopt an element of a plan but
this decision only triggered more interactions between planners, politicians, and
stakeholders. An example is Lerner's adoption of the trinary road system.
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Construction started soon after. But planners then had to interact with the bus
companies to get the express bus adopted. The situation was similar in TransMilenio
where the construction of the busways was just a component in a complex scheme to
rearrange bus service provision. Similarly, getting approved in the city council a city
law containing a plan or creating the agency in charge of implementing the plan does
not mean either that the plan was adopted. In Curitiba the City Council declared the
Director Plan a city law and enacted the creation of IPPUC. In Bogota the City Council
created TransMilenio Co. But this step only triggered other decisions.
Tracing the actual decision to adopt a plan is therefore difficult.'604 Part of the
complexity is that in the cases planning and implementation were not divorced as
many models of the planning process preach.'605 Instead, the window of opportunity
showed participants that the possibility of actual implementation was real. During the
window of opportunity, planning and implementation were therefore rather intertwined.
The initial interaction led to some initial decisions. These decisions in turn triggered
additional interaction between actors, which in turn led to other decisions and so
on 1606
What seems clear from the cases, however, is that underlying this pattern was
the gradual formation of coalitions in support of the plan or coalitions against it. The
ultimate decisional outcome-whether the plan was adopted or not-is correlated with
the position backed by the strongest coalition. Indeed, getting a plan adopted is not a
matter of rationality but of power.1607 Think of the metro proposal for Bogota backed
by President Samper and during some time by Mayor Pefalosa-two powerful
politicians with lots of "political will." Many planners believed the decision to adopt the
project had taken place. In reality, there was a rather broad coalition supporting the
metro. With the change of administration at the national level, Jaime Ruiz followed a
1604 For the difficulty of understanding and analyzing decision-making see Allison and Zelikow (2001);
and March (1994 and 1988)
1605 These models tend to be linear and consist of stages such as: analyze problem, design alternative
solutions, evaluate the solutions, and decide alternative to adopt. For examples of these models of the
planning process see Meyer and Miller (2001, ch. 2); Thomson (1983, esp. p. 57-78); Gakenheimer
J1995); Dickey (1983, ch. 2); Langmyhr (2001), Dimitriou (1995, ch. 5); Pas (1986); Pas (1995).
606 See Allison and Zelikow (2001, p. 294-313, esp. p. 302-4).
1607 See Flyvbjerg (1998); Feldman and Milch (1982); Luberoff and Altshuler (1996); Altshuler and
Luberoff (2003), among others.
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strategy that assembled a coalition against the metro. The ultimate decision was
eventually the one supported by the most powerful coalition-not undertaking the
metro. The question is therefore not how decisions happened in the cases-a
question that lies beyond the scope of my research. Instead, the question is how did
coalitions get assembled?
My analysis has unveiled two interdependent mechanisms that were
instrumental in assembling coalitions of support both related to the interaction
between participants in the planning process.1 608 First, as planners interacted with
politicians and stakeholders they discovered that these actors could not support the
plan because of some of its aspects. These aspects of the plans tended to hurt
stakeholders' interests. Planners then figured gradual adjustments to the plan bearing
in mind the political reality unveiled by the interaction. As planners introduced these
changes, stakeholders saw that the plan did not hurt their interests. There was no
longer a reason to oppose the plan. In some cases, moreover, the changes led to
plans that benefited stakeholders' interests. These stakeholders now had reasons to
support the new version of the plan. Therefore, as planners interacted with
stakeholders, adjusted the plans according to the resulting feedback, and lowered risk
for all participants, a coalition of support slowly emerged.160 9
A second mechanism to assemble a coalition of support is related to planners'
effort at reducing power imbalances. A politician in office that seems too powerful will
probably alienate parties affected by the plans. These stakeholders will gather forces
to oppose the plan. Likewise, if stakeholders against the plan seem too powerful, then
assembling a coalition of support would be more difficult. The would-be supporters
can fear the political cost of supporting a plan in light of the powerful coalition against.
If planners' mediation is effective, however, then these power imbalances will be
1608 Of course, there are other elements in the course of assembling a coalition of support for a plan.
For example, media campaigns directed at informing and promoting the plan, among others. Notice,
however, that through strong marketing, the public at large can be misled to believing that a plan
benefits legitimate goals when in reality it disproportionately favors private ones.
1609 This conclusion matches the conclusion reached by Luberoff and Altshuler when they analyzed the
planning process for Boston's Center Artery Third Harbor Tunnel (CAT) project. "Advocates of the
various project elements honed their design, essentially testing various configurations and elements
until they arrived at a solution that could generate substantial political support among the traditional
-
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smaller. The politician in office will not seem as powerful. Opponents will not have in
the mayor's power the fuel they need to assemble a coalition against. Opposing
stakeholders that seem less powerful will not prevent supporters from assembling a
coalition of support. Put differently, this second mechanism is related to planners'
work at creating a minimal space for government action. As planners build this space
for action, the resulting plan is seen as legitimate, in part because the plan reflects
collective goals and because the distribution of costs and benefits is somewhat fair.
The public sees no need to oppose a plan with those characteristics and can be
willing to support it.
I have illustrated above sufficiently how the plans in Curitiba and Bogota
changed as a result of the interaction between actors. These changes lowered risk,
mitigated the opposition and contributed to raising support for the plans. There
remains to illustrate the second mechanism for assembling coalitions-resulting also
from the interaction. In the RIT and TransMilenio at the outset most analysts doubted
such projects would be adopted.1 610 This included me during the years I followed the
unfolding of the TransMilenio case.'6 11 For example, I argued that the scale of change
implied by TransMilenio was so vast that bus operators would strongly oppose the
plan. I thought the chances of adoption were slim given the power the bus operators
exhibited in the past. For example when they opposed and eventually helped
terminate the Metrobus BRT project. Other analysts agreed that the impacts on the
existing operators were too large and most likely the operators would use their power
to oppose the plan.1 612
Yet thanks to the process followed the end result was a coalition strong enough
to get the plans adopted. In both cities, as seen, the process entailed a lengthy
interaction between planners, politicians, and stakeholders. The interaction allowed
planners to reduce power imbalances among others as noted above in this chapter. In
Bogota, for example, the mayor and the planners resorted to the "good cop, bad cop
elements of the region's pro-growth coalition while arousing only minimal opposition from
environmental and neighborhood groups." (Luberoff and Altshuler, 1996, p. VI-15).
1610 Acevedo (1998); Rodriguez (1999); and for the Curitiba case see Per6n et al. (1975, p. 32).
1611 See Ardila (1998, p. 52).
161 2 Acevedo (1998); Ceneviva (1990, p. 29).
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strategy." The strategy indicated the CEOs of the bus companies that they would be
better off if they participated in TransMilenio. The bus companies had less power. At
the same time, the planners, the "good cops," were able to reduce the power of the
mayor, by telling the CEOs that provided they cooperated, they would be able to
convince Mayor Peialosa, the "bad cop," of contracting the TransMilenio services
with them. In parallel, the interaction showed planners that the CEOs negotiated
individually but not in the presence of other CEOs.
By lowering the power of both the CEOs and the Mayor, planners facilitated the
assemblage of a coalition of support. The CEOs saw the possibility of adapting the
plans, even if Mayor Peialosa's statements suggested the project lacked flexibility.
Slowly, the CEOs understood the need to join the coalition supporting TransMilenio.
Interestingly, the process was successful even with Miguel Perez and his group of
small owners of buses. Perez opposed the TransMilenio project almost until the
project opened to the public. However, P6rez understood that the survival of the small
owners depended on supporting TransMilenio and joining the coalition of support.
Perez and members of his trade union, Apetrans, are now investors in S102, one of
the operators of the second phase.
In sum, the cases show that the interaction between planners, politicians and
stakeholders helps assemble a coalition of support via two interdependent
mechanisms. The interaction first led to adaptations that lowered risk and that
mitigated negative impacts of the plans. Stakeholders had fewer reasons to oppose
and more to support the amended plan. The interaction also allowed planners to
reduce power imbalances between politicians and stakeholders. A too powerful
stakeholder will prevent the formation of a coalition of support. A too powerful mayor
will motivate stakeholders to created a coalition against the plan. When planners
lower the power imbalances between politicians and stakeholders, the chances of
having a coalition of support increase. Coupled to the adaptations to the plans, the
end result was coalitions of support strong enough to get the projects adopted. At the
same time, the end result was plans that benefited collective goals-and not just the
interests of individual stakeholders or politicians. This outcome showed the public at
large that the plans were legitimate and worth supporting.
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Finally, instrumental in allowing these mechanisms for coalition building to work
was to have flexible proposals. BRT is the alternative adopted in Curitiba and Bogota
because its inherent flexibility allowed planning teams to involve the critical
stakeholders as investors. Further, BRT's flexibility helped planners show that it was a
valid solution to the city's mass transit needs. Specifically, thanks to the technological
innovations in each city, BRT could move as many people as light rail in Curitiba and
as heavy rail in Bogota. But because of the lower cost, BRT could offer a wider
coverage sooner than rail. This argument ensured support from segments of the
public at-large. Rail systems, on the contrary, are rigid. In particular, metros lack the
flexibility to involve bus operators as investors, because their fare barely covers
operating and maintenance costs. And because of their high construction cost, metros
generate opposition from people worried about their financial impact. In Bogota,
moreover, opponents to the metro resorted to increasing the lack of flexibility in order
to minimize the chances of pro-metro planners building a coalition of support. In
effect, the pro-metro coalition was small and had less power than the anti-metro
coalition.
Planners' roles opposing a plan
Some planners in Curitiba and Bogota fought against certain plans, mostly metros
and light rail. These planners believed the plans were not a sound solution or could
even hurt the long-term interests of the city or nation. Planners that oppose a plan,
therefore, play a critical role at helping society make better decisions. Even the pro-
metro planners in Bogota now acknowledge that the correct path was to undertake a
BRT solution and not a metro. The financial conditions of the national government,
and to some extent of Bogota's government, suggest that not adopting the expensive
metro was adequate.
In the cases, planners opposing a project resorted to a series of strategies to
minimize the chances of having the proposal adopted. First, planners sought to
introduce delays in the process. Windows of opportunity do not to last forever.
Therefore, delays can derail a plan. In Bogota, Jorge Acevedo convinced Mayor
Pastrana of requesting and update to the metro study in an attempt to delay President
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Barco's proposal. Jaime Ruiz during Pastrana's presidency forced the metro
procurement into the concession strategy, which required the most extensive and
time-consuming studies. In the mean time, Pelalosa's pet project, TransMilenio,
would be ready (or nearing completion) and the political cost of rejecting the metro
would be lower.
Second, planners in the opposition argued that the plan was not an adequate
solution to the particular problem the promoters claimed the plan addressed. In
Bogota planners put forward the argument that the metro would cater to less than 10
percent of the demand. For planners that supported the metro it was quite compelling
that a single line could transport such a large share of the demand. But planners
opposing the metro reinforced their argument by pointing out that the elevated cost of
the metro left no funds to improve the situation for the remaining 90 percent of the
demand. Planners supporting the metro were never able to counter this part of the
argument. In the end, many actors believed that the metro was not an adequate
solution. Planners supporting the metro might have attempted to increase support for
the metro proposal by emphasizing the city wide benefit of breaking the throttles of
mobility in corridors where the travel demand exceeded the capacity of any other
mode, or the idea that metro had the possibility of rejuvenating the city center to the
benefit of everyone. But such arguments were not forwarded; and it is not clear that
they could, in any case, be proven.
Third, and related, planners opposing a project directed key decision-makers to
alternatives that were better solutions to the problem. This is a basic ploy because
decision-makers need to show that they are doing something to address problems. In
Bogota, Acevedo and Ruiz presented the busway along Caracas Avenue as an
alternative that could be implemented during the short term in office and that could
improve the speed at which buses circulated. In Curitiba, Ceneviva presented the bi-
articulated buses and tube stations as a solution that could perform similar to light rail
but at a much lower cost. Finally, planners, such as Ruiz, opposing the metro
proposal pointed towards TransMilenio as the correct technological choice.
Fourth, planners opposing plans resorted to calls for keeping the proponents
honest. In Bogota, Ruiz and DNP planners forced the metro into the concession
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strategy. Because of the large amount of private equity involved, the concession
strategy demanded high-quality information. Otherwise, risk was too high for the
would-be investor. Pro-metro planners could not resort to other procurement
strategies with a lower total cost. Pro-metro planners could not tell lies either-as it
has happened repeatedly in the history of mega-project planning.1 613 If planners told
lies risk would be too high for investors.1 61 4 Nor did pro-metro planners want to tell
lies-they agreed with anti-metro planners that they wanted the best possible metro
and that they would not repeat Medellin's Metro debacle. As seen, the initial cost
estimate for the Medellin Metro was US$ 655.4 million. By the time of this writing the
cost was above US$ 2.6 billion. At the same time, actual ridership is less than a third
of demand projections.
Finally, planners that oppose a plan built a coalition powerful enough to counter
the coalition that supports the plan. As said, the adoption of a plan is a matter of
power and not of rationality. Too many plans and projects have been adopted-the
Medellin metro comes to mind16 1 5-because of powerful coalitions that are able to
push forward a plan, keep it unchanged in spite of stakeholders' requests, and crush
any opposition. Probably by introducing delays in the process, arguing that the plan is
not an adequate solution, proposing alternative solutions, and making the proponents
accountable, planners can begin weakening any powerful coalition of support.161 6 My
analysis of the cases, moreover, reveals that as long as there is a minimal democracy
that allows actors to participate in the process these strategies are feasible.1617 As
Altshuler and Luberoff found for mega-project planning in the U.S., "while business
has a near monopoly in organizing support for development proposals, the potential to
1613 See Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl (2002); and Flyvbjerg et al. (2003, esp. ch. 2).
1614 See Flyvbjerg et al. (2003, ch. 10 and 11) for an argument of why bringing in the private sector
leads to accountability in mega-project planning.
1615 See Acevedo et al. (1993) and CGR (1994).
1616 For examples of similar cases of planners opposing plans they consider bad for society see
Flyvbjerg (1998, 2002, and 2003).
16 7 My analysis can be interpreted as a call for more democracy. I am troubled by Scott and Fainstein's
(2003, p. 1) assertion that the fundamental question of planning theory is the following: 'What role can
planning play in developing the good city and region within the constraints of a capitalist political
economy and a democratic political system?" For me, instead of constraints, the question should read
opportunities, for it is democratic opportunities, enhanced by a capitalist setting (see Friedman, 1962)
that allow planners, politicians, and stakeholders to participate in the planning process and interact.
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derail proposals is far more diffused. Neighborhood, environmental, ethnic,
preservationist, and other interests with little or no capacity to mobilize support
coalitions can, if aroused, generally block or modify initiatives that threaten them."' 618
Politically and technically capable planning teams
If planners' main role in the planning process is to interact with politicians and
stakeholders, then planning teams have to be politically capable. But to arrive at
adopted plans that benefit legitimate goals, planning teams also need a high level of
technical capacity. Political capacity allows teams to interact with other participants in
the process. This interaction provides feedback that leads to adjustments to the plans.
Absent a solid technical foundation, the interaction leads to capture by powerful
vested interests. The plan no longer benefits legitimate interests; instead it favors
disproportionately a few private ones. In both Curitiba and Bogota there were planning
teams that were politically and technically capable. That planning teams have to have
political capacity does not at all reject the value of planning work that proceeds from
stable normative commitment in the planning problem. On the contrary, it takes both
political and technical capacity to form a team that is able to face the political and
technical requirements it faces in the planning process.
As argued in the introduction, political planners provide the political capacity in
the planning team. Political planners tend to like the contact with people and tend to
be good at lobbying and negotiating. They are skeptical about the ability of
information alone to influence. Political planners tend to see the value of receiving
input from a wide variety of actors and are thus able to mold planning proposals to
meet multiple requirements and to explain them favorably to stakeholders. Political
planners act from a focus on political and interest-based positions. These traits allow
political planners to interact with stakeholders and politicians. The planning teams in
Curitiba and Bogota had many political planners. In Curitiba, Carlos Ceneviva, Rafael
Dely, Euclides Rovani, Francisca Rischbieter, Karlos Rischbieter, and Dilcia Auriquio
in Lerner's camp, and St6nio Sales and Garrone Reck, among others, in Requido's
camp are examples of "political" planners. Notice that these planners also had a solid
1618 Altshuler and Luberoff (2003, p. 261).
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technical capacity. Countless other planners provided the technical capacity in the
team.
In Bogota, similarly, the planning teams for the Caracas Avenue busway had
political planners, such as Jorge Acevedo, Fabio Regueros, and Jaime Ruiz in the
upper echelons of the team. On the more technical part of the team, planners such as
Liliana Lyons, Nelson Galeano, and Libardo Serrano, among others also showed
political capacity. This capacity allowed these planners to interact with the bus
operators. Finally, TransMilenio's planning team exemplifies very well what I mean by
a politically and technically capable planning. Peialosa appointed de Guzman, a
political planner, to head Transmilenio's planning team. De Guzman was aware of the
political and technical requirements of planning Transmilenio. As the process
advanced, de Guzman reinforced the planning team by bringing in planners proficient
in the areas the process required, such as a lobbyist, a trained negotiator, and an
expert in public communications, among others. De Guzm.n's planning team was
complemented by a high level of technical capacity both from planners within the
team and a broad arrange of top-level consultants (more on consultant's role
below). 1 6 19
Among the political planners in the planning team, one or more became project
champions, which is essentially a leadership role. While the city mayors, Lerner and
Pefalosa, played the role of project champion, they did not have the necessary time
to tend to all the demands of planning a mega-project. Consequently, some members
of the planning team had to play the role of project champion as well.1620 Examples of
project champions at the planning team level are Carlos Ceneviva and Rafael Dely in
Curitiba, and Ignacio de Guzman, Jaime Ruiz, and Jorge Acevedo in Bogota. The
1619 Dickey (1983, p. 385-6) has a similar argument. Dickey argues that transportation planners need to
bring two types of expertise to the process. First, technical knowledge and skills, and second ""process
skills,"--listening, communication, and facilitating understanding and agreement." Dickey (p. 386) also
argues that the planners "should tailor the participation aspects of the planning process to the
situation." Dickey's comments are in the context of comprehensive transportation planning. My results
suggest, as those of previous analysts (Altshuler, 1965), that comprehensive plans cannot elicit the
participation by actors that is needed to provide planners with the feedback they need to adjust the
plan. Only when specific projects enter the political agenda of the city during a window of opportunity
will people respond to the plan. Hence the importance of having flexible plans.
1620 For examples of the importance of the project champion see Meakin (2002); Luberoff and Altshuler
(1996); Doig (1995) and Richmond (1991 and 1998).
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project champions in the cases seemed to have some or all of the following traits.
First, the project champion was able to understand basic aspects of planning,
engineering, law, public finance, and certainly political and social factors.6 21 Second,
the project champion led the planning team into interacting with other participants in
the process. Third, the project champion convinced the technical side of the team that
adapting the proposal was necessary in light of the political reality unveiled by the
interaction. Fourth, the project champion had access to critical politicians in office to
discuss the results of the interaction with stakeholders and obtain feedback. Fifth, the
project champion together with the mayor motivated the team even by creating a myth
around the plan at hand.
Finally, the cases suggest that politically and technically capable planning
teams seem to facilitate and enhance the roles of consultants. The reason was that
the planning teams interacted with stakeholders and politicians in an environment of
quite well defined planning objectives. The interaction yielded feedback. Because the
team also interacted with the consultants, the consultants work was politically realistic.
Consultants' work did not take place in a political vacuum. Again the main example
comes from TransMilenio, where several first-class consulting firms were involved.
The existence of a planning team willing to interact with stakeholders and politicians
supplied the consultants with political feedback on their proposals. Consultant's
advice was therefore more realistic and tightly suited to the client's objectives-to get
TransMilenio implemented before Pehalosa's term was over.1 622 The feedback
resulting from the interaction served to detect areas where the plans needed
adjustment. The planning and the consultants discussed any adjustment and figured
out the technical solution to the political problem.
1621 Ardila and Salvucci (2001, p. 117-118).
1622 Pearlstein (2004) argues that "corporations have recently grown weary of paying millions of dollars
for brilliant strategic reports that, in the end, could not be implemented." Pearlstein argues that one
cause is that consultants are not involved with the implementation of their recommendations. As seen,
one of my arguments is that this involvement will bring realism to consultants' recommendations and
hence improve the quality of their work as the TransMilenio case suggests.
-
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The importance of politicians in the planning process
In my discussion of the roles of planners in the planning process, politicians have
emerged repeatedly. Some might argue that the appearance of politicians in the
analysis is because the cases are located in a strong-executive political context and
because the mayors had particularly strong confidence in a planning process. In a
strong executive context, mayors have more formal power than in other types of
democracy. If this were true, then all mayors would have played similar roles, but this
was not the case. In Curitiba, Mayor Lerner and Mayor Requido differed in the way
they allowed their planning teams to interact with stakeholders and mediate. In
Bogota, Mayor Castro did not seem to have encouraged much the interaction with
other actors of the Metrobes planning team. Mayor Mockus strongly believed in
planning services, but his energy went mostly into stopping a poor plan for a metro
line rather than quickly advancing an alternative-the busway on 80th street, for
example. Mockus' strong belief in rational input before he makes a decision seems to
preclude planners from interacting after he makes the decision. Planners seem to
miss the benefits of the interaction. Mayor Peialosa, like Mockus, believes in planning
services. Pehalosa, however, had a pre-determined alternative-TransMilenio-that
his planners were to define and implement before his term in office was over. Lerner
in Curitiba had a similar urgency to see projects implemented. Lerner and Peialosa
offer, therefore, an example of the role of a politician in the planning process-
independent, probably, of the "strong executive" context.
Lerner and Pehalosa share several views on the planning process, the roles of
planners and the roles of politicians. These views facilitated planners' work. Both
leaders believe that there is a political side to planning parallel to a technical side. For
Lerner and Peialosa politics and planning are integrated and decisions are ultimately
political and not technical, as it should be in any democratic setting. Second, both are
aware of the criticality of time in the planning process. The window of opportunity their
appointment and/or election opened did not last forever. Hence their urgency to show
results and their willingness to take a pre-crafted solution and put it forward for
discussion during the window of opportunity. Third, Lerner and Peialosa share the
belief that as a result of politics a proposal might change in the path to adoption.
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Fourth, and related, both are aware of the importance of interacting with the planning
teams. In the end, the objectives that mattered in the processes were the ones the
mayor's had. By being aware of where they wanted to get to, Lerner and Penalosa
offered planners a useful benchmark against which to compare stakeholders'
demands for changes to the plans.1 623
All these characteristics facilitate planners' work. First, Lerner and Peialosa
are aware of the importance of assembling capable planning teams. If planning has a
political side, then the team has to be politically capable. But both recognize
planning's technical side. As Peialosa told me: "we brought the best consultants in
the world to help plan TransMilenio." Second, both leaders allowed their planning
teams to interact with stakeholders and both met periodically with the teams. Hence
planners could fulfill their main role during the window of opportunity-to interact with
politicians and stakeholders. Third, Lerner and Pehalosa's view on planning and
politics bring closer otherwise lose terms such as planning, implementation, and
decision making. The pressure to implement the plan makes planning more realistic
and forces planners to interact.
In sum, Lerner and Peialosa's views allow planning teams to interact. The
interaction allows planners to mediate between politicians and stakeholders. By
mediating, planners opened a space for government action and plans therefore
reflected legitimate goals and not individual ones. The interaction also allowed
planners to gradually shape the plans, lower risk to all parties involved, and build a
coalition of support. Put differently, the power these mayors had to get their pet plans
adopted did not come only from "political will" and being good leaders in a "strong-
executive" setting. Rather, the power that allowed them to implement the Director
Plan in Curitiba and TransMilenio in Bogota came from the space for government
action that the planning teams helped build. And power is what matters in order to get
a plan adopted-certainly much more than "political will" on its own.
1623 Lerner offers an additional example to planners. Lerner was originally a planner. Lerner, however,
entered politics in order to see the plans he favored adopted.
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